NOTE
From: Polish delegation
To: JHA Counsellors / COSI Support Group
No. prev. doc.: CM 6157/10 JAI COSI FRONT COMIX
Subject: Implementation of Council Conclusions on 29 Measures for reinforcing the protection of the external borders and combating illegal immigration: analysis of the replies to the questionnaire on "MS needs and capacities regarding Common Pre-Frontier Intelligence Picture (CPIP)"
- Compilation of replies

Delegations will find attached a compilation of the replies to CM 6157/10 JAI COSI FRONT COMIX.
PART I. CURRENT USE OF "CPIP-TYPE" INFORMATION.

This part of the questionnaire is intended to establish
1. what information Member States already exchange
2. who is involved in this exchange
3. how can this exchange and already existing mechanisms be most effectively incorporated to EUROSUR.

While filling in this part, as the point of departure please refer to the background information on the Technical Study (Annex), however you are invited also to go beyond the scope of the Annex, in your answers.

SWEDEN

General remark:
Please note, that due to an ongoing study in Sweden regarding the requirements of a EUROSUR implementation, we choose not to extensively elaborate with replies to some of the questions in this questionnaire. In Sweden today there is no NCC- function in terms of the Eurosur project.

The Swedish Government has assigned the National Police Board to, in cooperation with the Swedish Coast Guard and other relevant authorities, study the requirements for an implementation of the EUROSUR including the NCC- concept. The study will also take into consideration the outcome of other ongoing relevant projects, as for example the pilot project on integration of maritime surveillance in the Northern European Sea basins, MARSUNO.

NORWAY

Please allow us first to inform you that we are still in the process of establishing a national coordination center (NCC) in Norway. The National Police Directorate has decided that an NCC will be established with the National Crime Investigation Service (NCIS), but further conditions relating to the establishment of the NCC is still under consideration, ie the responsibilities and tasks of the NCC and the cooperation arrangements between the different authorities with border control responsibilities etc.
Furthermore, since these elements are still inconclusive, we have asked for input only from the police authorities that will be directly affected by the first steps of EUROSUR, i.e. the police district with land border towards Russia, and the NCIS in Oslo. Please accept that we are not in a position at the moment to give you a full and detailed response to the questionnaire. Please also be aware that circumstances may change before the CPIP is implemented.
1. Please enumerate authorities in your country that use information from third-countries related to irregular migration and serious crime at the EU external borders and other CPIP-type information (see above) in their daily work.

BELGIUM
Federal Police, Department of Federal Immigration, OCAD (organization of coordination and threat analysis), Security of the State

BULGARIA
Ministry of Interior and State Agency for National Security

CYPRUS
The information/data/analysis used is described in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SYSTEM</th>
<th>Kind of Info</th>
<th>Owner authority</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Distribution Local Authority</th>
<th>Exchange with other MS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Radars</td>
<td>Picture</td>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>Maritime Surveillance</td>
<td>Police, Dept of Merchant Shipping</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTMIS</td>
<td>Picture - Data-Voice</td>
<td>Dept. of Merchant Shipping</td>
<td>Monitoring Merchant Vessels Traffic,</td>
<td>Police, JRCC, other authorities as needed NAVY</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTS</td>
<td>Picture</td>
<td>Local Authority Port Authority</td>
<td>Traffic Monitoring within the port Vicinity</td>
<td>Police Navy</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMS</td>
<td>Picture - Data</td>
<td>Fisheries Department</td>
<td>Monitoring the Traffic of Fishing Vessels and Fishing Boats</td>
<td>Police Navy</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARES - AIS</td>
<td>IMAGE</td>
<td>Dept. of Merchant Shipping</td>
<td>Merchant Traffic Monitoring in Mediterranean</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Sea Net</td>
<td>IMAGE</td>
<td>Dept. of Merchant Shipping</td>
<td>Pollution Prevention</td>
<td>Police – Fisheries Department</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRIT (Long Range Identification and Tracking)</td>
<td>IMGA / DATA</td>
<td>Dept. of Merchant Shipping</td>
<td>Cyprus and Foreign Flag Merchant Vessels Traffic Monitoring (6 hours Intervals)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THETIS</td>
<td>Database</td>
<td>Dept. of Merchant Shipping</td>
<td>Special Data for Ship Inspections</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES – Via EMSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Data Information</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Strategic, Operational</td>
<td>Police Units</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAN</td>
<td>Data – Open Source</td>
<td>Police (Immigration Office)</td>
<td>Statistical Analysis</td>
<td>Other Police Units – Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE CZECH REPUBLIC
- Foreign Police Service of the Czech Republic (FPC)
- Organized Crime Unit of the Criminal Police and Investigation Service (OCU)

ESTONIA
- Police and Border guard board
- Security Police Board
- Taxation and Customs Board
- Maritime Board
- Environment Board

FINLAND
Border Guard, Police, Customs, Immigration office, Foreign Ministry, Defence Forces.
Answers are from The Finnish Border Guard; we are not able to answer on behalf of other authorities.

FRANCE
- Irregular migration: Border police for strategic key information as described in the technical study
- Serious crime: Police, customs for strategic key information and operational information
- Every operational operation for events at sea may also be sent to the maritime prefect’s operational center; strategic key information are analyzed by departments which adapt their assets for routine missions and refer to the maritime prefect for maritime aspects in order to adapt the surveillance system and coordinate means and patrols at regional scale
French customs are detailing the legal framework as follows:
French customs receive customs information related to illicit activities (contraband, drugs trafficking, commercial frauds…) in the frame of bilateral or multilateral international cooperation agreements such as:
- Naples II convention between UE Member States, signed in 1997, and regulations CE515/97 and 2073/2004 (excise).
- Nairobi convention (1977) or specific bilateral agreements, with third countries, e.g. agreement with Venezuela (10 october 1989) against drugs trafficking.
In the maritime domain, French Customs exchange information on illicit trafficking, in the frame of maritime agreements, e.g. San Jose agreement (10 april 2004). For example about drugs, originating from third countries in the Caribbean area, such as Guatemala, United States Belize and Dominican Republic.

ITALY
The Central Criminal Investigation Directorate, the Central Immigration and Border Police Directorate, the Central Anti Crime Directorate and the Central Anti Drugs Directorate are the branches of the Interior Ministry's Public Security Department which make use of such information.

LATVIA
Within bilateral cooperation the State Border Guard (SBG), Customs Criminal Board and Criminal Board of the State Police exchange information with Russia and Belorussia. Also within the framework of BSRBCC the SBG exchanges information with Russia concerning maritime matters. Latvia also uses information from Liaison officers from Russia, Belorussia and Georgia.

LITHUANIA
Within the scope of its competence (with regard to issues of border surveillance, individuals cross-border traffic control, etc), the SBGS exchanges information (including that related to criminal intelligence) with the third countries (Belarus and Russia). The cooperation is carries out on the central, regional and local levels (problematic issues are solved and information exchange is carried out), in line with bilateral agreements and cooperation arrangements implementing those agreements. On the local and regional levels, the SBGS receives daily information in the framework of the BSRBCC on the situation in the Baltic Sea from NCCs in Saint Petersburg and Kaliningrad.

THE NETHERLANDS
There is a number of authorities involved: Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (Kmar, Border Police), Seaport Police of Rotterdam, Regional Police Services, Centre of Expertise for Smuggling and Trafficking of Human Beings, Customs, National Police Service (i.e. Unit Maritime Police), Customs, other Coast Guard partners. All aforementioned authorities are participants in or work closely with the Netherlands Coast Guard. Public prosecutors offices. Regional police services.
NORWAY

The police has the overall responsibility for border control in Norway, and is the primary authority in Norway which uses information from third-countries related to irregular migration and serious crime at the EU external borders and other CPIP-type information in their work. The police cooperate and exchange information with other national authorities with responsibilities at the external border when needed.

The police in Norway exchange information regularly with Russia and Finland ("three-land-cooperation"). The purpose of this information exchange between the three countries is to establish a common situational picture og to provide information in specific cases. The source of information is the information that the police and border authorities in the three countries have gathered through investigation.

The police district with land border towards Russia draws up a report on the threat assessment at the Schengen external border every three months. The assessment is based on cooperation with other national authorities, ie. the customs, military (coast guard and border guard), fishery and the Norwegian Border Commissioner.

POLAND

The Border Guard.

Relevant information is forwarded, when needed, to other services such as the Police, Internal Security Agency, Intelligence Service, Counter-Intelligence Army Service, the Customs Service, the Office for Foreigners.

PORTUGAL

Regarding Portugal, the Immigration and Border Service (SEF) has full competence in all migration/illegal migration related issues, and criminal offences related with migratory phenomena such as Facilitation of Illegal Migration and Trafficking in Human Beings (even criminal offences)

The Judiciary Police which has the competence to investigate serious crime (PJ), the Secret Services (SIS/SIED) and Customs (DGAIEC) also have information related to trans-border crime.

Blue border surveillance is carried out by the National Republican Guard (GNR) and by the Navy.
ROMANIA

In accordance with Romanian National Strategy for the Integrated Border Management (IBM), there are several domestic institutions and authorities that are co-operating at national and international levels in order to implement the IBM. IBM is part of the national security system, and these institutions are carrying out these objectives (amongst other specific issues), according to each one’s responsibilities and competencies, as specified by the legal framework. Their participative mission is to enhance the national security environment, by establishing and maintaining operational control of the borders through specific missions, including the processing, aggregation and management of the information.

In this respect, the key responsible authorities that use in their daily work, to different extents, information from third-countries related to illegal migration and serious crimes at EU external borders are, as follows:
- the Ministry of Administration and Interior (especially the Romanian Police, The Romanian Border Police, The Romanian Immigration Office),
- the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
- the Ministry of National Defence,
- the Ministry of Justice,
- the National Customs Authority,

SLOVAKIA

- National Unit Combating Illegal Migration of Bureau of Border and Alien Police (NUCIM)
Source of information from pre-frontiers area and third countries related to cross border organized crime.
- Centre of Analysis and Strategic Management of Bureau of Border and Alien Police (CASM)
Source of internal and pre-frontiers information for internal use mainly.

SPAIN

Depending on the Secretariat of State for Security, the General Direction of Policia and Guardia Civil has the following Departments with responsibilities in immigration:
National Police:
General Commissariat for Aliens and Border: This Unit has to issue the foreigner's cards, to control the entry and exit of the national territory of Spanish and foreigners; to prevent, pursuit and investigate the networks of illegal immigration, and, in general, the police regime of foreigners, refuge and asylum and immigration.
Within this Unit is the UCRIF (Central Unit against Illegal Migration Networks and False Documents) and UCF (Borders Central Unit).
Sometimes National Police – National Unit of EUROPOL and National Police – INTERPOL Madrid Office can obtain this kind of information but not regularly, just for a specific circumstance.

Guardia Civil:
Fiscal and Border Command: This unit has the aim of avoiding and chasing the smuggling, the drug trafficking and other illicit traffic in the field or areas of its responsibility, as well as the custody and vigilance of the coasts, borders, ports, airports and territorial sea and, in this area, the control of the irregular immigration.
Coordination Centre for the Maritime Surveillance of Coast and Borders (NCC): This Centre advises and coordinates the Guardia Civil Director decisions regarding the Maritime Border Surveillance.

National Police and Guardia Civil: Police Attachés and Councilors of Interior posted in 3rd Countries with illegal migration flows.

Depending also on the Secretariat of State for Security, the General Direction of International Relations and Immigration has the responsibility of organizing and preparing the international activities regarding immigration issues that should be carried out by the Ministry of Interior. Therefore, this General Direction coordinates the activities of the Ministry of Interior with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the relations with the authorities of other Governments in this area of responsibility.

The Intelligence Center against the Organized Crime, within the Ministry of Interior, may ask for some reports related to illegal migration as well (strategic intelligence driven products).

