The Council agreed on 6/7 June 2013 on Conclusions calling for an update of the Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism. Subsequently, the Commission submitted a Communication on 15 January 2014 on Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism (see doc. 5451/14 JAI 30 ENFOPOL 5 COTER 3).

Delegations had a first exchange of views on the draft Strategy at the TWP of 6 March. On the basis of written contributions and further discussions at the TWP meeting of 8 April, the Presidency has further reviewed the text. The Presidency invites delegations to examine the current compromise proposal with a view to agreeing on it and submitting it to Council for adoption.

The definite numbering will be settled after agreement on the text.
Draft Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism

1. Terrorism is a threat to all States and to all people. It poses a serious risk to the security of the European Union and its Member States, and the lives of its citizens and residents. The EU is determined to take action against terrorism in all its forms and against radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism.

2. To enhance our policies to prevent radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism, a strategy and an action plan were adopted in 2005. The strategy was updated in November 2008. Following discussions in the Council in March 2013 on the revision of the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, the Council agreed on 6/7 June 2013 on Conclusions calling for an update of this strategy. Subsequently, the Commission submitted a Communication on 15 January 2014 on Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism, the content of which has been taken into account in the current document.

3. This strategy outlines how the Union and the Member States will combat radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism in view of the changing nature of the threat and our increased understanding of radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism over the past five years.

4. It is part of the broader EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Action Plan endorsed by the European Council in 2005. Within that framework it aims to confront radicalisation leading to terrorism.

The challenge

5. The main objective of the strategy should be to prevent people from becoming radicalised, being radicalised and being recruited to terrorism and to prevent a new generation of terrorists from emerging.

6. (...)
7. To do so effectively, we need to acknowledge that the means and patterns of radicalisation and terrorism are constantly evolving. Home grown terrorists, individuals supporting extremist ideology linked to terrorism, lone actors, foreign fighters and any other form of terrorism, as well as the mobilisation and communication potential of the Internet and social media present possible channels through which radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism could occur.

8. There is therefore a necessity to consistently revisit our priorities and ensure that our security approach can address emerging forms of threats.

9. Although the responsibility for combating radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism primarily lies with the Member States, this Strategy should help Member States develop and design, where relevant, their own programmes and policies, which take into account the specific needs, objectives and capabilities of each Member State based on the context and socio-political environment that prevails there. Notwithstanding the national specific nature of the radicalisation and recruitment background EU efforts may nevertheless add value to national and local efforts and provide an important framework for cooperation on appropriate responses to be prompted across the EU and to share good practices on the ways to effectively respond to radicalisation at both local, national, European and international level.

10. (included in 9.)

11. Experiences from the past years have revealed that countering radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism effectively requires a balanced approach between security-related measures and efforts to tackle those factors that may create an environment conducive to radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism.
Our points of departure

12. Overall, the challenge of radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism will not be met by governments working alone, but by collaboration with communities, civil society, non-governmental organisations (NGO) and the private sector. It requires a joint effort at local, regional, national, European and international level.

13. Full respect for human rights and our fundamental freedoms is one of the foundations for our work to counter radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism. All actions must be taken with full respect for these fundamental rights and freedoms. Focus should be on developing dialogue so as to promote mutual awareness and understanding. Stigmatising of any particular group of people must be avoided.

13a. Other points of departure include openness and transparency, effectiveness, flexibility and continued national and international collaboration.

14. (...)

15. (...)

16. (...)

17. (...)

18. (...)

(
Our response

18a. Throughout we will ensure at all times that respect for fundamental rights, international law and the rule of law are not undermined.

19. To counter radicalisation and terrorist recruitment, we resolve i.a. to:
   • Support further research into the trends and challenges of radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism
   • Promote security, justice, and equal opportunities for all
   • Ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism
   • Enhance government communications
   • Support messages countering terrorism
   • Counter online radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism
   • Train, build capacity and engage first line practitioners across relevant sectors
   • Support individuals and civil society to build resilience
   • Support disengagement initiatives
   • Support further research into the trends and challenges of radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism
   • Align internal and external counter-radicalisation work

20. (moved to 18a)

(points 21 to 25 have been moved after point 52)

Promote security, justice, and equal opportunities for all

25a. Violations of human rights can give rise to grievances and the very conditions conducive to the spread of radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism. (...)

