



## Analysis

# Security of the spectacle The EU's guidelines for security at major events

## Introduction

As major sport, political and cultural events have become increasingly international a corresponding need has been identified for greater levels of international police and security cooperation in order to ensure their smooth running. Since the late 1990s this has been formalised at EU level by numerous initiatives, [1] including various 'handbooks' that seek to provide "guidelines and inspiration" for law enforcement authorities. [2] These provide frameworks for law enforcement policy and practice during major events, with regard to general security preparations as well as more specialised counter-terrorist and public order work. In the context of a worldwide economic boom for the security industry, the guidelines can also be seen as playing a role in encouraging the purchase, installation and use of both new and more traditional technologies by police and security forces.

A new set of guidelines published by the EU in late 2011 make up part of this work, set out in the document *Protection of mass sports events with an international dimension from terrorist attacks* (hereafter the new Annex or the guidelines). These are an attempt to encourage uniformity in the approach of authorities to securing major events – an effort that may lead to a high level of safety, but, judging by certain aspects of the guidelines, could also lead to severe limitations of democratic rights and civil liberties, and provide a basis for invasive and intensive policing.

The guidelines are also used – to an extent – to encourage use of EU institutions for security preparations, particularly with regard to information gathering and exchange. In this respect they can be seen as one way to try and strengthen the position of the EU as an authority to which Member States should look to for expertise and assistance, overcoming traditional bilateral relationships. Alongside the development of the guidelines in the Council, funding for Member States hosting major events – demonstrated by various examples from Poland's co-hosting of the Euro 2012 football championships – also makes clear the increasing interest of the Commission in this area. Finally, the guidelines also provide a clear example of how cooperation between the police forces of EU Member States can lead to the creation of "best practice" documents with no democratic input whatsoever.

## Development of the guidelines

The Handbook and its new Annex were drawn up in working parties of the Council on the basis of responses from Member States' police and security agencies, and are not subject to any form of public or parliamentary scrutiny. The 2007 Handbook was initially to be drafted by the Council's Police Cooperation Working Party and the Terrorism Working Party (TWP), with the Police Chief Tasks Force given the job of examination and approval. However, it

seems that the Police Cooperation Working Party delegated its role to “an expert group” [3] made up of unknown persons.

The TWP was also involved in the drafting of the new guidelines, following the announcement on 1 June of the incoming Polish Presidency’s (July-December 2011) main priorities for the group. [4] Delegations to the TWP were invited to return a questionnaire on the issue of security at mass sports events. According to the guidelines, 24 Member States responded to this, although the responses of only 19 of those states have been made partially publically accessible, following requests by *Statewatch*. Those 19 states that responded (and the institutions, where known) were Austria; Belgium; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark (Ministry of Justice); Estonia; Greece (International Police Cooperation Division, Hellenic Police Headquarters, Ministry of Citizen Protection); Finland; France; Hungary; Italy; Lithuania; Luxembourg (*Direction Générale de la Police*); Latvia; Netherlands; Portugal; Romania; Slovenia; and the United Kingdom. A compilation of responses is contained in the Annex.

Further drafts then bounced back and forth between the TWP and the Law Enforcement Working Party (itself a successor to the Police Cooperation Working Party) from July 2011, until submission to COREPER (the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Member States) on 7 December 2011, when the document was approved.

The lack of transparency in the preparation of documents intended to have a significant impact upon Member State law enforcement policy and practice runs counter to the provisions on “democratic principles” in the Lisbon Treaty, of which Article 10(3) states that “decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen.” Decision-making by unaccountable, unnamed officials is of course not a new development in the EU; this is merely one instance amongst many.

### **Using “all means available” to draw up threat assessments**

The guidance begins with the suggestion that Member States require a “coordinating project group (e.g. task force, central coordination contact point) consisting of all competent national authorities” for organising security measures. A counter-terrorist unit, either within or without the group, should be established, and if a Member State has a permanent counter-terrorism centre, it should undertake this work. According to the guidelines, ten of the Member States that responded to the questionnaire already have permanent counter-terrorism centres, although it is not clear from the answers made public which states these are. It is possible to identify Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania and the UK. Poland, whose response to the questionnaire has not been made public, set up a new centralised police command centre for the country’s most recent major event, Euro 2012, in the city of Legionowo.

Whether the authorities make use of a permanent counter-terrorism centre or not, “it is of paramount importance to collect and streamline all pertinent information into a single spot.” Drawing all “pertinent information” into one place intended to make it easier to draw up a “special terrorist threat assessment”, which can either be part of “the general security assessment,” or “exist as a separate evaluation.” In drawing up this assessment, the authorities should use “all means available” (a statement that does not come with a qualifying “within the law”) and “should also include information provided by other Member State and EU competent bodies.” Member State and EU authorities should also be proactive in providing information to the Member State hosting a major event, by reporting “any credible, assessed information on potential terrorist threats related to the event.”

Responses to the questionnaire show a bewildering array of policing and security services in countries across Europe that may hold information considered relevant: the Greek response

notes fourteen different institutions and agencies which were responsible during the 2004 Athens Olympics for providing “information on priorities concerning: Internal and international terrorism; Organised and common crime; Social, political, religious and other movements; Natural disasters and accidents.”

A similarly wide scope can be seen in the EU guidelines, which suggest that information collected by Member States hosting major events should cover terrorist groups, lone wolves, extremists “known to competent national authorities, intending to conduct an attack during the event,” terrorists “having financial, logistical and technical ability to conduct an attack using CBRN [Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear] materials,” “groups of radically-oriented individuals pretending to be sports fans,” and “other groups, organisations and individuals potentially ready to resort to terrorism and take advantage of the event in order to present their ideologies.”

The guidelines strongly recommend the involvement in this process of local authorities, which:

“Could play a crucial role in the strategic planning as they are ‘closest’ to the competition venues and thus possess the broadest knowledge of local conditions and specificities as well as of neighbouring communities – their problems, tendencies, attitude, outlook on life etc. All these pieces of information are essential for an assessment of the terrorist threats posed by individuals or groups from local communities.”

There are a number of problems with these recommendations. No definition or guidance is offered as to how authorities should interpret the terms “radical” or “extremist”, leaving authorities significant leeway to apply their own ideas. Groups of “radically-oriented individuals” may simply *be* sports fans. What happens if an anarchist wants to watch a football match? Similarly, the term “potentially ready” is vague, and open to varying interpretations.

Further issues arise with the suggestion that those who resort to terrorism do so “to present their ideologies.” A terrorist attack is not an example of a group or an individual “presenting their ideology” – generally speaking, terrorist attacks tend to involve murder and destruction. Protests, however, frequently are geared towards a group or individual presenting their ideology, an activity which should, in theory, be protected by legal provisions on freedom of association and expression. Major events, however, often provide a situation in which it is deemed justifiable to invoke more stringent restrictions than usual upon those rights. In the run-up to the London Olympics, for example, the authorities apparently considered “peaceful protests – along with terrorism – as one of the biggest threats,” and political campaigning within and surrounding Olympic arenas was explicitly banned. [5] Despite making reference to human rights law in the opening paragraphs of the guidelines, there is no reiteration of these principles in relevant parts of the document.

Furthermore, the invitation to counter-terrorism centres or coordinating units to Hoover up as much information as possible on a wide range of individuals and groups gives police and security services the opportunity to treat major events as an information-gathering exercise for purposes beyond the event itself. The UK’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, responsible for analysis of information and intelligence and for “setting the threat level from international terrorism” [6] is run by MI5 and subject to the provisions of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, giving it an extensive remit:

“The functions of the Intelligence Service shall be exercisable only – (a) in the interests of national security, with particular reference to the defence and foreign policies of Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom; or (b) in the interests of the economic well-being of the UK; or (c) in support of the prevention or detection of serious crime.” [7]

## Accreditation centres: screening on a mass scale

Extensive amounts of information are also gathered and utilised in the run-up to major events through the demand for every person working at or attending an event to be “accredited” by the authorities. For Euro 2012, the police’s new Legionowo complex was responsible not just for police command and control operations, but also for undertaking screening and background checks on every single person applying for jobs, tickets, or engaged in any other role through which they may enter a stadium during the tournament. The Panoptykon Foundation, a Polish NGO concerned with surveillance measures, [8] told Statewatch that the checks will take place from the perspective of “potential risk to safety and public order,” and the police will subsequently present UEFA staff with a “confidential opinion about each person” based on the results. This opinion will be:

“Based on information stored in databases operated by the police or other data sets made available to the police. Under this procedure, UEFA can refuse accreditation... to specific people without justify its decision. What is more, their decision can’t be appealed.”

For the London Olympics, more than 380,000 people due to access venues for official or work purposes required accreditation, a process that involved “proportionate but stringent checks” including “immigration, criminal record and security checks, to determine each applicant’s suitability for accreditation.” The grounds for refusing accreditation included the belief of the Home Office that “an individual’s presence at the Games (or in the UK) would not be conducive to the public good.” [9]

Despite the guidelines opening with references to the need for legality, proportionality and the protection of human rights, statements that encourage the mass collection and collation of information and that equate protests with terrorism do not seem to have explicitly taken this into account.

## Thousands of euros in funding for counter-terrorism preparations

In the run-up to Euro 2012, the European Commission provided over half a million euros for projects involving the Polish authorities related to the safety of mass events. One such project received €470,796, was entitled “Terrorism-Police-Safety-Euro 2012” and involved Germany, Lithuania, Spain and Poland. Another had the bizarre title of “Save mass events in EU agglomerations: Police activities in preventing and fighting against crimes related to it”, and received €86,436 from the Commission.

The only project about which any detail is known was provided with €80,000 and was entitled “Counter-terrorist activities during international sports events – the role of national counter-terrorist centres”. State agencies from five EU Member States were involved: Germany’s *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the domestic intelligence agency); Lithuania’s intelligence agency, *Valstybės saugumo departamentas*; Poland’s *Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego* (Internal Security Agency); the *Serviciul Român de Informații* or Romanian Intelligence Service; and the National Counter-Terrorism Security Office from the UK. Observers came from Austria, the German federal police (*Bundeskriminalamt*); France; Europol; the USA (FBI); Ukraine; and Slovakia. A number of other Polish government agencies worked in cooperation with the Internal Security Agency.

