


Eastern European Borders Annual Risk Analysis 2015





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Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations and research, each marked with a distinct graphic identifier. Risk analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed by an arrow drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. Metaphorically, the arrow represents the cyclical nature of risk analysis processes and its orientation towards an appropriate operational response. The triangle is a symbol of ideal proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual exactness, truth and exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents the intelligence factor and the focal point where information from diverse sources converges to be processed, systematised and shared as analytical products. Thus, Frontex risk analysis is meant to be at the centre and to form a reliable basis for its operational activities.



European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union

Plac Europejski 6
00-844 Warsaw, Poland
T +48 22 205 95 00
F +48 22 205 95 01
frontex@frontex.europa.eu
www.frontex.europa.eu

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List of abbreviations used

ABC	Automated Border Control
ATO	Anti-Terrorist Operation in Ukraine
BCP	border-crossing point
CIRAM	Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CU	Customs Union
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EBC	Eastern Borders Conference
EB-RAN	Eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Union Document-Fraud
EDF-RAN	European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
EMCDDA	European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
EU	European Union
EUR	euro
Europol	European Police Office
Eurostat	European Union's statistical authority
FRAN	Frontex Risk Analysis Network
Frontex	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDPs	internally displaced persons
IIHF	International Ice Hockey Federation
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
JO	Joint Operation
LBTA	local border traffic agreement
LBT	local border traffic
n.a.	not applicable
OCGs	organised crime groups
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OLAF	European Anti-Fraud Office
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Q/Qtr	quarter of the year
RFI	Request for Information
RUB	Russian rouble
SAC	Schengen Associated Countries
SIS II	Second generation Schengen Information System
SMM	Special Monitoring Mission
UK	United Kingdom
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USD	United States dollar
VIN	Vehicle Identification Number
VIS	Visa Information System
VLAP	Visa Liberalisation Action Plan
WHO	World Health Organization

Executive summary

In 2014, the situation affecting security at the borders between EU Member States and Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the Russian Federation was determined by many correlated factors.

Firstly, the overall regular passenger flow, depending on the border section, was mainly influenced by such factors as: (a) the number of visas issued by EU Member States; (b) movements under the local border traffic regime; (c) fluctuation of shopping-related cross-border travel by both EU and EB-RAN countries and the Russian Federation; (d) economic situation of the EU's eastern neighbours; (e) entry restrictions.

In 2014, sanctions and other factors such as oil price declines in the world markets led to a strong devaluation of the Russian rouble and the Ukrainian hryvnia, as well as an economic downturn in the eastern neighbourhood of the EU. The worsening economic situation has an effect on the volume and profile of regular passenger flows. However, the impact seems to vary strongly between border sections depending on the composition of the flow (EU/non-EU) and the purpose of travel. Thus, the year 2014 was marked by decline of traffic flows at EU Member States' borders with the Russian Federation and growth at the borders with Ukraine.

Secondly, the smuggling of excise and illicit goods, to some extent connected to regular passenger flows, remained a major threat to border security. Data collected within the Eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network (EB-RAN), as well as during Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations, indicate that the smuggling of tobacco products was particularly common. Smuggling occurred pri-

marily through official border-crossing points (BCPs); however, a variety of *modi operandi* were also detected at green borders (between BCPs) varying from the so-called ant smuggling through BCPs to the use of rafts on border rivers to smuggle large amounts of cigarettes across the common borders. Even though 2014 was marked by fewer incidents, they involved larger amounts of smuggled illicit cigarettes. Undoubtedly, the economic crisis in the Russian Federation and Ukraine deepened the differences in prices of commodities such as tobacco, thus encouraging smuggling activities. Additionally, cross-border criminal activities also included attempts to smuggle stolen vehicles and motorbikes from the EU to EB-RAN countries. Smuggling of illicit drugs, in turn, ranged from cannabis and synthetic drugs transiting/originating from the EU and smuggled towards the EB-RAN countries to heroin and precursors of amphetamines smuggled to the EU.

Thirdly, in 2014 there were fewer people moving irregularly across the common borders. However, taking into consideration the composition of the flow, purpose of travel or different *modi operandi*, different trends were observed.

In 2014, detections of illegal border-crossing remained at a low level (1 275) in comparison with other sections of the EU's external borders: only 0.5% of all illegal border-crossings reported by EU Member States at the external borders were reported from the 6 000-kilometre-long eastern borders of the EU. Arguably, this is because irregular migrants (especially non-regional nationals*) who take the route via EB-RAN countries or the Russian Federation to the EU face considerable logistic difficulties and high costs, as well as

* Migrants from countries other than the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries



** Migrants from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries

a high risk of detection resulting from efficient cooperation of border-control authorities on both sides of the common borders. Although 'push factors' in the origin countries of irregular migrants, such as Afghanistan, would point to a growing threat of illegal border-crossing, the magnitude of the threat will most likely be limited in a wider EU perspective. As regards the origin of migrants detected by EU Member States crossing the border illegally between BCPs in 2014, the share of regional migrants** declined in favour of a higher number of non-regional ones.

In contrast to the rather low level of threat of illegal border-crossing, the number of migrants refused entry remained high in 2014, even though a significant drop was recorded. The number of refusals of entry reported by EU Member States fell to almost 36 700 down from over 50 000 in 2013. However, refusals of entry reported at the EU's eastern land borders still represented 32% of the EU's total, which may indicate a persisting risk of the abuse of legal travel channels. While the large number of refusals of entry can be partly explained by new key factors affecting movements towards the EU (the ailing Russian economy and the Ukrainian crisis), some individual phenomena stood out in 2014:

1. A sharp increase in Russian citizens refused entry to Ukraine;

2. A significant drop when compared to 2013 in refusals of entry issued to Georgians by Poland, coupled with a decreasing trend of their asylum applications and detections of illegally staying Georgian nationals;
3. A decreasing number of Russian nationals of Chechen origin, travelling through Belarus to Polish land borders without a visa;
4. A noticeable increase in the number of Ukrainian citizens refused entry, applying for asylum and detected for illegal stay compared to 2013;
5. A higher number of refusals of entry to the EU issued to Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz;
6. A growing number Syrian nationals using false documents to enter the EU and subsequently apply for asylum.

The situation in Ukraine, the consequences of the economic crisis in the Russian Federation and its migration policy remain the most important uncertainties affecting the outlook for the region. So far, in terms of border security at the common borders, the impact of the Ukrainian crisis has remained limited. However, continued political and economic pressure in Ukraine does make stabilisation of the situation hard to achieve. The ongoing crisis in Ukraine remains by far the most important source of current and future population movements in the region.

1. Introduction and methodology

The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) created a concept of the Eastern Borders Conference (EBC) in August 2008. The EBC was designed as a regular activity / forum where specific challenges related to irregular migration at the eastern borders of the EU could be addressed by FRAN (Frontex Risk Analysis Network) representatives and the relevant neighbouring third countries.

By 2009 Frontex signed cooperation arrangements with Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Moldova and Belarus. Subsequently, Frontex proposed to set up a permanent Eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network (EB-RAN), to be comprised of the competent border-control authorities from the four mentioned countries and the Risk Analysis Unit of Frontex. Additional agreements were later signed allowing for the establishment of regular information exchange and joint analytical activities: with Moldova in March 2009 (Cooperation Plan), with Ukraine in November 2010 (Mechanism on information exchange for risk analysis cooperation) and with Belarus in November 2010 (Memorandum on regular exchange information and joint analytical activities). Importantly, the Russian Federation opted to stay out of the EB-RAN.*

1.1. Data collection and additional information

In order to facilitate the exchange of information between the EB-RAN countries and Frontex, the Commission and Frontex set up a secure Internet platform on the European Commission's CIRCABC server, similarly to what is available for the Frontex Risk Analysis

Network (FRAN). This platform is used exclusively by EB-RAN countries and the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit.

EB-RAN statistical data from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine are available for the period 2010–2014. The core of the overview are EB-RAN and monthly statistical data of neighbouring FRAN members: Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania (only common borders, or borders with the Russian Federation) covering the year 2014. There are five key indicators of irregular migration: (1) detections of illegal border-crossing; (2) detections of facilitators; (3) detections of illegal stay; (4) refusals of entry; and (5) asylum applications. The last indicator used in previous reports (detections of false documents) is now covered by the EDF-RAN (European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network) with its statistical templates.

The 2015 Annual Risk Analysis follows the notion of risk as defined by the updated Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model, introduced in 2011.

EB-RAN countries – Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine – were addressed, prior to the expert meeting of 10 March 2015, with a Request for Information (RFI) covering the main risks defined in accordance with CIRAM methodology.

Other sources include, in particular, bi-monthly analytical reports from EU Member States, FRAN Quarterlies, and other analyses produced in 2014 as well as reporting from different Joint Operations coordinated by Frontex. Open sources of information such as reports issued by government agencies, EU

* Even though the Russian Federation opted to stay out of the Eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network and does not contribute its work, this report continues to cover external land borders of EU Member States with the Russian Federation with data provided only by the EU Member States and Schengen Associated countries.



institutions and international or non-governmental organisations were also used.

1.2. Quality of available data

Consistent with other law-enforcement indicators, variation in administrative data related to border control depends on several factors. In this case, the number of detections of illegal border-crossing and refusals of entry are both functions of the amount of effort spent detecting migrants and the flow of irregular migrants. For example, increased detections of illegal border-crossing might be due to an actual increase in the flow of irregular migrants, or they may in fact be an outcome of more resources made available to detect them. In exceptional cases, an influx of resources may produce an increase in reported detections while effectively masking the actual decrease in the flow of migrants, resulting from a strong deterrent effect.