26. Factors that may be conducive to radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism can include perceptions of diverse nature, among them inequality, marginalisation, social exclusion, and a difficult access to quality education. Those factors do not necessarily lead to radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism by themselves, but may make the extremist narrative which supports or is linked to terrorism more appealing.
27. We must, inter alia, focus on combating inequalities and discrimination where they exist, promoting inter-cultural dialogue, strengthening education to enable opportunities and critical thinking, and promoting tolerance and mutual respect, exchanging viewpoints and communicating to civil society the success in these areas. This work is significant and valuable in its own right, and need not have an exclusive and explicit counter-radicalisation or terrorism focus.

28. (moved to 25a. directly under the title)

29. Outside Europe, we must continue to promote good governance, rule of law, human rights, democracy, education, economic development, security sector reform, and stability by means of political dialogues and via our assistance programmes.

Ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism

30. (...) Extremist world views can lead certain individuals to accept and attempt to justify violence. The extremist propaganda expounds a simplistic rhetoric, distorting the reality of conflicts around the world and using them as alleged evidence of a clash between different values and social choices.

31. We must raise awareness and emphasise the voice of the majority which favours moderation and rejects recourse to violence. Not only do we need to strengthen moderate voices: we need to ensure that they are heard. Those voices must be communicated through an appropriate platform, such as mass and social media, which must be credible for the target audience. The direct involvement of civil society in promoting a moderate response should be encouraged and supported. As far as radicalisation leading to religiously articulated terrorism is concerned, this requires dialogue between public authorities and the various social, cultural and religious groups concerned or their leaders.

32. Moreover, we must continue our efforts to develop a non-emotive lexicon where appropriate, to ensure that our messages do not inadvertently aggravate differences.
**Enhance government communications**

33. Government communications are not just a means of describing policy decisions; they are also a powerful tool to support policy implementation. If policies are not communicated effectively and efficiently, including to those who may be vulnerable to radicalisers' messages, we risk allowing the extremist world view to go unchallenged.

34. We must promote the development of tailor-made communication methods that challenge an extremist ideology which supports or is linked to terrorism either online or offline. It is key to communicate in a language appropriate to context and audience, using a range of credible and appropriate delivery channels, and to challenge radical or extremist communications at the platforms used most frequently by those who are most at risk to be radicalised. A one-size-fits-all approach to communications will not work. At the same time, however, we must ensure consistency, clarity and continuity in our messaging at all levels.

35. It is important that we clearly communicate what we stand for, our own norms and values: international law, human rights and the rule of law. We should also seek to enhance government communication of work carried out, e.g. humanitarian aid and development support. We must try to make such communications relevant, appealing and meaningful, especially to those who feel most hostile and marginalised. We also have to be clear on our policies, our strategies and our objectives, not least in terms of counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation.

36. The (...) use of (...) the internet and social media is critically important, not least to respond promptly to online rhetoric supporting terrorism and to reach those most vulnerable to radicalising messages. In this regard, public-private partnership should be encouraged to tackle the challenge of radicalisation online.

36a. (...)

36b. (...)
Support messages countering terrorism

37. Counter-narratives have a dual purpose: convince those already engaged in violent extremism to abandon it, and dissuade those sympathetic to terrorist narratives from becoming actively involved in them.

38. We should support and amplify counter-narratives emanating from those with local influence, including community leaders where this concept applies, teachers, families, youth workers, public figures, thinkers, scholars, academics, religious leaders, businesspeople, media personalities, singers, sports stars and others who lead or shape public opinion and who can tell a positive and credible story. We should initiate projects with these actors at all levels and work to ensure that they are appropriately empowered and supported.

39. Some of the most effective counter-narrative work has also engaged with groups of victims of terrorism to create a genuinely powerful message. Many victims of terrorism have already engaged in prevention efforts through public outreach events; we must continue to support their efforts. As witnesses to the human consequences of terrorist attacks, victims and their families are best placed to "de-glamorise" and "de-legitimise" the terrorist narrative where they have overcome victimhood despite clear provocation.