An overview of the project was presented to the EU's Working Party on Terrorism in July 2011. The project aims included:

- The development of cross-border operational cooperation
- Enhancing interoperability during and after the attack
- Enhancement and support of the development of safety standards
- Exchange of know-how and experiences in the sphere of population and critical infrastructures

In October 2010, a counter-terrorist exercise – named “Offside 2010” – were held in Poland, based on a scenario in which “citizens of a fictitious country” who were planning to bomb a football stadium ended up taking football fans hostage on a train, while their associates conducted a cyberattack against a television station. The conclusions provided by the Polish delegation to the Working Party on Terrorism appear to indicate that during the exercise, a central counter-terrorism centre assisted with “shortening the decision making process”; “enhancing the effectiveness of services and institutions operating at the site”; “increasing the effectiveness of services’ cooperation”; and “enhancing communication amongst services and institutions.”

The EU's €80,000 also paid for four two-day conferences held in four different cities in March 2011, involving some “400 representatives of local and national administration” and “secret services and law enforcement agencies.” A further two-day conference held in May in Warsaw was made up of “around 120 persons – representatives of Polish services,” along with representatives of EU institutions and counter-terrorism coordination units from Lithuania, Romania, Germany, Ukraine, Greece and Hungary.

### **Critical infrastructure and “soft targets”**

It is not just the venues at which major events are to be held that are perceived to be potentially subject to “threats”. The guidelines also offer advice on the monitoring and protection of critical infrastructure and “soft targets”, which include “public venues, fan zones, public viewing areas, squares, traffic and evacuation routes, [and] means of public transport.” They are “highly exposed to diverse risks and unlawful acts, including terrorist attacks.” Thus, “monitoring of these soft targets, alongside the monitoring of the competition venues, should be considered as one of the main preventative and security measures.” This should be part of a plan in which “the area surrounding sports venues” is split into “special security zones”, according to the “general rule” that “the closer to the sports venue the tighter security measures are implemented.”

The preparations for the Euro 2012 football tournament in Poland provide ample evidence of the introduction of new technologies in order to secure areas around venues. Prior to the tournament, the Panoptykon Foundation recounted to Statewatch some of the ways in which surveillance and security facilities were being ramped up:

“All stadiums and so-called fan zones are to be fenced. For example, the main fan zone in Warsaw (located right in the city centre) will cover the area of approximately 120,000 m<sup>2</sup> [and] will be fenced and constantly protected by more than 1000 security guards... The cost of this investment amounts to 35 million PLN [Polish zloty, around £6.4 million or €8 million].”

According to the Panoptykon Foundation, in order to construct the fan zone “Warsaw city council had to cut the budget for culture.” Expenditure did not just go on fencing and security guards, however:

“More CCTV cameras are (or soon will be) installed in the public transport system and in the public space. It seems like all surveillance technologies that are normally use in [have been]

'intensified' in the run-up to Euro 2012. We have already noted a massive increase in the use of CCTV across Poland over [the] last three years and the tournament is often used as an excuse to modernise existing systems or add new ones."

Figures provided for surveillance cameras within some of the stadiums are also worth noting: 900 were installed in Warsaw; 673 in Poznań; 553 in Wrocław; and 500 in Gdansk.

All of this new technology of course provides ample work for the security industry. UK Trade & Investment, the UK government's promotional wing for exports (particularly for security and defence firms) [10] noted in a 2011 briefing on Poland:

"[G]ood prospects for the security sector in [Poland] and those related to Euro 2012 in particular.... Euro 2012 related opportunities in the security sector encompass:

1. Antiterrorist security systems for stadia and their surroundings (...)
2. Integrated crowd control system.
3. Audio-visual recording of crowd behaviour (...)
4. Training for stewards (...)
6. CCTV systems for public institutions and municipalities.
7. Vehicle and people recognition systems." [11]

Furthermore:

"Some of the largest cities, Euro 2012 host cities in particular, are investing in urban security by enhancing their CCTV networks installed in streets and on trams, buses and metro line in Warsaw. There is a trend for intelligent cameras, i.e. recognising specific actions. As an example, Warsaw plans to invest over €2m in developing its CCTV network in the nearest future." [12]

For some Member States, following the guidelines with regard to soft targets would require a significant change in practice – the Netherlands, for example, put "no special focus on critical infrastructures" when it hosted the Euro 2000 football tournament. In contrast, the UK government, for the Olympics, defined what critical infrastructure was through a series of "agreed criteria" and a "process implemented which defines the size of impact and disruption to the Games," following "each concrete case of threat assessment," and is estimated to have hundreds of millions of pounds on security measures.

The changes brought about by security preparations for major events are not temporary, and can provide the authorities with greater surveillance and repressive powers long after the event itself has passed. An automatic number-plate recognition (ANPR) system introduced in Newham, one of London's five 'Olympic boroughs', seems likely to stay in place after the Games. Papers from a Council meeting held before the Olympics began state that the London Organised Committee for the Olympic Games "has indicated that after the games they would be willing to negotiate with Newham regarding the sale of their ANPR vehicles." These are cars mounted with cameras and number-plate recognition software which will be used to enforce parking restrictions. Access to the central Driver and Vehicle Licencing Agency (DVLA) database was also hoped for: "Newham and other London Authorities will continue to lobby to have direct access to the DVLA database to assist with improved efficiencies in administering parking permits." Even without access to the central database, "it is the intention of Newham to roll out its own virtual permit system... ANPR would be used to automatically recognise vehicles parked without a valid permit." [13]

Surveillance and control technologies introduced at major events are frequently unwelcome before, during and after events. One deeply unpopular move undertaken by the Greek government for the Athens Olympics – an event which had "authoritarian effects over the hard-won rights and liberties of the Greek people" [14] – was the installation of over 1,200

CCTV systems including speech-recognition software that could transcribe speech into digital text “that was then searched for suspicious patterns along with other electronic communications entering and leaving the area.” Although the system never worked as a cohesive whole, as intended, parts of it were after the Olympics used for monitoring political rallies and demonstrations “all over the Athens metropolitan area.” Resistance to this system has included:

“Blinding the cameras with black hoods, ripping off their cables, spray painting the CCTV lenses, knocking down the CCTV poles, arson, and so on. Not only young radicals but also mayors and union leaders have blinded police CCTV cameras.” [15]

The importance given to soft targets by authorities across the EU was recently reinforced with the adoption of Council Conclusions “on the protection of soft targets from terrorist activities” in October 2012. Amongst other things, these invite the Member States to “establish national capacity in order to be able to carry out terrorist threat assessment for domestic purposes,” to “share best practices on soft target-protection with other Member States whenever appropriate, possibly supported by the EU by organising for example workshops,” and to “provide protection of soft targets based on, and proportionate to, risk and threat assessments.” [16]

### **Worst-case scenarios**

Some of the most invasive measures suggested by the guidelines come in the context of potential worst-case scenarios involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) threats:

“Awareness of these kinds of threats and diligent planning is fundamental to effective counter-terrorism protection of the event. Hence, CBRN threats should be properly emphasised in the terrorist threat assessment, risk analysis and counter-terrorism strategy for the event.”

An array of techniques and technologies are proposed to help in detecting CBRN materials: metal detectors; CBRN detectors; x-ray scanners; decontamination equipment; monitoring cameras; search, screening and checking procedures; canine corps; fencing.” There should be “continuous monitoring of the venues and vigilant searches for suspicious items, abandoned bags, packages devices or parcels should be carried out.” Plain-clothes CBRN specialists should mix with the crowds whilst undertaking their work “without arising suspicion or panic behaviours.”

Once again, the requirement of proportionality noted in the opening paragraphs of the guidelines seems to have been cast aside. Preparing for eventualities such as a nuclear attack is of course to some degree required for any state, but the situations in which it is considered necessary is highly dependent on how risk is assessed. Since 2000, according to the academic Stephen Graham, “historical ideas of proportionality” in such assessment have “basically been abandoned,” leading to models in which “all... threats are equally valid.” Putting forth the image of being able to deal with the numerous different threat scenarios put forward by event planners helps states to “demonstrate the awesome power, and elite status of the host city or state in the wider world.” [17]

Not all states participate in this grandstanding, at least according to their responses to the questionnaire. In response to the question “Have you used special procedures, technical equipment or other precautionary measures (e.g. canine corps) to prevent spectators from bringing CBRN materials to sports venues?” the Netherlands delegation simply answered “No.” Other states are more enthusiastic in their responses.

It is also interesting to refer again to UKTI's notes on preparations for Euro 2012:

"Although Poland has never been the target of terrorist attacks and therefore, terrorism is a low profile issue for the Polish government, it addresses all related threats co-operating with relevant European counter-terrorist institutions. Having said that, Polish stadia hosting Euro 2012 football championships will be protected against nuclear terrorist attack." [18]

The academic Stuart Price argues in a recent book that governments and corporations have increasingly embraced and further developed a paradigm that deems it "essential to prepare for the *worst* eventuality." By proposing horrifying potential futures – for example, "nuclear terrorist attack" – it becomes easier for contemporary authorities to justify, reinforce and secure their current and future practices and existence. [19] A document prepared by the Polish Presidency of the EU on general crisis management policy has a strong scent of fatalism about it: "Poland and neighbouring countries need to be prepared for an increasing number of incidents, including terrorist attacks, connected with large-scale public events." [20] This mindset – not dissimilar to that of military planners during the Cold War – seems to suggest that the only way to deal with such threats is through increased security measures and well-rehearsed contingency plans.

#### **Technical support from the Commission to Polish authorities for CBRN detection**

"As teams prepare to go out on the pitch," wrote the Commission's press office in early June, "the Commission is working with the Polish authorities to ensure a safe Euro 2012 football championship." The press release announced support from the Commission's Directorate-General for Home Affairs for the Polish authorities through the provision of:

"Technical support and guidance to the Polish police and border guards in training and developing the methodology for the use of mobile chemical and bio detection equipment to scan for explosives and terror weaponry at Polish stadiums and airports." [21]

According to a spokesperson for the Commission, this work was "supplemental" to that already undertaken by the Polish authorities and UEFA, and was being "carried out as part of the implementation of the EU CBRN Action Plan adopted in 2009," with equipment "calibrated to detect the substances listed on the High Risk List for both Chemical, Biological threats. The other types of portable equipment can also detect certain precursors and wide range of explosives."