Similar issues should be taken into account regarding the number of detections of cross-border crime at the borders. Higher numbers of detection at a particular border-crossing point might indicate a surge in criminality, but may also be the result of more efficient border control and/or the deployment of specialists whose expertise in a certain area (the identification of stolen vehicles, for instance) may lead to increased detections. The statistical data used for this analysis should not be considered as official statistics but as management of information to support the planning of joint operational activities. The data might therefore occasionally vary from data published officially by national authorities. The use of slightly adapted FRAN monthly statistical templates by EB-RAN countries created some compatibility issues between the FRAN and EB-RAN data sets. In par-

ticular, reasons for refusals of entry (Indicator 4) are standardised for FRAN members, but vary among EB-RAN members according to their national legislations. Detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs (Indicator 1B), as reported by EB-RAN countries, should also be analysed with caution since they may also include figures for persons using forged documents (Indicator 6). It should also be taken into consideration that figures for illegal stay (Indicator 3) refer only to detections at the border on exit of persons overstaying in a particular country. Considering some of the neighbouring FRAN members, the indicator on asylum applications does not have a clear link with the common borders (especially Hungary, Finland and Norway) as most asylum seekers arrive in these countries using other routes.

1.3. Application of the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM)

A key development in the CIRAM update released in 2011 was the adoption of a management approach to risk analysis that defines risk as a function of threat, vulnerability and impact. Such an approach endeavours to emphasise risk analysis as a key tool in ensuring the optimal allocation of resources within constraints of budget, staff and efficiency of equipment. According to the model, a 'threat' is a force or pressure acting upon the external borders that is characterised by both its magnitude and likelihood; 'vulnerability' is defined as the capacity of a system to mitigate the threat and 'impact' is determined as the potential consequences of the threat. In this way, a structured and systematic breakdown of risk is presented in the risk assessment chapter.

Figure 1. Risk as defined by the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM)



Source: Frontex Risk Analysis Unit – Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM)



2. Situation at the common borders – the context

Table 1. Summary of FRAN, EB-RAN* and selected Member States** indicators for 2014

Indicator	Totals	Member States		EB-RAN
		(eastern land borders only)	% of EU total	
Illegal border-crossing between BCPs	283 532	1 275	0.4%	2 446
Clandestine entries	3 052	12	0.4%	1
Facilitators	10 234	82	0.8%	30
Illegal stay	441 780	9 413	2.1%	22 151
Refusals of entry	114 887	36 631	32%	50 476
Applications for asylum	552 055	67 198	12%	386
False travel documents	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	291
Return decision issued	252 003	29 859***	12%	n.a.
Effective returns	161 309	25 245***	16%	n.a.


* 2014 data from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine

** Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania

*** Total numbers reported in FRAN by Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania

Source: FRAN data as of 12 February 2015

Figure 2. Evolution of EB-RAN and FRAN indicators – common borders




Source: EB-RAN and FRAN data as of 17 February 2015



Figure 3. **Geographical scope of the Eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network**

Note on definitions: in the text 'common borders' refers both to borders between EU Members States and EB-RAN countries (covered by both sides) and borders of EU Member States/Schengen Associated Countries with the Russian Federation (covered only by the EU/Schengen Associated Country side of the border)



2.1. Border controls

Regular passenger flows

The total volume of regular passenger flow entering the EU at the common borders (including the border with the Russian Federation) reached over 36 million in 2014.* The total share of the third-country nationals reached 72%, while 28% of the regular passenger flow was associated with EU Member State nationals. Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine reported additional 36 million border-crossings on exit at its borders with regional neighbours, with a 35% of share related to foreigners.

Depending on the border section, the main factors affecting the magnitude of regular passenger flows include: (a) the number of visas issued by EU Member States; (b) movements under the local border traffic regime; (c) fluctuation of shopping-related cross-border travel by both EU and EB-RAN country and the Russian Federation; (d) economic situation of the EU's eastern neighbours; and (e) entry restrictions.

The Polish-Ukrainian border section remained the busiest in terms of border-crossings, followed by the Finnish-Russian border and Polish-Belarusian border.

At the regional borders the busiest section was the Ukrainian-Russian border, with a predominance of Ukrainians (62%). The Ukrainian-Moldovan border section, in turn, proved the second most frequented regional border section, with a share of over 61% of foreigners on entry.

Both common and regional borders have some distinctive seasonal trends resulting from labour migration and tourism. Peaks observed during the holiday seasons and at weekends put considerable pressure on BCP capacity, which requires an optimal use

of resources in order to reduce undue waiting time for bona fide travellers. Moreover, the economic downturn in Ukraine and the Russian Federation, as well as tense situation in the eastern part of Ukraine inevitably affected regular passenger flow in the EB-RAN region in 2014.

Composition of regular passenger flows

From the EU Member State point of view, citizens enjoying free movement are subject to minimum checks while third-country nationals, whether they require visas or not, are subject to more thorough checks, as defined by the Schengen Borders Code. Hence, the composition and volume of passenger flow determine, to a large extent, the allocation of resources for border checks.

Data on composition of the regular traffic on entry were available at all border sections for 2014, and generally the share of non-EU nationals remained clearly higher than that of EU citizens.

New developments

In 2014, there was a clear economic downturn in the eastern neighbourhood of the EU, which led to a strong devaluation of the rouble and the hryvnia. The devaluation accelerated during December 2014 and in the beginning of 2015 resulted in a corresponding decrease of the purchasing power of Russian citizens in the euro area.


This economic downturn has had a bearing on the volume and possibly also on the profile of regular passenger flows. However, the impact seems to vary strongly between border sections depending on different passenger profiles, i.e. the composition of the flow (EU/non-EU) and the purpose of travel. Considering the data till the end of 2014, there was a drop in traffic flows at EU Member States' borders with the Russian Federation, while

* Data on regular passenger flow reported by FRAN members was collected under the pilot project for the second year in a row, starting from October 2013 (with data for September 2013). While collection of EB-RAN countries' data started from 2014. Due to changes in sources as well as problems in the traffic-data collection systems amongst FRAN members, data sets of 2013 (covering only four months) are not fully comparable. Thus, yearly comparison of the total regular traffic figures is not possible.



Figure 4. **The Polish-Ukrainian border section remained the busiest in terms of regular passenger flow, followed by the Finnish-Russian border and Polish-Belarusian border**

Data on the number of regular border-crossings on entry in 2014



at the borders with Ukraine the flows were still growing in 2014.

With regards to EU Member States' borders with the Russian Federation, the impacts on the regular traffic flow became visible already at the end of 2014. At the border sections where a large share of the regular traffic flow consisted of Russian weekend trippers and shoppers, a strong correlation between the weakening value of the rouble and the volume of regular traffic flow was observed. Indeed, as the price of hol-

idays and goods in the euro area rose rapidly the total number of border-crossings declined. Decreasing regular flows could be observed in December 2014 at least at the Estonian, Norwegian and Polish borders with the Russian Federation. However, situation at the border sections with larger shares of EU nationals seems to be more stable. This is due to the fact that the strengthening euro increased the purchasing power of EU nationals on the eastern side of the border just as it reduced the purchasing power of Russians in the EU.

In contrast to the EU's borders with the Russian Federation, the number of crossings at the border with Ukraine has been growing despite the conflict in the eastern part of the country and the deteriorating economic situation in the region.

Outlook on regular traffic

Regular traffic volumes are affected by long-term factors such as development of transport connections and increased issuance of visas. However, in the short term the passenger flow might fluctuate depending more on factors other than infrastructural developments or geographical proximity. In this regard, the economic downturn in the Russian Federation and Ukraine seems to be one of the most important developments. The weakening of the Russian and Ukrainian currencies in relation to the euro is likely to limit the growth potential of regular traffic in the coming year as regards tourism, shopping trips as well as lorry traffic.


Nevertheless, the effect of the economic downturn on international travel might prove less dramatic than expected considering that travelling to the nearby regions is less expensive than long-distance travel. Moreover, regional migrants' movement to the EU in search of employment becomes increasingly popular as the value of euro-denominated salaries has now grown in relation to the hryvnia and the rouble. This might also have affect the future dynamics of regular passenger flows. Additionally, the euro-rouble exchange rate has strengthened the EU citizens' purchasing power, which may increase the passenger flow from EU Member States, also raising the overall volume of traffic at the EU's eastern borders in 2015.

Visas

Data on visa issuance by EU Member States and third countries of issuance are not yet

Figure 5. **The rising trend of issuance of short-term visas continued in 2013**

Short-term visas issued in EB-RAN countries and the Russian Federation in 2007–2013



Source: *Overview of Schengen Visa Statistics 2007–2013*, European Commission Directorate – General Home Affairs, 2014

available for 2014, but the European Commission, through its Directorate-General Home Affairs, has released the data for 2013. Visa data are collected on the basis of the place of application rather than the citizenship of the visa applicant. Thus, for instance, applications made in the Russian Federation do not necessarily only represent Russian nationals. However, for the purpose of the following overview, the country where the visas were delivered is used as the most accurate approximation of the number of visas issued to citizens of that country.

In 2013, a total of 16 196 350 short-term uniform visas were issued by EU Member States, representing an increase of 14% compared to 2012. The Russian Federation alone accounted for 43% of all visas issued in 2013, with more than 6 million visas, followed by Ukraine (1.5 million, 9%). Multiple-entry visas accounted for 49% of all visas issued in the Russian Federation.