39a. In this regard, credible testimonies such as those coming from former terrorists who have abandoned the path of violence, or from their family members, might be explored. We should collate and promote their testimonies, as these are also powerful tools to counter the narratives and perceived ideals (...).
Counter online radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism

40. The internet and social media can be used for the dissemination of propaganda material, fund-raising, recruitment and communication with like-minded individuals, but also as a virtual training camp, as well as a means of exchanging skills and know-how. The internet is also a transnational entity transgressing various national jurisdictions.

41. Work to counter online radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism is wide-ranging. It covers activities aimed at disrupting terrorist use of the internet, but also initiatives to challenge the terrorist narrative. Some of it can be done at national or European level and some of it by people and organisations from within civil society, facilitated where necessary. Where content is illegal including material that is hosted in third countries, there must be processes in place to address the issue swiftly and effectively. This work will require effective dialogue with the private sector and in particular the internet (…), not only in Europe but also abroad. Efforts should also be made to use the internet and social media to promote counter narrative messages. All activities must be done in accordance with rule of law principles and in full respect of international human rights law.

42. We should continue to examine ways to actively prevent radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism by means of the internet and social media. We will address these issues as part of our Political Dialogues and we will offer technical support with the view of encouraging others, outside the EU, to do the same.

Train and engage first line practitioners across sectors

43. Radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism is a process during which an individual's opinions and/or behaviours will change, often dramatically. These changes may be most apparent to those closest to the person concerned. This means that, through engaging first line practitioners, there may be opportunities to intervene at an early stage and to prevent individuals at risk from being drawn into terrorist-related activity.
44. A wide range of sectors can help to prevent people supporting terrorism or promoting an extremist ideology linked to terrorism or becoming terrorists. Training of teachers, social and health care workers, religious leaders, community police officers, and prison and probation staff is a critical element of any successful programme to counter radicalisation. These practitioners or first line workers may be able to identify signs of radicalisation at an early stage, therefore they need to be aware of and understand signs of radicalisation to terrorism.

45. We should encourage the development of awareness raising programmes and sector specific training modules for first line practitioners to provide them with a better understanding of radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism, and skills to discuss related issues; and to help them offer support to individuals at risk or to refer them to specialised professionals for further help. We should also ensure that we learn from their experience to inform future policy, including through the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) and CEPOL.

**Support individuals and civil society to build resilience**

46. Governments need active involvement of partners to counter radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism. (…) Involving civil society and the private sector can bring to bear a range of tools and resources, as well as insight, not necessarily available to governments. The experience of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) is a particularly useful forum in this regard.

47. Working with the private sector and civil society will enhance trust and transparency, strengthen social cohesion and create a sense of 'belonging' (…) that is likely to make individuals more resilient to terrorist ideology and less vulnerable to radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism. Community engagement should be broad-based and should reflect the diversity of the community.

48. We should empower the civil society in building and promoting resilience to resist and withstand the appeal of terrorism. Building resilience can be done by equipping individuals and civil society with the skills and resources to understand and address radicalisation to terrorism. In practice, it can entail e.g. support to and education of young people to help them build a positive sense of identity and recognise the dangers of terrorist narratives.
49. We must, inter alia, promote the education/training of young people, mainly by means of Schools and Universities on issues related to nationality, politics, religious and national tolerance, democratic values, cultural differences, and the historical consequences of nationally and politically instigated violence. The members of the education sector supported by field practitioners, in particular, could play a significant role by raising awareness of terrorism-related issues and identifying and providing support to individuals **at risk**.

**Support disengagement initiatives**

50. Just as there are processes through which an individual becomes radicalised and possibly recruited to terrorism, there are also processes through which a radicalised individual can come to renounce violence, leave a group or movement, or even reject a worldview supporting **or promoting an extremist ideology linked to** terrorism.

51. Member States should consider designing and developing disengagement and exit strategies adapted to the culture and the specific context. These programmes should be evaluated by Member States and/or peers on a regular basis in order to ensure their effectiveness.

52. The exchange of best practices and experience at the European level, specifically those from the RAN, can assist in developing new programmes, acquiring know-how and re-integrating former terrorists.

**Support further research into the trends and challenges radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism**

21. In order to have a substantial and effective response to terrorism, we will continue to strive to better understand the phenomenon in all its forms and with reference to the role played by the actors involved in the process at local, **regional**, national, EU and international level.
22. Besides the specialised contribution made by all relevant services, there is a large body of literature and research that has given us valuable insights into the drivers of radicalisation to terrorism, which is connected to many factors - personal, structural, ideological, political, societal - that may shape an individual's unique path towards radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism.

