Brussels, 1 April 2016
(OR. en)

7491/16

LIMITE

COPS 97
CFSP/PESC 259
CSDP/PSDC 182
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MAMA 46
LIBYE 3

COVER NOTE

From: European External Action Service
To: Political and Security Committee
Subject: Planning for a possible non-executive Civilian CSDP mission in Libya

Delegations will find attached document EEAS(2016) 436.

Encl.: Document EEAS(2016) 436
Planning for a possible non-executive Civilian CSDP mission in Libya
Planning for a possible non-executive Civilian CSDP mission in Libya

Background

1. During its discussion on Libya on 9 March 2016, the PSC “welcomed the EEAS’s intention to present a paper on the state of play of planning of a possible CSDP mission”.

2. The political situation in Libya remains dynamic. On 12 March 2016, the Libyan Presidency Council announced that the Government of National Accord (GNA) was ready to move to Tripoli and assume its duties. It has done so with the support of the Libyan Political Dialogue and a majority of members of the House of Representatives (HoR), but without the latter's formal endorsement. It is therefore currently unclear what the response of the political and security actors across Libya will be.

3. Resolution of this impasse could potentially pave the way for the EU to offer security sector support to the GNA at a crucial juncture in its development. The paper assumes that the GNA will be formed, is established in Tripoli, and able to consolidate its position; alternative scenarios are not considered at this stage.

4. At the Foreign Affairs Council of 15 March 2016, Ministers had an informal debate on Libya with the participation of the UNSG Special Representative M. Kobler. The urgent need to achieve stability in the country was highlighted. In this context, recent statements by the Libyan Political Dialogue and by the Presidency Council were identified as a first important step towards the establishment of a Government of National Accord in Tripoli. The European Council of 18 March further reiterated the EU readiness to support the Government of National Accord, as the sole legitimate government of Libya, including, at its request, to restore stability, fight terrorism and manage migration in the central Mediterranean.

5. This paper builds upon existing analysis and planning, originally developed under the PFCA for Libya. It describes the factors governing existing planning and outlines an option for developing civilian police capacities both to support the functioning of the GNA in Tripoli as a functioning government, to underpin broader efforts on Security Sector Reform (SSR) across Libya, and to develop capacity in the Criminal Justice Sector (CJS). The paper underlines the need for close cooperation with UNSMIL.

6. The proposed option does not focus on directly developing coastguard capacity. Nonetheless,
the paper notes the possibility for the proposed option to address law enforcement aspects of coastguard activities.

**EU Planning Overview**

7. Planning is being informed primarily through the dedicated work of the EU Liaison and Planning Cell (EULPC) in Tunis which focuses on military planning issues and, since early March 2016, through the increased civilian planning capacity made possible by the reinforcement of EUBAM Libya. Further development of the planning option outlined in this paper should be the main focus of the civilian planning capacity currently provided by EUBAM Libya.

8. The EULPC continues to provide an essential element of the overall security planning led by the UN Support Mission to Libya (UNSMIL). The intention is that this effort will be coordinated with military planning presently being conducted by the P3+3\(^1\) community to provide a potential Libyan International Assistance Mission (LIAM) to Tripoli in order to ensure a safe and secure environment which would be delivered solely by Libyan forces trained and mentored by LIAM, if requested by the GNA.

9. All of the above planning is constrained by a limited possibility to engage with Libyan interlocutors. No substantive fact finding mission to Libya by the EULPC, EUBAM, UNSMIL, LIAM or other international body has been possible since the International Community evacuated from Tripoli in July 2014. Situational analysis based on ground truth to inform planning and risk management has yet to be in place. There is a consequent lack of clarity on key infrastructure available in Tripoli (and elsewhere), how exactly assistance could be delivered and to whom, and what the Libyan authorities' capabilities, needs, absorption capacity, desires and visions for security are.

10. Only an established GNA in Tripoli could allow the EU a window of opportunity to engage meaningfully with the Libyan authorities and, at an appropriate moment, secure a Libyan request for a non-executive civilian police and criminal justice sector capacity building and assistance mission, and allow planning to be developed further.