SWEDEN
Police authorities, Migration Board, Coast Guard and the Customs.
a) What kind of information/data/analysis do they use?

BELGIUM
Quantitative and qualitative information, risk-analysis, operational information

BULGARIA
- Statistical information;
- Information required for the detection and investigation of crimes across the state border;
- An analysis of migration processes at the EU external borders.

CYPRUS
The typical sources of information are: open sources, testimonies of arrested Smugglers/Traffickers and Illegal Immigrants.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC
see b)

ESTONIA
All available recourses and information that is needed for implementation of tasks stipulated or defined by legislation or deriving from the international obligations is used.
Where possible cross use of databases and automatized data exchange is used.

FINLAND
Information about suspects, traffic (sea and land borders), irregular phenomena, information about illegal immigration, falsified travel documents, etc

FRANCE
For operational information: Positioning (AIS, LRIT, etc...), basic current voyage data, identification (with databases such as Lloyd’s, etc...), historical data. These data are compiled and analyzed by their respective operational center or headquarter in order to be integrated in the common picture established by national sensors and sources with a view to obtain a global situational awareness
For strategic key information, generally frauds trends, alerts,…

Personal data might be used shortly according to the council directive 2004/82/EC of 29th April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to communicate passengers data.

**GERMANY**

The most common types of information processed are:

- related to push and pull factors in third countries of origin/transit of irregular migration
- immigration policies of these countries
- analytical and statistical data
- open source intelligence (media monitoring)
- strategic key information (history, people, government, economy, geography, communications, transportation and transnational issues)

**HUNGARY**

We have mainly general information and statistical data about the border area from official sources. We have only very limited information about concrete cases. We have general information about the border area and the criminal activities from open sources.

**ITALY**

They make use of information on the socio economic situation in third countries, on migration flows into and out of the third country concerned or the geographical area around it and on any changes in the legislative or institutional framework for combating illegal immigration and related criminal offences; such information is sometimes accompanied by statistical and analytical data on geopolitical migration factors. Other information is obtained directly during visits by delegations from third countries and at conferences on particular subjects. Seminars on the migration situation in third countries concerned have been held in implementing European projects dealt with by us (the Across Sahara 1 and Across Sahara 2 projects).
LATVIA
SBG uses the incident/information reports (information about illegal immigration, big smuggling cases, stolen cars etc.), alert reports, monthly operational reports of SBG, tactic alert reports, ad hoc reports.

LITHUANIA
With regard to Belarus: Information on unlawful border crossings and events (including those related to illegal migration), and statistical data on the former issues and volume of individuals traffic across border crossing points.
With regard to Russia: The cooperation arrangements set up cooperation on the regional and local levels in the exchange of photo- and video surveillance imagery, and information (including that related to criminal intelligence) in the issues of illegal immigration prevention, trends, risk analysis, etc.
Standard operational plans for staging joint operations have been approved with Belarus and Russia and supplemented with templates of reports and statistical data sets related to the planning and staging of and reporting on joint operations.

THE NETHERLANDS
Regarding the authorities dealing with border control and the surveillance of aliens information on alien and criminal records is used. In the Maritime context, crew and passenger information is used together with information on the routes, the vessel.

POLAND
points a) e):
Polish Border Guard uses information gained in the framework of Border Delegate's Institution and from neighboring countries. Cooperation in this field is carried out according to provision included in appropriate agreements concluded with these countries. Gained information stay in close relation with phenomenon of illegal migration and crime on state/EU border. Exchanged information concern detected and potential border crossing against the law, goods smuggling across the border and cases connected with breaking regulations on maritime areas. Exchanged information concern also information about traffic of vessels crossing maritime state border. Gained information is used directly for planning and conducting operations in the framework of state border protection especially for counteracting and combating cases of breaking provisions in force when it concerns
state border crossing, safety and public order in border zone and legal order on/in the border/maritime areas. Above mentioned exchange is carried out in an “ad hoc” mode. Additionally, parties exchange information at regular meetings not only on the level of Border Delegates but also on the experts level, in the form of assessment of situation on co-protected stretch of the border and in the form of forecast of the situation development. Regular consultations are carried out when mutual operation in the scope of state border protection are concerned. BG is carrying out regular exchange of statistical data with Ukraine and Belarus.

Exchange of information with Ukraine is carried out in the frame of two systems: DSR/MSR (Daily Situation Report/Monthly Situation Report) system. This system deals with exchange of data concerning the situation on external EU border with Ukraine and it is carried out by border services of: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Ukraine. The information exchanged concerns persons apprehended for illegal border crossing, facilitation as well as those returned in the frame of readmission. The data is transferred in DSR and DSM systems through e-mail (strategic level).

There is bilateral information exchange carried out which contains wider scope of data. This cooperation is carried out on the basis of agreements signed by Heads of border services of Poland and Ukraine in 2009. There is information exchanged every month according to the agreed model. Such information contains the following categories of data: illegal border crossing, readmission, refusal of entry, smuggling of chosen goods (only Ukrainian form), border traffic (strategic and operational level).

Regular exchange of information with Belarus. It is carried out on central level. Data is transferred in a monthly system and contains the following categories of information (Belarusian form): border traffic, persons detained for “breaking border regulations”, “potential illegal migrants” detained, deportation, smuggling, hiding places detected in means of transport (strategic level). There is also carried out current exchange of information with the Russian party, using Independent Risk Analysis Section of Warmińsko-Mazuski BG Regional Unit, responsible for protection of almost all stretch of Polish-Russian border. Data is exchanged in a monthly system and consist of: refusal of entry, detained migrants, cases of false documents and smuggling of weapons and dangerous materials (operational level).
BG is also carrying out cooperation with the Russian party within Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation (BCR BCC), which includes information exchange mentioned at the beginning (Border Delegates), however in the aspect of border services' multilateral cooperation in the Baltic Sea region.

Moreover there is information gained from BG Liaison Officers and by so called “open source information” (Internet, press, mass media).

Gained information is used for preparation of information materials and periodical reports concerning threats and risk analysis as well as for current monitoring of the situation concerning illegal migration and incidents on the border.

Statistical information exchange is carried out by daily and monthly system, and “ad hoc” - as far as information about incidents is concerned.

POLAND
See a)

PORTUGAL
Mostly operational information.

ROMANIA
The above mentioned authorities use:
- Information on persons, goods and transportation means involved in criminal activities and border incidents,
- Daily statistics regarding the traffic through each BCP, statistics concerning thorough controls in second line, border events
- Risk analysis or other risk analysis performed by cooperation structures
- Specific information related to illegal migration routes
SLOVAKIA

NUCIM:
- operational and strategic information

CASM:
- periodical and cumulative statistical information,
- daily situation reports,
- operational analyses,
- information sent by a liaison police officer
- information collected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic

SPAIN

Diplomatic reports and reports elaborated by other departments with responsibilities in the areas of immigration (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Labor, operational information (targets and alerts / relevant information) and strategic intelligence products, statistics and public information (newspaper, media, television), etc

SWEDEN

All kind of information such as intelligence reports, statistics, analysed data and other forms of ad-hoc information.
b) What are the typical sources of information?

BELGIUM
Official foreign institutions, similar foreign authorities

BULGARIA
- Liaison officers of Member States in Bulgaria
- Interpol and Europol
- Frontex Agency

CYPRUS
Although each authority works independently, there is close co-operation between them especially on emergency cases. These authorities meet regularly for operational and routine matters.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC
a) FPC use information from third countries which relate to illegal migration. Its Risk Analysis Department uses information from third countries relating to illegal migration as well as other types of „CPIP“ information from the following sources:
- reports provided by liaison officers of the Czech Republic responsible for documents and migration who are deployed at selected embassies of the Czech Republic abroad (where it is advisable to increase preventive activities in connection with granting both short-term and long-term visas, in particular the assessment of applications for long-term visas, or more precisely, applications for long-term or permanent residence permits, as well as assistance in detecting irregular travel and other documents)
- information provided by embassies of the Czech Republic
- information from various open sources
- information from the agency Frontex and from the FRAN network (analytical material, information from meetings)
- information provided by various authorities of state administration (e.g. Ministry of the Interior of the CR, Army of the CR, Security Intelligence Service etc.)
- information exchanged with all neighboring countries
Further, especially OCU gets information from Interpol, Europol and SIRENE and from EU projects aimed at combating illegal immigration.

**ESTONIA**

Border control IS , VIS, SIS, VTMS, Criminal Intelligence DB, Car registration DB, EUROPOL, EUCARIS, APIS, INTERPOL E-ASF, COASTNET, ICONET, FOSS and many other…

**FINLAND**

Typical sources are:
- relevant authorities, with long-term contacts e.g. Police, Customs and Border Guards.
- joint registers and databases (national level)
- cooperation procedures and organizations
- open sources

**FRANCE**

Each department receives information (operational or strategic) from his counterparts and partners in these third countries but some information may also come from supra national structures managing maritime intelligence, such as MARINFO for Customs, or inter-agencies (MAOC-N, CECLAD-M, JIATF) or European Agencies such as Europol which have agreements with third countries bodies and gather data from them.

Moreover, the police liaison officer network contributes also, at a high level to provide information

**GERMANY**

Basically there are three main sources:

1. In 2006 Germany has established the joint analysis- und strategy centre on illegal migration (GASIM) in Berlin which combines all relevant authorities who are dealing with aspects of illegal but also legal migration in a comprehensive manner. In this centre the following authorities and security agencies are present:

   Federal Criminal Office (BKA)
   Federal Police (Bundespolizei)
   Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)
Customs Service (Zoll)
Federal Intelligence Service (BND)
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The GASIM works as an early warning and analysis centre and deals with various kinds of information regarding the complex phenomena of migration and distributes these data to interested parties.

2. Federal Police have established a network of liaison officers (ILOs and document advisor officers) in 38 countries who are either installed at border guard authorities, the ministry of the interior, at an airport or at the embassies. The idea is to improve and to foster the cross border cooperation with other EU member states and important countries of origin or transit of illegal migration towards Germany.

3. Other sources for information are international organizations like UNHCR, IOM, Amnesty International etc. and other non-governmental organizations.

HUNGARY
The typical sources are the law enforcement agencies of the neighboring third countries, and OSINT (TV, internet, newspaper, local citizens).

ITALY
Reports and notifications from immigration experts; reports and notifications from liaison officers abroad or anti drugs experts; open sources; correspondence between branches of the Public Security Department concerning reports of potential illegal immigration (such as warnings about possible departures) and organized crime aspects. Analytical reports and notifications from the intelligence services and reports from our diplomatic representations abroad and from other central directorates.

LATVIA
Typical sources of the information for SBG are:
1) Incident/information reports, alert reports, Liaison Officer’s reports, Frontex ICONET system, BSRBCC cooperation information system COASTNET.
2) Publicly available information - TV, radio, press, Internet.

LITHUANIA
Statistical reports of the Belarus border agency on border checks. Information exchange is carried out by duty officer services through fax and email facilities. Operational information exchange with regional- and tactical-level units of the Belarus and Russian border agencies (through fax and email facilities) on unlawful border crossings and other events at the border.

THE NETHERLANDS
OSINT, intelops

POLAND
See a)

PORTUGAL
The Liaison Officers deployed in third countries are the most reliable source of information, although information from Intelligence services, Embassies, local Law Enforcement Agencies and Europol/Interpol information is also considered.

Others are internal sources such as the BCP and information on migratory flows gathered inside the territory.

ROMANIA
The typical sources of information are:
Open information sources - OSINT
Human information sources - HUMINT
SLOVAKIA

NUCIM:
- own operational activities,
- information from the Police Force departments,
- information from foreign police agencies,
- other state administrative agencies,

CASM:
Typical sources of information are:
- regular operational analytical reports,
- database of illegal migration,
- IS Migra,
- information collected by Migration Office of the Ministry of Interior of the SR (MoI SR),
- information flow from the Bureau of Border and Alien Police of the MoI of the SR,
- open source

SPAIN
Organisms and international Agencies, embassies and other departments with responsibility in migratory matters, liaison Officers in Embassies, Intelligence (National and from third countries).

