DSMA-NOTICE 01: Military Operations, Plans & Capabilities

1. It is requested that disclosure or publication of highly classified information within the categories listed below should not be made without first seeking advice:

(a) details of present or future operations, methods, tactics and contingency planning, to meet particular hostile situations and to counter threats of terrorist attacks;

(b) details of the state of readiness and operational capability of individual units or formations whose involvement in such operations is current or may be imminent;

(c) operational movements of such individual units or formations (as distinct from routine movements unconnected with operations);

(d) particulars of current or projected tactics, trials, techniques and training (including anti-interrogation training and operational techniques and tactics used to counter terrorism);

(e) details of defensive or counter terrorist measures taken by individual installations, units or formations.

2. **Rationale**. In general it is important not to publish highly classified information which could be damaging to national security by giving a potential enemy important strategic or operational advantages; which could be exploited by terrorists to devise counter-measures with the consequence that attacks which might otherwise have been frustrated could prove successful; or which could compromise counter-terrorist operations, endanger lives or put sources at risk.

See also DSMA-Notice No 5 concerning Special Forces.

DSMA-NOTICE 02 – Nuclear & Non-Nuclear Weapons & Equipment

1. It is requested that disclosure or publication of highly classified information about nuclear and non-nuclear defence equipment or equipment used to counter threats of terrorist attacks of the kind listed below should not be made without first seeking advice:

(a) nuclear weapons, highly classified information on:

1. the detailed design of nuclear weapons and the technologies for producing them;
2. operational details;
3. detailed security arrangements for the storage, transport and development of nuclear weapons and associated fissile materials;

(b) non-nuclear defence and counter-terrorist equipment, highly classified information on:

1. design details, technical specifications and materials;
2. performance figures and operational capabilities;
3. areas of vulnerability to counter-measures.

2. **Rationale**

Nuclear. The release of highly classified British technical information on nuclear weapons could enable others to develop such weapons which would be in breach of the British Government's non-proliferation obligations and ultimate disarmament objectives. Release of highly classified operational plans and security arrangements could potentially jeopardise the safety and security of our nuclear forces and reduce their deterrent value.

Non-Nuclear and Counter-Terrorist. The disclosure of highly classified information about equipment used for defence and counter-terrorism purposes could enable potential enemies or terrorists to devise effective counter-measures more quickly, to speed up the development of their own weapons and equipment and to alter their operating methods so that attacks which might otherwise have been frustrated could prove successful.

DSMA-NOTICE 03: Ciphers & Secure Communications

1. It is requested that no details be published, without prior consultation, of the British Government's highly classified codes and ciphers, related data protection measures and communication facilities, or those of NATO or other allies.

2. It is also requested that advice be sought before disclosing, or elaboration on, information published at home or overseas about UK official codes and ciphers or their potential vulnerability.

3. **Rationale**. Disclosures that could compromise codes and ciphers put at risk the classified information protected by them and, indirectly, people's lives. Revealing details of associated data protection measures and communications facilities, whether obtained, for example, from documents or by techniques such as computer hacking, could assist potential enemies to penetrate these elements of national security.

DSMA-NOTICE 04: Sensitive Installations & Home Addresses

1. It is requested that disclosure or publication of security details of, or other sensitive information not widely in the public domain which might be useful in particular to terrorist planning about, the following facilities should not be made without first seeking advice;

(a) defence and related sites associated with the nuclear weapons programme;

(b) high security MOD and military sites associated with intelligence and other sensitive activities;

(c) sites of headquarters or communications facilities for use by government or NATO in time of crisis;

(d) serious vulnerabilities of a long-term nature identified in the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) which if directly attacked could cause major widespread disruption and/or loss of life*.

2. It is also requested that where individuals are likely targets for attack by terrorists, care should be taken not to publish details of their homes or addresses without first seeking advice. People who are assessed as being at particular risk are those with security and counter-terrorist duties or backgrounds. However, others because of their duties or backgrounds may also be at risk in certain circumstances. Specific advice on this will be given on a case-by-case basis.

3. **Rationale**. Information about key facilities and installations could be of value to persons or governments whose interests might be harmful to those of the UK and NATO.

* Further information on CNI is available under "Security Advice" on http://www/mi5.gov.uk/

DSMA-NOTICE 05 – UK Security & Intelligence Services & Special Forces

1. Information falling within the following categories is normally regarded as being highly classified. It is requested that such information, unless it has been the subject of an official announcement or has been widely disclosed or discussed, should not be published without first seeking advice:

(a) specific covert operations, sources and methods of the Security Service, SIS and GCHQ, Defence Intelligence Units, Special Forces and those involved with them, the application of those methods*, including the interception of communications, and their targets; the same applies to those engaged on counter-terrorist operations;

(b) the identities, whereabouts and tasks of people who are or have been employed by these services or engaged on such work, including details of their families and home addresses, and any other information, including photographs, which could assist terrorist or other hostile organisations to identify a target;

(c) addresses and telephone numbers used by these services, except those now made public.

2. **Rationale**. Identified staff from the intelligence and security services, others engaged on sensitive counter-terrorist operations, including the Special Forces, and those who are likely targets for attack are at real risk from terrorists. Security and intelligence operations, contacts and techniques are easily compromised, and therefore need to be pursued in conditions of secrecy. Publicity about an operation which is in train finishes it. Publicity given even to an operation which has been completed, whether successfully or not, may well deny the opportunity for further exploitation of a capability, which may be unique against other hostile and illegal activity. The disclosure of identities can prejudice past, present and future operations. Even inaccurate speculation about the source of information on a given issue can put intelligence operations and, in the worst cases, lives at risk and/or lead to the loss of information which is important in the interests of national security. Material which has been the subject of an official announcement is not covered by this notice.

* even when used by the National Crime Agency (NCA). This is intended purely to protect national security and not to inhibit normal reporting on law enforcement.