11. The option outlined in this paper is necessarily reliant on a number of planning assumptions.

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\(^1\) P3+3 grouping = FR, UK, US + DE, ES, IT.
and information gaps which will need to be addressed and refined through subsequent engagement with Libyan interlocutors. This includes a comprehensive mapping of different Libyan criminal justice actors’ capacities across Libya; the Libyan legal framework; and analysis of the plans and capacities of other international actors, including EU Member States.

12. The proposed civilian mission would need to be conducted in a number of phases. It could commence with refining planning and supporting police capacity in Tripoli while contributing later to longer term efforts within an overall SSR effort. To this end, this CSDP engagement needs to be linked to the Libya Political Agreement (LPA) implementation and enable the EU, the UN and the IC to coordinate their joint efforts in assisting the GNA with more overarching reforms which will be needed in the medium to long term.

13. The EU is committed to pursuing a conflict sensitive approach in Libya, in collaboration with a number of Member States, the UN and other partners.

14. The proposed CSDP activity will complement existing CSDP efforts in the region, including supporting, conditions provided, capacity for coordination of border management with neighbouring countries and will be developed as part of the overall envisaged EU package of support for Libya. The need for continued close cooperation with UNSMIL/LIAM and coordinated and coherent action from the IC remains paramount in this regard.

Political and Security Situation

15. The political situation remains extremely fluid. Several political and military actors still remain opposed to the LPA and the GNA itself. This has an important bearing on the legitimacy and longevity of the GNA, its ability to be located in Tripoli, and how the EU can engage meaningfully on security issues. It is thus paramount that both the EU and the international community continue to assist the UN SRSG in his efforts to broaden the support of the LPA and GNA and to ensure that the latter is able to operate effectively from Tripoli.

16. The security situation in Tripoli (and elsewhere) remains volatile in face of the persisting and bitter rivalries between the local and regional militias. The consent of the militias to adhere to a code of conduct and support the establishment of the GNA will be critical in providing tangible results on the ground, and shaping the necessary political and security conditions to support the presence of the international community.
The security situation in Libya is increasingly influenced by the activities of Daesh and other terrorist groups which threaten to undermine stabilization efforts in Libya. Countering this threat will require the generation of capable, accountable Libyan ground forces able to defeat these groups in position and establish broad public confidence.

Human smuggling is a very profitable activity in Libya with low risk for smugglers, allowing criminal groups – possibly including terrorists- to obtain important resources for their activities. Re-establishing the rule of law in Libya is therefore paramount.

The Regional Perspective

Neighbouring countries are concerned by the evolution of the political and security situation in Libya. All of them have repeatedly raised their concern about the risk of infiltration of terrorist elements from Libya into their countries.

Accordingly, diplomatic engagement with these regional countries and both the LAS and the AU will be required throughout to support planning and foster engagement for the potential mission. Close coordination with the UN could facilitate this engagement. EU support to Libya's neighbours in border management and security sector capacity building also needs to be further enhanced.

Security Planning Perspective

UNSMIL. Notwithstanding the emerging threat from Daesh and other terrorists in Libya, the prime security planning focus of UNSMIL, the broader IC, and the nascent Libyan authorities, will likely remain on installing the GNA in Tripoli as quickly as possible in order to enable it to function as an effective and representative government.

UNSMIL's mandate was renewed as a technical 3-month extension on 15 March 2016 under UNSCR 2273/2016. This mandate remains political, rather than adding any capacity building. UNSMIL's role as a coordinator for all the IC's support to Libya is crucial and is anticipated to be retained after June 2016. There are currently no plans being undertaken by DPKO for a possible peacekeeping mission in Libya on capacity building support to law enforcement and criminal justice. There is the need to clarify with the UN and its agencies the modalities of their future political and security engagement in Libya.
23. The initial focus on Tripoli is broadly outlined in UNSMIL’s Concept Note, a document which depicts the UN mission goals for the three months after the GNA forms. In terms of the security sector, it foresees three main objectives; firstly, securing Tripoli and beyond; secondly, the reorganization of the national security apparatus (once conditions allow), and finally the development of a Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

24. In order to reach these objectives, a number of landmark events are listed in the paper. Based on the provisions of the LPA, these events depict both planning steps or actions realised on the ground, such as the GNA is established in Tripoli; the GNA begins the process of reorganizing the National Security Forces; the TSC convenes a high-level meeting on security with the support of the IC and the UN; and lastly that the TSC and PC initiate strategic planning to counter the capabilities of extremist groups.