23. In spite of this knowledge and research, there are still a number of important questions in areas where more empirical evidence and research would be very much welcome and help inform future policy decisions, also in the area of exit strategies and - programmes

24. (…)

25. Discussions with governments that have faced this problem, with academics, first line practitioners from various fields, vulnerable individuals, former terrorists, NGO, and with victims of terrorism in Europe and elsewhere are advised. The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) is also a particularly useful forum in this regard, as well as the future "knowledge hub" which acts as a hyphen between the RAN and the Member States. Member States efforts within the various work-streams are another important contributor and should be encouraged and continued.

Governments from Member States should equally strive to develop synergies for more research into trends in radicalisation and evaluation of existing practices. Research carried out at the EU level, with the Commission financing support can add value to analyse broad trends in radicalisation and offering possible responses.

Align internal and external counter-radicalisation work

53. Terrorist attacks planned against targets in Europe have often had connections outside European territory. Some have been planned in or directly involved people from third countries; some have been externally funded; many have involved people who have been trained abroad (such as foreign fighters). Terrorist attacks abroad have also been conducted by people from Europe. Domestic and international terrorism are often inextricably linked.
54. Ideology developed in third countries and messages broadcast or sent into Europe may have an impact on radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism in Europe. Also travel can be part of the radicalisation process. A significant number of individuals who have been involved in terrorist activities have travelled abroad where they have been influenced by members of terrorist organisations. **It is also important to take into account this Strategy as well as the EU Counter-terrorism strategy in the development of the border management policies, including visa policies, within the existing legal framework in the EU.**

55. In addition to our local, regional, national and European approach to stop people supporting or becoming terrorists, we need to work in and with third countries. Radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism abroad poses as much of a threat to European citizens and interests abroad as it does at home. Hence, an external component is a critical element of our counter-radicalisation work. The challenge is to ensure coherence between our counter-radicalisation work in third countries with our domestic experiences, based on the rule of law and full respect of international human rights, lessons learned and good practices, but also unsuccessful practices. **In order to ensure this, support to third countries in strengthening their security sector as well as the rule of law is necessary.**

56. In terrorist narratives, issues concerning external policy are often brought up. In our political dialogues and our participation in international organisations and fora, we should highlight our strategic approach and relevant actions such as the implementation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of the United Nations and relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council, and exchange know-how. We also have a role to play in building capacity abroad, to assist third countries to form and implement their own policies for preventing and countering radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism and how to address messages supporting terrorism.

57. Raising awareness of counter-radicalisation work as part of development programming at country-level should be encouraged, where relevant, as well as taking radicalisation into account in the overall country analysis as the basis of programming. This would help to focus, as appropriate, some of the EU development programs on specific geographic areas / communities where radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism are highly concentrated.
Deliver the strategy

58. Member States will work, individually and together, with the support of the Counter Terrorism Coordinator, the European Commission, and the EEAS to deliver this strategy. Both Member States and the EU should also work in conjunction, amongst others, with the UN, the Council of Europe, OSCE and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum to develop projects overseas in this sphere.

59. The challenge of countering radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism is primarily the responsibility of the Member States. (...) The problems of radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism and how to counter it vary greatly from one Member State to another, but there are a range of common elements and broad agreement that we need to work together to tackle it, including with a wide range of stakeholders – such as civil society, private sector, and other organisations.

60. As previously stated, the present strategy provides Member States with the ability to take measures at a national level, on the basis of the common understanding of the factors of radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism and the principles and actions to combat it. They should proceed to draw up or update national strategies taking into account their own needs, objectives and capabilities building on their own experiences and on available expertise from (...) the RAN and EU institutions.

61. Member States should coordinate their policies, share information and experiences regarding the efforts to deal with challenges of radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism, at a national as well as at a European level, institute best practices and cooperate in developing new ideas.

62. It will also require a joint effort at local, regional, national, European and international level. Beyond the borders of Europe, initiatives can be undertaken through the instruments, mechanisms and processes that the EU has established with individual countries and regional organisations, including bilateral Political Dialogues and assistance programmes.

63. The relevant Council preparatory bodies are invited to follow-up the delivery of this Strategy.