

Internal ref. ORD/FOU/2023

Specific Activity Plan

JO OPAL COAST 2023

This document is not to be disclosed to any third party without the prior consent of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency

Done at Warsaw

Electronically signed

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Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION	3
2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK	3
3. DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION	3
4. OPERATIONAL AIM, OBJECTIVES AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPT	6
5. IMPLEMENTATION	15
6. INITIAL PLAN OF DEPLOYED RESOURCES	18
7. COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES, OTHER UNION BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS	19
8. COORDINATION STRUCTURE	20
9. DESCRIPTION OF THE TASKS AND SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE TEAMS INCLUDING RULES ON USE OF FORCE	24
10. COMMAND AND CONTROL	25
11. COMMUNICATION	26
12. REPORTING	26
13. DATA PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS	32
14. WORKING CONDITIONS, PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS AND LOGISTICS	33
15. EVALUATION	34
16. FINANCIAL PROVISIONS	34
17. CONTACT DETAILS	34

1. INTRODUCTION

The Specific Activity Plan (SAP) of the joint operation (JO) Opal Coast 2023 is agreed between the Frontex Executive Director (ED) and the authorities of the host Member States² (MS), namely Belgium and France, in consultation with the participating MS.

The JO Opal Coast 2023 shall apply provisions defined in this SAP including “Description of the tasks and specific instructions to the members of the teams including use of force”, “Contact details” and “Working conditions and logistics”, “Data Protection Agreement” between Frontex and host MS and the General Part of the Operational Plan for operational activities in the Member States and Third Countries 2023. All these documents constitute the Operational Plan of the JO.

The approval of this SAP accompanies the approval of the General Part.

Any amendment to or adaptation of this SAP shall require the agreement of the ED and the host MS of the JO, after the consultation with the participating MS.

The provisions of this SAP complement the provisions of the General Part 2023 and regulate specifically all issues related to the implementation of this JO.

The Handbook referred to in the Operational Plan contains complementary information regarding Frontex operational activities.

More information is available in the General Part.

2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

EU and international legal framework is stated in the General Part.

This SAP contains references to relevant Belgian and French national legal framework in the document “*Description of the tasks and specific instructions to the members of the teams including rules on use of force*” which is available on FOSS.

The Code of Conduct applicable to all persons participating in Frontex operational activities is available in the General Part, on Frontex website and FOSS.

The provisions related to the legal framework including general instructions on how to ensure the safeguarding of fundamental rights during the JO and the complaints mechanism are defined in the General Part (chapter 2.3.).

3. DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

3.1. Situational assessment

2022 was the third consecutive year with a gradual rise in the number of migrants in the Channel. As of 31 August 2022, over 41 500 migrants were detected on both sides of the Channel, which represents an 82% increase compared to the same period in 2021, and a 374% compared to the same period in 2020. [REDACTED]

² For the purposes of the present document, the term “Member State” includes also the States participating in the relevant development of the Schengen acquis in the meaning of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and its Protocol (No 19) on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union, that is, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland.

Commented [KW1]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

Out of the total number of detections, over 18 400 were illegal border crossing attempts detected in Belgium (over 200, all of them related to detections at BCP) and France (over 18200 sea crossing attempts), and roughly 23 000 were successful sea crossings (UK). Most of the detections took place

[Redacted]

In 2022, out of all attempts, 56% of the migrants managed to cross the sea or were rescued by the UK and 44% were prevented by the French authorities.

Nationalities

As of 31 August 2022, over 46 different nationalities and many unidentified migrants were recorded in this operational area. The main nationalities on this route were Afghan (accounting 18% of migrants identified), Iraqi (16%), Albanian (16%), Syrian (13%), and Iranian (11%).

[Redacted] were migrants from Eritrea, Algeria, Morocco, Afghanistan, and Sudan,

Since mid-April 2022, Albanian nationals recorded the sharpest increase, and featured since then in the top 5 nationalities detected on this route.

Sea route towards the UK

[Redacted]

People smuggling networks

[Redacted]

Means of transport

Commented [KW2]: The non-disclosed parts cannot be released as it refers to details crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the European Union which is used by Frontex to conduct its operational activities and to develop risk analyses. The disclosure of this information would hamper the effectiveness of Frontex operations and jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities at the external borders. It would thus benefit criminal networks especially those involved in people smuggling and trafficking in human beings, which would put the life of migrants in danger. Hence, the disclosure of the information pertaining to this variable would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and has to be refused based on Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The information related to this part is also used for the development of risk analyses, which constitute a specific form of internal decision-making processes based on the intelligence derived from previous and presently ongoing activities and have a bearing on the conduct of current and future operations. Being an important base for determining the strategic orientation of the Agency, the possibility to conduct such analyses without interference is crucial for Frontex to effectively exercise its mandate. Consequently, releasing this information would enable third parties to gain insights into this decision making process and, with ascertainable likelihood, result in depriving Frontex of the possibility to conduct such analyses wholly independently, free from any external pressure or third-party influence. In sum, releasing this information would seriously undermine Frontex internal decision making-processes. As no overriding public interest that is objective and general in nature and not indistinguishable from individual or private interests for the release of this information is ascertainable in the present case, information pertaining to this part cannot be released based on Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and pose a hazard to the course of ongoing and future operations aimed at curtailing the activities of such networks, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as to prevent unauthorized border crossings. The disclosure would thus undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.