SWEDEN
Open sources, intelligence and investigations, informants and other sources like consulates, embassies, liaison officers, travel and shipping industry, Frontex and Europol. Within the BSRBCC cooperation Sweden exchanges information on cross-border related crime including illegal immigration.
c) Do these authorities cooperate or work separately? What are the information flows? Is there an authority playing a leading role in this exchange?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Cooperation/Independence</th>
<th>Information Flows</th>
<th>Leading Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>Most of the time they work separately. There are exchanges of information. There is no authority that is playing a leading role.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BULGARIA</td>
<td>- Information exchange via „International operational cooperation” Directorate - MoI, which coordinates the interaction.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYPRUS</td>
<td>Although each authority works independently, there is close co-operation between them especially on emergency cases. These authorities meet regularly for operational and routine matters.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE CZECH REPUBLIC</td>
<td>There is a direct exchange of information among the particular interested authorities. In addition, information is also exchanged by means of the joint authority ANACEN which associates other authorities of state administration in charge of subject matter of foreigners.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTONIA</td>
<td>As general rule and based on national legislation and field of responsibilities the authorities work separately. In the areas where there is common interest or where coordination of available resources is needed the activities are regulated by bi-lateral or multilateral cooperation protocols.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND</td>
<td>All authorities are responsible for their own activities and functions according to the national laws. In the Police, Customs and Border Guards cooperation (PCB), the Police is responsible for certain intelligence oriented activity. Information flows from the field to the intelligence centers, which analyzes information and provides it further to the end users.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
National cooperation between maritime authorities i.e. METO consists of coordination and development of maritime functions, support services and investments to increase efficiency and productivity. These authorities are The Finnish Border Guard, The Finnish Navy and Finnish Maritime authorities. With this cooperation we have created a joint recognized maritime picture to Finland.

Worth of mention is Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation (BSRBCC). BSRBCC is seen as a flexible regional tool for daily inter-agency (Police, Customs, Coast Guard and Border Guards) interaction to combat cross-border crime and environmental protection of the maritime areas, able to adjust with time and changing conditions.

In the short perspective, cooperation is:
- focus of practical cooperation on sea borders (sea areas, ports and coastal areas)
- actual, daily communication where border security cooperation serves as a tool for regional border security
- knowledge from green border and airports to maintain situational awareness
- operational activity: blue border surveillance operations (operation brand) High quality, broadly prepared joint operations (instructions containing pre- and post operational analyses)

In the long perspective, Baltic Sea area cooperation is seen as becoming a flexible regional tool for daily inter-agency (Police, Customs and Border authorities) interaction, able to adjust with time and changing conditions.
- Information exchange
- Surveillance data exchange
- Common operations

FRANCE
These authorities cooperate in the frame of their own existing agreements.
Regarding French Customs the National Directorate for Intelligence, Customs Investigations (especially its Customs Intelligence Directorate) is the central point gathering all information coming from foreign countries.
For maritime domain, the maritime prefect already organizes a monthly meeting with every department for a global assessment where they will produce analysis in order to assess the threat level, the risks and if needed adapt the assets schedule for patrolling or give specific orders. His MOC is already managing the maritime operational information in order to create the regional situational picture (for example for all the Mediterranean). The CoFGC at Paris will gather all the Regional Situational Pictures and establish the NSP.

For the French border police, a new department has just been created. It is in charge of gathering information about human smuggling provided by the police liaison officers network and specialized agencies.

**GERMANY**

The cooperation and the flow of information of the authorities is institutionalized and regulated in the above mentioned GASIM. In issues regarding illegal migration the Federal Police has a lead role.

**HUNGARY**

The Hungarian Police keep contact with the partner agencies in the neighboring third countries. There is no cooperation on national level in the field of CPIP, but the relevant information is share internally between the border surveillance and criminal investigation units of the Police.

**ITALY**

The authorities cooperate with one another, lest any information go astray. Depending on spheres of responsibility and on the kind of information being exchanged, the lead is taken by the Central Immigration and Border Police Directorate, in combating illegal immigration, by the Central Anti Crime Directorate, in investigating illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings, and by the Central Criminal Investigation Directorate, in Interpol related work.

**LATVIA**

Authorities cooperate with each other at national level. Leading role in the information exchange plays the authority which requests the information. Moreover, at national level information exchange is being performed on an ad hoc reports, request or periodical basis (monthly, quarterly etc.)
LITHUANIA
According to national law (legal acts and agreements), all border control-related information is to be sent to the SBGS which is responsible for the implementation of this function. Following corresponding agreements, the SBGS carries out information exchange on the local and regional levels on a regular basis, and on the central and regional levels as necessary and at intervals established in agreements. The SBGS is the leading agency in the exchange of information in relation to border guard and associated issues and sole agency implementing border control, as per the Schengen Borders Code.

THE NETHERLANDS
They cooperate in a chain. In the ‘alien chain’ information follows the alien, in the criminal justice chain the information follows the suspect/criminal. The Immigration and Naturalization Service and Repatriation and Departure Service also participate in this chain.

POLAND
See a)

PORTUGAL
All authorities cooperate fully but the leading role in border control and immigration information exchange is under SEF’s competence.

ROMANIA
These authorities cooperate on the base of specific inter-institutional cooperation plans, which contain also informational flows. There is no authority playing a leading role in this exchange.

SLOVAKIA
NUCIM:
These authorities work separately and cooperate in the field of coordination of the joint operation. Each country deal with cases under its own legislation, there is no leader role in this exchange.
CASM:
The Bureau of Border and Alien Police is the only subject that is dealing with the illegal migration issues (specifically Centre of Analysis and Strategic Management, National Unit Combating Illegal Migration and the Border Police located at BCP). The exchange of information is realized for analytical and risk assessment purposes.

**SPAIN**
All these Authorities cooperate regularly in the exchange of this kind of information. All of them are within the structure of the Ministry of Interior in Spain and the role of coordination is assumed by the General Direction of International Relations and Immigration when the International dimension is required, sometimes by the General Commissariat for Aliens and Borders (CIAR – Risk Analysis and Intelligence Centre within the Central – UCRIF and the Borders Central Unit (UCF) and when dealing with irregular maritime immigration, the National Coordination Centre, from Guardia Civil, plays a leading role.

**SWEDEN**
The different authorities work both separately and together. The police is the main authority for general information exchange with e.g. Frontex, Europol, Interpol etc. Relevant information is distributed further to other competent authorities.

Regarding maritime related information exchange, the Swedish Coast Guard is the national contact point within BSRBCC cooperation. The relevant information regarding maritime cross border crime is distributed further to other competent authorities such as police and customs.

The Swedish Maritime Intelligence Center within the Swedish Coast Guard exchanges intelligence information related to the maritime area on national and international level and contributes to the maritime intelligence picture.

In Sweden there is a multi- agency body at the National Bureau of Investigation with representatives from different agencies like Customs, Coast guard, the Tax-Agency, Migration Board, Swedish Economic Crime Authority and National Prison and Probation Administration. The multi agency body is exchanging all kind of intelligence information between the participating agencies. Primarily this multi- agency body produce analysis on the national intelligence picture and support multi- agency intelligence cooperation at regional level.
d) For which purposes is the information used?

BELGIUM
Outline a policy, outline of operations, formation of an image

BULGARIA
- For the purpose of crimes investigation committed within the country and abroad;
- For the purposes of strategic and tactical analysis.

CYPRUS
The information is used for the effective maritime border surveillance along the coastline and the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus. Also, in order to contribute to the efforts of other M.S. to prevent and combat illegal immigration, smuggling of goods & arms and other forms of international cross border crime, information is exchanged with other EU Member States.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Information is used for the purpose of situation analysis from a global point of view and they also serve for assessment of possible impacts of the given phenomena on the territory of the Czech Republic.
Moreover, OCU in particular gathers the information for two reasons:
1) detection of general modus operandi of illegal immigration committed by various foreigners’ communities.
2) use of the information ad 1) as supporting material during criminal proceedings

ESTONIA
For implementation of tasks stipulated or defined by legislation or deriving from the international obligations is used.
FINLAND
Information is used to built up and maintain situation at sea and land borders. Idea is to have information for risk analysis, to prevent cross border crimes and have fundament for planning activities of resources.

FRANCE
Depending of their nature, they are used for global maritime surveillance, law enforcement at Sea, investigations and analysis dedicated to combating all illegal activities.

GERMANY
Most of the information is evaluated and checked on its consistency and on its usefulness for analytical purposes and its influence on illegal migration. The analytical products are used for the improvement of border control measures and other crime prevention activities on the tactical as well as on the strategic level.

HUNGARY
Based on the information the local level (BCP, BPO) organize its daily shift, and the information is a part of the risk analysis and assessment model at regional level.

ITALY
The information is used for risk assessments sent to Frontex and to internal or local (border police) units of the Central Immigration and Border Police Directorate. It also serves to identify suitable ways and means of cooperating more smoothly with third countries in combating unlawful immigration.

LATVIA
Information is used for the operational work, risk analysis (tactical and operational) and risk assessments, planning (tactical and operational), as well as daily work.
LITHUANIA
To perform the established functions, plan and perform service, carry out risk analysis and prevention of offences of law, respond to events and incidents, and carry out prevention and investigation of interstate crime.

THE NETHERLANDS
(Border) checks, information input, input for prosecution purposes.

POLAND
See a)

PORTUGAL
The information is used to produce analytical reports, alerts regarding document fraud or used modus operandi, and particularly in the Integrated Border Management.

ROMANIA
The information is used to carry out police, border or customs specific actions in order to combat illegal migration and serious crime at the border.

SLOVAKIA
NUCIM:
Information is used for the purposes of detection, documentation and evidence of illegal migration with emphasis to organized people smuggling.

CASM:
The information is used for processing of analytical outcomes, which are distributed in vertical and horizontal direction. The information is a base for creation of strategic, operational and tactical analyses.
SPAIN

In general terms, the information is used for analyzing the trends and migratory phenomena, specially the irregular immigration, and to elaborate state of situation reports. In addition the Ministry of Interior elaborates and publicizes an Annual Report on irregular immigration.

The information is analyzed in order to obtain intelligence to fight against the illegal immigration, drug trafficking and cross border crime, specially to identify and then tackle illegal migration threats and to unify the information coming from different sources to elaborate general and specific reports (tactical, operational and strategic)

SWEDEN

The purpose is to put together an intelligence picture and situational awareness regarding cross-border activities. Information is needed for different analysis on both strategic and operational level. The information is also used to react upon threats at the external borders and for the assessment in planning of resources which are carrying out border control activities.
e) What is the frequency/regularity of information exchange? Is it ad hoc and/or regular reporting?

BELGIUM
Regular and ad hoc

BULGARIA
- If necessary;

CYPRUS
Information is exchanged on a daily basis.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC
There is a various frequency of information exchange, mostly on a weekly or monthly basis, if necessary ad hoc as well.

ESTONIA
Frequency depends on the needs and situation. Between the Police and Border guard Board and police prefectures data exchange is in real time, reporting in daily basis.

Regular data exchange with other authorities as rule takes place at least once per week (weekly reports) or on monthly basis (depending how it is regulated by agreements).

FINLAND
Mainly ad hoc information, there are also regular meetings between authorities and certain regular reports available.

FRANCE
It can be as well in real time than on demand. This frequency is linked to the terms of implemented agreements. Information are generally disseminated on a continuous flow basis and according to operational needs.
GERMANY
Migration flows and with this phenomenon related issues are monitored on a regular basis. In cases there is a crisis unfolding we take a closer look at it (e.g. currently political unrest in Tunisia).

HUNGARY
The general and statistical information came regularly on monthly level (there are bilateral meetings on local level in every months), and information about concrete cases on ad hoc bases.