The Commission's support was also aimed at "broadening the use of different technology in the field of improving public security," and the accompanying press release stated that "the Commission is expected to launch more practical trials of detection equipment in other areas of public security during the autumn of 2012 and the spring of 2013." Pressed on this point, the Commission refused to say who would be receiving support in the future – merely that several volunteer organisations and Member States have showed interest."

The equipment itself came in the form of handheld scanners, purchased by the Commission from the firm Morpho Detection and supplied to the Polish authorities, to be used as a follow-up to "alarms caused by the walk-through metal detectors or for other reasons." The Commission's spokesperson stated the aim of allowing the authorities "to carry out such checks without producing negative results on processing the flow of spectators."

Responding to a question on how many officials had received training as part of the program, the Commission said that while over 30 officers participated in the initial training sessions, "more than 300 officers have received similar training on other types of mobile detection equipment."



When asked how much the assistance cost and from which funding stream the money came, the Commission stated that it “provided technical assistance and not funding as such. The associated costs were rather limited and the equipment was indeed provided at no cost.” The price the Commission paid for the equipment in the first place remains unknown.

## Foreign friends

One concern of the guidelines is to encourage cooperation between the host Member State and the authorities of other Member States, as well as with EU institutions. This is frequently with regard to information-gathering – “the sum of fragmentary information from different partners gives a clearer picture of the overall terrorist threat” – but is also geared towards providing a learning experience, by encouraging observers from the authorities of different Member States to attend the event in question. In this way, “best practice” can be disseminated and a more uniform approach to security at major events can be developed.

For Euro 2012, Polish police forces were “supported by units from 17 European countries,” according to the Panoptikon Foundation. Foreign police officers (“spotters”) accompanied their national teams, in order to support the Polish police and “to detect potential dangers stemming from specific circumstances, e.g. identifying people who may be dangerous on the basis of their past record in a given country.” 18 officers from foreign forces were also deployed at the central command centre in Legionowo.

Border controls were also reintroduced for the tournament, with over 29,000 people subject to checks between 4th June and 1st July. A significant amount of work was coordinated by Frontex, who were responsible for a joint operation in which 130 officers from 23 EU Member States were “deployed on the Polish-Ukrainian border to assist with border checks and border surveillance. Frontex also invited border guards from Ukraine, Russia and Croatia as observers, a status allowing them to “support the Polish border authorities during examination of travel documents, assist local officers with their language skills, and facilitate information exchange between participating Member States and Ukraine.” [22]

A number of Member States, in responding to the questionnaire, note the importance of EU institutions: Europol information exchange channels are noted by Greece, Finland, Lithuania and Latvia, while Portugal states that its international cooperation during major events is based on “recommendations and practices approved by the European Union”, with the EU’s football handbook providing “guidance for the model adopted during the Euro 2004 tournament.” Latvia notes that an “officer of Europol was present during event on stand-by capacity” during the 2006 ice hockey championships, while Europol even provided “its own threat assessment” for Finland when it hosted a world athletics competition in 2005. According to a representative of Europol, the agency’s activities at major events are “tailor-made and usually involve the dispatch of a mobile office with direct access to counter-terrorism databases.” [23] Greece and Lithuania also note cooperation with Interpol, who were also present in Poland and Ukraine during Euro 2012, providing Interpol Major Events Support Teams (IMESTs), the aim of which is to assist local forces by transferring messages and materials: fingerprints, descriptions, data and documents.

What becomes clear from looking at the answers to the questionnaire is the vast number of police, security and other law enforcement agencies across EU Member States that play a role in the cross-continental exchange of information. Ongoing efforts to try and achieve “better coherence and consolidation in the area of information exchange”, currently being undertaken as part of the development of a European Information Exchange Model, [24] may encounter significant obstacles with EU institutions attempting to simplify what is in reality a diverse and messy picture. There is also a significant risk that in attempting to ensure that Member States’ law enforcement authorities are able to access any information deemed necessary from any other institution within the EU, fundamental rights – notably with

regard to data protection – will be “overshadowed” by other priorities, a concern raised in a previous Statewatch analysis on the subject. [25]

The guidelines, meanwhile, make no mention of data protection or privacy in the section devoted to cooperation with foreign and EU institutions. Due to foreign nationals visiting the host Member States, there is “an even greater need for exhaustive data also from other Member States and third states on potential threats to the security of the event,” while EU institutions, “more specifically Europol and SitCen [now known as IntCen and run by the European External Action Service]... could make a significant contribution to ensuring security at the event.”

Similarly, Member States are also urged to involve private security firms in the security effort: those “responsible for critical premises, particularly those possessing security cameras (CCTV), should participate in security planning and be trained to spot irregular behaviour and strange placement of suspicion-arousing items.” There is no mention, however, of the need to ensure that the appropriate regulatory frameworks for private security companies and their employees are in place to ensure that such involvement is proportionate and respects rights to privacy and data protection. It is worth noting that there is no Europe-wide regulation of private security firms and employees.

### **“The enemy”**

The vast majority of Member State responses to the questionnaire indicate that their practices for media management in case of a terrorist attack are already in line with those of the guidelines, which state that “contacts with the mass media should be coordinated.” The response of the Netherlands delegation perhaps best sums up the general mood: contact with the media should be “as much as possible centralised... The aim is to prevent that more than one voice is talking to the media, to the public (for obvious reason!)”

The Greek delegation’s response, meanwhile, is one of the most detailed, and gives an impression of the thinking behind relations with the media during crisis situations:

“Given the opinion that the negative approach of a matter has a commercial impact, usually in the case of a crisis the negative dimensions of the incidents are underlined, the comments are mainly critical, intensely dramatizing the incidents. The increase of the pressures can be observed through dramatized expressions depending the ‘silence-weakness’ of the other side. During an emergency and especially a terrorist attack, it is quite usually that there is concern, agony, insecurity. Our aim is to compensate these reactions; transmitting the message that the police has [sic] the control over the situation, has effective results.”

What comes out of the guidelines, however, is starkly different to any of the answers to the questionnaire:

“In the event that a terrorist attack occurs, it is crucial to shape the social perception of the attack in order to avoid panic. Bearing this in mind, regardless of the means of communication with the public used to convey information on the attack, media coverage could: inform the public of what has happened and appeal for information from the public; underscore the fact that competent national authorities are doing everything possible to alleviate the attack’s consequences and minimise its repercussions; appeal to national values making it possible to remain united towards the enemy; point to positive effects of counter-measures and actions taken by competent national authorities; encourage further preventive actions; highlight efforts aimed at the apprehension of the perpetrators.”

## Continental consensus?

The guidelines are the latest in a growing list of EU documents concerning security at large-scale events, a process that has been increasingly formalised over the last decade following large-scale protests and disorder in Genoa and Gothenburg in 2001. After this, “EU working groups were created to develop security standards.” [26] The history of the Police Chiefs Task Force – closely involved in drafting the original guidelines to which the new Annex is attached – demonstrates how a body set up with no legal basis can go on to significantly influence policy and practice across Europe. [27]

The recommendations made in the guidelines are not binding upon any Member States, and they are not obliged to make any use of them or support available from EU institutions – the UK, for example, declined to ask for any EU support in its security preparations for the London Olympics. However, given that they have been debated amongst delegates of all Member States in a number of EU working parties, they can be taken to represent a consensus of the authorities towards how to approach major events. Despite the most prominent themes being the widespread use of security technologies and surveillance techniques, and the collection, collation and exchange of vast amounts of information between EU Member States, EU institutions, and third countries, it is far from clear that those drafting the guidelines have taken seriously the relevant human rights law and standards. That agreement on the guidelines was reached away from the public eye and with no opportunity for intervention or amendment by the public or their representatives in the European Parliament likely contributed to this.

Drawn up and agreed by a small group of bureaucrats, diplomats and law enforcement agencies whose views were informed by police, security and interior ministry officials in the Member States, the guidelines do little to take into account the requirements of legality, proportionality and fundamental rights that are remarked upon in the opening paragraphs, despite the immediate and long-term implications that security measures implemented for major events can have upon the cities in which they take place, and the individuals who live in them.

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## Endnotes

[1] [Joint Action of 26 May 1997 with regard to cooperation on law and order and security](#) (OJ L 147, 5 June 1997); 2001 [Security Handbook \(Council “conclusions”\)](#) (doc. 12637/3/02 ENFOPOL 123 REV 3); 2004 [Handbook for the cooperation between Member States to avoid terrorist acts at the Olympic Games and comparable sporting events \(Council Recommendation\)](#) (doc. 5744/1/04 ENFOPOL 14); “[Football Council Decision](#)” (OJ L 121, 8 May 2002) and “[Football Handbook](#)” (OJ C 22, 24 January 2002); [Handbook for police and security authorities concerning cooperation at major events with an international dimension](#) (doc. 10589/1/07 ENFOPOL 119 REV 1); [Handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member States is involved](#), Annex to doc. 13119/06, 16 October 2006

[2] ‘[Council Recommendation concerning a handbook for the co-operation between Member States to avoid terrorist acts at the Olympic Games and other comparable sporting events](#)’, 13 February 2004, 5744/1/04 REV 2, p.4

[3] Police Cooperation Working Party, ‘[Summary of discussions](#)’, 7 November 2006, p.3

[4] Working Party on Terrorism, ‘[Summary of discussions](#)’, 4 July 2011, p.8

- [5] Tim Edwards, '[Activists give Olympic sponsors the wrong kind of publicity](#)', *The Week*, 16 April 2012; see also Statewatch Analysis: '[A "clean city": the Olympic Games and civil liberties](#)', August 2012
- [6] Home Office, '[Current threat level](#)'
- [7] [Section 1, Intelligence Services Act 1994](#)
- [8] Panoptikon Fundacja, <http://panoptikon.org/>
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- [10] Statewatch Analysis: '[Brothers in arms](#)', July 2012
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## Annex – Compilation of responses to questionnaire from the Polish delegation to delegations in the Terrorism Working Party (CM 3061/11)