The average refusal rate for all visa applications in 2013 was 6.2%. As regards visas issued in Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation, the refusal rates were considerably lower: 3.4% for visas issued in Ukraine, 1.4% – in the Russian Federation, and 1.2%



– in Belarus. In relative terms, the highest rate of visa refusals among EB-RAN countries was registered in Moldova, with the refusal rate of 6.3%.

Possible measures to enhance and develop border checks

The growing regular passenger flow requires the border authorities to allocated increasing resources in order to maintain border security and facilitate travel. Consistent efforts are also needed to develop BCP infrastructure in order to respond to further challenges of the increasing passenger traffic.

Although expansion or reconstruction of the BCPs requires huge investments, it simplifies border-crossings, improves travel conditions and enhances the throughput capacity. For example, construction works of Narva BCP between Estonia and the Russian Federation, carried out in the framework of a project funded by the EU under the Estonia-Latvia-Russia Cross-Border Cooperation Programme, is expected to ease traffic and double the throughput at the border, as the new pedestrian crossing point will be approximately three times bigger than the old terminal. As Narva BCP is one of the biggest road connections between the EU and the Russian Federation, these developments are essential for the whole region.



© Finnish Border Guard, 2015

Figure 6. **Renovation of the BCP of Vaalimaa at the Finnish-Russian border streamlined the border checks considerably**

Importantly, apart from mitigating the growing pressure on border checks, such investment programmes aim at promoting joint development activities for the improvement of the region's competitiveness by using its potential as the crossroads between the EU and the Russian Federation. Specifically, they focus on making the wider border area an attractive place for both its inhabitants and businesses through improving the living standards and investment climate.

Moreover, the newly constructed BCP Privalka at the Lithuanian-Belarusian border increased the BCP's capacity and improved cargo traffic security. Modern equipment and appropriate illegal traffic detection procedures enhance the effectiveness of smuggling prevention. Detailed inspection of vehicles does no longer generate long queues or impede active transit traffic through the area.

Therefore, new approaches and innovative solutions to increase the efficiency of the currently available resources are also necessary. The following non-exhaustive list of mitigation measures is intended to give a quick overview of the measures that have been planned or already implemented at various border sections in the region.

a) New logistical and technical solutions for border checks

Effectiveness and speed of border checks can be enhanced by minimising the time required for passengers to move from the vehicles to the check point. Possible solutions include the e-booking projects or pre-checks before arrival at the BCP. These solutions are in line with the growing volume of passenger and vehicle flows, providing better organisation of the flows and making border checks easier.

The positive experience of special lanes dedicated, for example, for LBT permit-holders speeded up border checks and cut queues.

Moreover, high efficiency of green corridors implemented at some BCPs at the Polish-Ukrainian border section during the UEFA Euro 2012 led to further development of this initiative and introduction of similar green corridors at the Latvian-Russian border in 2014.

Similarly, border checks performed in trains have been developed at departure stations thus minimising long stops at BCPs and giving border guards more time for the checks.

Automated Border Control (ABC) can also decrease pressure on BCP personnel. However, from the EU side of the border, the main problem has been the technical difficulty in using the ABC for border checks of third-country nationals.

b) Online queuing/registration systems for border checks

In order to avoid the formation of queues and to streamline border-crossing of bona fide travellers, several EU Member States have adopted or are planning to introduce on-line systems for lorry/bus or passenger traffic, where a time slot for border checks can be booked in advance. This is a response to the increasing regular passenger and vehicle flows.

In addition to improving the comfort of travellers, these systems make the operational environment more predictable for the border authorities and help plan the effective use of resources.

c) Strengthening of the cooperation between border and customs authorities

Close cooperation between border and customs authorities is one of the key issues in

improving the capacity to counter cross-border crime. Additionally, joint efforts help both services to use resources more efficiently, avoid duplication of work and implement additional necessary measures.

d) Legislative changes considering private imports of excise goods

Small-scale smuggling of excise goods, especially gasoline, for resale has been widespread among regular passengers at several border sections. In some locations these activities produced significant queues at BCPs. Consequently, the restrictions of these activities can have important impacts on the volume of passenger flows.

The smoothness of border checks is, indeed, a significant factor encouraging tourist flows. Importantly, improved transportation links and shorter queues at the border may stimulate the growth of tourism in the neighbouring countries.

2.2. Irregular migration

In 2014, indicators of irregular migration at the common borders showed mixed trends. There were fewer detected attempts of illegal border-crossing, but clearly more asylum applications and refusals of entry, which indicates a rising risk of the abuse of legal travel channels. Cross-border criminality, mainly large- and small-scale smuggling of excise goods (tobacco), trafficking in stolen vehicles and smuggling of drugs, remained an important threat to border security at several border sections. In fact, many detections of illegal border-crossing, especially those involving regional nationals, were linked to cross-border criminal activities rather than irregular migration.



2.2.1. Illegal border-crossing

Detections at common and regional borders

In comparison to 2013, detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs in 2014 dropped by 21% from 4 708 to 3 721 at the common and regional borders (including the border with the Russian Federation, for which only data from the EU or EB-RAN member side of the border were available). Similarly, detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs dropped by 25% from 1 771 to 1 326.

However, it needs to be emphasised that 50% of the detected illegal border-crossings between BCPs, and merely 8.2% at BCPs, were associated with the purpose of irregular migration. The share of those crossing illegally for smuggling purposes was 11% between BCPs and 23% at BCPs. 'Other' reasons, which accounted for 36% of detections between BCPs and 68% at BCPs, were reported mainly at the regional borders and were often linked to illegal hunting, fishing and other local-level activities with little or no impact on the wider EB-RAN region.

Detections by EU Member States/Schengen Associated Countries

In 2014, detections of illegal border-crossing by EU Member States remained at a low level in comparison with other parts of the external border: only 0.5% of all illegal border-crossings reported by EU Member States at external borders were reported from the 6 000-kilometre-long eastern borders of the EU.

In line with the figures from the common and regional borders, EU Member States also reported decreasing (-3.1%) numbers of illegal border-crossings between BCPs in 2014 (1 275) compared with the previous year (1 316). The drop in relation to 2013 can be mainly explained by lower detections of Georgians,

Moldovans, Ukrainians, Somalis, Eritreans and Russians at the EU's eastern borders.

The total number of clandestine entry attempts at BCPs at the common borders detected by EU Member States was only 12. However, considering the high volume of vehicle and lorry as well (cargo and passenger) train traffic crossing the common borders, the risk of this *modus operandi* should not be underestimated.

Composition of the flow

In contrast to the previous year, in 2014 EU Member States detected more illegal border-crossings by transiting non-regional migrants than regional nationals. In relative terms, illegal border-crossing is the preferred *modus operandi* used by non-regional migrants to enter the EU. Moreover, the purpose of illegal border-crossing tends to differ depending on the type of migratory flow. In the case of regional nationalities, reasons other than irregular migration (e.g. smuggling) accounted for almost half of detections of illegal border-crossing, while for non-regional migrants irregular migration was clearly the main purpose of illegal entry.

In terms of nationalities reported by EU Member States, Vietnamese ranked first, followed by Afghans and Georgians. Vietnamese were the fastest growing detected nationality, even though their detections remained low in a wider European comparison.

Main entry points

At the common borders, with data available from both sides of the border, the greatest number of detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs was reported at the Lithuanian-Belarusian border.

While Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania reported the highest number of illegal bor-

der-crossings between BCPs at the common borders, the largest increase, both in relative and absolute terms, was reported by Latvia and Hungary.

In 2014, the share of regional migrants detected for illegal border-crossing between BCPs by EU Member States decreased in favour of the growing proportion of non-regional migration.

2.2.2. Abuse of legal entries


In contrast to the decreasing trend in detections of illegal border-crossing, the number of refusals of entry was relatively stable when compared to 2013, with an increase of only 2.6% (from 84 929 to 87 107). However, refusals of entry issued at the EU's eastern borders represented 32% of the EU total, what may still indicate a high risk of the abuse of legal travel channels.

Importantly, significant changes were observed in 2014 in terms of the top nationalities. Undoubtedly, the consequences of the financial turbulences in the Russian Federation as well as the crisis and worsening economic situation in Ukraine were important factors affecting movements to the EU, including cases of the abuse of legal travel channels. The most important phenomena in 2014 were:

1. A sharp increase in the number of Russian citizens refused entry to Ukraine;
2. A significant drop in refusals of entry issued to Georgians compared to 2013, together with fewer asylum applications and illegal stay detections of these nationals;
3. A decreasing number of Russian nationals of Chechen origin travelling through Belarus to Polish land borders without a visa, being refused entry and then apply-

Figure 7. **The share of regional migrants in the total Member States' detections of illegal border-crossing in 2014 shrank in favour of non-regional migration flow**

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs by neighbouring FRAN members with shares of regional and other migrants in 2011–2014



Source: FRAN data as of 17 February 2015

ing for asylum in Poland just to travel further to Germany;

4. A noticeable increase in the number of Ukrainian citizens refused entry, applying for asylum and detected for illegal stay compared to 2013;
5. An increase in refusals of entry issued to Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz;
6. Increasing use of false documents by Syrian nationals to enter the EU.

2.2.3. Document fraud

Similarly to refusals of entry, detections of fraudulent documents at the common borders were most commonly made at the borders with Ukraine. Záhony at the Hungarian-Hungarian land border, followed by Medyka and Korczowa at the Polish-Ukrainian border, reported the most document fraud on entry to the EU/Schengen area.