ITALY
Information is obtained from immigration experts every two months; ad hoc correspondence also takes place when warnings are issued or significant new developments observed in the pattern of migration flows. Information is constantly being exchanged on an ongoing basis.

LATVIA
Normally information exchange is performed on ad hoc and regular basis. Within BSBRCC cooperation it is possible to acquire quarterly reports about situation in Russia.

LITHUANIA
On the local and regional levels, on a regular basis; on the central level, Lithuania and Belarus will exchange monthly statistical reports starting 2011. Upon request, other statistical data may be a matter of exchange as well. On the regional level, as necessary and at intervals established in cooperation plans. Sometimes, ad hoc requests for information are sent. Daily information relevant to cooperation in the Baltic Sea is channeled through national coordination centers.

THE NETHERLANDS
Police services have agreement on automatic use of each other’s information systems when needed. The Immigration and Naturalization Service has agreements on information exchange with the police organization.

POLAND
See a)
PORTUGAL
Depends on the information needs. For instance, all liaison officers from SEF produce regular monthly reports, but there are also punctual and ad hoc requests for information.

ROMANIA
The cooperation plans, concluded between the authorities responsible with the information exchange, also stipulate the frequency of the data exchange and the informational flows. The information exchange may be based on an ad – hoc reporting or a regular one.

SLOVAKIA
NUCIM:
Exchange of information is ad hoc.

CASM:
The exchange of information at national level is well determined and depends on type of information. In terms of cooperation with other member states the exchange of information is executed ad hoc or regularly (the frequency is approved).

SPAIN
It depends on the kind of information exchanged. There are regular information in terms of statistics and analytical reports and ad hoc information when necessary because an incident or a concrete threat.

SWEDEN
It is a daily, regular reporting and ad-hoc.
2. How do these activities meet your existing information needs regarding the situation in third countries/security environment?

BELGIUM
It is most of the time an analysis of the past. There is not enough attention for future perspectives and tendencies.

BULGARIA
- Meet the needs of operative and investigation activities of Border police.

CYPRUS
The information needs for the security environment in third countries cannot be fulfilled by the existing information sources. Further HUMINT, IMINIT, OSINT info is needed to have a more accurate view of the security environment especially in Eastern Mediterranean.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC
For the purposes of FPS, the information flows are currently sufficient. However, the information exchange with third countries for criminal investigation conducted by OCU is quite problematic; especially the information efficiency in the criminal proceedings is low.

ESTONIA
They correspond to our actual needs as far as tailored or ad-hoc issues (situation) are not involved.

FINLAND
We are satisfied the situation for now on. In the future there should be more comparative data available on illegal immigration inside Schengen area and illegal immigration from third countries.

FRANCE
It is always interesting to have an important flow of information or data but presently the challenge is not to have data but to find the useful one in the enormous amount of what can be sent and received. Data are received by exchanging with third countries through networks (VRMTC, MSSIS, etc...) for operational ones, by dedicated and specific networks for strategic key information and classified ops information as security domain is sensitive.
There is a need for upgrading the information received from third countries but in terms of quality, not quantity.

**GERMANY**
In general our information needs are satisfied. However not every information we obtain from our cooperating partners in the GASIM can be transformed into immediate action. The reason for this is that some of the information has been classified by the information owner and therefore the usefulness is sometimes very limited. Good and effective sources of information are our liaison and document advisor officers in relevant third countries. They form the spearhead of what we call the border forefront strategy. Indeed, due to resources and sometimes political limitations we cannot deploy liaison and document advisor officers in every country which is of relevance for us.

**HUNGARY**
We need not only statistical data and general information about the border situation on the other side of the common border, but evaluated information about the trends and modus operandi too.

**ITALY**
Where there are immigration experts in place, the flow of information for risk assessment purposes can be regarded as satisfactory.

**LATVIA**
All the information received in general corresponds to our needs; however, the quality of the information could be improved (for example, the information regarding the illegal immigration in the neighboring third countries could be more comprehensive).

**LITHUANIA**
Indeed, they do. Cooperation with Russia ought to improve after an agreement on border delegates is signed.

**THE NETHERLANDS**
Unknown.
NORWAY
The cooperation between the national authorities in Norway, and the Norwegian/Russian/Finnish authorities, has resulted in the police having an overall picture of the situation at the Schengen external land border between Norway and Russia.

The police receives only strategic information from Russia (no operative information), and there are some delays in the transmission of the information, because Moscow needs to approve the transmissions. The information is primarily exchanged at regular meetings between Norwegian and Russian authorities. The cooperation and information exchange with Finnish and Swedish authorities are on a strategic, operative and tactical level. There are no delays in the transmission of information exchange from these countries, and information can be exchanged by phone, e-mail, regular mail or meetings.

POLAND
The scope and data specification of the exchange of information with Ukraine are comprehensive and very detailed. Exchange of information with the Russian side is also good and meets the expectations and the current needs in the protection of state border. If it is possible, Polish Border Guard will be also interested in acquiring information from the Russian Federation on incidents which take place not only at the common border but also along the entire length of Russian border. Further expanding the scope of information exchanged with the Belarusian side is also planned, especially making these information be more detailed.

PORTUGAL
Actually, it meets our needs quite well, although information from other sources is asked in specific cases.

ROMANIA
Taking into account the daily pressure to which the border crossing points and the border police sectors (both green border and blue border are concerned) are subject to, these activities meet to a small extent our existing information needs regarding the situation in third countries/security environment.
SLOVAKIA
NUCIM:
It is sufficient.
CASM:
The exchange of information with/regarding third countries is unsatisfactory. Lack of this information causes a lot of problems in our analytical work. We see a need to improve exchange of this information within the Schengen area.

SPAIN
We exchange information through secure channels such as Seahorse when is available, nevertheless Information from Spanish Police attachés and Councilors of Interior posted in third countries (origin and transit countries) is very fluid.

SWEDEN
The information is focusing in general on law enforcement and consequently there is a lack of situation and security information about third countries. Within the BSRBCC cooperation there is information exchange that to a certain extent contributes to the needs regarding the situation in neighboring third country. However information on the situation in third countries could be improved in general.
3. Please describe the placement of your National Coordination Centre (NCC) in this information exchange system. Could you describe the current involvement of your NCC in these information flows?

BELGIUM
It is provided that the MIK will function as the NCC. They collect and distribute all kind of maritime information with some kind of importance for the border control units and other units of the police and controlling governments in Belgium and the neighboring countries. It is a cooperation of the Police, the Marine and customs. They are also capable of following certain targets on the territorial waters.

BULGARIA
- A network for information exchange exists between NCC and International operational cooperation Directorate regarding third country nationals’ migration and serious crimes committed at the external borders.

CYPRUS
The National Coordination Center (NCC), established to fulfill the EUROSUR requirements, is located at the Port & Marine Police Headquarters at Limasol New Port. The NCC currently operates 24/7 and receives images, data, voice and intelligence form various authorities. The role of the NCC is to coordinate the maritime surveillance, to combat illegal activities within Cyprus Maritime domain including the combating of illegal immigration and other cross border crimes. The police has the primary role for law enforcement within the maritime area and therefore the task of surveillance is coordinated by the police via the NCC.
Currently, the NCC has no leading role in the exchange of information with other authorities. Each authority exchanges information within its mandate, with respective EU agencies and authorities in other Member States. The NCC currently exchanges information with FRONTEX within the framework of the European Patrols Network (EPN).

THE CZECH REPUBLIC
The Czech Republic does not have National Coordination Centre.
ESTONIA
There has been set up for a single National Coordination Centre (NCC) in Estonia from the 1st of January 2010 (operates 24/7 from the 1st of July 2010) which provides situational awareness and ensures an adequate reaction capability at national level with regard to external border sections. Our NCC is located in the capital of Estonia (Tallinn) and it’s set up at the Police and Border Guard Board. It’s closely involved with the EUROSUR and FOSS projects. The current involvement of our NCC in information flows with third countries: particularly it is done with Russian Federation and the cooperation is based on protocols which are signed between Estonian Board of Border Guard and Federal Border Service of Russian Federation. These protocols are regarding the information exchange. Information exchange with competent authorities of Russian Federation is carried out during the meetings of border guard representatives, and also via phone, fax and e-mails.

FINLAND
Information from the border security comes to the NCC from LCC:s and other national and international cooperation parties, that means that NCC is the end user for analysis purposes and to maintaining “the Big Picture” of the situation. NCC is responsible for giving information further to other authorities. One of the Border Guard NCC employees is appointed to the National Criminal Intelligence center at the Police.

FRANCE
Since 23 march 2011 (official declaration to the Commission), the NCC is located at “Coast Guard Function Information Management Center of the Coast Guard Function” (CoFGC in French), which is an interdepartmental structure developing and becoming an important place of regulation of operational information, as well as between all French administrations involved in law enforcement at sea than with other Member-States and also with the maritime prefects which may act as RCC according to their empowerment for coordinating all departments at regional level.
The CoFGC is connected to SPATIONAV, which is the National Surveillance System for France in EUROSUR as officially defined, for all metropolitan maritime approaches. Spationav works in such a way as a tool for supporting the risk analysis established by the border police.
Manned by officers from every department (navy, customs, maritime affairs, border police, gendarmerie, civilian security) involved at sea or concerned by the surveillance of our maritime approaches, which are our external border for EUROSUR, these people have access to their own and specific intranet and databases. This center is currently increasing its management of information, processes are likely to move.

**GERMANY**

For the time being there has been no NCC established within the Federal Police since Germany has the role as an observer in the EUROSUR proceedings. However basic thoughts were made, where the German NCC should be installed and how the different tasks and information flows within the NCC and our cooperation partners would be managed.

The information management according to the EUROSUR guidelines also foresees the exchange of risk analysis data with Frontex which is more or less already done through other channels (e.g. FRAN). We see that there is a risk that similar information is communicated via different channels which might be interpreted differently and as a result might lead to different measures. Therefore we recommend a clear and stringent information management regime.

**HUNGARY**

Hungary has not NCC at this moment.

Hungary is planning to establish the NCC till the end of the first half of 2011. After the implementation of the NCC, it will collect the necessary information from the local and regional units to manage the national situational picture. And it will forward every relevant information/data/analysis, which came from other NCCs or the Frontex, to the competent regional unit.

**ITALY**

The NCC is attached to the Central Immigration and Border Police Directorate, coming under its Immigration Service, which is responsible for migration flow analysis and has the risk assessment section located within it. The NCC is not yet fully operational and its current involvement is therefore minimal (see the reply to question 4 below).
LATVIA
The Operational Duty Unit of the Central Board of the SBG is responsible for the collection of all the information and forward it to Liaisons officers (including Chief of the SBG) in order to make decisions and provide recommendations within their competence. Furthermore Maritime Operations Coordination Centre of the Ventspils Board of the SBG is fully responsible for the sea border guarding matters and for cooperation with BSRBCC countries.

LITHUANIA
Although the NCC Lithuania is yet to be established, information exchange is legally regulated and maintained on a regular basis on the local, regional and central levels. All border surveillance-related information is submitted to a central-level unit (the Operational Management and Operations Division which performs the functions of the NFPOC and has its staff on duty 24 hours a day) which accumulates, analyses, distributes, classifies and, as necessary, exchanges information and coordinates activities, and the same is relevant with regard to information obtained from the third countries.

THE NETHERLANDS
The NCC is purely a maritime NCC. For the maritime segment it the highest information level, but at the same time a side branch like other information centers (air, land) subordinate to the Strategic Information Centre (in the future a ‘profiling and targeting centre’) at the national level and –regarding border information- working together with regional information nodes operated by the Rotterdam Seaport Police and Customs.