[Redacted]

The risk taken by migrants in their attempts to cross the Channel is high. Although the number of reported fatalities in the area is low compared to other maritime routes used by irregular migrants, the risk of having an accident with commercial vessels, drowning at sea or dying by hypothermia is high.

UK policy and activities (new policy)

In Mid-April 2022, the UK launched a new strategy plan for immigration, in order to deter illegal migration to the UK, to modify the asylum process, and to prevent high-risk sea crossings on small boats. According to British authorities, the implementation was scheduled to be fully executed by Q1 2023. But by the second half of 2022, the implementation of the new regulation and its measures faced legal slowdowns, which are likely to delay the full implementation. Thus, it is very likely that the UK plan is not going to achieve the expected results in the first half of the year 2023.

[Redacted]

Threats and risks

[Redacted]

Outlook

The following factors must be taken into consideration in terms of the trend in the flows of migrants crossing the Channel:

[Redacted]

Commented [KW3]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. Its disclosure would jeopardize the work of law enforcement officials and pose a hazard to the course of ongoing and future operations aimed at curtailing the activities of such networks, ultimately obstructing their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime as well as to prevent unauthorized border crossings. The disclosure would thus undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts cannot be released as it refers to details crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the European Union which is used by Frontex to conduct its operational activities and to develop risk analyses. The disclosure of this information would hamper the effectiveness of Frontex operations and jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities at the external borders. It would thus benefit criminal networks especially those involved in people smuggling and trafficking in human beings, which would put the life of migrants in danger. Hence, the disclosure of the information pertaining to this variable would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and has to be refused based on Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Recommendations

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. OPERATIONAL AIM, OBJECTIVES AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

4.1. Specific operational aim

To provide increased technical and operational assistance to Belgium and France by coordinating operational activities to detect and prevent unauthorised border crossings from the Belgian and French coast and from the territorial sea of Belgium towards the United Kingdom. To tackle cross-border crime, including migrants smuggling and trafficking in human beings. To enhance European cooperation on coast guard functions as well as to support SAR in accordance with the international law.

The general operational aim is defined in the General Part.

Commented [KW4]: The non-disclosed parts cannot be released as it refers to details crucial for situational awareness at the external borders of the European Union which is used by Frontex to conduct its operational activities and to develop risk analyses. The disclosure of this information would hamper the effectiveness of Frontex operations and jeopardise the efforts carried out by the European Union and Member States to curtail criminal activities at the external borders. It would thus benefit criminal networks especially those involved in people smuggling and trafficking in human beings, which would put the life of migrants in danger. Hence, the disclosure of the information pertaining to this variable would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and has to be refused based on Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

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The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

4.2. Specific operational objectives

The specific operational objectives of the JO are as follows:

General objectives	Specific objectives	Indicators
To support MS in border control, including prevention, detection of and combating cross-border crime.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide the support by deploying human resources (HR) to the JO. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overall number and man-days of HR (SC and other relevant staff and host MS co-financed staff) deployed during the JO. Average number of SC officers, per deployment period (total, per category and per SC profile). Percentage of deployed SC officers versus plan of deployed resources. Percentage between SC categories. Total number of fundamental rights monitoring days in the operational area. Gender composition of deployed SC operational staff in percentages (overall and per profile). Average number of host MS staff per deployment period, co-financed by Frontex in the JO.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide the support by deploying technical equipment (TE) to the JO. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overall number and asset-days of aerial assets (host and participating MS, Frontex owned, co-owned and leased) deployed during the JO. Average number of aerial assets (host and participating MS, Frontex owned, co-owned and leased) per deployment period / per type of TE / asset-days / patrolling hours performed. Percentage of TE (aerial assets) deployed by participating MS and Frontex versus plan of deployed resources (per type of TE). Percentage of TE (aerial assets) deployed by the host MS (co-financed by Frontex) versus the TE deployed by participating MS (per type of TE). Percentage of TE (aerial assets) deployed by host MS, participating MS and Frontex versus plan of deployed resources (per type of TE). Percentage of Frontex leased, owned, co-owned TE (aerial assets) versus offered by the participating MS (per type of TE). Number of supporting TE deployed (per type of TE).