2.3. Institutional changes

Visa liberalisation process with Eastern Partnership countries

The EU conducts 'Visa Liberalisation Dialogues' with Ukraine and Georgia. Through these dialogues, the EU is taking gradual steps towards the long-term goal of visa-free travel on a case-by-case basis, provided that conditions for well-managed and secure mobility are in place. The dialogues are built upon 'Visa Liberalisation Action Plans' (VLAP), which include four blocks of benchmarks related to (block 1) document security, including biometrics; (block 2) border management, migration and asylum; (block 3) public order and security; and (block 4) external relations and fundamental rights. The benchmarks concern both the policy and institutional framework (legislation and planning).

The EU-Ukraine Visa Liberalisation Dialogue was launched on 29 October 2008 and the VLAP was presented to the Ukraine on 22 November 2010. Upon the last Commission's report (27 May 2014) and its Council endorsement (23 June 2014) Ukraine is now officially in the second phase of its VLAP.

The EU-Georgia Visa Liberalisation Dialogue was launched on 4 June 2012 and the VLAP was presented to the Georgian authorities on 25 February 2013. Georgia started implementing the second stage of the VLAP on 29 October 2014.

Impact of EU-Moldova visa liberalisation

By far the most striking impact of visa liberalisation for Moldova was linked to passenger flows at the Romanian border with Moldova. With an exception of asylum claims at the EU level, which increased marginally, other indicators followed a very similar trend as in the case of visa liberalisation with the Western Balkans.

Detections of illegal border-crossing declined, while refusals of entry doubled and illegal stay increased slightly. In conclusion, visa liberalisation for biometric passport-holders from Moldova has so far produced the expected and largely positive effects (greater mobility, better contacts between communities on both sides of the border, etc.). The situation, however, needs more monitoring, in particular with regard to persons detected for staying illegally in EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries.

2.4. Selected countries of transit and origin

The Russian Federation

The Russian Federation is one of the largest receivers of migrants in the world with roughly 10 million foreign workers staying in the country. It is estimated that there is approximately 3.5–4 million irregular labour migrants working in the Russian Federation. The vast majority of them originate from CIS countries, mostly Uzbekistan, Ukraine and Tajikistan.

As a result of the influx of immigrants looking for work, especially in the capital, nationalist sentiments and tensions between particular ethnic groups are on the rise. To come up to the social expectations, between 23 October and 2 November 2014 the authorities carried out the operation 'Migrant-2014'. According to the press office of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, in four days the administrative status of 14 000 migrants was checked and 7 000 people were arrested. A similar operation, named 'Operation Illegal 2014', was conducted in St. Petersburg between 22 September and 10 October 2014.

Furthermore, apart from the wide-scale police raids in the country's major urban centres, Russian authorities continued with their more restrictive migration policies by introducing

legal amendments. New rules came into effect on 1 January 2015 abolishing the former quota system and requiring all foreign workers to obtain work permits, the price of which more than tripled. Migrants are also obliged to pass language tests, prove their knowledge of the Russian history and basic laws and cover their own health insurance. In addition, residents of CIS countries must be in possession of a foreign passport in order to enter the Russian Federation.

Importantly, economic sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation over its annexation of Ukraine's Crimea peninsula have adversely affected the Russian financial market. Indeed, loss of business confidence, shrinking foreign investments as well as outflow of capital from the Russian Federation has already had a negative impact on the Russian economy.

The deteriorating economic situation inevitably influenced the labour market making it difficult for migrants to find low-skilled jobs. Moreover, working in the Russian Federation has become unprofitable since migrants' wages almost halved and, consequently, the amount of remittances sent home significantly shrank.

Georgia

On 1 September 2014 Georgia introduced a new law on 'The Legal Status of Aliens and Stateless Persons' abolishing hitherto visa-free entry and unlimited stay, which made Georgia one of the most open places in the

world. Visa-free stay will now be limited to 90 days and those who need a visa will need to apply for it at Georgian embassies or consulates before travelling to Georgia, rather than just receive it at the border. In general, foreigners who currently work in Georgia without a visa will have to apply for work permits. While some argue that Georgia adopted 'punitive model of migration management', Georgian officials state that these measures lie in Georgia's national security interest and will help to combat trafficking and customs fraud as well as irregular migration.

Nevertheless, shortening the duration of visa-free stay from 360 to 90 days might reduce the number of visitors and possibly translate into weaker economic indicators in the coming year. The new entry restrictions to Georgia might possibly also result in changing the migratory routes in the region.

Ukraine

The ongoing crisis in Ukraine is by far the most important source of current and future population movements. Apart from physical security threat in the conflict zone in the east of the country, most inhabitants of Ukraine are also negatively impacted by inflation of consumer prices (nearly 25% in 2014). The central bank expects to see an inflation rate as high as 18% in 2015. Ukraine's economy is also in a deep financial crisis as the country's ability to sustain imports with its currency reserves is rapidly shrinking. This economic downturn might push increasing numbers of Ukrainians to move towards the EU.



3. Annual risk assessment

The following risk assessment is guided by the CIRAM working definition of risk as a function of three main components: threat, vulnerability and impact. A systematic examination of each component allows for classifying risks into categories of significance.

Establishing a general context in which border authorities from EB-RAN countries and the neighbouring Member States operated during 2014 is therefore important for identifying the main border (regional and common) security risks. To narrow down the selection, a detailed analysis of the available monthly statistical data (both FRAN and EB-RAN), Frontex operational data, bi-monthly reports and previous EB-RAN annual risk analyses was performed. The following three main risks have been identified:

* Commonwealth of Independent States

1. Risk of cross-border smuggling and exploitation of green/blue borders as a point of entry for smuggled goods (tobacco products, drug precursors and drugs, stolen vehicles and other goods);
2. Risk of significant transiting irregular migration flows originating outside of the wider EB-RAN region;
3. Risk of sustained irregular migration flows from the EB-RAN region, including CIS* and Eastern Partnership countries.

Each identified risk is described in detail, broken down by its main components.

3.1. Risk of cross-border smuggling and exploitation of green/blue borders as a point of entry for smuggled goods (tobacco products, drug precursors and drugs, stolen vehicles and other goods)

EB-RAN data, as well as information from Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations supported by open sources, indicate that cross-border criminality, mainly large- and small-scale smuggling of excise goods, trafficking in stolen vehicles and drug smuggling remain the most significant threats to border security at the common land borders.

Due to the legal and institutional characteristics, national border guard authorities along the EU eastern border have different types and degrees of responsibility in the fight against cross-border crimes. Moreover, the nature and extent of inter-agency cooperation at the external borders differs greatly between these countries. Typically, preventing the smuggling of goods falls under the responsibility of customs authorities rather than border guards. Nevertheless, border guards regularly have to react and engage in combating these criminal activities, especially along the green borders. Indeed, according to statistical data, at some border sections smuggling of goods seems to be a more frequent reason of illegal border-crossing than irregular migration.

Smuggling of excise goods

As a response to formal EU requirements on the minimum level of excise duty, EU Member States have to bring their national legislation in line with the tobacco directives, resulting in price changes. Between January 2013 and July 2014, 22 EU Member States increased their excise duties on cigarettes, on average by EUR 0.10 per pack of cigarettes, as defined by the European Commission.*

Currently, an average pack of cigarettes would cost EUR 5 in Finland, whereas across the Russian border, a customer would pay less than EUR 1 for the same good.

Large differences in price of excise goods between EU countries and their neighbours remain a major incentive for the smuggling of tobacco products. Not only individual consumers and small-scale 'ant-smugglers' from economically weak border regions try to take advantage of the existing price differences. Large-scale criminal businesses illicitly import large amount of cigarettes hidden on freight trains and in lorries.

To address the problem of contraband and counterfeited cigarettes on the EU markets, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) has signed legally binding agreements with the world's four largest tobacco manufacturers, which cover 80% of the global market. Apart from the companies' commitments to sell their products to legitimate clients only, important preventive measures such as a tracking system have been implemented. However, one of the main problems of cigarettes' oversupply in the third-country markets, where only an insignificant share can be absorbed by the local demand, has not been solved. Smaller companies outside the EU continue to sell large quantities of tobacco products destined for and smuggled to EU Member States. In particular the seizures of 'cheap white brands' have shown a strong upward tendency over the past years.


The concept of the tracking system assisting law-enforcement authorities in determining if cigarettes have been traded illegally was further developed under the Protocol to

* European Commission, Excise duty tables – part III, European Commission, Directorate General, Taxation and Customs Union, REF 1042, January 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/excise_duties/tobacco_products/rates/excise_duties-part_iii_tobacco_en.pdf



Figure 8. **Large differences in cigarette prices between EU Member States and their neighbours remain a strong incentive for smuggling**

Average cigarette prices (pack of 20) in the EU and neighbouring third countries



Source: European Commission (prices in Member States) and open sources (prices outside the EU)

Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, closed for signature by the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control on 9 January 2014. To assist in the investigation of illicit cross-border trade in tobacco products, it requires the signatories to implement a global tracking and tracing regime through unique, secure and non-removable identification markings, such as codes or stamps on cigarette packages. Within the EU,

this and other measures for public health are implemented through the revised Tobacco Products Directive, which entered into force on 19 May 2014 and will apply after a transposition period of two years.