NORWAY
The NCC will be established at the NCIS, which is already the national contact point for Frontex, Europol, Interpol, "the Swedish initiative", and the PTN cooperation (ie the police and customs cooperation in the Nordic countries). The NCIS is also the national SIRENE office. Furthermore, the NCIS has the overall responsibility for national threat assessment and risk analysis regarding the Norwegian external borders. The NCIS is also responsible for all central police registers, and is staffed 24/7. We believe that locating the NCC with the NCIS will possibly provide synergy effects between border control activity and anti-crime measures in general.
POLAND
Headquarters of the Border Guard is supposed to be the NCC. The NCC will be obtaining data from the local and regional level and from the analytical department, aliens department, border management department and investigation/intelligence department. At the same time a large part of the abovementioned information exchange system is carried out at local/regional level i.e. at the local/regional coordination center according to the EUROSUR concept that allows delegating responsibilities by NCC to the lower level units.

PORTUGAL
The Portuguese NCC is under political decision process and it’s an important platform for exchange of information.

Within SEF, there is the Borders Situation Center (CSF) which assumed the role of central node for information exchange at national and international level.

All relevant information is gathered in the CSF and disseminated by the CSF after treatment and very close to real time, through the Borders Portal.

ROMANIA
In certain situations, the information is exchanged using National Coordination Centre, the maritime component within the Operational Coordination Centre (OCC) - General Inspectorate of Romanian Border Police. At this moment the Operational Coordination Centre is in the process of development in order to fulfill the duties of the National Coordination Centre, according to the EUROSUR Pilot provisions. The current involvement of OCC in these information flows consists only in maritime information reports for Frontex. OCC also carries out an internal monitoring of the daily border events.

SLOVAKIA
The NCC in the Slovak Republic is placed at the Eastern border of the Slovak Republic with Ukraine, specifically within the Border Police Directorate in Sobrance, where also the HQ for ensuring protection of the Eastern border is located. Most of reasons for this choice are connected with an already existing technical infrastructure in place due the Schengen accession efforts of the Slovak Republic since 2007, including suitable software and hardware solution, as well as communication infrastructure. More importantly, the staff working at this HQ is more than capable to cope with additional tasks connected with creating the NCC and ensuring that it fulfils all tasks according to the requirements.
SPAIN

Within the Guardia Civil’s sphere: The NCC is the responsible to centralized all the information coming from these sources, analyze and do the risk analysis to coordinate all the Guardia Civil efforts (and means) at the external borders. The NCC has the general picture of the situation, and it is placed in the Guardia Civil Headquarter.

Within the Cuerpo Nacional de Policia´s sphere: Related to illegal migration flows the coordination in the exchange of information is placed within the Central UCRIF (CIAR –Risk Analysis and Intelligence Centre).

SWEDEN

In Sweden today there is no NCC in terms of the Eurosur project. The Swedish Government has assigned the National Police Board to, in cooperation with the Swedish Coast Guard and other relevant authorities, study the requirements for an implementation of the EUROSUR including the NCC- concept.

Today, an NCC- function exists within the Swedish Coast Guard as a national contact point within the BSRBCC-cooperation.
4. Concerning involvement of your Member State in the preparations for the EUROSUR Pilot Project, does the range of information types that are referred to in the Incidents Catalogue of the EUROSUR data model meet the need to reflect strategic and operational risks in situational awareness?

BELGIUM
The maritime and river police has more authorities than illegal migration. So it would be interesting to have information on all kinds of illegal traffic.

BULGARIA
The information exchange included in the Incidents Catalogue of the EUROSUR will provide the NCC complete picture of the operational situation at the EU borders and will contribute to the implementing of effective measures for illegal migration prevention.

CYPRUS
The EUROSUR data model includes the range of information exchanged between MS and Frontex. The main types of information exchanged are illegal Immigration, cross border crime, crisis and other information of general interest that is required for operational awareness. However, for strategic planning further information is needed.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC
The Czech Republic is not involved in the EUROSUR Pilot project and its preparations.

ESTONIA
Yes it does.

FINLAND
At this point (early beginning) it is enough. Later on we need to have more information to the system on border crossings and illegal activity inside the Schengen area. In Finland the major part of illegal immigration comes through internal EU-borders. So the information about the flows of the illegal migration of third country citizens via internal borders of Schengen area will be more and more important.
FRANCE
According to the draft issued 1st October 2010, it does meet the need but with an emphasis on operational information, which is coherent with the role of incidents reporting system.

GERMANY
As mentioned before, Germany has currently the status of an observer and is not directly involved in the preparations of the EUROSUR Pilot Project. From our perspective we deem the reception of strategic information as more useful since Germany’s external borders are not a hotspot of illegal migration (anymore). Nevertheless we do acknowledge the need for operational information for other member states that are much more affected by illegal migration. Each member state faces different challenges and thus has different and legitimate information interests. EUROSUR should be flexible and balanced enough to cover both.

HUNGARY
That information which are related to the surveillance of the land border (illegal migration activities, cross border crime, crisis situations).

ITALY
The incidents catalogue was drawn up and endorsed by the expert group for the Eurosur pilot project. The range is at present comprehensive, with cases shown in particular detail. The pilot exercise will bring out any further needs and show if incidents of little relevance have been included, or described in too much detail, making them hard for practitioners to collate. The catalogue includes some incidents for which the Italian national coordination centre does not have direct responsibility (drug trafficking, smuggling etc.). Participation in the pilot project has here been extended to involve the other organisational units of the Interior Ministry and of the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministry, for customs, which are responsible for dealing with those incidents.

LATVIA
Latvia took part in the discussion concerning the Incidents Catalogue of the EUROSUR data model. All comments of Latvia were accepted; therefore we consider that the range of the information types which are included in the Catalogue meet the need to reflect strategic and operational risks.
LITHUANIA
The Incidents Catalogue of the data model considered in the framework of the Pilot Project meet the needs and are fully acceptable and sufficient for situational awareness.

THE NETHERLANDS
The Catalogue meets the needs for situational awareness on illegal immigration and cross-border crime. The other segments (crisis, other) contain largely information that is not seen as relevant or useful in the Eurosur-context.

NORWAY
Norway does not participate in the EUROSUR pilot project itself, but attend the pilot project meetings as observers, in order to gain experience for the coming implementation of EUROSUR in Norway.

POLAND
The scope of data indicated in the EUROSUR Catalogue is sufficient for the needs of the operational / strategic risk analysis. However, one should aspire to improve the efficiency of information exchange at international level (among the EU MS as well as between EU MS and third countries).

PORTUGAL
Yes, it meets our needs for now.

ROMANIA
The range of information types that are referred to in the Incidents Catalogue of the EUROSUR data model meet the need to reflect strategic and operational risks in situational awareness. Thus, the monitoring of the border events registered within 24 hours is based on the categories of incidents contained by the Catalogue. However we will be able to appreciate this in a better manner only when we are directly involved in the EUROSUR Project.
SLOVAKIA

NUCIM:
National Unit Combating Illegal Migration use operational information (intelligence), which are protected under the Act on protection of classified information.
This kind of information is not included in the catalogue.
Exchange of this kind of information with authorities of third countries has to be protected by national and international legislation.

CASM:
The Slovak Republic uses the IS Migra, which daily records detailed information concerning illegal immigrants detained in Slovakia.
Information regarding illegal migration are exchanged through „flow of information“ in a written or electronic form. This flow of information is a proven effective tool for analytical and statistical reports on illegal migration issues.

SPAIN
Yes, Spain is one of the MS working directly in the Pilot Project.

SWEDEN
The Incident Catalogue meets the present needs for strategic and operational risks in situational awareness. However, the Catalogue ought to be a living and flexible document.
5. Can you name and describe shortly current national/international projects aimed at establishing the pre-frontier intelligence picture?

**BELGIUM**

FRAN

**BULGARIA**

- Three helicopters equipped with EO/IR sensor systems “Star Safire HD” and ground based information exchange system are in use for external borders surveillance;
- An automated Integrated System “Blue border” for sea borders surveillance and resources management is implemented and in use;
- An Integrated surveillance system is in process of development at the Bulgarian-Turkish border between BCP Kapitan Andreevo and BCP Lesovo with total length of 58 201 meters. Establishment of Integrated surveillance system at the rest of the Bulgarian-Turkish external border is foreseen under the frame of External Borders’ Fund;
- EUROSUR – pilot project.

**CYPRUS**

Various national authorities have in place activities for the implementation of a number of EU projects such as EUROSUR, MARSUR, Integration of Maritime Surveillance, etc. At present there is no special National Project aiming to establish a pre-frontier intelligence picture.

**THE CZECH REPUBLIC**

Neither FPS nor UCO are involved in any such projects.

**ESTONIA**

International level
EUROSUR, MARSUNO, COASTNET II, FOSS

**FINLAND**

We have some projects between National authorities for improving our cooperation nationally. Detailed information about national security projects is classified information.
FRANCE
As described, the near pre-frontier area for France is covered by our NSS which is called SPATIONAV, already described. France (Navy as leader and other departments consulted on their specific needs) is permanently upgrading it in order to detect and classify 100% of everything in our territorial waters and detecting at longer ranges with use of HFSW radars, live integration of data from ships and aircrafts patrolling far from the shore.
France is involved in GMES but has concerns regarding the lack of liability, confidentiality and security of data as it is assumed that they will be free of use.
Some French departments are involved as “end-users” in FP7 projects such as I2C, SeaBilla, Perseus, Dolphin, Simitysys and Nereids which will develop tools useful for CPIP
Pilot projects of DG MARE (Blue Mass Med and Marsuno) are not aimed at developing the CPIP but their results may be helpful as they will improve integration and sharing of data of several partners across the Med and with a view to extend it to the neighboring third countries.
In the same sense, MARSUR from EDA is of interest and works of NATO for MSA may have an impact.

GERMANY
Pre frontier information with the aim to produce national border related analytical products is – besides other sources- obtained by deployed ILOs and ALOs as referred to in point 1b.

HUNGARY
Hungary is establishing a technical surveillance system along the Ukrainian and Serbian border line with the External Borders Fund. With this system we can collect real time information about the other side of the border approximately in 10-15 km depth, and we can react the detected illegal migration activities in due time.

ITALY
With regard to the pre frontier intelligence picture, the anti immigration information system (SIA) processes early warning reports of potential illegal immigration risk situations in third countries and in international waters; examples of such warnings include intelligence reports of possible departures of suspicious vessels from third countries and reports of vessels with illegal immigrants on board in international waters. Warning information is shown on a mapping system. The SIA is at a trial start up stage.
The Italian national coordination centre is involved in carrying out the Eurosur pilot project, under which some of the tools serving to make up the CPIP could be put to the test.

Under the border control system (BCS), warning information on passengers entering Italy by air will also be available upon completion of check in procedures. It should be pointed out that border checks, such as those at airports, do not entirely come within Eurosur, but such information, showing risks, will enhance the Italian national coordination centre's pre frontier intelligence picture.

LATVIA
Currently SBG is developing the information system “RAIS 2009” which is aimed at improvement of analytical and intelligence acquiring capacities of SBG. This system also could be used for CPIP needs in the future.

LITHUANIA
In the course of the implementation of EBF annual programmes, border surveillance systems are installed at the most sensitive border sections, continuity of the installation of systems is ensured, installation of new border surveillance systems is planned, available surveillance systems are integrated, national border surveillance infrastructure is formed on the national level, and establishment of an NCC is progressing.

THE NETHERLANDS
No.

NORWAY
No comment.

POLAND
Polish Border Guard participate in international projects mentioned below:
- participation in BSRBCC cooperation,
- participation in the MARSUNO pilot project (in part connected with the integration of maritime surveillance systems sea basins of northern Europe, including Baltic),
- participation in DSR / MSR system.
The Bluemassmed project is an innovative initiative from the European Commission aiming at increasing the cooperation for maritime surveillance in the Mediterranean Sea and its Atlantic Approaches.

France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain have decided to cooperate on this specific project to strengthen their common actions against illicit trafficking, illegal immigration and environmental pollution. It will also permit to reinforced the Search and Rescue efforts in the area.