### I. General information

	<b>1. Has your country already hosted a mass sports event of an international nature? If so, please give some details concerning:</b>			
	<b>(a) the type of the sport event(s) (e.g. Olympic Games, athletics content)</b>	<b>(b) indoor/outdoor competition(s)</b>	<b>(c) the number of venues where the competition(s) took place</b>	<b>(d) the approximate number of spectators at the event(s).</b>
<b>AT</b>	Austria hosted together with Switzerland the EURO 08 – European Football Championship from 7. – 29.7.2008	outdoor competition	4 Venues in Austria : Vienna, Klagenfurt, Salzburg, Innsbruck	Visitors at stadia: 620.000; Visitors at public viewing and fan miles: 2.026.00; Total: 2.646.000
<b>BG</b>	Bulgaria hasn't hosted mass sports events of international nature under the Council recommendation of 6 December 2007 concerning a Handbook for police and security authorities on cooperation at major events with an international dimension.			
	Bulgaria has hosted single matches from UEFA tournament Europe League, FIBA, FIVB, FIS – single round-women.	Football matches are outdoor competitions but FIBA and FIVB are indoor.	Bulgaria hasn't hosted any competition with more than one venue, yet	Depends on the sports event – between 1000 and 20 000
<b>CY</b>	(a) Small States of Europe Games; (b) Shooting World Chamionship; (c) Champions League and Europa League – preliminary matches; (d) Champions League - groups	Both	(a) several venues; (b) several venues; (c) one venue; (d) one venue	(a) 3000; (b) 500; (c) 15000 – 20000; (d) 20000 - 23000
<b>CZ</b>	(a) 2004 - World Championship in Ice Hockey; (b) 2009 – World Championship in Cross Country Skiing; (c) 2010 – World Championship in Basketball; (d) Each year – Prague Marathon Race; (e) Each year – Moto Grand Prix	(a) indoor; (b) outdoor; (c) indoor; (d) outdoor; (e) outdoor	(a) Prague, Ostrava; (b) Liberec; (c) Karlovy Vary; (d) Prague; (e) Brno	(a) av. 10,000 watchers; (b) av. 10,000 watchers; (c) av. 3,000 watchers; (d) av. 8,000 runners; (e) av. 200,000-250,000 watchers
<b>DK</b>	Denmark has not hosted major international mass sports event like e.g. Olympic Games, international athletics contests or major international football championships. Accordingly, the Danish Ministry of Justice will not be able to respond to point IV.-VII. that are based on actual experiences in connection with the hosting of such mass events.			
<b>EE</b>	There have been various mass sports events, ranging from athletics competitions to ski competitions	Both	Ranging from one to approx. four	Ranging from 1000 to 10 000 spectators
<b>EL</b>	Greece has organized in the past major sport events such as the 1997 World Championship in Athletics, the UEFA Champions League Final in 2007, the Athens Basketball Final Four 2007 etc, with peak the organization of the 2004		The Olympic sports have been conducted in 35 sports facilities (in Athens and in the Olympic Cities).	3.598.444 tickets for all sports events have been disposed of. The “Special Olympics ATHENS 2011” took place from 09/06 until 04/07.

	Olympic Games.			
<b>FI</b>	The biggest sports event which is held in Finland in 21st century have been IAAF:s athletic world championship competition in Helsinki at 2005.	The event in question was hosted as outdoor setting in Helsinki Olympic stadium.	There were only one actual venue, but also warm-up place and athletes contest village with the training fields was included within security arrangements. Also marathon and walking routes had security arrangements.	There were almost 400.000 spectators taking part in the events.
<b>FR</b>				
<b>HU</b>	(a) European Championships in Modern Pentathlon (1997); (b) European Athletics Championships (1998); (c) Kayak-Canoeing Worlds Championships (1999); (d) World Championships in Modern Pentathlon (1999); (e) World Youth Championships in Athletics (2001); (f) World Championships in Artistic Gymnastics (2002); (g) Triathlon European Championships (2002); (h) World Indoor Championships in Athletics (2004); (i) World Indoor Championships in Athletics (2004); (j) Formula 1 Hungarian Grand Prix (each year)	(a) outdoor; (b) outdoor; (c) outdoor; (d) outdoor; (e) outdoor; (f) outdoor; (g) indoor; (h) outdoor; (i) indoor; (j) outdoor;		(a) 9,000 spectators; (b) 211,000 spectators; (c) 21,000 spectators; (d) 25,000 spectators; (e) 10,000 spectators; (f) 37,000 spectators; (g) 16,000 spectators; (h) 10,000 spectators; (i) 22,000 spectators; (j) 160,000 spectators
<b>IT</b>	As from February 10 to 26, 2006, Italy hosted the XVIII edition of the Winter Olympic Games.	Both outdoor and indoor competitions	Sports competitions were carried out in 7 Municipalities (Turin, Bardonecchia, Cesana Torinese, Pinerolo, Pragelato, Sauze d'Oulz, Sestriere). N. 3 Olympic villages were built in Turin, Bardonecchia and Sestriere	1 million spectators approx.
<b>LT</b>	European male basketball championship "Eurobasket 2011" is being planned during August- September 2011. This is the first time the sports event of such scale is being organized in Lithuania.	Numerous international sports events had been organized in the past, e.g. international football and basketball tournaments and matches, athletics contests, etc.	There are 6 main basketball arenas and 3 football stadiums, which will be used to host the above mentioned sports events.	The number of the spectators depends on the event. Nominal basketball arenas capacity ranges from 4500 to 13000 spectators. Football stadiums may host from 5000 up to 13000 spectators.
<b>LU</b>	No. Luxemburg has (not yet) hosted a international mass sport event.			
<b>LV</b>	Yes, Latvia has hosted sport events of international nature. One of the last and largest sport events in Latvia was the International ice-hockey championship in 2006. It included wide security	International ice-hockey championship was an indoor event.	In Latvia competitions were organized in two venues. Additionally there was a third ice hall but it was used only for trainings.	Number of spectators was different from game to game. The capacity of both venues was approximately 16'000 people (5'000 + 11'000). On the one hand games between foreign teams

	measures that are described in further replies.			were partly attended but on the other hand tickets to all games of Latvian ice-hockey team as well as finals were sold completely.
<b>NL</b>	European Football Championship 2000 (EURO 2000). The Netherlands and Belgium were the host countries.	This was an outdoor competition.	There were four venues in the Netherlands and also four in Belgium.	About 1,2 million spectators at the venues, and about 1 billion watched the event on the television.
<b>PT</b>	Yes, Portugal has hosted many sports events of international nature such as UEFA EURO 2004, UEFA EURO 2006 Under-21; World Sailing Championship 2007; European Futsal Championship 2007; UEFA Cup Final 2005.		The UEFA EURO 2004 took place in 10 venues distributed in 8 cities. The UEFA EURO 2006 U-21 took place in 6 venues distributed in 6 cities.	A total of 1.165.389 spectators attended the EURO 2004 matches at the venues.
<b>RO</b>	Romania has not hosted a mass sports event of international nature yet, so the following answers are deriving from the general legislation and operational procedures currently in place at national level.			
<b>SI</b>	Slovenia has hosted several sporting events at the global and European levels, both outdoors and indoors. The number of participants reached 35,000 spectators at outdoor events and 16,000 in halls.			
<b>UK</b>	The UK hosted the 2004 Commonwealth Games in Manchester and regularly hosts major football fixtures including the Champions League Final. In 2012 London will host the Olympics and Paralympics. The Games will involve over 30 venues, both indoor and outdoor. Organisers expect to sell 10 million for the Olympics alone. There will 205 competing nations, approximately 15,000 athletes and around 10,000 officials. The questions below are answered on the basis of our planning for the 2012 Games, which is informed by our experience of hosting major events in the past.			

## II. Responsible bodies

	<b>2. Which services were responsible for ensuring security, particularly for preventing terrorist attacks and terrorist threat management?</b>	<b>3. How was the effort of terrorist threat management coordinated: at what level and which entity had the role of the coordinator? What was the coordinating entity in charge of?</b>	<b>4. Were the local authorities involved in terrorist threat management? If yes, to what extent?</b>
<b>AT</b>	Within the Ministry of Interior a task force composed of all relevant security authorities and units was introduced to set up and execute the security concept for the EURO 2008. The Federal Agency for State Protection and Counterterrorism (BVT) was responsible for the terrorist threat assessment.	See above. The head of the task force was the head of the Centre for Sports Affairs within the Ministry of Interior.	Yes. The BVTs offices in the “Länder” were involved in information collection ; the police forces in preventive protection measures.
<b>BG</b>	The general security is ensured by Regional Police Directorates - MOI, on which territory the fixture takes place. Representatives of Criminal Police Chief Directorate – NFIP ensure the international operational data exchange as well as coordination and monitoring of the police forces included. Prevention of terrorism is a responsibility of Combating Organised Crime Chief Directorate and State Agency National Security (SANS).	There have not been coordinated so far the activities relative to the terrorist threat concerning the sport events. These activities should be included in the plans ensuring the public order and security during the concrete sport event.  In practice in Bulgaria there is a common mechanism on exchange between the competent national bodies of information about the risks of terrorist threat. The coordination function in this mechanism is granted to the Counterterrorism Coordination Center (CTCC) within SANS that draws up in a n expert level the analyses and threat assessments on the basis of the information received from the lawenforcement bodies and the foreign security partner services.	By reason of the absence of terrorist threat assessment at major sport events with international dimensions the local authorities were not involved in terrorist threat management.
<b>CY</b>	Cyprus Police only	Cyprus Police had the role of the coordinator and was in charge of the implementation of the security plan.	No
<b>CZ</b>	Main body responsible for coordination of the protection against terroristic attacks was Police of the Czech Republic. Especially Unit for Detection of organized crime. This unit acts also as a National point of contact for terrorism in the Czech Republic.  Following institutions: Security counsels of arranging region in connection with Integrated Rescue System,	Security measures were managed by the leading security officer of the World Championships and liaisons security officers in separated sports areas.	Besides regional authorities were informed touched municipalities about adopted measures.