Undoubtedly, the economic downturn in the Russian Federation and Ukraine with a sharp devaluation of the rouble and the hryvnia in 2014 deepened price differences of such ex-

cise commodities such as tobacco, petrol and alcohol. The smuggling of cigarettes from the EU eastern border countries affected the by economic crisis remained highly profitable and still fuelled the growth of transnational OCGs active in that business.

In 2014, the largest share of illicit cigarettes reported through Frontex Joint Operations, was smuggled across the eastern borders of the EU. More than 14.6 million cigarettes were seized by the authorities in 303 incidents. Most detections of small-scale cigarette smuggling were linked to residents of border regions or other frequently travelling individuals. While small amounts of cigarettes were brought by individuals in cars and buses in primitive hiding places, OCGs used specially constructed vehicles concealments.

As for fuel smuggling, the contraband of petroleum products was mainly reported from the EU's eastern borders with Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. It was encouraged by the price difference between EU Member States and their third-country neighbours. In many cases, the smugglers crossed the border several times a week to fill up the large or illegally extended petrol tanks of their private vehicles. This type of smuggling not only caused substantial fiscal losses but also increased the workload of border guards significantly. Frequently, fuel smugglers were responsible for large shares of the border queues at the BCPs at common borders.

Exit of stolen motor vehicles

According to Eurostat, the total number of vehicles including cars, motorcycles, buses, lorries, construction and agricultural vehicles stolen in the EU was steadily falling from 1.85 million in 1998 to 0.88 million in 2010. Among the reasons for the decline were the advanced technical protection technologies

developed by the producers and intensified international law-enforcement cooperation.

Only a small share of the vehicles stolen in the EU are detected at its external borders, often in the context of Frontex Joint Operations. In contrast to the overall theft statistics, detections at the borders reported to Frontex showed a decrease from 519 in 2013 to 430 in 2014, around 60% of which at the EU's eastern borders. Stolen vehicle detected included passenger cars, lorries, trailers, boats, excavators, agricultural machines and motorbikes.

Most car thefts were detected by querying SIS II, INTERPOL and national theft data with the Vehicle Identification Numbers (VIN) placed on the engine, frame and major parts of most motor vehicles. Car thieves applied various *modi operandi* to conceal the identity of their stolen vehicles at the external borders.

Stolen vehicles were regularly reported at the EU's eastern borders, where such cases detected on exit decreased from 313 in 2013 to 260 in 2014. The brand preferences did not change over the last years, as more than 40% of the private vehicles detected were produced by Mercedes Benz, Volkswagen and BMW. A slight change, in turn, was noticed in the type of stolen vehicles. More older cars were reported as stolen than brand new and luxury ones, which might suggest possible changes in the preferences of target groups in response to their diminished financial means.


Most persons driving the stolen vehicles on exit from the EU were nationals of the country which they intended to enter while leaving the EU. For example, 80% of the persons caught with a stolen vehicle at the EU's borders with Ukraine were Ukrainian nationals, only 18% were EU citizens.

Most stolen cars were reported from the EU's eastern borders exiting the EU through Pol-



Figure 9. **EB-RAN countries continue to be the market for vehicles stolen in the EU**

Main routes of stolen vehicles across the EU's eastern borders in 2014



Source: Joint Operations Reporting Application and Member State bi-monthly reports

ish BCPs, particularly Medyka and Korczowa, to Ukraine. These BCPs are situated at or in proximity of the economically important European Route E40, which connects Western Europe with the countries of Central Asia. Stolen vehicles mainly originated from Italy, Poland and Germany.

Authorities of EU Member States bordering Ukraine registered a further rise in stolen motorbikes transported hidden in vans or lorries on the direction to Ukraine. The phenomenon spread to an extent that one-third of the vehicles detected at this border sec-

tion were motorbikes, which were almost entirely stolen in Italy.

Smuggling of illicit drugs

In 2014, the overall amount of cannabis reported by border authorities as smuggled from Poland to Belarus and Ukraine was higher than in the previous year, even though the number of detected cases and the period of seizures were comparable to 2013. This quantity of the drug detected per detected case was significantly greater.

Cannabis is smuggled to Europe in the form of two distinct products, cannabis resin ('hashish') and herbal cannabis ('marijuana'). The main provider of cannabis resin to Europe is Morocco, although its production capacities are in decline.

Belarusian and Polish Border Guards reported that only between September and December 2014, there were five major trafficking cases leading to the seizure of a total amount of around 550 kg of cannabis. The amount detected in Belarus only during the last four months of 2014 represented 91% of the hashish seized during the whole year at the EU's eastern borders.

With regards to cocaine, according to EMCDDA calculations based on seizure data, it is the third most smuggled drug in Europe after cannabis resin and herb. The number of seizures increased between the mid-1990s and 2007, but have been declining since 2009. Reported quantities slightly increased in 2011 and 2012, mostly because of seizures made in transit countries including Spain and Belgium. Some of the cocaine seized in the EU was in fact destined for emerging markets in third countries such as the Russian Federation.

Although most shipments of cocaine continue to enter the EU through Western Europe, a diversification of trafficking routes is taking place. Apart from direct shipments across the Atlantic, a large share of cocaine from South America destined for Europe is smuggled via the African route. This might have been the case of the seizure of 116 kg of cocaine in the seaport Klaipeda in December 2014. This was the largest shipment of cocaine from Central

Africa detected in recent years by Lithuanian customs officers. The cost of the drugs was estimated at over EUR 6.6 million.

As regards heroin, most of the drug consumed in the EU is produced in Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, in Iran and Pakistan. Heroin is transported to Europe along a variety of routes, including the Northern route, which runs through Central Asia and the Russian Federation.

Changes in legislation

Adjustments of legislation and introduction of limitations for the import of excise goods may give border officials the authority to tackle small-scale fuel or cigarette smuggling cases at BCPs. It would also reduce the workload of border authorities.

Close cooperation between border-control authorities and customs services

The detection of drugs and smuggled excise goods requires a close cooperation between border-control authorities and customs services.

Border security investments

Investments in the area of border security definitely constitute a major deterrent factor for smugglers. As an example, the new border surveillance system lately installed in Lithuania along the most vulnerable land border section with Belarus significantly reduced illicit border-crossings, primarily related to cigarette smuggling.



3.2. Risk of significant transiting irregular migration flows originating outside of the wider EB-RAN region

3.2.1. Description of the threat

EB-RAN members are transit countries for irregular migrants originating outside of the region, including the Middle East, South Asia, South-East Asia and Africa, moving to the EU. Illegal entries and transit flows are often combined with further secondary movement inside the EU area. The threat of non-regional migration flow along the routes via EB-RAN countries and the Russian Federation remains, though on a relatively lower level than on other transiting migration routes (e.g. via Turkey or North African countries).

As migrants are facing more logistic difficulties and higher costs while transiting the EB-RAN countries, the routes along the EU's eastern borders seem to be less attractive. In addition, the risk of detection is regarded as high while travelling illegally to the EU due to efficient cooperation of border control authorities at the common borders and strengthening border security.

Nevertheless, the transit of non-regional migrants via the EB-RAN region and the Russian Federation should not be underestimated. Although the EB-RAN countries as such do not form a unified transiting 'route' towards the EU, there are links between phenomena observed at different border sections along the common borders, indicating that facilitators are actively searching for vulnerable border sections. Notably, in 2014 the EU's eastern 'green' borders were significantly affected by the increasing influx of non-regional nationals (Afghans, Vietnamese and Syrians). Moreover, ongoing pressure of African migrants from the Russian Federation was also observed.

3.2.2. Magnitude of the threat

Illegal border-crossings

In 2014, EU Member States reported 754 detections of illegal border-crossing by non-regional migrants at the common borders and borders with the Russian Federation, which was 19% more when compared to 2013 (633), and 15% less than in 2012 (886).

Illegal border-crossings reported on both sides of the common borders (with available data for Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) show a 24% increase when compared to the previous year (from 1 035 in 2013 to 1 285 in 2014).

The growth resulted from a sharp increase in Afghans and Vietnamese nationals, predominating in the flow of non-regional migrants via the EU's eastern borders in 2014.

Routes

As far as the routes are concerned, the Slovakian-Ukrainian border remained the busiest border section in terms of illegal border-crossing of non-regional migrants, followed by the Lithuanian-Belarusian border. Hungary and Ukraine, in turn, recorded the highest increases in the number of migrants originating from the wider EB-RAN region detected at their common border, both in relative and absolute terms compared to the previous year.

It is estimated that well-established facilitation networks as well as significant non-regional communities in the EB-RAN countries played a key role in choosing the transit routes via the EU's eastern borders.

Modi operandi

According to EB-RAN experts, illegal border-crossing of non-regional migrants is increasingly facilitated. It includes several legs of the journey and usually involves several criminal groups or hired local drivers who deal with particular parts of the trip on both sides of the common borders.

Seasonality

According to EB-RAN data collected on a monthly basis, detections at both the common and regional borders show seasonal fluctuations with the threat of illegal border-crossings peaking in October 2014, similarly to 2013.

In 2014, seasonal movements of non-regional irregular migrants were also affected by the situation in Ukraine. By contrast to the previous year, in 2014 a sharp increase in detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs was observed between March – marking the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine – and April.

Composition of the flow

Composition of the non-regional migration flow depends on a variety of push and pull factors including the changing situation in their countries of origin, on other routes leading to the EU, and operational responses by the EU and EB-RAN country authorities. In 2014, the flow of non-regional migration between BCPs at the common borders was dominated by Afghans, Vietnamese and Syrians, together accounting for almost 65% of the flow of migrants from the wider EB-RAN region.