Seaport Cooperation Programme (SEACOP)

This program was implemented in order to reinforce the cooperation between EU Member States and third countries, on strengthening their support capabilities in combating maritime smuggling and criminal networks associated with it.

This cooperation has as a special objective combating international crime related with drug trafficking, human being trafficking, weapon and NBQ smuggling and smuggling of other goods. The project workgroup is led by France, Spain, Portugal and the UK.

SEAHORSE NETWORK

The SEAHORSE NETWORK developed by Spain, has in it’s main objective the Exchange of information regarding illegal migration by sea, on a closed and satellite secured communications network between Spain, Portugal, Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal and Cape Vert.

The coordination of the activities tackling the illegal migration in the Southern Atlantic Ocean is done by the Coordination Centre in Las Palmas, the Canary Islands, involving Spanish and Portuguese authorities, Frontex and third countries.

SIVICC – Portuguese Integrated System of Surveillance, Command and Control
The SIVICC is managed by the GNR and has as main objective to assist in prevention and repression of crime in the Portuguese maritime area, particularly assisting in combating illegal migration by sea, drug trafficking and THB. This system allows a real time connection with the Spanish counterpart (SIVE) providing a much quicker information exchange with the Spanish Guardia Civil.

ROMANIA

A substantial role concerning the implementation of CPIP will be accomplished by the future Border Surveillance Integrated System, through its subsystems.

The Border Surveillance Integrated System represents the most important instrument of the Romanian IBM. It consists in all the measures and actions, carried out by each institution with border competence, in order to:

- enhance the control and surveillance of the Romanian border
- develop the cooperation with third countries of origin and transit
- combat cross border crime.

The main objectives of the implementation of the Border Surveillance Integrated System, in order to effectively combat cross border crime and illegal migration, are:

- progressive and constant implementation of the specific procedures concerning border protection, migration and asylum, in accordance with the process of legislation harmonization with the acquis
- strengthening the international cooperation on border management with EU Member States, neighbor countries, and also with other countries, including countries of origin or transit
- implementation and factual utilization, at all levels, of an efficient integrated border management monitoring and evaluation mechanism
- infrastructure and border equipment modernization, at the level of all the Romanian Border Police’ structures
- assurance of a high security level of the future EU external borders.
SPAIN
International projects in FRONTEX Agency with the participation and support of the MS:

- EB – RAN (Risk Analysis Network at the Eastern Borders: exchange of information FRONTEX Agency - Belarus, Ukraine, Russia and Moldova)
- WB – RAN (Risk Analysis Network at the Ex- Yugoslavian Republics and Albanian borders: exchange of information FRONTEX Agency – Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, FYROM, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania).
- Seahorse Project: to exchange surely information (voice and data) via satellite between MS and third countries.
- Position (and visualization) of national assets permanently (deployed in the external borders and in third countries) and other MSs assets deployed during Joint Operations.
- Mariss Project, satellite surveillance.
- In April 2010, during the Spanish Presidency of the EU, the first step to build an Intelligence Community between the countries of the EU and some other Africans with intelligence Units tackling the illegal immigration was done (AFIC). 14 African countries: Benin, Burkina Fasso, Cape Vert, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Conakry, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo

SWEDEN
See answer to question 3.
PART II. THE ROLE OF MEMBER STATES

Please use the following headings while specifying your information needs and contributions. Please also indicate which information would be of highest added value for you.

LATVIA: The most important is operational and strategic key information.

ESTONIA: [Replies have been] lined up in according to importance of our prioritisation would be given as follows:
  a) Strategic key information (periodical analysis products)
  b) Operational information (intelligence data, threat assessments, incident reports)
  c) Knowledge base

FRANCE
First, the exchange of information should comply to the following rules:
Property of information;
Protection of information;
Exchange on a voluntary basis;
Dissemination inside a community or on the basis of existing bilateral or multilateral agreements. (see the roadmap for the implementation of the CISE which has to be the guideline for all communities, including “border control” with EUROSUR)

i. Operational information (dynamic information, consisting of open source information, imagery and human intelligence, e.g. detected Objects of Interest and movements)

LITHUANIA: This information is important, usable and necessary

PORTUGAL: We can only provide OSINT and HUMINT for now. Movements and OI detections will be available in the future NCC.
### ii. Strategic key information (e.g. push/pull factors for illegal migration, trends, routes, methods, statistics)

**LITHUANIA**: This information is important, usable and necessary.

**PORTUGAL**: All strategic information can be provided as it is already made available through FRAN.

### iii. Basic geo-data (static information, such as topographic maps, thematic maps, digital elevation model, nautical charts, climate data etc)

**LITHUANIA**: This information is case-specific or periodically important.

**PORTUGAL**: We cannot provide this data at this moment. This is a need.

### iv. Knowledge base (formalized description of vocabulary and methods, such as categorization of vessel types incl. size, speed etc; description of typical scenarios including processes, means, departure/destination etc)

**LITHUANIA**: This information is case-specific (it may be relevant for regular use forming a knowledge base for continuing usage) or periodically important.

**PORTUGAL**: It would be interesting if we could have a common knowledge base, decided by all participating MS. We can contribute on this subject.
6. In the framework of CPIP, could you please specify:
   a. which information/data you would need to receive?

**BELGIUM**
In order of added value: i.,ii.,iii.,iv. Strategic en Geo-data on the same level.

**BULGARIA**
- Operational information;
- Strategically important information;
- Basic geographical data;
- Knowledge base.

**CYPRUS**
In the framework of the CPIP all four types of information as described above are an essential part of effective information exchange. Operational and Strategic Information are of higher added value.

**THE CZECH REPUBLIC**
All types (possibly except for the basic geo-date)

**ESTONIA**
Strategic key information (periodical analysis products)
Operational information (intelligence data, threat assessments, incident reports)

**FINLAND**
All

**FRANCE**
As much as possible regarding the operational and strategic key information (i.e. Merchant vessel description / Cargo information / Next/last port of call / Crew list,…)
Information relating to migrants arriving, immigration routes, countries of origin, nationalities of migrants, information on smugglers and on criminal investigations dealing with human smuggling.
**GERMANY**
Operational information: That kind of information would have an added value for us because the results permit conclusions to be drawn on related methods, routes and patterns. In particular we are interested in information of flight routes to the EU member states.

**HUNGARY**

**ITALY**
There is a need, in the common pre frontier intelligence picture, for accurate, timely intelligence information (from human sources or produced by detection systems, e.g. using satellites), such as detected objects and movements, on departures of suspicious vessels heading for the EU's shores, before or immediately after they set sail.
Tracing of routes taken by illegal immigrants, modus operandi and statistical data from which to assess the scale and pattern of the problem.

**LATVIA**
We would be interested in the operational and actual information about illegal immigration, big smuggling cases, stolen cars, especially from neighboring countries, ship positional data, ship voyage data, ship ownership and operational data, ship identification and historical data.

**LITHUANIA**
i; ii, iii; iv.

**THE NETHERLANDS**
i and ii, possibly iv

**NORWAY**
The police work at both strategic, operative and tactical levels, and need information at each of these levels.
However, the police are most interested in information that can keep the police updated on the situational picture, new trends, current crime picture etc, i.e. information that is relevant in order to work out good threat/risk analysis, and in order to initiate countermeasures.

The police are ready to share the threat assessments, which contains numbers, statistics, and specific conditions which might influence other factors/assessments.

The police are willing to share as much information as possible, and do not see that national legislation is an obstacle to bilateral or international cooperation.

**POLAND**
Strategic key information; Operational information; Basic geo-data;

**PORTUGAL**
Mainly information regarding origins in third countries, particularly operational information, alerts related to border control and illegal migration routes or tendencies.

**ROMANIA**
We want to receive the same data which Romania provides to the states participating to the Pilot Project.

**SLOVAKIA**
NUCIM:
Operational and strategic information should be of benefit in the activities of NU.
CASM:
The highest added value has information concerning:
- push/pull factors around the border,
- areas of disturbance,
- time of violation,
- migrants nationality,
- modus operandi (place of detention, routes, transport means),
- neighboring country measures taken against illegal migration
Spain
Regular Statistics, Tactical, Operational, basic geo-data and Strategic key information

Sweden
Replies to the questions could be extensive due to the large amount of the different types of information. For the time being we choose not to elaborate with exhaustive replies to these questions. See general remarks.

Operational information
In order to increase situational awareness and reaction capability upon threats there is a need to have information on objects of interest and their movements. This includes incident reports, relevant positional and ID data of vessels etc. Operational information based on open sources should be verified, e.g. AIS- information with additional imagery and human intelligence. Operational information on smaller vessels/boats is of interest.

Strategic key information
Modus operandi as regards the maritime traffic as tactics of smugglers etc. Main routes in the maritime area including departure ports etc.

Basic geo-data

Knowledge base
b. which information/data you would be ready to share?

**BELGIUM**

All types of information except for that kind of information which is liable to legal barriers.

**BULGARIA**

- Operational information;
- Strategically important information.

**CYPRUS**

All four types of information could be exchanged with the exception of sensitive data which might affect national security if disclosed. The protection of intelligence source should also be taken into account.

**THE CZECH REPUBLIC**

All types, mainly operational and strategic information.

**ESTONIA**

Strategic key information (periodical analysis products)
Operational information (intelligence data, threat assessments, incident reports)

**FINLAND**

All, but with later restrictions

**FRANCE**

“Basic” data could be exchanged without restriction and all “non-basic” depending on agreements (see foreword); this posture is the result of the works conducted in the frame of BLUE MASS MED, process that could be presented to DG HOME and/or the experts group of M.S for EUROSUR
**GERMANY**
Except from personal data we are ready to share relevant information and data in the framework of existing legal provisions.

**HUNGARY**
1. Basic geo-data, 2. Strategic key information, 3. Knowledge base

**ITALY**
On the basis of the Eurosur pilot project, we are ready to share information on warnings and on illegal immigration incidents in progress or concluded, photos, risk assessments and patrolling plans under the European patrols network (EPN) and joint operations.

**LATVIA**
Incident/information reports (for instance, information about illegal immigration, big smuggling cases, stolen cars etc.), alert reports, monthly operational reports of SBG, ad hoc reports. As well as, ship positional data, ship voyage data, ship ownership and operation data, ship identification and historical data.

**LITHUANIA**
i; ii; iii (topographic/thematic maps)

**THE NETHERLANDS**
i, ii, iii, iv if possible by law.

**POLAND**
Strategic key information, Operational information (except human intelligence)

**PORTUGAL**
Strategic information, Liaison officers information.
ROMANIA
The data / information that we are ready to share are:
- data concerning illegal border crossings (place, number of persons, nationality, modus operandi)
- events regarding border crossings with weapons, false documents, forbidden substances, drugs.
- Information about the vessels registered in LOSS – List of Suspect Ships at Black Sea and Danube

SLOVAKIA
NUCIM:
It is possible to share strategic key information (e.g. push/pull factors for illegal migration, trends, routes, methods, statistics related to smuggling people that is not classified)
CASM:
We are ready to share information regarding:
- push/pull factors around the border,
- time of violation,
- areas of disturbance,
- migrants nationality,
- modus operandi (place of detention, routes, transport means),
- measures taken against illegal migration

SPAIN
Regular Statistics, Tactical, Operational and Strategic key information

SWEDEN
In general all types of information.
BELGIUM
Personal information on traffickers, legal barrier: privacy legislation. It depends on the authority with whom the information is exchanged. And certain cases it is necessary to follow certain procedures.

BULGARIA
- Operational information;
- Strategically important information;
- Basic geographical data;
- Knowledge base.

CYPRUS
As regards the information related to illegal immigration and other cross border crimes all four types of information can be exchanged with the exception of sensitive data mentioned above. The protection of personal data might be a legal barrier for such an exchange of information. In addition, special bilateral agreements with third countries might restrict the exchange of particular information among Member States.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC
There are some legal barriers concerning personal data protection.