	Headquarters Fire Rescue service, State Office for Nuclear Security and Army of the Czech Republic.		
<b>DK</b>	<p>As the national security authority the task of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service is to prevent, investigate and respond to terrorist threats or attacks in accordance with Danish law.</p> <p>In relation to a major events, such e.g. a mass sport event, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service will collect the relevant intelligence information and make investigations in connection with the event.</p> <p>The National Police together with the local police authorities have the general responsibility for the police and security efforts related to major events. The Danish Security and Intelligence Service can, however, assist the responsible police authorities with the handling of physical protection and information security.</p>		
<b>EE</b>	Security Police of Estonia is sole responsible agency in Estonia for fighting terrorism. The security of the mass events is provided by the Estonian Police- and Border guard Board.	Security Police of Estonia is sole responsible agency in Estonia for fighting terrorism	No
<b>EL</b>	The Hellenic Police has been institutionally assigned with the obligation and responsibility for the Security of the 2004 Olympic Games by the State. Therefore, the Olympic Games Security Division had been established, which was an independent service under the direct command of the Chief of the Hellenic Police, with the mission to plan the measures for order, security and traffic organization of the Games, to coordinate all services involved with the security for the Games and to provide the operational implementation of the drawn up plans.	Within the framework of the Request Plan for Olympic Information – Threat Assessment, the Central and Regional Services of the Hellenic Police Headquarters and more specifically: The Counterterrorism Division; The State Security Division; The Public Security Division; The International Police Cooperation Division; The Aliens Division as well as the rest of the General Police Directorates in the Country, in co-operation with the National Intelligence Service, the National Defense General Staff, the Fire Brigade, the Port Authority as well as with other bodies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Financial Crime Persecuting Corps, General Secretariat for Civil Protection etc.) have provided the necessary information on priorities concerning: Internal and international terrorism; Organized and common crime; Social, political, religious and other movements; Natural disasters and accidents; More specified information about the security of the organization; Other involved bodies during the organization of the 2004 Olympic Games apart from the aforementioned were the National First Aid Ambulance Corps, the Centre for Diseases Control and Prevention etc.	
<b>FI</b>	<p>The main responsibility of security arrangements was given for the Helsinki Police Department. They had operative command of all the operations during the event. They do have major expertise on such events due to in the capital of Finland several similar major events are kept regularly. The National Bureau of Investigation had the responsibility for crime intelligence and the Finnish Security Intelligence Service was responsible for crime intelligence related to terrorism.</p> <p>The Helsinki Police Department had the main responsibility for security arrangements including strategic and operative command. The local police</p>	The Finnish Security Intelligence Service had responsibility for providing a common terrorism threat situation picture and threat assessment. As said before, Helsinki Police Department had the main responsibility of security arrangements and operative command, the National Bureau of Investigations answered about crime intelligence and Intelligence Service answered about crime intelligence related to terrorism.	The Intelligence Service composed terrorism threat assessment and operative command of the Helsinki Police Department planned it's measures and operations based on it.

	<p>departments had the responsibility of the contest village, The Airport Police was responsible for the Airport and The Helsinki Police Department was responsible for Olympic Stadium. The operative intelligence centre was established to the National Bureau of Investigation which together with Intelligence Service was responsible for composing and updating threat assessments. Under the operative command of Helsinki Police Department worked cooperation authorities such as the Border Guard, Customs, Defence Forces, Rescue Services and Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority providing expertise and assistance requested by the operative command. All the authorities mentioned including Bureau were under direct command of the Helsinki Police Department.</p>		
<b>FR</b>			
<b>HU</b>	<p>National Police, Constitution Protection Office (national security agency), Information Office (since 01/09/2010 the newly established Counter-terrorism Centre has taken over the CT-related tasks of the Constitution Protection Office)</p>	<p>At strategic level: the Counter-terrorism Coordinating Committee (a coordinating structure comprising National Police, all of the civilian and military security agencies; as from 01/09/2010 the Counter-terrorism Centre is leader of the Committee) is responsible for monitoring and assessment of the terrorist threat in Hungary.</p> <p>At operational level: an ad hoc coordinating structure would have been set up in case of terrorist threat.</p> <p>If there had been an imminent terrorist threat/a terrorist attack, the National Situation Centre would have been activated within the Ministry of Interior (former Ministry of Local Government) to assume the role of central analysis and assessment body in order to supply the Government's Cabinet for National Security with information.</p>	No.
<b>IT</b>	<p>At central level, the services responsible for ensuring security were the Department for Public Security of the Ministry of the Interior, the C.N.I.O. (National Information Centre on 2006 Winter Olympic Games).</p> <p>At local level, the Prefectures and the local Police</p>	<p>The C.N.I.O. was in charge of collecting, analysing and exchanging information as to evaluating the risk, both at national and international level. DELETED</p>	<p>The local authorities, both public and private, cooperated by providing information aimed at identifying sensitive targets (approx. 3000 Olympic sites, security, energy, telecommunications, transportation, health, tourist targets), allowing the</p>

	Headquarters in Turin, in particular through the DIGOS office.		creation of an ad-hoc database.
<b>LT</b>	In Lithuania the police is responsible for ensuring safety and safeguarding of public order during the mass sport events.  VSD participates in the prevention of the terrorist attacks and terrorist threat management by collecting information on the possibility of a terrorist act (including during the mass sports events) and sharing it with the Police Department under the Ministry of Interior and other competent state authorities.	The Police Department under the Ministry of Interior has established a coordination group on police action for prevention of terrorism threats.	Yes, every time the local police station is involved in terrorist threat management in the period of preparation and during mass event.
<b>LU</b>			
<b>LV</b>	Security measures including also preventing of terrorist attacks were managed by State police and assisted by Security police and private security company.	Terrorism threat management and coordination was the responsibility of Security police.	Municipal police was involved to ensure security in the area of fan-tent. This area was located in the centre of Riga and was not in vicinity of both venues.
<b>NL</b>	The National Security and Intelligence Agency, in cooperation with the National Police Service and the regional police forces.	A national Information Centre, manned by national police officers and security officers, including security officers from the participating countries. Intelligence about threats to the event came from the national headquarters and were assessed in the national Information Centre by the experts. Coordinating entity was the Dutch Security and Intelligence Service, exploitation of information to relevant authorities was done by this body.	Yes, but only on 'need-to-know'- basis.
<b>PT</b>	In Portugal, all Security Forces and Services are responsible for ensuring security and preventing terrorist attacks.  The Judiciary Police (PJ) is the responsible body for investigating terrorism. The Intelligence and Security Service (SIS) is responsible for threat assessment on terrorism. We must also consider other stakeholders, such as the Internal Security System (SSI), the Public Security Police (PSP), the Republican National Guard (GNR) and the Immigration and Borders Service (SEF), since the prevention of terrorist attacks is a	At an operational level, the Judiciary Police had the role of coordinator, developing their coordination activities in cooperation with the other security forces on the Anti Terrorist Coordination Unit, with delegates of all the Security Forces and Services. The UCAT was responsible for the coordination and sharing of information in combating terrorism.  Nevertheless, at a strategic level, the Security Commission of the EURO2004 defined the strategic and political guidance, regarding the terrorist threat	Local authorities weren't directly involved in threat evaluation/management.  They would be involved, if needed, in the protection and security procedures approved as response to the threat.

	<p>responsibility shared between all the security forces. There is also an Anti Terrorist Coordination Unit (UCAT), with delegates of all the security forces mentioned above, that also includes the maritime authority.</p> <p>All of them act, when circumstances require, under the operational command, coordination or control of the Secretary General of the Internal Security System.</p> <p>All these stakeholders were involved in the process of ensuring security during the above mentioned sports events.</p>	<p>management.</p> <p>Terrorist threat assessment was ensured by SIS (Security and Intelligence Service).</p> <p>The coordination of the effort and terrorist threat management was ensured by the General Secretaries of the Internal Security System and Intelligence (SSI).</p>	
<b>RO</b>	<p>At national level, the activities for preventing and countering terrorism are carried out within the National System for Preventing and Countering Terrorism (SNPCT). The System represents an inter-institutional cooperation mechanism – including all public institutions and authorities with responsibilities in this field.</p> <p>SNPCT ensures a prompt response both in terms of prevention and of managing terrorist crises.</p> <p>In such a case, the main competent institutions/authorities are the Romanian Intelligence Service (for CT intervention) and Ministry of Administration and Interior (for public order and civil emergency response).</p>	<p>As national authority in the field of preventing and countering terrorism, the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) is responsible for the technical coordination of activities within SNPCT, through the Antiterrorist Operative Coordination Center (CCOA). CCOA will provide the platform for risk assessment and evaluating the necessary measures for enhancing the level of protection against a possible threat.</p> <p>In case of a terrorist crisis, CCOA provides the logistic and operational support for the efficient operation of the National Center for Antiterrorist Action (CNAAT). CNAAT is activated and operates on the infrastructure of CCOA, as a temporary body, created by consolidating the CCOA personnel with experts and decision-makers from SNPCT.</p> <p>CNAAT is to be activated in a case of terrorist attack against a mass sports event of international nature. The civil emergency response will be coordinated through National Center for Emergency Situation (within MoI).</p> <p>DELETED</p>	<p>Yes, should the event fall under their responsibility (for example, if local authorities approval is mandatory for certain events).</p>
<b>SI</b>	<p>Police, Criminal Police Directorate</p>	<p>Police, Criminal Police Directorate, Organised Crime Division, Terrorism and Extreme Violence Section – in a major case a so-called operational headquarters is set up at the police level, with the participation of all police units. In a highest-risk case, the operational</p>	<p>No.</p>

		headquarters can be set up at the national level, comprising of all competent ministries and agencies.	
<b>UK</b>	Olympic security builds on our existing counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. Primary responsibility for operational CT work lies with the British Security Service and the police, though counter-terrorism in the UK is a collaborative effort between a number of agencies and Government departments. CT policing is provided with national coordination by the Assistant Commissioner of Special Operations (ACSO), and his Senior National Coordinator of Terrorist Investigations (SNCTI) in the Met Police, and by the Association of Chief Police Officers - Terrorism and Allied Matters.	Existing arrangements for managing the threat of terrorism in the UK (please see previous question) remain in place for the Olympic and Paralympic Games. The role of ACSO is well established and we have not sought to change it because of the Games. The security operation overall, however, will receive an additional degree of national coordination through the creation of the National Olympic Security Coordinator – Assistant Commissioner Chris Allison. He has responsibility for assuring the Home Secretary that all Olympic security plans are fit for purpose, including but not limited to all those police forces who will have a sporting venue, cultural event or training camp in their area. It is also the role of the National Olympic Security Coordinator to form the single interface between Government and multiple Olympic GOLD commanders to ensure a consistent national overview of Olympic security operations’	Local authorities have a role to play in counter-terrorism in the UK. Information is shared between local authorities and the relevant police force to ensure that local problems are understood and worked on effectively. Local authorities also run the system of Safety Advisory Groups and Local Resilience Forums, ensuring an event organiser is undertaking sufficient safety planning prior to an event, and that adequate preparedness and resilience is in place for the risks which might emerge. Local Authorities lead the safety advisory group whose responsibility it is to assess all aspects of public safety at large public events and set the measures needed for these events to go ahead