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase MS capacity in conducting search and rescue operations with the deployed aerial assets. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number and percentage of SAR incidents in which aerial assets (host and participating MS, Frontex owned, co-owned and leased) deployed to the JO have been engaged versus the total SAR incidents reported within the JO.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effectively use deployed resources in the operational activity. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level of capacity in the host MS for the effective use of deployed resources. • Level of flexibility for using deployed resources. • Level of capacity of the deployed TE (host and participating MS, Frontex owned, co-owned and leased) in the operational environment. • Availability for duty of deployed resources.
Enhance collection and exchange of operational information for developing up-to date situational picture and for the purpose of identifying possible risks and threats.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collect information and report in JORA in a timely manner all incidents having impact on the relevant JO, including data on fundamental rights related aspects. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number, quality and timeliness of reported incidents in JORA. • Number of referrals initiated, and number/types of vulnerable persons, including persons in need of international protection, identified and/or referred to the competent national authority (including disaggregated data by e.g., sex/gender, age and nationality).
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prepare regular and ad hoc reports from the operational area on illegal immigration and cross-border crime for risk analysis. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number, quality, and timeliness of operational reports, such as information / reports drafted with relevant content and sent to MS and Frontex.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prepare situational awareness reports and analytical products for the JO to be shared with the relevant stakeholders. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of analytical products prepared and disseminated with adequate content according to the Operational Plan and corresponding to the needs of relevant stakeholders.
Enhance operational cooperation, including cooperation on coast guard functions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish and maintain an effective coordination structure in the JO, including a well-functioning command and control structure. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level of assigned Frontex staff for coordination tasks (FCO, FTSO-ORS, Shift leaders etc.). • Level of the host MS staff assigned to the coordination structure. • Level of cooperation within the coordination and command and control structures.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilitate and enhance operational cooperation between the host MS/TC and participating MS/TC and Frontex. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Level of operational cooperation between host MS and participating MS/TC and Frontex. Number of participating MS involved in the JO. Number of TC which deployed observers and number of TC observers deployed.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure proper working conditions, including logistical arrangements by the host MS and Frontex. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Level of working conditions including logistical arrangements provided by the host MS and Frontex for the participants of the JO.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilitate and enhance operational cooperation among the national authorities in the host MS. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of national authorities involved in the JO. Level of operational cooperation between national authorities in the host MS.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordinate and support the cooperation with other Union bodies, offices and agencies or international organisations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number and level of operational cooperation with other Union bodies, offices and agencies or international organisations involved in the JO. Number of experts from International and Non-Governmental Organisations, represented within the Frontex Consultative Forum who carried out on-the-spot visits in the JO.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish and enhance cooperation with EFCA and EMSA, competent Regional Coordination Centres (RCC) and other national authorities responsible for coast guard functions to increase maritime situational awareness and to support coherent and cost-efficient actions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of sighting forms sent to EFCA and EMSA. Number of feedbacks received from EFCA and EMSA on sighting forms.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide, in cooperation with EFCA and EMSA, services, information, equipment and training. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tailored SOPs developed / implemented in cooperation with other agencies for the coast guard functions related activities. Number of EFS services provided following the request of the host MS to support coast guard functions. Number of shared information from EFCA and EMSA about suspicious objects (e.g., fishing vessels, merchandise vessels, etc.)

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of EMSA and EFCA trainings delivered to stakeholders in regards fisheries and environmental matters and services provided.
To support MS operational capacity building including integration of relevant research and innovation activities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deliver and support workshops, meetings, other networking events, including innovation cells. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of workshops, meetings, other networking events implemented in JO, including on the serious incident reporting, supervisory mechanism on the use of force, the Frontex complaints mechanism and other fundamental rights related aspects.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deliver operational briefings / debriefings and tailored briefings / awareness sessions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of operational briefings and debriefings delivered, including the number of operational briefings contributed by the FRO and/or FROMs. Number of other Union bodies, offices and agencies or international organisations contributing to the operational briefings. Number of tailored briefings /awareness sessions supported / provided to the participants of the JO.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deliver Frontex projects, products and services as well as technical solutions including those linked with EUROSUR. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of contributing Frontex projects, products and services implemented in the JO. Number of contributing Frontex technology pilot projects, technical assistance actions and responses, including study visits or research activities implemented in operational environment.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify and exchange best practices during JO. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of best practices identified and exchanged.

4.3. Operational concept

4.3.1. Operational activities

The specific objectives of the JO will be achieved by combining different types of operational activities, particularly:

- Border surveillance.
- Prevention of unauthorised border crossing.
- Technical and operational assistance to SAR operations³.