ESTONIA
Personal data.
Due to Personal Data Protection Act § 18 (1) the transmission of personal data from Estonia is permitted only to a country which has a sufficient level of data protection.

FINLAND
There are some legal barriers for example to change personal data
FRANCE
for c) and d), this has been very precisely defined by BLUE MASS MED’s studies and the result concerns 6 MS (PT, ES, FR, IT, EE, MT); DG HOME has been invited to the meetings organized in order to inform her, including this process. A presentation as proposed in b) would be useful. All information except those which is covered by the justice confidentiality.

GERMANY
With reference to the current discussion in the Council on amending the Frontex regulation it is Germany’s opinion that the Agency should be limited to process personal data only in the field of return operations. We believe that the Agency is able to fulfill its mandate to produce risk analysis products of an added value without processing personal data. This reflects the current state of play which gives Frontex no mandate to process personal data obtained from operational activities.

HUNGARY
1. Operational information (technical – data transfer –, and in some cases legal barriers)

ITALY
The Italian national coordination centre and the SIA do not at present have accreditation to exchange information up to EU restricted level; until the structure is suitable for that purpose, therefore, the information exchanged with Member States, with Frontex or even within Italy will be subject to that limitation. Work is in hand to enable the Italian NCC to exchange such information.

LATVIA
1) Sensitive or classified data – National legislation does not allow exchange of sensitive or classified data without special procedures.
2) Information from radar screens – SBG does not have its own radars, therefore SBG puts into effect radar screens which are received from the navy. This could be the reason why sharing this information could be problematic.
LITHUANIA
Some legal barriers may occur in relation to the exchange of operational information (information evolving from operational criminal intelligence-led investigations) which is subject to classification as “EU Confidential” (if security requirements in the EUROSUR domain correspond to “EU Restricted” information exchange) or higher as well as in relation to information containing personal data.

THE NETHERLANDS
Not known yet.

POLAND
Operational information (human intelligence)
These kinds of information are collected by the investigation/intelligence department and its transfer depends on the decision of the head of this department and on the level of classification of these information.
Basic geo-data: There is lack of access to satellite pictures and products of Geographic Information Systems (GIS).

PORTUGAL
Some information, specially personal and criminal data, cannot be exchanged due to data protection regulations.

ROMANIA
We want to receive the same data/information that we offer, as well as a situational map with external border events. There is a legal hindrance represented by the law on personal data protection.

SLOVAKIA
NUCIM:
As in answer b)
CASM:
Personal data exchange could be useful, but there are technical barriers (secure IS) and legal barriers (authorization to handle personal data for foreigners).
**SPAIN**
Related to facilitators and traffickers in origin and transit who are involved in an outcome investigation and haven’t been arrested yet. Technical and legal barriers could be focused in the personal data management authorizations.

**SWEDEN**
Operational information: regarding personal data there could be certain constraints in the sharing of information. The right of access may, according to the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act and according to the Swedish constitution, be restricted when necessary having regard to (for instance),
- the security of the state or its relations with a foreign state or an international organization
- the inspection or control activities of an authority
- the interest of preventing or prosecuting crimes, and
- the protection of the personal integrity or economic circumstances of private subjects.

The information about ships, the position of a ship, its port of arrival, departure or carriage and of sightings of the ship might in some cases be restricted to protect the economic circumstances of the owner of the ship. Information of an authorities’ interest in a ship can further more be restricted when necessary having regard to the authorities plans to control or make an inspection of that ship.
The information concerning a ship might also be restricted when necessary to the public interest to detect, prevent, investigate or prosecute a crime.

Explicit information of a crime or a suspected criminal activity, especially when concerning an individual natural person, is restricted due to the authorities’ interest to detect, prevent, investigate or prosecute a crime as well as to the protection of the personal integrity or economic circumstances of private subjects, real or legal person. The same restrictions apply to information regarding private subjects processed because of border control activities.
**d. which information/data you would exchange only with particular (similar?) authorities?**

**BELGIUM**
Operational police information

**BULGARIA**
- Operational information;
- Strategically important information.

**CYPRUS**
Drugs related intelligence could be exchanged via particular authorities by-passing the NCC.

**ESTONIA**
No limitation as far as MS law enforcement is involved and all requirements of information security and data protection are fulfilled

**FINLAND**
Part of operational information, it is not possible to share information with other authority if you don’t own the information or you have to have permission from the third party to give information further.

**FRANCE**
All non basic data depending on agreements (see previous comment)

**GERMANY**
In certain cases there might be a need to exchange information only with law enforcement agencies.

**HUNGARY**
1. Operational information, 2. Strategic key information, 3. Knowledge base
ITALY
--

LATVIA
Operational data, intelligence information and risk analysis.

LITHUANIA
Aforementioned information, with similar MS agencies and Frontex.

THE NETHERLANDS
Not known yet.

POLAND
According to the "need to know" principle.

PORTUGAL
Personal and criminal data.

ROMANIA
It will be established subsequently (as observer country) or at the time of our involvement in the Pilot Project.

SLOVAKIA
NUCIM:
As in answer b)
CASM:
Currently, there are not specified any particular authorities.

SPAIN
The information that only affects an area or an Authority

SWEDEN
Operational information only with law enforcement authorities
e. which information/data you would certainly not exchange?

**BELGIUM**
None

**BULGARIA**
- Which is not in compliance with Bulgarian legislation.

**CYPRUS**
National Security related data, sources of information and any other sensitive data.

**ESTONIA**
Information that goes beyond the mandate and purpose of EUROSUR and CPIP particularly.

**FINLAND**
Intelligence data is classified it is (never) possible to share it.

**FRANCE**
Defense classified information and any information depending on the decision of the originator of the information, whatever its kind

**GERMANY**
Personal data.

**HUNGARY**
Information related to the cross border criminality, the human smuggling, and the trafficking of human beings. (It has legal barriers – personal data etc.).
ITALY
Personal data, i.e. individual details of those involved in illegal immigration, with the sole exception of identification of vessels used or suspected of being used for trafficking in human beings (those included in the various pictures), until such time as Frontex is empowered to process such data. Nor will we exchanged classified data, until national coordination centers are authorized to process data up to EU restricted level.

LATVIA
Possibility to exchange sensitive or classified data would be evaluated depending on the authority which requests this information. Restricted and secret/top secret data would not be exchanged.

LITHUANIA
On the basis of explanation in (d), we can state that information related to criminal intelligence would be a matter of exchange only in exceptional cases.

THE NETHERLANDS
Information about suspects, unless agreed beforehand.

POLAND
According to the assumptions of the EUROSUR system personal data and sensitive information classified higher than "Restricted" will not be exchanged (eg. human intelligence).

The issue of "basic geo-data" requires careful analysis because there may emerge in this respect issues related to licensing / rights to the relevant software.

PORTUGAL
The one not allowed by legal barriers.

ROMANIA
It will be established subsequently (as observer country) or at the time of our involvement in the Pilot Project.
SLOVAKIA
NUCIM:
We would certainly not exchange classified information that is protected by law.
CASM:
Classified information can be exchanged only on the basis of international agreement.

SPAIN
Personal data

SWEDEN
Information related to national security
7. Is there a need for classified information exchange? If so, which type of classified information would it be?

BELGIUM
Personal information of traffickers/targets or victims of illegal migration. Certainly when they’re involved in some kind of investigation.

BULGARIA
- Border Police exchanges classified information in a certain order, according to regulations.

CYPRUS
For the purpose of the CPIP it is not foreseen any need for classified information exchange unless such information is of common interest for the purpose of combating illegal immigration and the other cross border crimes as described in the incident catalogue of the EUROSUR pilot project. In addition, the status of information (being classified or not) might vary from one Member State to another and thus its dissemination restricted.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC
We prefer to share preferably unclassified information only. The rules as regards classified information treatment are very tough is the Czech Republic. It is not possible to exchange them by electronic way at all.

ESTONIA
Yes, when tactical level operations (i.e. operational plan) are under preparation or on-going, as well as where immediate actions or response (based on the level of threat or risk to the internal security) is needed (i.e. preventing, detaining, arrest or monitoring of a target- person, object etc.). As rule exchange of personal or other (operationally) sensitive data requires applying of strict classification rules.

FINLAND
Information about persons who have been or are being suspected for commit crimes.
FRANCE
BLUE MASS MED process has demonstrated that the word “classified” has different meaning for everyone, most of the time being assumed to military side; it is then preferable to use the wording “sensitive” but first and most important thing is to agree on common agreed wording. Nevertheless, this kind of exchange could be useful.

GERMANY
We believe that an exchange of classified information up to the level of “restricted” should be sufficient for the EUROSUR System.

HUNGARY
Information related to the cross border criminality, the human smuggling, and the trafficking of human beings.

ITALY
See the answers to question 6(c) and (e).

LATVIA
Yes, there is need for classified information exchange.
1) Operational information about fighting against illegal border crossings, illegal immigration flows and other criminal cross border activities.
2) Sometimes classified information could be necessity to exchange for intelligence purposes.

LITHUANIA
Indeed, there is a need for classified information and personal data exchange. Information related to criminal intelligence would be a matter of exchange in exceptional cases, for the purposes of joint investigation. Furthermore, there may be a need for exchange of information of a strategic nature containing no personal data, e.g., a lot of Frontex analytical products are classified as “EU Restricted”. Plans of joint operations, results, and statistics.

THE NETHERLANDS
If a MS has certain information useful to the Netherlands, we would like to be informed. Such information exchange of classified data (MS have their own rules about classification) could be done on a reciprocal basis, if necessary using bilateral agreements. The exchange in the framework of Eurosur might therefore be less indicated.
NORWAY
Information exchange with regards to border cooperation is seldom of a classified nature, and the police have not experienced that this has been a problem.

POLAND
Yes, there is a need for exchange of classified information (up to the level "restricted"). Operational data obtained from operational/investigation cases and preparatory proceedings should be classified.

PORTUGAL
Yes. All information should be classified Confidential – Law Enforcement Only.

ROMANIA
It will be established subsequently (as observer country) or at the time of our involvement in the Pilot Project.

SLOVAKIA
NUCIM:
It is necessary to exchange information that can be used in investigation of organized people smuggling.
CASM:
No, the exchange of classified information is not required currently.

SPAIN
According the Spanish legislation, depends the information to exchange, the addressee, the way, etc, it could be confidential, restricted or not restricted. For instance, the one about facilitators and traffickers.

SWEDEN
Please see replies to question 6 a-e. There could also be a need for classified information considered case by case.
8. Which part of the above information/categories are already managed/used at your Member State level? By whom? How much of its exchange is centralized in the NCC?

**BELGIUM**
All. Police, OCAD, Security of the State. The NCC, MIK, exchanges only information with a maritime character.

**BULGARIA**
- Border Police exchanges operational information and strategic important information.

**CYPRUS**
Operational, Strategic, Basic Geo-data and Knowledge base information is managed by the Intelligence Services in cooperation with the Police. The NCC receives such information via the in-house security/intelligence office. Strategic Key information for illegal immigration is managed by the Immigration Department of the Ministry of Interior in close co-operation with the Police. When information is related to surveillance it is forwarded to the NCC.

**THE CZECH REPUBLIC**
The Czech Republic does not have NCC. However, FPC Directorate, Europol, Interpol and SIRENE could be regarded as national centers of its kind.

**ESTONIA**
All above-mentioned data that is not made available through computerized systems (data bases) or in case where IT systems would become not operational, can be exchanged via NCC by alternative communication means.

**FINLAND**
All of it, Police, Customs, Border Guard. 70-80%
FRANCE
All those information are currently managed by the NFPOC at the French border police headquarter except the national situational picture provided by Spationav received at the coast guard function center. The “Management information center of the Coast Guard Function” will centralize the main part of the exchange of operational information and will be endorsed to have a direct contact with the regional authorities in charge of reaction capability. The French Navy deals with these 4 categories of information. All of them can be used by the central level as well as by local operational centers.