Detections of Afghans illegally crossing the EU's eastern borders between BCPs increased significantly at the common borders in 2014, placing them on the top of detected non-regional migrants. Illegal border-crossings

of Afghans at the common borders hiked by almost 60% up to 346 in 2014, when compared to 2013.

Notably, in 2014 eastern European green borders were also affected by the influx of Vietnamese migrants reported in the highest numbers since 2009. The detections of nationals of Vietnam at the common and regional borders increased by 65% (from 209 in 2013 to 345 in 2014).

As Vietnamese comprise a significant portion of economic refugees seeking better living conditions and opportunities they tend to move further towards Western Europe. Those who manage to cross the EU external borders target countries such as Poland and Germany.

Similarly to the previous year, in 2014 Syrian nationals became the third top non-regional nationality detected for illegal border-crossing at the EU's eastern borders. While common border sections saw a 59% increase in detected Syrians, the regional borders faced only few incidents related to Syrians in 2014.


The increasing trend is linked to the ongoing civil war in Syria, which has produced large displacements and refugee flows, also towards the EU via EB-RAN countries. It is worth pointing out that apart from Finland, there were no detections of Syrian nationals at the EU's eastern borders on exit from the Russian Federation.

It is very likely that the Syrians detected at the common borders are mainly headed for Sweden and Germany, which are the main destination countries for Syrian asylum applicants within the EU.



Figure 10. **As in the previous year, most detections of non-regional migrants were made in October 2014**


Monthly detections of illegal border-crossings between BCPs of non-regional migrants reported at the common and regional borders in 2013–2014



Source: FRAN and EB-RAN data as of 17 February 2015

Figure 11. **While the common borders saw a 59% increase in detected Syrians compared to 2013, there were only few such incidents reported at the regional borders in 2014**

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs of Syrians reported at the common and regional borders as well as those reported exclusively by FRAN members at the EU eastern border



Source: FRAN and EB-RAN data as of 17 February 2015

Illegal border-crossing at BCPs (clandestine entries)

The detection of clandestine entries of non-regional nationals reported by EU Member States at the common borders was limited to individual cases. Only a minority of incidents reported at the common borders were related to illegal migration and about 80% were associated with smuggling or reported under other reasons.

Due to the growing regular traffic flow of goods in lorries and trains the detection of this *modus operandi* may become more challenging and should not be underestimated.

False documents

The main change observed in 2014 was the growing number of non-regional migrants in possession of false documents. The top five of the false document users included citizens of Syria, Sri Lanka, Iran, Afghanistan and Cuba with the highest increase in relative terms recorded for migrants from Sri Lanka. In total, as reported by the EU Member States the number of non-regional top five migrants detected using false documents increased more than 50% when compared to 2013.

Abuse of legal travel channels

Attempts to abuse legal travel channels, especially visa issuance, are regularly reported by the EU Member States situated along the EU's eastern borders. It is likely that similar methods are used also in EB-RAN countries. Non-regional migrants used visas obtained under false pretences to a much lesser extent than it was the case for the nationalities from the EB-RAN region. However, taking into account detections of fraudulently obtained visas at the EU airports of the reporting EU Member States (used for example by citizens of Iraq and Syria) this phenomenon should not be underestimated at the land borders.

Importantly, the year 2014 was marked by a new phenomenon related to the abuse of legal travel channels. As Belarus took an unprecedented step abolishing visas for visitors and participants of the IIHF World Hockey Championship, fans were able to enter Belarus without a visa if they had valid tickets for the event. Indeed, an increased flow of non-regional migrants posing as hockey fans was reported.

Indeed, apprehensions for attempts or for illegal border-crossing reported by both sides of the common border with Belarus covered a wider scope of non-regional nationals in 2014 than in 2013. Apart from the influx of Vietnamese, also detected were citizens of Iraq, Iran, India, Syria, Afghanistan, Egypt, Senegal, Bangladesh, Cuba and Morocco.

According to EB-RAN experts visa abuse cases tend to require a lot of effort from the border authorities. Presumably, the exchange of information under the VIS system leading to enhanced cooperation of consulates is likely to reduce the risk of visa abuse.

3.2.3. Impact

Loss of life

Exposure to harsh winter conditions while crossing the border illegally can prove fatal, especially for those not fully aware of or prepared for the risks. However, even summertime crossing can be dangerous, e.g. for people traversing border rivers.

Labour exploitation and trafficking in human beings (especially Vietnamese nationals)

In the EU, Vietnamese irregular migrants are working unregistered, for example, in nail bars, as gardeners in cannabis plantations and as couriers for methamphetamine. There is indeed an increased risk of trafficking in human beings associated with Vietnamese irregular migration through the common borders, as Vietnamese were one of the most detected nationalities of victims of human trafficking in the EU.

Time consuming second-line checks in visa abuse cases

Validating a long string of travel plans, work contracts etc. in second-line checks with limited availability of interpreters creates additional workload at BCPs.



3.3. Risk of sustained irregular migration flows from the EB-RAN region, including CIS* and Eastern Partnership countries

* Commonwealth of Independent States

The threat of irregular migration flows originating from the EB-RAN region, including CIS* and Eastern Partnership countries (regional migrants), resulted from a variety of different migration motives and *modi operandi*. This is natural due to the geographic proximity, large regular passenger flows and sizeable labour migration.

Despite important variations between nationalities and rapid political and economic changes unfolding in the region, the following main irregular migration trends of recent years continued in 2014: (a) the threat of illegal border-crossings with the purpose of migration remains relatively low, while (b) the threat of abuse of legal travel channels (asylum misuse, overstaying, obtaining visas under false pretences) is much higher.

Even though the abuse of legal travel channels may not be facilitated meaning that persons are guided through the border, individual parts of the journey of irregular migrants are facilitated starting from production of fraudulent supporting documents to taxi-drivers arranging their intra-EU movements. As these facilitating acts usually precede or follow the actual border-crossing, they are challenging to identify and prosecute by the border authorities.

Illegal border-crossing

When considering data on illegal border-crossing by regional migrants, two main observations should be made. First, in contrast to transiting non-regional migrants, regional migrants are relatively less likely to cross the border illegally for reasons linked to irregular migration but rather do it in connection to other (usually economic) activities. Secondly, the data need to be read carefully as

the reporting countries still follow slightly different practices in reporting the purpose of illegal border-crossing.

In 2014, there was a clear decrease in the number of detected illegal border-crossings by regional migrants. EU Member States/SACs reported a 24% decrease (521 detections in 2014). Moreover, only 281 detections were reported to be linked with irregular migration, while 87 were connected with smuggling and 126 with 'other' reasons (including fishing, tourism, etc.).

Considering both sides of the common borders (with data available for Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine), 2014 was also marked by a clear 27% decrease in detections of regional migrants.

The most affected section of the regional borders remained the Ukrainian-Moldovan border; however, it should be underlined that at the regional borders most cases of illegal border-crossing involved local inhabitants and were largely not connected with migration, but rather with activities such as smuggling, illegal logging, fishing or hunting. This also explains the fact that a great majority of the detected illegal border-crossings were made by the nationals of the countries sharing the border.

Abuse of legal travel channels

In contrast to the threat of illegal border-crossing, the magnitude of the abuse of legal travel channels is much higher as can be seen when indicators such as refusals of entry and illegal stay are analysed. A considerable proportion of the refusals and illegal stayers were not necessarily connected with irregular migration. Some cases simply resulted

from accidental attempts to cross the border on an expired visa or short overstay with no intention of irregular migration.

The total number of refusals of entry issued at the eastern European borders has fluctuated over the past few years, with 2014 marking a clear overall decrease. As regards nationalities, the number of refusals issued to Russian and Georgian nationals decreased significantly, while refusals to Ukrainian and Belarusian nationals remained relatively stable. The number of refusals of entry reported by FRAN members at the EU's eastern land borders was over 36 600 in 2014 – a great majority of them issued to regional nationalities. Although 2014 saw a marked decrease from roughly 50 000 refusals in 2013, mainly due to fewer refusals issued to Russian and Georgian nationals, refusals issued at the EU's eastern borders accounted for 32% of the EU total, which shows that attempts to abuse legal entries persist at the common borders.

There were also over 41 000 detections of illegal stay by regional migrants detected by all EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries. Poland reported the largest number of detections of illegal stay, followed by the EU Member States with no shared land border with EB-RAN countries or the Russian Federation, i.e. Germany, Sweden, and Austria. This indicates possible secondary movements from the common borders to more distant EU Member States.

New developments

The most important new developments were connected with the crisis in Ukraine. As the situation in the eastern part of the country deteriorated, there were increased movements of people inside Ukraine. In comparison to internal displacement, the number of Ukrainians fleeing the conflict and moving to the EU was relatively modest.

Citizens of Ukraine

Most displaced Ukrainians stayed in the country (610 413 IDPs as of 25 December 2014) or moved to neighbouring countries (in total 593 609 externally displaced as of 24 December 2014), mainly to the Russian Federation, but there were also some increase in movements towards the EU.

Considering indicators of irregular migration, the number of detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs by Ukrainian citizens remained at a very low level. Moreover, only 60 out of 154 detections of illegal border-crossings between BCPs by Ukrainian citizens reported at all EU external borders were linked to irregular migration. This is most likely due to two factors: (a) Ukrainians tend to prefer legal travel channels; and (b) Ukraine was able to keep border surveillance at a sufficient level despite transfers of personnel to eastern parts of the country.

Significant changes in the number of asylum applications and detections of illegal stay were recorded in 2014.