³Provide technical and operational assistance in support of search and rescue operations for persons in distress at sea which may arise during border surveillance operations at sea as defined in Article 10(j) of the EBCG Regulation.

- Collecting information through operational activities.
- Supporting the prevention, detection and combatting of cross-border crime⁴.
- Supporting national authorities carrying out coast guard functions in cooperation with EFCA and EMSA.
- Facilitating the cooperation with other Union bodies, offices and agencies or international organisations, and Third Countries deploying observers.
- Implementing VEGA children activities.

During the JO a clear and updated situational picture from the operational area will be provided.

In addition, during the JO the following aspects to be ensured:

- Supporting the identification of persons in need of international protection, victims of trafficking in human beings, unaccompanied minors, and other vulnerable persons and persons in a vulnerable situation including those indicated in the non-exhaustive list of categories defined in the General Part (chapter 2.3.2.) and thus, their referral to competent authorities.
- Referring and providing initial information to persons who need, or wish to apply for, international protection.

General data protection requirements for processing of operational personal data, personal data processing activities and data protection responsibilities within the JO are defined in the chapter 13 of the General Part.

4.3.1.1. Border surveillance

- **Aerial border surveillance**

Aerial border surveillance shall be carried out by aerial assets for the detection / tracking / identification of objects of interest [REDACTED]

Apart from assets above stated, the use of Eurosur Fusion Services (EFS) could be envisaged if conditions permit to support border surveillance, upon request of the host MS.

The main tasks of the aerial assets are:

- Early detect, report and track suspicious groups of persons and/or transportation means suspected of carrying persons and in possession of any equipment which may facilitate sea crossings in order to prevent unauthorised border crossings from [REDACTED] towards the United Kingdom in an irregular manner or of being engaged in the smuggling of migrants in the operational area.
- Support Search and Rescue (SAR) operations.
- Provide situational awareness in the operational area, including by identifying normal and abnormal navigation.
- Contribute to preventing, detecting and combating cross-border crime.

In compliance with the national legislation of the host MS⁵, including the applicable national provisions on data protection, the aerial assets must properly document⁶ [REDACTED] all actions (detection, tracking and prevention).

⁴ Serious crime with a cross-border dimension that is committed or attempted at, along or in the proximity of the external borders, in accordance with Article 2 (10) of the Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard (OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, p. 1), with the focus on migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings, stolen vehicles, smuggling of drugs, weapons, excise goods, document fraud, environmental crimes and terrorism.

⁵ The national legislation of the host MS is defined in the document "Description of the tasks and specific instructions to the members of the teams including rules on use of force" available on FOSS.

⁶ Reasonably excluding the possibilities to identify individuals or in case of using technical devices, that personal identification is avoided.

Commented [KW5]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security in the sense of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

[REDACTED] is

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and other national authorities of the host MS, if requested by the host MS.

The participating aerial assets perform their tasks under the coordination of the ICC [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The patrolling schedule must be flexible and prepared taking into account the capabilities of the participating aerial assets [REDACTED].

Flexibility in the patrolling schedule is a key element: participating assets can be requested by the ICC to reschedule patrolling activities according to the operational needs. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] shall be provided [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Commented [KW6]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in the operational area by Frontex and Member States. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the exact type and capabilities of the equipment and would enable third parties, e.g. by combining this information with other sources, to draw conclusions regarding usual positions and movement patterns. This would open way for abuse, as numbers and types of equipment used in previous operations are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding years. Releasing such information would thus benefit criminal networks, enabling them to change their modus operandi and, consequently, result in hampering the course of ongoing and future operations of a similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of such operations: to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of information regarding the technical equipment deployed would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Aerial assets

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

- *Minimum requirements for technical equipment*

Minimum standards for technical equipment used in Frontex JO are defined in the Management Board Decision 51/2021 of 21 September 2021⁷.

The Management Board Decision 51/2021 is available on FOSS.

4.3.1.2. Prevention of unauthorised border crossings

All participants involved in the border surveillance activities will focus [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

4.3.1.3. Technical and operational assistance to SAR operations

The MS shall observe their obligation to render assistance to any vessel or person in distress at sea and they shall ensure that their participating units comply with that obligation, in accordance with international law and respect for fundamental rights under the coordination of the responsible RCC. They shall do so regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found.

⁷ Management Board Decision 51/2021 of 21 September 2021 on the Technical Standards for the equipment to be deployed in Frontex activities.

Commented [KW7]: The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in the operational area by Frontex and Member States. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the exact type and capabilities of the equipment and would enable third parties, e.g. by combining this information with other sources, to draw conclusions regarding usual positions and movement patterns. This would open way for abuse, as numbers and types of equipment used in previous operations are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding years. Releasing such information would thus benefit criminal networks, enabling them to change their modus operandi and, consequently, result in hampering the course of ongoing and future operations of a similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of such operations: to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of information regarding the technical equipment deployed would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

4.3.1.4. Collecting information through operational activities

- *Collection of information through operational reports*

[REDACTED]

Commented [KW8]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 .