25. Within this broad concept, existing planning undertaken by UNSMIL in the 'Security Track' for Tripoli, foresees that security in Tripoli could be achieved through dividing Tripoli into three concentric security zones, controlled by a mix of units coming from the Libyan National Army (LNA) and some elements of the Tripoli police and able to take up duties as the embryo of a new Libyan force. In order to provide a bridging capability for the early stage of GNA in Tripoli, the concept of an ad hoc unit called the “Presidential Guard” is being developed. This is thought to comprise a mixture of former military and police personnel, personnel trained in UK and Italy (under the now defunct General Purpose Force training), and militia members. It could total some 2,000 personnel to be deployed as advanced party of the regular Libyan forces to protect the GNA in its vital first days in the capital. The exact composition and capacity of the Presidential Guard has yet to be confirmed.

26. The success of this plan is dependent on a number of currently unconfirmed variables, including the exact composition and compliance of the Armed Groups in the capital (originating either from Tripoli or Misrata), a suitably permissive environment, the necessary infrastructure to allow the IC to provide capacity to the GNA, and the continued availability, loyalty, professionalism and readiness of the identified Libyan security forces.

27. It is currently estimated that some elements of the Presidential Guard could be deployed without any training period, while follow-on Libyan forces would need (a yet to be defined)

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period of training to reach a first operating capacity. This reflects the urgency of installing the GNA to Tripoli as quickly as possible to avoid losing political momentum. Confirmation by the GNA, TSC and indeed by UNSMIL about the Presidential Guard concept in this regard, and on the overall Libyan ownership of such a plan, remains a key planning consideration.

28. Provision of assistance for the professionalization of Libyan police and military forces is an area which will require coordinated IC support. The current IC planning focus remains on the provision of capacity to the Libyan military as well as some police and border management capabilities (see LIAM below). Potential support to the Libyan police and criminal justice sector, is an area, where the EU, with its proven experience in delivering a number of civilian CSDP policing and Rule of Law (RoL)/SSR related Missions, could add value and provide a capability not foreseen to be provided by any other actor.

29. Securing early Libyan political support for police and criminal justice sector reform will be essential as it will involve shifting power centres and access over key institutions of the state. Simply put, no effective police or criminal justice sector assistance can be rendered unless there is political common ground between all relevant Libyan actors on the basis of a nationally owned reform blueprint, in the interim phase as well as for the more overarching reform needed in the future. Public support and engagement in developing this strategy will also be important. Assisting in developing this common framework should therefore be a first priority for overall EU engagement. Furthermore, functional police and judiciary are instrumental to ensure sovereignty over national territory and borders, while enabling the fight against transnational organized crime (e.g. trafficking in human beings and money laundering, smuggling of migrants and counter-terrorism).

30. European Gendarmerie Force (EGF). The EGF has the potential capacity, subject to a political decision, to provide policing support in Libya. This could either complement or be in advance of activity envisaged in the proposed option described in this paper. Civilian policing/law enforcement to the fragmented Libyan law enforcement sector needs ideally to be distinguished from its military counterpart from the outset. This could allow the EU to contribute to an overall strategic approach on police and criminal justice in Libya. Coordination with and clarification of EGF planning is required.
31. LIAM. Italy is providing the framework nation capability for P3+3 planning for a possible non-executive international support, assistance and training mission to Libya which will focus primarily on providing military training capacity to the GNA for the Libyans to provide their own security in Tripoli. A first pillar of activity is likely to focus initially on basic training to provide capacity in infrastructure protection, crowd control, diplomatic protection and the general provision of security. Two other pillars of activity are being considered; provision of capacity on policing and border management/coastguard.

32. It is understood that, if requested by the GNA, lead elements of the LIAM capacity forces could be in Tripoli between 40-90 days after invitation, with the main body deployed thereafter.

