TECHNICAL NOTE: CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION ON EXTERNAL SECURITY

Introduction

1. The Prime Minister set out in her Munich speech that the UK wants to develop a new security partnership with the EU that builds on the breadth and depth of our shared interests and values, and one that goes beyond any existing third country arrangements. As agreed with Taskforce 50 this paper provides further detail on what future UK-EU consultation and cooperation on external security might entail. This builds on the UK presentation to Taskforce 50 on 4 May, which we published on 9 May 2018.

2. Europe’s security is our security. As the Prime Minister said in Munich, the United Kingdom is unconditionally committed to maintaining it. We must do whatever best provides security for our citizens. The UK and EU need to be able to work together to respond quickly and effectively to the evolving and challenging threats that both parties face. Upon leaving the EU, the UK will pursue an independent foreign policy, but around the world the interests that we will seek to project and defend will continue to be rooted in our shared values. We must therefore create a future partnership that allows the UK and the EU to combine our efforts to the greatest effect – where this is in our shared interests.

3. As set out in the UK presentation, any future UK-EU consultation arrangements must respect both the decision-making autonomy of the European Union and the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. They also need to go beyond current arrangements between the EU and third countries if they are to capture the full depth and breadth of our envisaged relationship. This includes the distinctive features that Taskforce 50’s own presentation recognises, not least our position as a departing Member State that is: a permanent member of the UN Security Council; a leading member of other international fora such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the G7, the G20, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Commonwealth; and the only European country that meets both the NATO target of spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence and the UN target of spending 0.7 per cent of gross national income on international development.

4. We are therefore of the view that a new, flexible and scalable framework of consultation and cooperation with the EU would be in our mutual interests and best suited to the unique circumstances we face. This would enable the EU and the UK to work closely together to have maximum impact – whether through coordinated positions in the UNSC or by cooperating together during a crisis.

5. Where it is appropriate, this framework could become part of the broader institutional arrangements that will be required to underpin the deep and special future partnership that the UK envisages.

6. Key to making all of the proposals outlined in this paper effective is the exchange of expertise and information. This would require underpinning agreements on secondments and sharing sensitive information.
Foreign Policy

7. Foreign policy depends on building international consensus, including working with like-minded external partners – of which the EU will remain one of our most important.

8. We are therefore seeking a framework of consultation and cooperation that will allow us to combine our foreign policy efforts around the world to the greatest effect. These arrangements should be flexible and scalable, to allow more intensive consultation and cooperation during times of crisis. Where appropriate, they should link to the broader institutional arrangements for the future partnership between the UK and the EU.

9. In addition to this framework there will be regular, day-to-day exchange of views between the Member States, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the UK, between Capitals and through the UK Mission and relevant missions in third countries.

10. Consultation and cooperation in Brussels could include:
   a. UK/EEAS Secretary General level strategic talks;
   b. UK/EEAS Political Director consultations;
   c. UK/EEAS Defence DGs consultations;
   d. UK/EEAS Director/MD-level consultations and, where appropriate, with the Commission, on e.g.
      i. Africa;
      ii. Americas;
      iii. Asia/Pacific;
      iv. Balkans;
      v. Eastern Europe;
      vi. Middle East;
      vii. Defence and Security Policy;
      viii. Human Rights;
   e. Association with EU-third country groupings;
   f. Political and Security Committee (PSC) Chair/UK Mission weekly dialogues.

11. Consultation and cooperation with the EU27 could include:
   a. Ad-hoc meetings with the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) in informal sessions or attending sessions of informal Councils;
   b. Ad-hoc meetings with the PSC in informal sessions.

12. Such consultation and cooperation could lead to the possibility of joint outcomes, including:
   a. Joint statements;
   b. Joint positions;
   c. Joint demarches.

13. Consultation and cooperation in multilateral fora and in third countries could include:
a. Regular contact between the EU Head of Delegation and the UK Embassy/High Commission/Delegation;

b. Ad-hoc attendance at informal sessions of EU Heads of Mission meetings;

c. Regular working level consultation with EU partners in multilateral fora e.g. UN, G20, G7, IMF;

d. Possibility of joint or mutually supportive statements/interventions/positions.

14. Cooperation on **analysis** could include:

a. Possibility of sharing intelligence and analysis through INTCEN, supported by a permanent UK liaison presence.

15. **Sanctions** are a key foreign policy tool. The UK is the most active EU Member State on sanctions with over half of designations underpinned by UK evidence. Much of our consultation and cooperation will be similar to, and flow from, our consultation on foreign policy. Consultation and cooperation specific to **sanctions** could include:

a. Exchange of information on listings and their justification;

b. UK-EU sanctions dialogue;

c. Intensive interaction when both the UK and the EU are trying to adopt mutually supportive sanctions, including in crisis situations.

**Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)**

16. As the Prime Minister said in her Munich speech, the UK remains committed to using its assets, capabilities, and influence in tandem with the EU and European partners, where this is in our mutual interest. We see the EU’s CSDP as being an important component of that cooperation. We recognise the important role that CSDP missions and operations play in crisis management and response, and therefore see a shared interest in continuing to work together on them. The potential scope of UK contributions will depend on defined arrangements.