4.3.1.5. Supporting the prevention, detection and combatting of cross-border crime

Given its activities at the external borders, Frontex coordinated operational activities should contribute to preventing, detecting and combatting cross-border crime⁸, with the focus on migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings, environmental crimes and terrorism, where it is appropriate for it to act and where it has obtained relevant information through its activities.

4.3.1.6. Supporting national authorities carrying out coast guard functions in cooperation with EFCA and EMSA

The cooperation with EFCA and EMSA⁹ is focused on the exchange of information, namely sightings as regards fisheries activities [REDACTED] and potential marine pollution [REDACTED] within the operational area. To support the quality of the data contained in the sighting forms, tailored briefing will be organised for the National Officials, Commanding Officers and Crew Members of the assets deployed in the JO.

In addition, representatives of other agencies engaged in implementation of European cooperation on coast guard functions (EMSA, EFCA) can be deployed in the ICC or on board of the respective assets to facilitate the implementation of the European cooperation on coast guard functions.

4.3.1.7. Facilitating the cooperation with other EU bodies, offices and agencies or international organisations and TC deploying observers

Information about the cooperation with other Union bodies, offices and agencies or international organisations, and TC deploying observers is provided in the chapter 7 of the General Part and this SAP.

4.3.1.8. Implementing Vega children activities

VEGA Children focuses on children trafficked or smuggled through the external borders. Upon agreement with the host MS, experts from International and Non-Governmental Organisations represented within the Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights might carry-out on-the-spot-visit to support the identification of children at risk on the move, as well as their referral to the welfare and protection institutions, sharing their expertise and advising border guard officers on the spot.

4.3.2. Contributing Frontex projects, products and services

In this JO the following contributing Frontex projects, products and services may be used and implemented:

- Vega Handbook.

⁸ Ibid footnote 4

⁹ The precise forms of cooperation on CG Functions between Frontex, EFCA and EMSA are based on the tripartite working arrangement (available on FOSS).

- Handbook on Risk Profiles on Trafficking in Human Beings (THB).
- Handbook on Common Risk Indicators (CRI).
- Practical Handbook on European cooperation on coast guard functions.
- SAR workshops.
- EUROSUR Fusion Services.
- Research and Innovation pilot projects or demonstrations related to border surveillance technologies.


Information about the listed above contributing to Frontex projects, products and services is available in the General Part and Handbook.

5. IMPLEMENTATION

5.1. Implementation period

Commencement	25 January 2023	12:00 (CET ¹⁰)
Termination	24 January 2024	11:59 (CET)

The JO will be implemented [REDACTED]



Commented [KW9]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

5.2. Operational area



¹⁰ Central European Time

5.2.1. Map of the operational area



Commented [KW10]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

REMARK:

The operational area as presented in the operational plan has been established only for operational implementation purpose and does not imply the expression of any position whatsoever on the part of Frontex concerning the legal status of any overlapping areas concerning boundaries.

5.2.2. Coordinates of operational area

[Redacted line]

Third Countries	To be confirmed during the implementation phase of the JO ¹³
Union bodies, offices and agencies	European Border and Coast Guard Agency, European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA), European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)
International Organisations	Not envisaged

REMARK:

Any change related to the involvement of the entities above, except for the host MS, occurred during the JO do not require the amendment of the SAP. Any change will be agreed between Frontex, host MS and the respective new parties during implementation phase of the JO.

5.4. Pre-deployment training, operational briefing and debriefing

Information on the pre-deployment training, the operational briefing and debriefing is provided in the General Part.

6. INITIAL PLAN OF DEPLOYED RESOURCES

The tables below reflect the operational needs for the human and technical resources per deployment period to be deployed in the JO. The actual deployments overview is available in OperaEvo. The final list of resources deployed in the JO will be provided in the Frontex Evaluation Report.

6.1. Human resources

Frontex and Participating MS:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	I	I	I
[Redacted]	I	I	I
[Redacted]	I	I	I

Host MS:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
------------	------------	------------	------------

¹³ Upon agreement of the host MS.

[Redacted]

Commented [KW12]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6.2. Technical equipment

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

REMARK:

Any changes related to the level of the deployed resources in the course of the JO do not require the amendment of the SAP. Those deployments will be agreed between Frontex, host and respective participating MS during the JO.

Abbreviations:

Members of the Teams:

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Other operational actors

OLO-TE - Operational Liaison Officer for Technical Equipment (host MS)

7. COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES, OTHER UNION BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

7.1. Cooperation with third countries

TC observers may be deployed during the implementation the JO, if such need occurs, with prior agreement of the host MS.