33. The exact level of ambition for LIAM's security capacity, if requested by the GNA and authorised under a UNSCR, is therefore yet to be decided but by implication would represent the main international security presence/capacity in Libya.

34. The provision of LIAM capacity for the Libyan police and also the coastguard remains to be clarified. It is axiomatic that EU coordination with LIAM is further developed as a matter of priority to achieve an efficient division of labour and ensure a coordinated and coherent approach is achieved. Depending on the deployment rhythm, sequencing of efforts on policing capacity building between LIAM and the EU could be considered.

35. The planned End State for LIAM is "that the GNA and its security forces are capable of maintaining an acceptable level of security and stability in Tripoli without LIAM assistance, and are able to gradually expand authority throughout Libya". Accordingly, this assistance could be expanded to include participation by a broad coalition of the willing, and possibly include countries who expressed interest during the Rome Conference of 19 January 2016, thereby enhancing a regional focus. The Force Sensing Conference of 15 March 2016 confirmed this planning concept and revealed that there is considerable political interest from the IC in the initiative. A Force Generation Conference is anticipated shortly after a GNA invitation for support which would further frame the LIAM structure and strength.

36. Potential synergies possibly through shared research and analysis, intelligence, agreed force protection arrangements, common training locations and vetting procedures, and the development of standardised training curricula, and complementary joint training, could also
be further explored by EU planners with LIAM and the TSC.

37. **TSC.** The Temporary Security Committee is mandated, under the arrangements of the LPA, to be the main technical Libyan interlocutor on security in the vital period ahead of the formation of a National Defence and Security Council. It has immediate responsibility for delivering the security track for Tripoli and in particular overseeing arrangements for the withdrawal of armed groups from Tripoli and the cantonment of heavy weapons. The TSC has only recently started to meet (and not yet as a full committee) and the ability of EU planners to engage effectively with the TSC through UNSMIL will be crucial to future mission effectiveness.

38. **In sum, the provision of security support to the GNA is challenging.** The urgency of the situation, the current lack of a Libyan agreed and coordinated plan, limited absorption capacities and complex nature of security challenges and actors all indicate the need for a phased approach by the IC to ensure success. A key factor remains that a number of planning assumptions have yet to be assessed fully.

**Current EU engagement on security in Libya**

39. **EU Delegation to Tripoli.** The Head of the EU Delegation is responsible for the local coordination of all EU activity in Libya, raising Libyan awareness and buy-in of CSDP missions, and for providing political advice on engagement with the Libyan authorities and other IC actors. In this regard, the HoD is supported by a military security advisor (dual-hatted as the Head of the EULPC) and a senior Police and CT advisor. Both advisors will have a crucial continuity role in providing advice and corporate memory to any potential civilian CSDP mission in Libya. At the operational level, the local coordination, conflict sensitive programming and implementation of EU cooperation programmes in Libya remains a key activity for the Delegation.

40. **EULPC.** Since its establishment in April 2015, the Cell has provided a fundamental role in supporting UNSMIL planning. Its immediate focus is to operationalize the military element of the security track in order to enable the GNA to move to Tripoli and operate effectively as a government. In addition to informing EEAS planning, the EULPC's added value is in being a credible partner in Tunis which is allowing it to engage directly with the TSC (in conjunction with UNSMIL). This credibility is also facilitating early access to key
interlocutors for EUBAM Libya's civilian planners. The EULPC currently consists of nine personnel (including one EGF planner/police advisor since the outset). Its mandate expires on 18 April 2017.

41. **EUBAM Libya.** Following the revision of its mandate on 21 February 2016, the main objective for EUBAM Libya is to inform EU planning for a possible civilian capacity building and assistance crisis management mission. EUBAM will support UNSMIL's planning capacity on police and criminal justice cooperation and contribute to planning for a possible future civilian CSDP mission. The mission’s existing mandate expires on 21 August 2016. The opportunity exists for EUBAM Libya to continue as the shell for the proposed civilian mission option outlined in this paper or to close at the end of the current mandate.