Ukrainian nationals increasingly applied for asylum in many EU Member States/Schengen Associated Countries. In total, there were over 12 300 applications for asylum by Ukrainian nationals compared to only 791 in 2013. Most applications were made in October 2014.

Although the number of asylum seekers from Ukraine is still perceived as high, a steady decreasing trend of submitted asylum claims has been observed since October 2014.

As to the country of application, Germany ranked first, followed by Poland, Italy and Sweden. This is very much in line with the most popular destination countries of Ukrainian labour migrants and it is possible that at least during the first half of 2014 many



Ukrainians applying for asylum had in fact stayed in the EU for a longer period.

Furthermore, a significant increase in detections of Ukrainian nationals illegally staying in the EU was recorded, from 12 472 in 2013 to 16 744 in 2014. However, it should be noted that 45% of the detections were made on exit at the external land and air borders, meaning that most of these persons were in fact voluntarily returning to Ukraine.

Citizens of the Russian Federation

The main *modus operandi* to enter the EU for irregular migrants from the Russian Federation was clearly the abuse of legal travel channels. In 2014, there were only 131 detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs by Russian citizens reported by FRAN members at the common borders, of which only 44 were connected with irregular migration.

In contrast, the number of refusals of entry issued to Russians in recent years was huge. This is linked to the phenomenon of Russian nationals of Chechen origin travelling through Belarus to the Polish land border without a visa. Once refused entry and they apply for asylum in Poland as a way to travel further to Germany to make another asylum application there and subsequently overstay. However, in 2014 the extent of this phenomenon clearly decreased. Refusals of entry at the Polish borders issued to Russian nationals decreased threefold from almost 16 000 in 2013 to roughly 5 000 in 2014. The lower numbers of asylum applications in Poland and Germany as well as lower detections of illegal stay in Germany also confirm the decreased volume of the flow.

Citizens of Georgia

In general, the main *modus operandi* of Georgian nationals attempting irregular entry to the EU has remained unchanged over the past

few years, with only minor modifications. The journey generally includes three legs: (a) from Georgia to Belarus/Ukraine; (b) to cross the EU's eastern green border illegally or to apply for asylum at the BCP; and (c) secondary movements inside the Schengen area to reach their country of destination.

As far as illegal border-crossings between BCPs are concerned, detections of Georgian nationals clearly decreased. EU Member States/Schengen Associated Countries reported 171 detections in 2014 as opposed to 235 in 2013. The total for all common and regional borders reveals an even more pronounced drop, i.e. from 686 to 376.

The numbers of refusals of entry, asylum claims and detections of illegal stay of Georgian nationals decreased. By contrast, at the same time the number of Georgian illegal stayers in the EU in fact increased.

Detections of illegal border-crossing and refusals of entry issued to Georgian citizens show a decreasing inflow of Georgians to the EU. However, increased detections of illegal stay and a stable trend of asylum applications might point to their continued abuse of legal entry channels.

Citizens of Moldova

The implementation of visa liberalisation in May 2014 brought no major negative phenomena. As expected, visa liberalisation further accelerated the decreasing trend in detection of illegal border-crossing already observed in previous years.

With an exception of asylum claims, other indicators followed a very similar trend as was the case for visa liberalisation with the Western Balkans. Detections of illegal border-crossing declined, illegal stay increased, while refusals of entry doubled. As for refusals of entry, most of the increase was con-

centrated at air borders of EU Member States such as Italy, thus not impacting the common land borders.

By far the most striking effect was observed on regular passenger flows at the Romanian border with Moldova, which showed an increase when compared to 2013.


In conclusion, visa liberalisation for biometric passport-holders from Moldova has so far produced the expected and largely positive effects (greater mobility, better contacts between communities on both sides of the border, etc.). The situation, however, needs more monitoring, in particular with regard to persons detected staying illegally in EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries.

Other regional nationals

Irregular migration of other CIS-country nationals such as Uzbeks, Azerbaijanis or Tajiks tended to affect the regional rather than common borders. In this regard, the changes in migration policy regulations in the Russian Federation, which is the main destination for migrants from Central Asian CIS countries, seem to be an important factor. Most of significant changes refer to labour migrants, which might strongly affect further movements of migrant labour force within the Russian Federation.

Figure 12. Indicators on asylum, refusals of entry and illegal stay in Germany and Poland show a clear decrease in the flow of Russian irregular migrants of Chechen origin through the common borders

Quarterly levels of Russian asylum applications (in Poland and Germany), refusals of entry issued to Russians by Poland and Russian illegal stayers detected in Germany in 2013–2014



Source: FRAN data as of 17 February 2015



4. Outlook

4.1. Regular traffic

The long-term factors for growth of regular cross-border traffic remain valid. However, due to the economic slowdown in Ukraine and the Russian Federation, deepened further by the Ukrainian crisis, the prospect for economic growth in 2015 is clearly bleaker than in previous years, possibly leading to lower regular traffic flows at some border sections.

Nevertheless, the measures to increase the capacity of BCPs by improving infrastructure, technology and border check processes should not be abandoned but, on the contrary, further encouraged. This is especially important in terms of (a) the Visa Information System requiring fingerprint verification and biometric visa issuance at BCPs; and (b) possible further visa liberalisations between the EU and Eastern Partnership countries (Georgia, Ukraine), which would most likely increase traffic flows and raise the workload associated with validating the conditions of entry.

4.2. Cross-border crime

Cross-border crime will remain a major challenge affecting both green borders and BCPs. Price differences of commodities such as tobacco, petrol and alcohol are seen by EB-RAN experts as a vulnerability encouraging smuggling of excise goods from the region to the EU. This vulnerability may now be exacerbated by the widening of the price spread due to the devaluation of the rouble and hryvnia. Evidence is still too patchy to allow for any reliable conclusions, but the increase in the profitability of excise goods smuggling operations will most likely raise the threat of smuggling activities in 2015.

4.3. Irregular migration

The situation of important origin countries of non-regional migrants, such as Afghanistan and Syria, as well as in countries of their residence (e.g. Iran) remains highly problematic and may result in continued refugee flows. Another factor impacting both regional and non-regional migrants is the restricted migration policy of the Russian Federation, resulting in significant changes in migration legislation and migration labour markets. In the context of the economic downturn and economic sanctions, this may also act as a push factor for migration from the Russian Federation towards the EU.

However, the impacts on the common borders are much more difficult to assess as the geopolitical or economic developments have rarely correlated directly with the irregular migration flows in the region. Indeed, it is likely that, for example, the number of Afghan migrants attempting illegal border-crossing will increase in 2015. However, the magnitude of the threat will depend on several interlinked factors, such as changes in use of other routes, prices of facilitation and the possibilities of entering the CIS area. It is possible that the abuse of legal entry as a *modus operandi* may grow also considering non-regional migrants.

The abuse of legal entries is likely to continue. Further possible fluctuations in 2015 are difficult to predict as seasonality is not the only factor affecting this phenomenon; however, the risk of rumours about low-risk options to enter the EU being spread remains valid. Modifications of routes observed in 2014 may lead to quickly increasing pressure at BCPs

and on the asylum system of the most affected countries.

4.4. Ukrainian crisis

One year after the Euro Mайдan protests in Kyiv and the Russian Federation's annexation of Crimea, Ukraine saw mass movements of civilians from insecure regions. The number of internally displaced people exceeded 1.1 million as of 11 March 2015, while over 740 000 fled to neighbouring countries, of which number almost 608 000 were seeking legal status in the Russian Federation (including over 290 000 who filed asylum applications). Moreover, according to OCHA*, between mid-April 2014 and 5 March 2015 at least 5 820 people were documented as killed and 15 270 as wounded. Given that definitive reports on casualties – especially those near Donetsk airport and in the Debaltseve area – are still pending, the total number of fatalities in eastern Ukraine is estimated as having passed the 6 000 mark. As the conflict prolongs the period of displacement is growing and it is clear that the return of many IDPs to the separatist-controlled areas will be impossible.

The latest truce, negotiated in the capital of Belarus (Minsk II agreement of 12 February 2015), has been largely observed. Both sides, Ukrainian security forces and pro-Russian separatists, appear to be honouring the terms of the ceasefire to end the fighting in eastern Ukraine, yet violations are still occurring. OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) reports that fighting continues in areas around Donetsk airport and to the east of Mariupol.** Thus, the military situation in Ukraine remains unstable as the willingness of the separatists/Russian Federation to fully implement the Minsk II agreement is still unclear. Worryingly, the Russian Federation is likely to continue attempts to destabilise Ukraine in order to prevent the country's efforts to integrate with the West. Therefore, the risk of



Figure 13. **One of the border-crossing points destroyed in hostilities at the Ukrainian-Russian border**

further military operations against Ukraine, especially in the direction of Mariupol, remains valid. Further attacks could also potentially trigger new waves of forced population movements.

Additionally, the question of the section of the Ukrainian-Russian border that is currently not controlled by the Ukrainian government is one of the key issues to be solved. According to the Minsk II agreement, Ukrainian authorities should return to this border section by the end of the year. However, there is a high risk that the separatists/Russian Federation will not be willing to allow this, as it would impede the supply of weapons and fighters from the Russian Federation. At the same time, Ukraine aims to develop border infrastructure at its Russian border under 'the Wall' project and to enhance the control of movements of people and goods to and from the ATO*** area and across the administrative border with Crimea in order to counter security threats.

Undoubtedly, the impact of the crisis in Ukraine together with the worsening economic situation has already instigated many Ukrainian citizens to move. Further deterioration of the situation may trigger more visible migratory movements towards the EU.