Information regarding cooperation with TC is provided in the General Part.

7.2. Cooperation with other Union bodies, offices and agencies or international organisations and other entities

The operational cooperation between Frontex and EFCA and EMSA is maintained during the JO.

Provisions of cooperation with other Union bodies, offices and agencies or international organisations are provided in Chapter 7 the General Part.

Commented [KW13]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profile of officers and technical equipment deployed in the operational area by Frontex and Member States. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the exact type and capabilities of the equipment and would enable third parties, e.g. by combining this information with other sources, to draw conclusions regarding usual positions and movement patterns. This would open way for abuse, as numbers and types of equipment used in previous operations are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding years. Releasing such information would thus benefit criminal networks, enabling them to change their modus operandi and, consequently, result in hampering the course of ongoing and future operations of a similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of such operations: to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of information regarding the technical equipment deployed would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

8. COORDINATION STRUCTURE

8.1. Partnership

Frontex coordinates the JO via Coordinating Officers from Field Operations Unit.

The Belgian Federal Police and the French Central Directorate of Border Police are the direct partners of Frontex and responsible for all border related activities within the JO.

The participating MS and Frontex deploy their resources to the JO.

More detailed provisions related to partnership are defined in the General Part.

8.2. Main operational actors and structures

The following operational actors and structures are established within the JO:

8.2.1. Member States

- ICC Coordinators - Officers of the Belgian Federal Police and the French Central Directorate of Border Police
- National Officials (NO) - Officers of participating MS deploying aerial assets
- Commanding Officers (CO) - Commanders of the assets
- Local Coordination Centres (LCC) - [REDACTED]
- LCC Coordinators - Officers of the Belgian Federal Police and the French Central Directorate of Border Police
- Operational Liaison Officer (OLO)
- Operational Liaison Officer for Technical Equipment (OLO) for TE - Officer of the host MS deployed on board of the aerial asset
- Officers of the host MS - at the central and local levels

8.2.2. Frontex

- Frontex Operational Coordination Centre (FOCC) - Frontex HQ
- International Coordination Centre (ICC) hosted by the FOCC - ICC Warsaw
- Joint Coordinating Board (JCB) - ICC Coordinators, NO, OLO for FSA, FCO/OT /FTSO-ORS, OLO, etc.
- Frontex Coordinating Officer (FCO) - Field Operations Unit (FOU)
- Operational Team (OT) - Frontex Operational Coordinator (FOC)¹⁵, TM supporting OT
- Operational Analyst (OA) - Risk Analysis Unit (RAU)
- Frontex Situation Centre (FSC)
 - 24/7 Monitoring Hub /Senior Duty Officer (SDO) and FSC Shift Leaders
 - Frontex Incident Reporting and Validation (IRV) Team
 - European Surveillance Team (EST) - [REDACTED]
 - Operational Liaison Officer [REDACTED] - FSC representative
 - Maritime Surveillance Team (MST)
- Information Fusion Centre (IFC)
- Logistics Unit (LOG)
- Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO)
- Fundamental Rights Monitors (FROMs)

Commented [KW14]: The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the technical equipment deployed in the operational area by Frontex and Member States. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the exact type and capabilities of the equipment and would enable third parties, e.g. by combining this information with other sources, to draw conclusions regarding usual positions and movement patterns. This would open way for abuse, as numbers and types of equipment used in previous operations are indicative of similar numbers and types for succeeding years. Releasing such information would thus benefit criminal networks, enabling them to change their modus operandi and, consequently, result in hampering the course of ongoing and future operations of a similar nature. This would ultimately obstruct the purpose of such operations: to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of information regarding the technical equipment deployed would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

¹⁵ FOU (OIS) operational experts.

8.2.3. Members of the teams

Members of the Teams (TM) - Standing Corps operational staff - Categories 1, 2 and 3

[Redacted text block]

Commented [KW15]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. The non-disclosed parts contain information regarding the number and profiles of officers deployed in the operational area. Disclosing such information would be tantamount to disclosing the weaknesses and strengths of Frontex operations and pose a risk to their effectiveness. As a result, the course of ongoing and future similar operations would be hampered, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. Consequently, the disclosure of such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security as laid down Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001.

8.2.4. Observers

TC observers may be deployed during implementation the JO, if such need occurs with prior agreement of the host MS.

Observers from other Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies or international organizations and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations, may be invited during the implementation the JO, if such need occurs with prior agreement of the host MS.

8.2.5. Composition of the teams

The composition of the teams is reflected under chapter 4.3.1. of this SAP.

8.2.6. Frontex chain of coordination

Information about Frontex chain of coordination is available in General Part and Contact Details. Actors of the Frontex chain of coordination are included in the "Contact details" available on FOSS.