### III. Terrorist threat assessment

	5. At what level was the terrorist threat assessed before/during/after the event? Has the competition influenced it in any way? If yes, what was its impact on the terrorist threat level?	6. Was there a special assessment focusing only on terrorist threat or was this issue included into a general mass sports event security assessment?
<b>AT</b>	Austria does not have a system of fixed or announced threat levels.	There was a special assessment focusing on terrorist threat (also with assistance of EUROPOL) which partly was also included in the general security assessment.
<b>BG</b>	Such of assessment was not drawn up in connection with the a/m events .	No.
<b>CY</b>	The terrorist threat before/during/after the event was assessed low; No	In general, this issue was included into the general mass sport event security assessment but sometimes we did special assessment focusing on terrorist threat.
<b>CZ</b>	Level of the terrorist threat was assessed before and during the events by the Regional Security Counsel – rating – very low. The competitions did not influence it in any way.	Terroristic threats were assessed in general within a framework of security measures.
<b>DK</b>	Before a major event, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service can if necessary work out an assessment of the terrorist threat related to the specific event. Furthermore, The Danish Security and Intelligence Service can inform the responsible police authorities of specific terrorist threats related to a major event.	
<b>EE</b>	The terrorist threat was assessed with all other threats to public order during the mass event. No special arrangements for the terrorist threat assessment were made.	No special report.
<b>EL</b>	DELETED	The planning of counter terrorism response concerning the Olympic Security focused on two (2) basic fields-targets: 1.On the Internal Environment with the aim to eradicate the domestic terrorism threat; 2. On the post-9/11 International Environment, including all potential threats.
<b>FI</b>	Before the event the preliminary threat assessment was provided and the actual/proper threat assessment was provided after that. There were preparedness to update threat assessment while the event. While the event or after it there were not such incidents related to terrorism which would have led wide updating of threat assessment.	Terrorist threat was included to a general threat assessment.
<b>FR</b>		
<b>HU</b>	The terrorist threat level has been assessed “low” for several years in Hungary; no sports event has had any impact on this.	An overall security assessment (including different potential threats such as terrorism) is made before each event.
<b>IT</b>	The carrying out of the Olympic games hasn't increased the threat level, which was anyhow already high, in consideration of the international scenario; it has anyway intensified the attention and therefore the prevention activity.	

<b>LT</b>	<p>VSD performs the general terrorism threat assessment – collects information and evaluates the threat of a terrorist act. The threat assessment is passed to the Crisis Management Committee (consists of Prime Minister and the ministers of interior, national defence, finances, foreign affairs and economy) which discusses the provided information, and if required decides on the draft Government resolution on the change of the level of the threat of a terrorist act. The draft is then passed to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, which may enact it. The threat of a terrorist act is evaluated by five levels. Currently, the threat level is determined as the lowest.</p> <p>There is a possibility to perform an evaluation and to determine the threat level of a terrorist act for a specific mass event. So far, the general threat level of a terrorist act in Lithuania has never been changed because of some sports event, neither specific threat level of a terrorist act was introduced for any sports event.</p> <p>In order to ensure radiation protection of the public, the Radiation Protection Center (hereinafter RPC) carried out terrorist threat assessment to European male basketball championship “Eurobasket 2011” from radiological point of view and developed the RPC Preparedness Action Plan. Additionally such threat assessment will be done during and after this sports event.</p>	This issue is included into a general mass sports event security assessment.
<b>LU</b>		
<b>LV</b>	Terrorism threats were assessed as relatively low and did not change during event.	There was a special assessment of terrorist threats prepared.
<b>NL</b>	International, national and local level. No.	This was included in a general mass sports event security assessment.
<b>PT</b>	<p>Before the tournament started, SIS produced a threat assessment, under the guidance of the Security Commission of the Euro2004.</p> <p>During the event, SIS continually updated the threat assessment, although the Intelligence Coordination Centre of the Euro 2004 held an important role, as it counted with the additional cooperation of the liaison officers of the participating countries, and even some intelligence provided by EUROPOL.</p> <p>DELETED</p> <p>After the tournament, national intelligence services and the Europol processed the information gathered.</p> <p>The way the competition occurred did influence the ongoing assessment of the terrorist threat, although we can say that the threat and risk levels were always low/medium.</p> <p>Threat assessment, particularly terrorist, assumes a dynamic nature and, in the Portuguese case, it focuses on people, places or premises and events.</p>	<p>Apart from the general threat assessment, there was also a specific terrorist threat assessment.</p> <p>Before the tournament, SIS produced a strategic threat assessment that was constantly updated during the tournament. There were also specific assessments for each of the matches. This specific terrorist threat assessment was integrated in the general risk assessment of the tournament.</p>

	The existence of high public impact events tends to raise the level of terrorist threat assessment.	
<b>RO</b>	Not applicable. If the case, the risk assessment is to be carried out on a regular basis, through CCOA.	Not applicable. If the case, the risk assessment would be focused on terrorist threat, that, up to a certain extent, would be included in the general threat assessment related to the security of such an event.
<b>SI</b>	Before an event, the Criminal Police Directorate draws up a threat assessment. In the assessment the level of threat is determined and on its basis the concrete measures needed for ensuring the security of people and property.	No.
<b>UK</b>	The threat to the UK from international terrorism is currently assessed as SEVERE (on a scale of LOW, MODERATE, SUBSTANTIAL, SEVERE and CRITICAL). The UK has had to operate within the context of this threat level for a number of years and Olympic security planning has been designed on that basis.	The threat to the UK from terrorism is assessed by a number of organisations, including the police and the security and intelligence agencies. Strategic assessment of threats to the UK from international terrorism is provided by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). For the purposes of the Games, we have created the Olympic Intelligence Centre, a multi-agency body which is able to coordinate the assessments of all UK agencies with responsibility for intelligence collection and analysis. The creation of the OIC means we are able to see a picture of all threats to the Games in a single place, including terrorism, wider national security, domestic extremism, public / football-related disorder, crime, fixated individuals etc. During the period of the Games, the OIC will provide a daily briefing for international liaisons working in London in order to keep them informed about intelligence issues of note.



#### IV. Critical infrastructure and soft targets

	<b>7. How were the critical infrastructure and soft targets, located in the immediate vicinity of the competition venues, secured from terrorist acts during the event? Which entities were involved in their protection?</b>
<b>AT</b>	The operators of identified critical infrastructure were informed about the event and asked for increased alertness and to sensitize their employees to suspicious perceptions.
<b>BG</b>	DELETED
<b>CY</b>	DELETED
<b>CZ</b>	Critical infrastructure and soft targets in surrounding location were secured by reinforced activities of Integrated Rescue System.
<b>DK</b>	
<b>EE</b>	DELETED
<b>EL</b>	DELETED
<b>FI</b>	DELETED  All the measures taken by mentioned authorities before and during the event were planned in the cooperation with the operative command of the Helsinki Police Department.
<b>FR</b>	
<b>HU</b>	DELETED
<b>IT</b>	DELETED
<b>LT</b>	There were no specific measures implemented to secure critical infrastructure and soft targets, located in the immediate vicinity of the sports venues.  Police antiterrorist squad checks the venue of sports event and after that some private security company becomes responsible for safety and security of sports venue. Public police forces are responsible to ensure safety and security in the perimeter of sports venue. If there is a high risk sports event, criminal police is involved as well.  RPC in cooperation with other services participates in search for radioactive materials and takes all necessary measures to ensure radiation protection of the public.
<b>LU</b>	
<b>LV</b>	DELETED
<b>NL</b>	There was no special focus on critical infrastructures. The venues were secured following the rules of the UEFA and the local rules.
<b>PT</b>	DELETED
<b>RO</b>	DELETED
<b>SI</b>	For each concrete case of threat assessment for a particular event, the critical infrastructure buildings are determined, which are defined in a special act at the national level. Also, in each environment where an event is taking place buildings with special symbolic significance are identified as they could be targeted by different risk groups. Local authorities together with the private security segment and the police are responsible for security. In extreme cases the Defence Act

	foresees the role of the army, in accordance with the National Protection and Rescue Plan in case of use of instruments of mass destruction.
<b>UK</b>	To define what is critical infrastructure for the competition venues, agreed criteria has been used and a process implemented which defines the size of impact and disruption to the Games. This has resulted in an agreed list. There are nine sectors which critical infrastructure can belong to and some additional services sectors necessary for events e.g. waste removal. An Olympics risk assessment called the Comparative Risk Assessment Model (CRAM) with advice from Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs), has been undertaken with each sector to understand the risks and appropriate mitigations. This work has been coordinated by Government with support from security stakeholders.