* United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

** Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time), 16 March 2015, <http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/145331>

*** Anti-Terrorist Operation



Nevertheless, the impact in terms of irregular migration across the common borders between Ukraine and EU Member States has remained relatively modest. Abuse of supporting documents, overstay and unauthorised work will likely remain the main risks, while the threat of illegal border-cross-

ings between BCPs is likely to remain relatively low. Importantly, despite the extreme pressure at Ukraine's eastern borders, the Ukrainian border guards have continued their surveillance duties at the western borders of the country.

5. Statistical annex

LEGEND

Symbols and abbreviations: **n.a.** not applicable
: data not available

Source: EB-RAN and FRAN data as of 16 February 2015, unless otherwise indicated

Note: 'Member States' in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including both 28 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries



Annex Table 1. Illegal border-crossing between BCPs

Detections reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring EU Member States, by purpose of illegal border-crossing, top ten nationalities

	2012	2013	2014	Share of total	% change on previous year
Purpose of Illegal Border-Crossing					
Irregular migration	366	1 565	1 868	50	19
Other	30	1 898	1 332	36	-30
Smuggling	24	584	396	11	-32
Not specified	4 879	661	125	3.4	-81
Top Ten Nationalities					
Ukraine	1 475	1 318	990	27	-25
Moldova	937	691	446	12	-35
Georgia	645	686	376	10	-45
Afghanistan	328	263	356	9.6	35
Vietnam	193	209	345	9.3	65
Russian Federation	510	498	334	9.0	-33
Syria	37	114	188	5.1	65
Not specified	86	193	102	2.7	-47
Belarus	198	163	100	2.7	-39
Iraq	7	3	38	1	1 167
Others	883	570	446	12	-22
Total	5 299	4 708	3 721	100	-21

Annex Table 2. Illegal border-crossing at BCPs

Detections reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring EU Member States, by purpose of illegal border-crossing and top ten nationalities

	2012	2013	2014	Share of total	% change on previous year
Purpose of Illegal Border-Crossing					
Other	37	1 252	901	68	-28
Smuggling	26	355	300	23	-15
Irregular migration	6	156	109	8.2	-30
Not specified	2 004	8	15	1.1	88
Top Ten Nationalities					
Ukraine	1 107	791	564	43	-29
Moldova	544	508	472	36	-7.1
Russian Federation	88	78	59	4.4	-24
Romania	72	61	49	3.7	-20
Tajikistan	52	95	35	2.6	-63
Not specified	24	39	21	1.6	-46
Belarus	42	25	13	1	-48
Syria	2	1	10	0.8	900
Kyrgyzstan	34	49	9	0.7	-82
Bulgaria	7	6	8	0.6	33
Others	101	118	86	6.5	-27
Total	2 073	1 771	1 326	100	-25

Annex Table 3. **Facilitators**

Detections reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring EU Member States, by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2012	2013	2014	Share of total	% change on previous year
Place of Detection					
Land	124	69	110	98	59
Inland	0	3	2	1.8	-33
Others	11	0	0		n.a.
Top Ten Nationalities					
Ukraine	53	13	17	15	31
Belarus	4	13	15	13	15
Russian Federation	14	8	14	13	75
Not specified	4	2	10	8.9	400
Hungary	0	0	9	8	n.a.
Lithuania	7	3	8	7.1	167
Moldova	10	9	7	6.3	-22
Poland	6	6	7	6.3	17
Estonia	3	1	5	4.5	400
Latvia	3	0	4	3.6	n.a.
Others	31	17	16	14	-5.9
Total	135	72	112	100	56

Annex Table 4. **Illegal stay**

Detections reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring EU Member States, by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2012	2013	2014	Share of total	% change on previous year
Place of Detection					
Land	24 176	23 952	23 673	75	-1.2
Air	14 013	16 083	6 433	20	-60
Inland	678	863	1 029	3.3	19
Sea	568	303	288	0.9	-5
Between BCPs	699	137	141	0.4	2.9
Top Ten Nationalities					
Ukraine	6 883	8 159	9 824	31	20
Russian Federation	7 051	6 887	6 140	19	-11
Georgia	4 187	4 938	2 465	7.8	-50
Moldova	2 139	1 707	2 137	6.8	25
Belarus	1 534	1 487	1 394	4.4	-6.3
Uzbekistan	2 889	2 879	957	3	-67
Azerbaijan	2 345	2 261	798	2.5	-65
Turkey	1 359	1 455	696	2.2	-52
Armenia	1 677	1 737	639	2	-63
China	700	913	613	1.9	-33
Others	9 370	8 916	5 901	19	-34
Total	40 134	41 339	31 564	100	-24



Annex Table 5. Refusals of entry

Refusals reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring EU Member States, by border type and top ten nationalities

	2012	2013	2014	Share of total	% change on previous year
Border Type					
Land	62 463	77 100	77 278	89	0.2
Air	2 690	4 485	5 952	6.8	33
Sea	3 184	3 344	3 877	4.5	16
Top Ten Nationalities					
Russian Federation	9 226	22 977	24 408	28	6.2
Ukraine	19 182	19 685	21 770	25	11
Moldova	3 608	3 659	6 763	7.8	85
Georgia	9 640	9 643	5 784	6.6	-40
Belarus	4 972	4 450	5 255	6	18
Lithuania	5 259	5 372	4 110	4.7	-23
Uzbekistan	1 169	2 375	3 056	3.5	29
Armenia	1 217	1 901	1 776	2	-6.6
Tajikistan	1 889	1 588	1 773	2	12
Azerbaijan	482	770	1 356	1.6	76
Others	11 693	12 509	11 056	13	-12
Total	68 337	84 929	87 107	100	2.6

Annex Table 6. Applications for asylum

Applications for international protection reported by EB-RAN countries and neighbouring EU Member States, by top ten nationalities

	2012	2013	2014	Share of total	% change on prev. year	Highest share
Top Ten Nationalities						Reporting Country
Kosovo*	519	6 609	21 674	32	228	Hungary (99%)
Afghanistan	2 936	3 661	10 107	15	176	Hungary (87%)
Syria	1 212	3 479	9 926	15	185	Hungary (70%)
Russian Federation	6 801	13 499	3 225	4.8	-76	Poland (84%)
Ukraine	136	109	3 086	4.6	2 731	Poland (72%)
Eritrea	1 224	3 404	2 997	4.4	-12	Norway (95%)
Iraq	1 170	1 148	1 780	2.6	55	Finland (46%)
Not specified	444	734	1 572	2.3	114	Norway (49%)
Somalia	2 745	2 208	1 442	2.1	-35	Norway (56%)
Georgia	3 900	1 690	1 070	1.6	-37	Poland (61%)
Others	9 644	16 297	10 705	16	-34	Hungary (42%)
Total	30 731	52 838	67 584	100	28	

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Annex Table 7. Document fraud

Detections reported by EB-RAN countries, by border type, document type, top ten nationalities and top ten countries of issuance

	2012	2013	2014	Share of total	% change on previous year
Border Type					
Land	636	265	125	43	-53
Air	112	109	124	43	14
Sea	2	1	35	12	3 400
Not specified	0	0	7	2.4	n.a.
Document type					
Passport	189	200	239	82	20
Not specified	540	157	16	5.5	-90
Visa	10	5	15	5.2	200
ID card	8	10	10	3.4	0
Stamp	0	0	8	2.7	n.a.
Residence permit	3	3	3	1	0
Top Ten Nationalities					
Moldova	59	72	70	24	-2.8
Ukraine	369	165	56	19	-66
Syria	8	8	27	9.3	238
Russian Federation	27	18	14	4.8	-22
Iran	6	4	14	4.8	250
India	0	8	12	4.1	50
Sri Lanka	0	0	10	3.4	n.a.
Egypt	6	0	8	2.7	n.a.
Iraq	4	0	7	2.4	n.a.
Armenia	15	5	7	2.4	40
Others	256	95	66	23	-31
Top Ten Countries of Issuance of Documents					
Ukraine	103	86	59	20	-31
Moldova	8	10	36	12	260
Romania	19	19	25	8.6	32
Not specified	163	137	15	5.2	-89
Russian Federation	4	8	13	4.5	63
India	0	0	12	4.1	n.a.
Uzbekistan	0	8	11	3.8	38
Turkey	13	7	10	3.4	43
Egypt	0	0	8	2.7	n.a.
France	21	2	7	2.4	250
Others	419	98	95	33	-3.1
Total	399	375	291	100	-22



Explanatory note

Detections reported for Member States for indicators Illegal border-crossing between BCPs, Illegal border-crossing at BCPs, Refusals of entry and Persons using false documents are detections at the common land borders on entry only. For Facilitators, detections at the common land borders on entry and exit are included. For Illegal stay, detections at the common land borders on exit only are included. For Asylum, all applications (land, sea, air and inland) are included.

For EB-RAN countries, all indicators – save for Refusals of entry – include detections (applications) on exit and entry at the land, sea and air borders.

Each section in the table (Reporting country, Border type, Place of detection, Top five border section and Top ten nationalities) refers to total detections reported by EB-RAN countries and to neighbouring land border detections reported by Member States.



European Agency for the Management
of Operational Cooperation
at the External Borders of the Member
States of the European Union

Plac Europejski 6
00-844 Warsaw, Poland

T +48 22 205 95 00
F +48 22 205 95 01

frontex@frontex.europa.eu
www.frontex.europa.eu



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