8.3. Tasks and Roles

8.3.1. Member States

ICC Coordinator

[Redacted text block]

[Redacted]

Operational Liaison Officer (OLO)

[Redacted]

National Official (NO)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Commanding Officer (CO)

[Redacted]

Commented [KW16]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

[Redacted]

Local Coordination Centre (LCC)

[Redacted]

LCC Coordinator

[Redacted]

Operational Liaison Officer for Technical Equipment (OLO-TE)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Commented [KW17]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

[Redacted]

8.3.2. Frontex

International Coordination Centre (ICC)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Joint Coordinating Board (JCB)

[Redacted]

8.3.3. Members of the teams

Members of the teams

The tasks of the TM are defined in the chapter 9 of the General Part.

8.3.4. Observers

The tasks of the Observers are defined in chapter 8.3.4. of the General Part.

9. DESCRIPTION OF THE TASKS AND SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE TEAMS INCLUDING RULES ON USE OF FORCE

The tasks of the TM per profiles are defined in the chapter 9 of the General Part.

The description of tasks and specific instructions to the members of the teams including rules on use of force in the host MS are further described in a document uploaded on FOSS.

In addition, Annex V to the Regulation applies for Category 1 staff.

Commented [KW18]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

10. COMMAND AND CONTROL

10.1. Technical equipment

Provisions of the command and control of technical equipment are provided in the General Part.

10.2. European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, other relevant staff and observers

Provisions of the command and control of members of the teams and observers are provided in the General Part.

Contact details, including names of the host MS officers responsible for cooperation with deployed members of the teams and observers as well as locations of their deployments are available on FOSS.

10.3. Command and control scheme

Commented [KW19]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

11. COMMUNICATION

Operational communication lines and communication with Press rules are available in the General Part.

The contact details of Frontex Media and Public Relations Office members (Spokesperson and Frontex Field Press Officer) and the relevant press officers of national authorities of the host MS are available on FOSS.

12. REPORTING

12.1. Reporting in JORA

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Commented [KW20]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains personal data, such as names of individuals and/or characteristic features which could lead to the identification of individuals. The disclosure would undermine the protection of privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with European Union legislation regarding the protection of personal data and therefore has to be precluded pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

12.1.1. JORA Actors

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

12.1.2. JORA reporting structure

- Incidents reporting structure




Commented [KW21]: The non-disclosed part contains personal data, such as names of individuals and/or characteristic features which could lead to the identification of individuals. The disclosure would undermine the protection of privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with European Union legislation regarding the protection of personal data and therefore has to be precluded pursuant to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

- JORA Reporting Timeline



Commented [KW22]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

12.2. Operational reports of participants¹⁸

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [KW23]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

¹⁸ Excluding operational reports reflected in chapter 12.1. Reporting in JORA

				[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] to: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [KW24]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

[REDACTED]

				to

[Redacted]

Commented [KW25]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

12.3. Serious incident reporting

The reporting of serious incidents (SI) must be in line with the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on Serious Incident Reporting²² and shall follow the subsequent reporting lines:

- for SI Category 1: the participant shall immediately report to the FRO via email at: [Redacted] or via phone at: [Redacted] who ensures the report is formally inserted in JORA in line with chapter 12.3. of the General Part. Additionally, without prejudice to the SIR SOP and the national legislation as regards reporting obligations on potential fundamental rights violations, the participant may report the SI to the coordinating staff of the JO at [Redacted] the FTSO-ORS and keep informed the ICC, the respective ICC Coordinator and the NFPOC of the respective host MS via email. After receiving such knowledge, the FRO shall immediately inform the FSC, the FCO, the respective ICC, the respective ICC Coordinator and NFPOC of the involved MS or TC with initial information including a summary of the case at that point of time and serves as preliminary information to obtain immediate knowledge about the incident and conduct the first assessment.
- for SI Category 2 and 3: the participant shall immediately report to the coordinating staff of the JO at [Redacted] and FTSO-ORS or via phone number of the respective FCO/OT/FTSO-ORS. The FCO/OT/FTSO-ORS shall ensure immediate reporting to the FSC, the ICC, relevant ICC Coordinator and the OT using functional email accounts. The coordinating staff should collect any additional information and report the incident, together with an initial assessment, to the FSC with the ICC, the respective ICC Coordinator and the NFPOC of the respective host MS in cc.

An exceptional reporting can be applied in case a participant is prevented by his/her hierarchy from reporting a SI or has any concerns about the forwarding of his/her report. The participant may either directly address the ED or the FRO for fundamental rights concerns. If he/she fears retaliation, he/she may address Frontex Inspection and Control Office with the report by writing to whistleblowing@frontex.europa.eu.