42. The policy, timing and practical arrangements for the move of the EU Delegation, EULPC, and EUBAM Libya to Tripoli requires both coordination within the EU (mainly to assess security conditions), and consultation with external partners.

43. **EUNAVFOR Med Op Sophia.** The military CSDP operation has been conducting Phase 2 activities on the High Seas off the coast of Libya since 7 October 2015. The transition of the operation to subsequent phases in Libyan territorial waters currently foreseen in its existing mandate should be pursued with the GNA authorities as soon as practicable. The necessary legal arrangements will need to be agreed and put in place for the processing of alleged smugglers and human traffickers encountered by the operation. A role for Op Sophia in support of building Libyan Coastguard and Navy capacity could also be considered. Subject to the findings of a strategic review (due in April 2016) the current mandate of the operation expires on 27 July 2016. The offer of police and CJS support articulated in this paper, in addition to the coastguard and navy training possible under Op Sophia, could be part of an overall package that could contribute to ensuring GNA support for Op Sophia to transition to phase 2b.

44. An increased IC presence in Libya as a result of the transition of Op Sophia, combined with the potential concurrent deployment of LIAM and a civilian CSDP mission, would have an impact on Libyan perceptions regarding foreign support. This increased presence however also suggests the possibilities for synergy from pooled force protection and extraction capacities.
45. **CSDP missions in the region.** Coordination on policing and criminal justice sector issues as well as on illegal migration flows and support on counter-terrorism activities with the two regional civilian CSDP missions in the Sahel and ENFM Sophia, including through the identification of lessons learnt, would be of importance for the envisaged mission.

46. **EU Cooperation Programmes.** There are at present no planned EC projects related to policing and the criminal justice sector focused on Libya. Previous programmes in those areas were confronted with several implementation-related obstacles. Lessons learnt from those experiences confirm the need to utilise CSDP as the appropriate instrument tool to deliver in this challenging domain. Nonetheless planning for the envisaged mission should draw upon lessons identified and mapping already conducted by previous programmes. An improvement in the security situation on the ground may allow a renewed focus on Libya in due course. Consideration is currently being given under the IcSP for stabilization funding for UNDP that might include sending a small number of policing experts to Libya.

**Planning Factors**

47. Analysis of the Libya security situation highlights the following key planning issues:

a. The potential civilian CSDP action should have a non-executive mandate;

b. It will be, by definition, part of a broader comprehensive EU approach;

c. It will need to be phased and coordinated with other IC efforts and follow a conflict sensitive approach;

d. It will be based on a Libyan request with strong Libyan ownership of the process, taking into account Libyan capabilities, needs, absorption capacity, and a vision for a National Security Architecture;

e. Close liaison with the TSC, EU actors, UNSMIL, LIAM and other key partners is required to avoid duplication and underpin effective cooperation, coordination and a viable communication strategy. This includes taking into account Libyan sensitivities on the combined profile, posture and presence of all foreign forces in Libya;

f. There is a potential need for shared intelligence to assess the security situation and possibly to pool resources for force protection and in case extraction of IC actors is
48. **Assumptions.** The following assumptions are made and will need to be refined where appropriate through further strategic and parallel operational planning:

a. The GNA is formed;
b. The GNA is based in Tripoli;
c. The GNA requests the proposed EU civilian CSDP mission;
d. A Status of Mission Agreement is concluded with the GNA;
e. UNSMIL's mandate 2273/2016 is renewed in June 2016 and thereafter;
f. The necessary infrastructure exists in Tripoli to support the IC engagement (as identified by an appropriate fact finding mission);
g. The security environment is sufficiently permissive and protective measures are considered satisfactory;
h. EU MS will provide the necessary resources;
i. A National Security Architecture will be developed to underpin the necessary training and recruitment programmes required to reconstitute Libya’s security forces;
j. The GNA will request complementary support from LIAM;
k. Libyan political stability is maintained throughout the Mission mandate;

49. **Constraints.** Existing planning has been conducted with limited possibility to engage with Libyan interlocutors and will need to be updated on the basis of thorough mapping and needs analysis.