## V. Risk of using CBRN materials

	<b>8. Have you used special procedures, technical equipment or other precautionary measures (e.g. canine corps) to prevent spectators from bringing CBRN materials to sports venues?</b>	<b>9. Do you have contingency plans for the protection of mass sports events from a terrorist attack and/or the use of CBRN materials by terrorists? Which entity/entities have taken part in their elaboration?</b>
<b>AT</b>		
<b>BG</b>	DELETED	DELETED
<b>CY</b>	DELETED	DELETED
<b>CZ</b>	Units of the Police were reinforced (traffic and disciplinary police, pyrotechnic unit, canine corps - including special trained dogs for CBRN detection). 31 <sup>st</sup> Brigade of chemical and biological protection of the Czech Army and the Laboratory of Civil protection Lázně Bohdaneč were alert.	Czech Integrated Rescue System disposes of Type-Plans for crisis situations. Single units of Integrated Rescue System are processing register papers of their activities. These papers are published by the Ministry of the Interior.
<b>DK</b>		
<b>EE</b>	DELETED	DELETED  The Estonian Security Police is responsible agency, the plan was made also with the cooperation with Estonian Rescue Board and Estonian Ministry of Interior.
<b>EL</b>	DELETED	DELETED
<b>FI</b>	DELETED  It's very important that the security management have the capability to look different levels of threats. Terrorist act is not the only threat and it's very important to identify the situation ASAP and to do threat and risk assessment.  One part of the planning is to write down possible scenarios on different levels and in this way create basic models for action. This helps different partners to focus own part in the organisation and how to play together in different situation.	Against different CBRNE threats Finnish police has created a CBRNE task force to support the planning and operative command. The task force consists of different national authorities who are dealing with CBRNE matters. The key element is that the operative command has always the best expertise, support and equipment available of all possible authorities.
<b>FR</b>		
<b>HU</b>	DELETED	DELETED
<b>IT</b>		DELETED
<b>LT</b>	Yes, such special equipment is being used to prevent CBRN materials from getting into the sports venue.	There are general police contingency plans for protection of the public order during mass events.  The Fire and Rescue Department under Ministry of Interior is responsible for CBRN materials detection.
<b>LU</b>		

<b>LV</b>	DELETED	DELETED
<b>NL</b>	No.	In general there are contingency plans. National and local authorities will take these in action if an incident with CBRN-materials should occur. So, a handling on a case-by-case strategy.
<b>PT</b>	DELETED	DELETED
<b>RO</b>		DELETED
<b>SI</b>	When entering a public event, visitors are searched as it is forbidden to bring bottles, cans, weapons, pyrotechnical devices or any other dangerous objects to the event. Technical equipment for effective detection is used. Technical equipment is also used by the private security firms that participate in the provision of security at such events.	The Police have a special plan of action in case of a threat or a terrorist attack and start carrying out preventive measures for providing security. In doing that, they are connected with the competent authorities, institutions and involve the public-private partnership. In cases of such threat, the National Protection and Rescue Plan in case of use of instruments of mass destruction would be implemented.
<b>UK</b>	DELETED	DELETED

## VI. Cooperation with foreign partners and private entities

	<b>10. How was cooperation with foreign services and law enforcement agencies carried out in terms of exchange of intelligence on potential terrorist attacks related to the event? Was it conducted via PoC, liaison officers or other channels?</b>	<b>11. Concerning the terrorist threat, to what extent were private entities engaged in ensuring security?</b>
<b>AT</b>		
<b>BG</b>	<p>The coordination of the information exchange as regard the sport events is carried out by the National Information Center within the Criminal Police Chief Directorate. There was no coordination connected to the terrorist threat in case of the competition with international nature.</p> <p>In principle the CTCC (where is the national PoC) within SANS carries out permanent exchange of intelligence with the foreign security partner services. On the bases of this intelligence there could be drawn up analysis on the terrorist threat in order to give assistance to the law enforcement services in case of major sport events with international dimension.</p>	As regard the terrorist threat there have not been engaged the private entities yet.
<b>CY</b>	The cooperation was excellent at all levels. The exchange of intelligence was conducted via PoC and liaison officers.	No private entities were engaged in ensuring security.
<b>CZ</b>	Cooperation with foreign partners is realized in spirit of information exchange. It is used official channels between police institutions and intelligence services.	For the event in Liberec, there was hired company "Kohout" for elaborating fire documentation. During the event this company organized system of fire-guards which was operating in cooperation with Fire Rescue Service.
<b>DK</b>		
<b>EE</b>	Several different channels were used.	No
<b>EL</b>	<p>The planning and the materialization of such a big and complex endeavor, due to the globalization of the Games and the international security environment, post 9/11 and the continuous terrorist attacks, required international co-operation.</p> <p>Therefore, since the beginning of the planning we have cooperated with the Olympic Advisory Group of the seven (7) countries (USA, Australia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Spain, Israel) which had significant experience in the organization of major sports events.</p> <p>Furthermore, we cooperated with the Balkan and Mediterranean countries, the EU member states, the member states of the Schengen acquis, Russia, the channels of police cooperation (Interpol, Europol, SECI etc) the International Olympic Committee and the Sponsors. As far as international cooperation is concerned we focus on information sharing regarding the Olympic Games by means of raising the awareness of the competent authorities of all the countries participating in the Olympic Games.</p> <p>The International Cooperation through international and bilateral agreements included: Sharing of information with all countries about the Olympic Games, especially as far as international terrorism threat is concerned; Dealing with the organized trans-border crime (trafficking in weapons and drugs, human trafficking etc.); Strengthening border surveillance in order to combat illegal immigration and to secure the smooth transportation of visitors; International assistance on the</p>	

	basis of worst case scenario.	
<b>FI</b>	The Intelligence Service used it's own channels for inquiry related to terrorism. Cooperation was made with foreign police forces, security forces and intelligence services and the main subject of inquiry was surveying possible threats. The Europol channel was also used and Europol provided it's own threat assessment for the event.	The Intelligence Service did not use private sector. As far as we know, the event organiser used a private security company (general access control at the Stadium) which had tight cooperation with security management of the Helsinki Police Department.
<b>FR</b>		
<b>HU</b>	No specific arrangements were taken before the sports events: the Police and the security agencies used their normal (bi- and multilateral channels) to exchange intelligence on potential terrorist attacks. The relevant information was then assessed properly through the coordinating structures (see question 3)	The organizer of a mass sports event is responsible for ensuring security at the venue of the event. The organizer can ask the local police station for police support in this regard. In any case, the organizer should properly inform the police at least 15 days before the event and present a security plan.  The classification of an event based on an overall security assessment is made by the Police, after consulting the organizer, the relevant national sports association, representatives of the Chamber of Bodyguards, Property Protection and Private Detectives and the head of the competent sports administration authority.
<b>IT</b>	All required channels were alerted to optimize international cooperation, both in the months before the event and during it. A strong cooperation was ensured by the specialised services operating in the partner Countries. During the event, the liaison officers of many Countries cooperated with the National Information Centre on Olympic Games.	The private sector cooperated with the state bodies in charge of security during sports events, by providing information and support requested by the Public Security Authorities..
<b>LT</b>	VSD constantly exchanges information on the terrorism threat with foreign partners.  For the exchange of criminal intelligence and operational information the Police Department under the Ministry of Interior uses INTERPOL and EUROPOL channels via national PoCs.	Private security companies hired by the event organizers are responsible for safety and security on the spot - performing control on the entrance to and inside the sports venue.
<b>LU</b>		
<b>LV</b>	International cooperation with regard to security issues of this event was activated long before 2006. Several officers of State police were sent to Austria where previous championship (in 2005) took place. They participated there as observers to see how Austrian colleagues manage the security measures and to take the best practice for use in Latvia.  Information on the event as well as request for any intelligence and other useful information were distributed to all partner services via different channels before the championship.  EUROPOL was involved to collect any contributing information from member states and prepare a threat assessment. Additionally, officer of EUROPOL was	One private security company was assisting State police to ensure ticket control and security inside the venues. The perimeter around the venues was set and controlled by State police but the security inside the halls was ensured by security guards.

	present during event on stand-by capacity.	
<b>NL</b>	In the national Information Centre, officers of services (police as well as security) acted as PoC's, received intelligence and processed this intelligence further into the national services of the organising countries. Same time all European services communicated the relevant intelligence to the colleague-services of the participating countries.	Private entities were only involved to the extent that the general security of the public was taken care of by them: private security companies, stewards in stadiums etc.. Any concrete threat was handled by security- and police services.
<b>PT</b>	International cooperation was very positive. It was based on recommendations and practices approved by the European Union about this matter. The EU adopted a model currently in place [the handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension - Council Resolution 03JUN2010 (2010/C 165/01)], which provided guidance for the model adopted during the Euro 2004 tournament. The exchange of intelligence flowed using different but complementary channels, such as Intelligence Services and Criminal Police PoC's, Liaison Officers of the Europol and participating countries on the Intelligence Coordination Centre. The cooperation was very fruitful.	The entities responsible for stadium security and critical premises, particularly those that had security systems (CCTV systems, private security, access control) participated in security plans. This did not require a pre-qualification of all threats.  They were briefed generally about issues to be aware of, procedures and actions to be taken when implementing contingency plans.  Additional information would be provided to private operators only in case of real and identified threat situations.
<b>RO</b>	In accordance with the provisions of law no.535/2004 on preventing and countering terrorism, the members of SNPCT carries out activities of international cooperation related to a certain event, via relevant and counterpart channels.  CCOA could serve a platform for exchange of information on potential terrorist attacks related to the event, as it has specialised communication channels.	
<b>SI</b>	DELETED	NO
<b>UK</b>	The International Liaison Unit, based in the Met Police, acted as a point of contact for all law enforcement queries relating to the Games including intelligence related queries. The ILU have already hosted a conference for all competing nations on safety and security and plan to host another two before the Games. Regular meetings with international partners are held by the ILU and engagement to date has been very positive.	We have engaged with the UK Security Industry through our Olympic Security Industry Advisory Group. This Group has provided advice and support during the planning phase of our work. Meanwhile, we have used established procurement networks and processes to get some products and services delivered (for example, additional equipment required for the Police). The London Organising Committee (LOCOG) have contracted private companies to provide security guards and search and screening services at venues.