Provisions on the categories of Serious Incidents and the definition of responsibilities are included in the General Part.

The Serious Incidents Reporting procedure including Serious Incidents Catalogue is available in the Handbook.

12.4. Use of force (UF) and incidents involving use of force (IF) reporting

Provisions on the types of reports and responsibilities are included in the General.

The UF and IF reporting standard operating procedure²³ is available in the Handbook.

²² Decision of the Executive Director No R-ED-2021-51 of 19 April 2021 Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) - Serious Incident Reporting.
²³ Decision of the Executive Director R-ED-2021-38 of 6 March 2021 on Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) - Use of force and incidents involving the use of force reporting (UFR / IFR).

12.5. Frontex reports

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

Commented [KW26]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information on the means of communication used by law enforcement officials. The disclosure of this information would put law enforcement officials' work in jeopardy and harm the course of future and ongoing operations aimed at curtailing the activities of organized criminal networks involved in the smuggling and migrants and trafficking in human beings. As the disclosure of such pieces of information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, it must therefore be refused as laid down in Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

13. DATA PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS

Personal data will be collected only for the achievement of specific purposes for which the JO has been launched.

When the processing of personal data takes place on behalf of the host MS, the instructions on how to process personal data are defined in the corresponding "Data Processing Agreement".

In particular for this JO, the purpose of processing personal data is for preventing unauthorised border crossings from the Belgian and French coast and from the territorial sea of Belgium, and to tackle cross-border crime, including migrants smuggling and trafficking in human being. Processing of personal data is limited to the operational activities defined below:

Activity	Personal data processing activities	Data protection responsibility
Border surveillance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Crew Members of the aerial assets must properly document [REDACTED] all actions (detection, tracking and prevention) for information and evidence collection purposes. 	MS as Controller Frontex as Processor on behalf of the Controller

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The collected/collated information [redacted] related to sightings of potential marine pollution / fishing vessels (including fishing gear) gathered by participating assets during patrolling activities will be sent to EMSA and EFCA's dedicated contact point, after approval by the ICC of the host MS. 	Parallel controllership between MS, EMSA, EFCA and Frontex
Reporting obligations ²⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use of Force - UFR Incidents involving Use of Force - IFR Serious Incident Report - SIR 	Frontex

Commented [KW27]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed parts refer to details of the operational area and cannot be released. As ongoing operations tend to cover similar operational areas as the operations conducted in preceding years, disclosing details of previous operational areas would be tantamount to disclosing the current state of play. This would provide smuggling and other criminal networks with intelligence, enabling them to change their modus operandi, which would ultimately put the life of migrants in danger. Consequently, the course of ongoing and future operations of similar nature would be hampered by depriving the operations of any strategy and element of surprise, ultimately defeating their purpose to counter and prevent cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In this light, the disclosure of documents containing such information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The data protection requirements are available in the General Part.

14. WORKING CONDITIONS, PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS AND LOGISTICS

14.1. Working conditions and working environment of the operational area

The working conditions and environment vary according to the place of deployment.

Participants of the JO perform their tasks at the offices and /or on-board of the deployed technical equipment.

The ICC Warsaw

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

REMARK:

Any changes related to the "Working conditions and logistics" in the course of JO do not require the amendment of the SAP.

14.2. Working time

Information on working time is available in the General Part.

²⁴ In accordance with the respective SOP

²⁵ The ICC Coordinator can perform their tasks remotely, with the previous agreement with the operational team FCO.

14.3. Safety and health

Information on safety and health is available in the General Part.

Frontex Guidelines on "Occupational health and safety - deployment information" available on FOSS.

14.4. Logistics

Information on the registration of deployed resources in Opera Evo, field visits, weapons and ammunition, diplomatic clearance, transportation and accommodation, Frontex visual identity are available in the General Part and /or Handbook.

15. EVALUATION

Information regarding evaluation of the JO including required reports from Frontex, [REDACTED] host MS and participating MS/TC is available in the General Part.

16. FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

Information on the applicable financial provisions is available in the General Part.

17. CONTACT DETAILS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Commented [KW28]: The non-disclosed part contains detailed information related to reporting tools and methods used by law enforcement officials to conduct border control tasks and counter criminal activities. Its disclosure would jeopardize the implementation of ongoing and future operations, and thus facilitate irregular migration and trafficking in human beings as the effectiveness of law enforcement measures would be significantly reduced. As disclosing this information would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security, this part is not disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

The non-disclosed part contains detailed information regarding the modus operandi of law enforcement officials performing border control and/or coast guard duties. Disclosing such information would expose the working methods applied in ongoing and future operations, thus obstructing their effectiveness in prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossings. In consequence, it would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security and thus, cannot be disclosed pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) first indent of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.