**Description of the proposed Option**

50. The potential civilian CSDP Mission, in line with phases described below, could be to further support police capacity in Tripoli in the interim and, when conditions allow, contribute to longer term efforts on SSR (including through mapping) of the Libyan Police and Libyan Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Sector across Libya (including relevant border management authorities), thus enabling the EU, the UN and the IC to coordinate their joint efforts in assisting the GNA with more overarching reforms likely to be needed after the interim phase.

51. A formal request from the GNA would commence the process outlined in the conceptual design below. Prior to establishment of a Crisis Management Concept, political engagement
with the GNA (and in the region) would need to be taken to foster awareness and gain support for the intended CSDP action.

52. The CSDP mission could either be delivered as a new CSDP activity or through adapting the existing mandate of EUBAM Libya.

53. At present, operating from Tunis, EUBAM Libya's civilian planning capacity, together with the EULPC and the EU Delegation, is and will continue working on planning, in close coordination with UNSMIL, LIAM and other IC actors. Enhanced engagement with the Libyan authorities has recently started and needs to be pursued fully.

54. A key deliverable in the initial phase will be a mapping exercise and thorough analysis (including needs and risk management) to inform options envisaged for future phases to be elaborated in further planning. Consideration could be given in this phase to the possibility of conducting training outside Libya, if appropriate.

55. The Mission will commence being located in Tripoli and will be subsequently operating further afield, subject to MS approval and if conditions allow. Advisory tasks would likely be to provide planning/advice on addressing urgent policing needs in Tripoli and how best to support policing elements (particularly once a temporary Libyan Chief of Police for Tripoli is appointed by the TSC). This key leader engagement could be complemented with technical advice on the recommissioning of key enablers such as the Joint Operations Room for Tripoli and the effective functioning of the police stations and those police personnel already identified as available for training in the Tripoli area.

56. The Libyan authorities will need to ensure effective coordination (with UNSMIL) amongst all security elements including army, militia and police services as well as the IC present, in particular LIAM (including its Gendarmerie component) and potential EGF and EU actions. Advice on coordination to the relevant Libyan authorities could be provided as part of the initial phase activities.

57. Additional advisory tasks in this phase could include the provision of policing support on other security-related confidence building measures including through:

Support to develop a Libyan National Security Architecture;
Recommissioning of vital communication facilities in Tripoli (border management and control procedures/facilities at airport/harbour), developing policing aspects related to coastguard and customs capacities/procedures;

Support to establishing a Libyan judicial process on suspected smugglers/traffickers and terrorists;

CT advice/support to relevant Libyan authorities (in conjunction with the EU Delegation CT advisor and regional EU initiatives).

58. **Capacity building** of the Libyan police and CJS could support Libya in providing normal policing activities, e.g. more in a "EUCAP" sense in particular in the area of "civilian policing" i.e. oversight and accountability, criminal investigations, and reform of the MoI/Criminal Procedures. These capacity building activities could also include logistics, human resources management and other sustainability issues.

59. Given the threat of terrorism in the country, building counter-terrorism capacities of the police and related CJS actors (and the possible creation of a gendarmerie, including in the areas outlined above, should be an integral and important part of the mission, as anticipated by the HRVP in her letter to FAC of 4 December 2015.

60. The police reform process in Libya could include:

   a. Institutional reform of the Ministry of Interior, professionalization of the Libyan National Police and development of justice-police linkages, with a strong emphasis on an intelligence driven and evidence based approach, anti-corruption, human rights and gender;

   b. Development of a training strategy and modern senior management techniques;

   c. After the first phase, the mission should continue to provide CT advice and support to the Libyan authorities, including the development and implementation of a comprehensive CT strategy and inter-agency coordination.

61. Activity could also be focused on improving police aspects in relation to the migration challenges. Anti-migrant smuggling and countering trafficking of human beings is a logical challenge for the Libyan authorities to deliver on. This capacity would need to focus on:
Increasing investigative capacity and improving international cooperation in fighting irregular migration;

Establishing institutional accountability and transparency;

Maintenance of temporary shelters/accommodation for migrants and refugees in line with international best practice. Consideration needs to be given to incarceration facilities, but also for alternatives to incarceration for migrants;

Dignified treatment, in full respect of Human Rights, of the migrants (regular and irregular alike) and of the refugees by the police/law enforcement authorities;

Particular attention to those with special needs: children, including unaccompanied minors and women;

Complementary support as regards coastguard capacity building.