## VII. Mass media

	<b>12. Have you established special communication channels with mass media and the public to convey information on terrorist threat before or during the event?</b>	<b>13. Which communication channels would be used in case a terrorist attack has occurred?</b>
<b>AT</b>		
<b>BG</b>	<p>Normally, before/ during the sport events there is established a contact with the mass media in order to inform the public on the holding of the competition and on the safeguarding measures to be undertaken in the vicinity and the avenues of approach of the venues.</p> <p>There have not been established special communication channels with mass media and the public to convey information on terrorist threat before or during the event, yet.</p> <p>In general, SANS takes efforts to establish communication channels with the mass media in order to inform the public in an accurate manner on the respective level of terrorist threat and on the precautionary measures to be taken (a single mechanism of the collaboration with the mass media in case of terrorist threat).</p>	
<b>CY</b>	We established communication only for security measures.	We have recently issued, contingency plan which gives guidelines about the handling of media in major events, natural disasters, manmade disasters etc. The communication channels depend on the type of the crisis and are clearly determined on the contingency plan.
<b>CZ</b>	There was not established any special communication channels with mass media for the events.	In case of terroristic attack it will be used existing communication channels with mass media (TV, Radio, Internet).
<b>DK</b>		
<b>EE</b>	No	There is no special communication channels to be used
<b>EL</b>	<p>In order to respond to the whole of the communication needs in the field of security of all those sports events, the Hellenic Police drew up and materialized an integrated communication policy pattern based on three communication axes:</p> <p>Briefing on the basis of documented information</p> <p>At this level a relation of mutual confidence and permanent cooperation was built with the Media (Greek and international) especially in terms of providing documented and reliable data.</p> <p>This briefing concerned all the organization stages of the sports events. It is worth mentioning that during the organization of the Athens Olympic Games of 2004 the following actions took place which enhanced the communication axis</p>	<p>The Media management is one of the main elements in the successful crisis management when there is a case of terrorist threat.</p> <p>Given the opinion that the negative approach of a matter has a commercial impact, usually in the case of a crisis the negative dimensions of the incidents are underlined, the comments are mainly critical, intensely dramatizing the incidents.</p> <p>The increase of the pressures can be observed through dramatized expressions depending on the “silence –weakness” of the other side.</p> <p>During an emergency and especially a terrorist attack, it is quite usual that there</p>



<p>with the Media:</p> <p>Official presentation of the security programme through a press conference where Greek and foreign journalists were invited to attend</p> <p>Creation of a press kit abundant in information material concerning the security field</p> <p>Constant presentation of the work of the Hellenic Police in the field of the Olympic Games Security (as for instance planning, organizing, exercises) in terms of Press Releases</p> <p>Meetings-briefings-interviews with Greek and international Media representatives with a view to present the planning of the Olympic Games Security</p> <p>Providing information through the website of the Ministry of Citizen Protection in Greek and English</p> <p>Visits-guided tours of Media representatives at Olympic sites with selected journalists aiming at the personal briefing concerning the progress of the security preparations</p> <p>Presenting the readiness exercises which were conducted in the framework of the personnel training</p> <p>Presenting the security systems technologies; Advertising information programme including the following: informational videos concerning the training and readiness of the police authorities aiming at confronting any kind of threat; Written material with information on the security measures during the Games; Publications in the daily Greek and foreign newspapers and magazines; Information messages on the radio</p> <p>Communicative management of crisis situations</p> <p>At this level emphasis was given to establishing rules concerning communicative involvement during crisis situations. The aim was the direct and reliable information provided to the public in a way, however, that would not affect the operational management of the crisis. A Plan of Emergency /Crisis Situation Communicative Management was set up, which included the following:</p> <p>Risk analysis of possible events which might cause any communication crisis (target, public, strategy, actions)</p> <p>Cooperation protocols in the field of communication between: the Governmental Communication Field; the Security Forces (Hellenic Police, Fire Brigade, Hellenic Coast Guard etc.); the body responsible for the organization of the event</p>	<p>is concern, agony, insecurity.</p> <p>Our aim is to compensate these reactions; transmitting the message that the Police has the control over the situation, has effective results.</p> <p>This first message provided to the Media has the characteristics of a first brief information-announcement. It contains the main factual features of the incidents, guide-lines and the total of the first actions. It offers, so to say, the most secure subset of information collected by that moment. The information conveyed must be secure meaning that it is absolutely cross-checked.</p> <p>Then, depending on the development of the incident, a respective evolutionary information process of the Media (information time schedule) has to be followed as well, which will be based on the prompt and documented information. This information can be provided in terms of announcements (oral or written) or Press Releases in the written and electronic press, but also in terms of sms sent to accredited journalists, as well as through direct communication with the public in general, utilizing social network tools like the “twitter”.</p> <p>The information process follows the cycle of the crisis.</p> <p>It is brought to completion in a comprehensive way of debriefing as regards the end of the incident.</p> <p>The Press Conference or a comprehensive Press Release may “close an incident” if there are enough data to illustrate the situation or its development.</p>
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	<p>Cooperation Protocol with other bodies (health sector, civil protection etc.)</p> <p>Communicative Response Procedures in emergency cases</p> <p>Press Office Operations &amp; Procedures Rules</p> <p>List indicating the key persons in communication issues</p> <p>Maintenance and enhancement of good faith and confidence between the Hellenic Police and the public.</p> <p>At this point emphasis was given to the mutual communicative relation with the public by means of providing prompt and reliable information.</p>	
<b>FI</b>	<p>Common precept is that authority leading the operations is responsible for content of communication/public relations and other authorities support the one who is responsible for the matter.</p> <p>The Ministry of Traffic and Communication Authority guidance preparedness team is responsible for technical developing, monitoring and ensuring usage condition of emergency announcement system which is passed via mass medium/media. The television and radio companies are obliged to forward authorities emergency announcements for the population when it is necessary to save a life or assets/one's properties or to ensure society actions. These can be given for example because or since threat or attack caused by terrorism.</p>	
<b>FR</b>		
<b>HU</b>	No.	The public service broadcasters (there are 3 TV and 3 radio public service broadcasters at national level) and the Internet web site of the Government.
<b>IT</b>		
<b>LT</b>	Yes, there are certain procedures established to inform the public via mass media on the possible terrorist threat and pass on any safety recommendations accordingly.	All available mass media (TV, radio) and internet resources would be invoked to inform the population on the terrorist attack.
<b>LU</b>		
<b>LV</b>	The communication with mass media was ensured by specially designated officer of State police who had contacts with all representatives of mass media. One of the messages that had to be distributed through media before the event was that due to security measures spectators are invited to arrive duly. That helped to run all measures smoothly.	In case of terrorist incident the same communication system would be used as illustrated in previous point. A special press centre can also be established if necessary.
<b>NL</b>	As much as possible centralized; that is that the NCTb, the national coordinating body on fighting terrorism, will act as a speaking body; all information from any national entity goes to the Coordinator, also the information from colleague-	Not applicable.

	security-services as far as it is exploitable. The aim is to prevent that more than one voice is talking to the media, to the public (for obvious reasons!). Please note that this answer describes the current situation. The NCTb was established in 2004/2005.	
<b>PT</b>	<p>The formal channel to provide information to the public and mass media was the Security Commission of the Euro 2004.</p> <p>A strategy was approved for communicating with the media that included written communications as well as briefings once or twice a day.</p> <p>Several scenarios of communication were identified (public order, organized crime, fans management, access to stadiums and cities), such as a potential terrorist action.</p>	<p>On a first line, the communication channel was assured by the Security Commission of the Euro 2004, but, complementary, other entities with responsibilities on the operational management of terrorist incidents were also involved.</p> <p>We can also mention channels as the media, communication systems of stadiums and cities, communication systems of Security Forces and Services, communication systems of Civil Protection.</p>
<b>RO</b>		DELETED
<b>SI</b>	NO. All communication would proceed through a well-established public relation service.	
<b>UK</b>	<p>Details on the potential types of terrorist attack methodologies have already been published into the public domain [add link to unclassified OSSRA] and the UK declares publicly the terrorist threat level.</p> <p>There is also generic guidance available to the general public on government and local authority websites on what to do in an emergency, see <a href="http://www.direct.gov.uk">www.direct.gov.uk</a></p>	<p>For major emergencies, including terrorist incidents, there are well established protocols regarding informing the public and providing advice to those affected. The News Coordination Centre coordinates this activity and works with the emergency responder community, Government and the media.</p> <p>Provision of information would be through a range of communication channels, including broadcast, radio and internet. Senior representatives of the emergency responder community and Government would give regular media briefings, and importance is placed on timely accurate updates.</p> <p>Emergency call centres would be established to deal with general inquiries from the public which could be re-directed as needed to the relevant organisations. If necessary a Casualty Bureau would be activated. The media would publicise a dedicated telephone number for those concerned about the well-being of friends and family.</p>

## Additional material

<b>FI</b>	<p>All the planning, management and operations are based on the following principals;</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. There can be only one operative command centre</li><li>2. Intelligence is worthless owned by individual authorities. It must be shared within the law enforcement agencies and be in the use of operative planning and command centre</li><li>3. All the authorities provide intelligence, support, expertise, equipment for the common goal under supervision of one operative command</li></ol>
<b>SI</b>	<p>Security standards and the dimensions of possible threats to the safety of sporting competitions of the highest class have outgrown the competences of individual organisations responsible for providing security. This has inevitably led to links and cooperation between different security and intelligence services. In practice individual countries include in their threat assessments and security plans various security agencies (Interpol, Europol, intelligence services, etc.). In implementation plans all structures and levels of individual services of law enforcement authorities are included, which resulted in a whole range of implementation plans to be devised – manuals, handbooks, which are based on the principles of operation and cooperation of these services within individual countries and internationally. The same can be said about the Manual on police cooperation in providing security at mass international sporting events.</p> <p>The number of law enforcement agencies included, the level of participating companies and possibilities of implementation have shown that, despite great efforts, all these specific aspects could not be put in one universal and all-encompassing document. We believe that Poland's intention to include counter-terrorist measures in the Manual on police cooperation is well-intentioned; however, the planning of counter-terrorist measures requires certain data, assessments, analyses, etc. that are drawn up by different agencies. We do not think that these agencies will make the data they possess, process and, of course, protect, generally available. The terrorist threat is already included in the Manual under III.2.3 and the measures for providing safety and prevention in the field of terrorism are already being carried out in practice.</p> <p>Before each major event the Criminal Police Directorate draws up a threat assessment. In the assessment the level of threat is identified, which is the basis for the determination of measures needed for providing the safety of people and property. All the players responsible for the provision of security get informed of the assessment. Any data referring to a possible threat to people's lives or property at events in other countries is immediately forwarded to the country organising the event through competent services.</p> <p>We recognise that including terrorism in the Manual would have an added value; however, it does not seem feasible given the specific nature of the field. Should there be a consensus about the inclusion at the EU level, we suggest inclusion in general terms.</p>