17. Consultation and cooperation on **CSDP** could include:

a. Regular dialogue as per consultation and cooperation on CFSP, including through ad-hoc meetings with the PSC and EU Military Committee (EUMC) in informal sessions;

b. Ad-hoc meetings with the Foreign Affairs Council (Defence) in informal sessions or attending sessions of informal Councils;

c. Through EU Military Staff (EUMS) and INTCEN liaison we could do joint and shared horizon scanning and analysis;

d. Exchange of information on possible UK contributions to the EU force catalogue;

e. Following political consultation between the EU and UK, and subject to appropriate decisions by the EU, the EU could share crisis management planning documents (including Political Framework for Crisis Approach, Crisis Management Concept, Military Strategic Options, Initiating Military Directive, Concept of Operation, Operational Plan, Rules of Engagement) with the UK in order for the UK to
contribute to force sensing, analysis of strategic or military options, and eventually to offer to contribute to an operation or mission if so invited by the EU after its decision to establish a mission or operation;

f. Through liaison and secondments to the EEAS and EUMS the UK could provide expertise, facilitate information sharing, and enable cooperation – where appropriate and beneficial to both sides – in the development and operational planning stages;

g. Possibility for the UK and EU to cooperate on diplomatic support for crisis management operations (UNSC authorisations, Status of Forces Agreements, continue to provide diplomatic support to the effective functioning of EU missions and operations in third countries etc.);

h. Where the UK contributes to a mission/operation, and in proportion to the size/significance/nature of its contribution:

i. UK participation in the Operational Headquarters;

ii. Ad hoc consultations with the FAC/FAC(D)/PSC/EUMC in informal session;

iii. UK participation in the Committee of Contributors;

iv. UK participation in force generation conferences and/or calls for contributions at the appropriate moment.

**Defence Capabilities (European Defence Agency and European Defence Fund)**

18. Europe has a shared interest in ensuring that the UK and EU can cooperate and collaborate together on defence capability. This will ensure that we provide the capabilities that our Armed Forces need to deliver our shared security (such as in the field of military mobility) whilst helping to promote our common prosperity and strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. To achieve this, the UK has set out that it intends to agree a bespoke Administrative Arrangement with the European Defence Agency (EDA); to agree arrangements for participation in the Commission’s European Defence Fund; and to have the option to participate in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects as a third party (in line with arrangements to be agreed by the participating Member States). For UK contributions to programmes to deliver mutual benefit, the UK would require access to both sensitive information and commercial opportunities.

19. The UK believes it is important that arrangements facilitate a meaningful, strategic consultation between the UK and the EU. This would support a coordinated approach to European capability development and planning. This could be achieved in a number of ways, including through:

a. Regular strategic EU-UK dialogue on capability collaboration and industrial development;

b. Consultation on capability planning processes;

c. Ad-hoc invitations to the EDA Ministerial Steering Boards;

d. Ad-hoc UK attendance at EDA National Armaments Directors, Research & Technology, Policy and Capability Directors Steering Boards and Point of Contact meetings;
e. Dialogue with DG Grow and DG Move on broader European defence industrial and capability priorities;

f. UK attendance at the European Defence Research Programme (EDRP) and European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) programme committee.

20. In order to enable UK participation in specific projects, initiatives or programmes then consultation on the technical aspects will also be necessary. This could be achieved through:

a. Director/Chief Executive dialogue with the EDA to consider UK participation in future projects, programmes and activities, including the possibility of re-establishing a ‘Consultative Committee’ with 3rd countries;

b. Dialogue with the PESCO Secretariat to discuss UK involvement in PESCO projects as a third country;

c. Dialogue with DG Grow to consider UK engagement in EDF projects;

d. Where the UK contributes to an EDA, European Defence Fund (EDF) or PESCO project or initiative, participation in the relevant meetings;

e. SNEs and/or UK liaison officers in the EDA and Commission.

Development and External Instruments

21. As the Prime Minister said in Munich, if UK contributions to relevant EU programmes and instruments can best deliver our mutual interests, the UK and EU should both be open to that, on a case by case basis but underpinned by a shared framework that enables the UK to play an appropriate role in the relevant decision-making mechanism. This includes development policy where, as two global leaders on development, it makes sense for the UK and EU to continue to work together to address poverty and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.

22. Consultation and cooperation on development policy could include:

a. A focus on thematic and geographic areas where there is a strong case for close collaboration and potential pooling of resources, e.g:
   i. Humanitarian aid;
   ii. Migration;
   iii. Peace and security.

b. Ad-hoc meetings with the Foreign Affairs Council (Development) in informal sessions or attending sessions of informal Councils;

c. Strategic dialogues on development cooperation and humanitarian assistance;

d. UK attendance at informal sessions of EU Heads of Cooperation or EU Heads of Mission meetings;

e. Ad-hoc attendance at informal EU Directors-General meetings on humanitarian aid and development;
f. Ad-hoc attendance, upon invitation, at expert group meetings convened by the Commission on thematic priorities areas of strategic importance to both the UK and EU, e.g. gender or education;

g. Coordinated humanitarian and development planning and delivery in response to crises overseas.

23. Cooperation and consultation on **external programmes** (e.g. development, humanitarian, foreign policy and security programmes) could include:

   a. Dialogue on how the UK and EU coordinate programmes, whether through cooperation on the ground or a contribution;

   b. If the UK were to make a contribution to an EU programme or instrument it would need:

      i. To play an appropriate role in the relevant decision-making mechanisms e.g. through participation at the relevant Steering Committee and Operational Committee for that instrument;

      ii. Eligibility for UK entities to implement EU external programmes.

**Conclusion**

24. The proposals set out above are not an exhaustive list. They describe what a future framework of UK-EU consultation and cooperation on external security might look like. Any framework would be flexible and scalable to enable the UK and EU to cooperate more closely when it is in their mutual interests. The proposals respect the decision-making autonomy of the European Union and the sovereignty of the United Kingdom.

25. **We should not wait where we do not need to.** The UK welcomes the agreement that future arrangements on CFSP and CSDP could become effective during the implementation period. Bringing the proposals outlined in this paper into force early would allow the UK and EU to benefit from closer, more intense and more productive cooperation than the EU enjoys with any partner. It will ensure there is no drop off in our mutual effort in support of European security, and ensure that we remain able to most effectively respond to crises ahead.