62. Apart from other initiatives at governmental level (policy development and legislative proposals), considerations should be given to the possibility to undertake capacity building activities in situ in Tripoli and/or abroad as appropriate. The relative merits of these options would need to take into account the urgency of the situation, challenges of security vetting, accountability mechanisms, quality and diversity of personnel being trained, funding, appropriate training needs analysis, absorption capacity and buy-in from the Libyan training audience.

63. All training programmes involving police and the criminal justice sector should include elements on human rights, international humanitarian law and refugee law. This is a commitment in the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (adopted by the FAC in July 2015), and in the Valletta Summit Action Plan.

64. Longer term efforts could focus on the reform of broader criminal justice sector, providing training for Libyan police, judiciary and penitentiary officials, including counter-terrorism aspects (e.g. investigations, prosecutions, adjudication of CT cases, development of rehabilitation programmes inside and outside of prison, counter financing of terrorism/Anti Money laundering aspects). This could contribute to the establishment of a professional criminal justice system based on rule of law and respect of human rights and development of
coordination and collaboration between the various branches of the criminal justice system.

65. Within Libya itself, lessons previously identified from EUBAM Libya show that training is beset by confusion/rivalry on inter-ministerial responsibilities regarding security. Accordingly, an essential underpinning function of capacity delivery will be to support Libya through the provision of strategic advice on designing Libyan internal security architecture/processes under civilian government responsibility, and re-establishing the rule of law, advice on establishing and resourcing this architecture, and also the capacity to deliver it including through training and on the basis of broader UNMIL coordination.

End State and Duration

66. The End State of the Mission is that a critical mass of a Libyan-led police and criminal justice capacity is in place and being delivered by Libyan authorities without further CSDP assistance.

67. The duration of the Mission could initially be based on an extension and adaptation of the existing EUBAM Libya mandate for a period of 2 years i.e. expiring on 21 August 2018. The eventual duration of the Mission would likely be over a period of several years.

Risks to Mission Effectiveness

68. The political and security instability in Libya and increase in terrorism within the region present serious threats to Mission personnel. Operational planning should therefore explore the potential synergies in complementarity activities, extraction capacities and force protection possible through an increased IC presence in Libya (e.g. UNMIL, Op Sophia and LIAM). In addition to the wide range of security measures that will need to be established, the engagement of a private security company under contract will most likely be needed.

69. A lack of effective coordination by the IC, insufficient local buy-in, and inability to develop a National Security Architecture, will jeopardise the sustainability of mission accomplishments.

70. The level of ambition for the Mission must be kept both manageable, measurable and targeted against real needs that will add value. This requires a progressive build up in capabilities and resources, together with close dialogue with the Libyan authorities to ensure the effective management of expectations.
Conclusion and next steps

71. The political and security tracks in Libya are not aligned and the situation is dynamic.

72. The GNA is not yet in Tripoli and the extent of Libyan political support and compliance for such a move, particularly from militias present in the Tripoli area, is not yet clear.

73. The security situation in Tripoli and security arrangements must provide sufficient guarantees for the deployment of the IC and to support meaningful CSDP engagement.

74. The move of the EU Delegation, EULPC and EUBAM Libya to Tripoli is a key priority but its timing depends on several factors – in particular staff security – that need to be analysed further.

75. The planning challenges in designing any new CSDP activity in Libya are considerable and many planning assumptions will need to be assessed as conditions allow.

76. Coordination and an agreed division of labour between UNSMIL, LIAM, the EU and other IC actors are required.

77. There is a potential requirement for the IC to support the GNA in terms of police and CJS capacity; this is an area where the EU could add value in a phased approach.

78. Planning should continue to ensure greater clarity on the issues highlighted in this paper.

79. Member States are invited to have an exchange of views on the matter to allow planning to proceed and, if appropriate, to allow a timely approach to be made to the GNA to solicit consent for the option proposed in this paper.