GERMANY
For the time being we don’t have established an NCC in the context of EUROSUR. Apart from that we do have a situation centre located at Federal Police headquarters. It is provided with command and control powers in cases nationwide coordination of resources is required. The centre is in constant exchange of information with situation centers of other security agencies on federal as well as on state level. Furthermore, it is the first point of contact for our foreign security partners. The diversity of information which is exchanged via these channels is mostly focused on the operational/tactical level, enriched with strategic information. Due to the federal structure of our country there is no centralized police organization and thus no NCC covering all aspects of policing.

HUNGARY
The operational information are managed by the local and regional units, the strategic key information by the regional and central unit. After the establishment of the NCC these information will be collect by the NCC too and share with other competent units.

ITALY
We are not at present considering any centralisation of classified information exchange via the national coordination centre. At least for the centre's initial period of operation (for the first few months or year), we do not think it advisable to make or propose any change in the way such information is handled. Exchange via the NCC will come as a later step.
LATVIA
At national and EU level information concerning incident/information reports (information about illegal immigration, big smuggling cases, stolen cars etc.), alert reports, bimonthly analytical reports of SBG, ad hoc reports is managed with law enforcement authorities. SBG also exchanges information with navy concerning ship positional and voyage data, ship ownership and operation data, as well as ship identification and historical data.

LITHUANIA
All sea-related information, with minor exceptions. The information is managed and used by SBGS units. Sea border-related information exchange is carried out on the tactical and regional levels. Sea-related information exchange (maps and the like) is planned but not yet permitted within the scope of the central quarters.

THE NETHERLANDS
The Dutch NCC/Coastguard Centre is an end user. It is not managed at MS level.

NORWAY
We have not yet established an NCC in Norway.

POLAND
Operational information is exchanged and processed at central/ regional/ local level (Polish Border Guard Headquarters, Border Guard Regional Units and Border Guard Posts), strategic information is processed and exchanged at the Border Guard Headquarters and Border Guard Regional Units level.

PORTUGAL
All the information exchange in Portugal between LEA is already confidential. In SEF, all of it it’s centralized in the CSF.

ROMANIA
It will be established subsequently (as observer country) or at the time of our involvement in the Pilot Project.
SLOVAKIA
NUCIM:
Strategic information related to routes, trends, methods and some statistical information on illegal migration is used at the level of NU.
CASM:
Information listed in "Part II. paragraph i, ii, iii. The information is managed/ used by Bureau of Border and Alien Police of the MoI SR and its subordinated units.

SPAIN
Operational information (dynamic information, open source information, human intelligence, detected Objects of Interest and movements)
Strategic key information (e.g. push/pull factors for illegal migration, trends, routes, methods, statistics)
Knowledge base (methods, such as categorization of vessel types incl. size, speed etc; description of typical scenarios, departure/destination etc).
Secretariat of State for Security (General Direction of International Relations and Immigration), through the Deputy Direction for International Relations and Immigration and also Guardia Civil, Cuerpo Nacional de Policía and their Intelligence Services exchange all the information of interest.

SWEDEN
Currently there is no NCC-function in the Eurosur concept. However, the different types of information /categories are in general managed as follows:
Operational information – Police, Coast Guard and Customs
Strategic key information – Police, Migration Board and Coast Guard
Basic geo-data - Coast Guard
Knowledge base- Coast Guard

The Swedish Coast Guard manages the maritime situational picture and to some extent provides for/manages the above mentioned types of information. Within the existing NCC-function (BSRBCC) at the Swedish Coast Guard, information exchange as regards operational and strategic information is centralized.
9. What are the most common sources of exchangeable information?

BELGIUM
Police, Marine (Army), customs and Open sources and other foreign partners

BULGARIA
- Open sources and operational.

CYPRUS
Electronic data received by different reporting systems, open sources and intelligence.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Operational information, investigation.

ESTONIA
National data bases, operational reports, incident reports, open sources etc.

FINLAND
Other relevant authorities

FRANCE
All information managed by SPATIONAV system, such as NMEA standards (AIS, GPS); internet protocols standards and photo, videos standard formats but also information provided by risk analysis units.

GERMANY
Most of the information we use is obtained from our cooperation partners in the GASIM and from our own sources (ILO/ALO network).

HUNGARY
Statistical data, daily, weekly, monthly reports, ad-hoc reports about concrete cases, risk analysis reports.
ITALY
Open sources, satellite images, photos generally, video footage, assessments and information from liaison officers and movements of vessels involved or suspected of involvement in trafficking in human beings.

LATVIA
1) Incident/information reports, alert reports, ad hoc reports.
2) Databases (national, EU and Frontex), surveillance systems, data about local risk analysis, local patrol and incident’s.
3) AIS, radar pictures, video cameras, e-mail, SAR chat.

LITHUANIA
Surveillance equipment, reports, consolidated reports (including those of other agencies), and regular cooperation with other agencies in information exchange.

THE NETHERLANDS
OSINT, information from border checks provide input for intelligence data bases and risk analysis.

NORWAY
The most common sources of exchangeable information is statistics on the border controls carried out at Storskog border crossing point (the only border crossing point at the land border between Norway and Russia).

POLAND
Polish Border Guard databases, SIS, information from the Polish Border Guard Liaison Officers and other national services.

PORTUGAL
The Border Control Posts.
ROMANIA
The most common sources of exchangeable information are represented by open sources, data received from RBP sensors, border events database, risk analyses, and also monthly statistics for Frontex.

SLOVAKIA
NUCIM:
Own operational activities, Information from the Police Force departments, Information from foreign police agencies and other state administrative authorities,
CASM:
- Internal (within Bureau of Border and Alien Police of the MoI SR)
- External in the framework of the MoI SR
- External outside of the framework of the MoI SR

SPAIN
Official e-mail within the secure internal exchange of information platform of the Police and Guardia Civil Directorate General, and the General Direction of International Relations an Immigration.
In the case an information illegal migration or trafficking in human beings networks has to be sent to EUROPOL using the common process throughout the National Unit of EUROPOL-Spain. In the case of FRONTEX Agency secure platform IcoNET of the EU Commission is used.
It is also used the means of the Seahorse Project.

SWEDEN
Open sources, law enforcement information and intelligence exchange. Via encrypted communication channel (BRSBCC) there are different sources in participating MS and third country (Russia).
10.  At what frequency/regularity and when would the different types of information be needed? At what delays (ad hoc/after what time)? In which format?

BELGIUM
At a regular frequency depending on the kind of information and ad hoc in a digital/electronically format

BULGARIA
- Depending on the operational situation /analysis of risk/ and in particular cases.

CYPRUS
- Operational data is needed on a daily basis – electronic format
- Strategic Information is constantly needed – electronic format
- Basic Geo-Data is needed on a case by case basis as a result of Strategic information – electronic format
- Knowledge Base Data – daily on electronic format

THE CZECH REPUBLIC
- Types i. and ii. – without delay
- Types iii. and iv. – ad hoc

ESTONIA
Frequency depends on the needs (topic), situation and value of information.
It can be on daily, weekly monthly, quarterly Between the Police and Border guard Board and police prefectures data exchange is in real time, reporting in daily basis.

FINLAND
Ad hoc warning system (phone, data format), other information daily basis (data)

FRANCE
From real time up to 8 hours for i and ii categories. On a regular basis concerning iii and iv.
Preferred formats are IP-compatible formats on a most common basis (http, smtp, ftp …).
GERMANY
For the fulfillment of our tasks it is crucial that we receive information in time and regularly in order to react accordingly. The stakeholders of our analytical products are dependent on it for the planning’s of their own operations. We prefer short intervals and information reduced to the essential.

HUNGARY
It is depends from the information. We need operational information in real time or daily basis (written report and map base visual information), strategic key information on monthly basis (written report and map base visual information), and basic geo-data on seasonally (map base visual information). Knowledge base information on ad-hoc base (in written form)

ITALY
--

LATVIA
1. Operational information - close to real time
2. Daily information must be exchanged as routine. Ad hoc information must be delivered within 1 hour.
3. Other type of information 1/24h or on request.
Information should be exchanged in format which is common for all CPIP contactors/users and usage of this format should be determined by EU legislation.

LITHUANIA
Information that calls for immediate action would be needed immediately, within 3 hours, and other information that may influence the efficiency of border surveillance within 24 hours. Text format (Word, PDF, XML). The frequency would depend on the nature of information: Information that calls for immediate action would be needed on a real time basis, and information of the strategic nature would be received on a quarterly basis. Dynamic information for situational awareness could be supplied on a daily or weekly basis depending on the nature of information.
THE NETHERLANDS
i: asap, in a format compatible with our national systems.
ii: after significant changes.
iii-iv: yearly, or after significant changes

NORWAY
The police would like to receive relevant information for the threat/risk analysis prior to each report (every three months), and would like to receive any operational information 24/7.

POLAND
Periodical exchange of strategic information, current exchange of operational information and "ad hoc" information exchange for the identification of specific events / threats at the border; basic geo-data - regular obtaining of satellite imagery of the most vulnerable sections of the border to illegal migration and other forms of transnational crime, with possibility of "ad hoc" analysis for the identification of specific incidents / threats at the border is necessary.

PORTUGAL
The desirable regularity is, of course, in real time or close to real time due to the validity of the information. Apart from that, a daily situational picture should be in place in whatever electronic format.

ROMANIA
The information is needed both ad – hoc and on a weekly, monthly basis, as well as reports every two months.

SLOVAKIA
NUCIM:
Ad hoc in different format - by mutual agreement
CASM:
The frequency of exchange of information is determined by its relevance. The Bureau of Border and Alien Police daily sends incident reports in a specified time. Operational and strategic materials are processed in the specified period. All materials are distributed electronically.
We expect similar way of exchange and processing of information in the future.
SPAIN
It depends on the type of information and the need of a concrete MS. Incidents and alarms at or beyond the external borders should be reported no longer than several hours after being detected. According to operational reports the frequency could be weekly describing the situational picture by geographical areas (tactical and operational dynamic information). Intelligence products could be shared every 3 – 6 months and one Annual Analytical reports should be produced as well (key strategic information).

SWEDEN
There must be an up-date of the information on a daily basis and upon incidents. The up-date should be electronically and in accordance with an agreed format.
11. Are there any specific areas of your interest (geographical areas/countries)?

BELGIUM
Countries that have a history as a source of illegal traffic and migration and areas on which there is almost no information.

BULGARIA
- Member States with whom an exchange of operational information is in process for the purposes of crimes prevention/detecting, as well as third countries - origin of illegal migration.

CYPRUS
The main routes of illegal immigration flows that concern the Republic of Cyprus are the areas of the South Coast of Turkey, the main ports of Syria (Tartus and Lattakia) and the Coast of Lebanon. For the time being the vast majority of illegal immigrants come from Turkey. They arrive at the occupied areas and enter the Government controlled areas through the ceased fire line (green line).

THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Countries being considered as risk areas are e.g. Vietnam, Nigeria, the Ukraine, Russia, Egypt, China, Mongolia in which CZ liaison officers responsible for documents and migration are deployed.

ESTONIA
Yes. Countries in Baltic Sea Region (RUS,FIN,SWE,LVA,LTU,POL,DEU,DNK), Scandinavian countries (FIN,SWE,NOR,DNK,) and main risk countries of departure and transit (RUS,BLR,UKR,MDA) that can be linked to the Estonia by irregular migration route.

FINLAND
Sea areas, pre-frontier areas (Caucasus, Central Asia, India, China and Russia)

FRANCE
First Mediterranean Sea then Atlantic Ocean and but some information like IMO number are relevant if analyzed on a world range.
GERMANY
Currently the focus is on North-Africa (Maghreb), Turkey, Western Balkans, Asia and Latin America.

HUNGARY
Information about the area of the neighboring third countries and information about the main migration routes.

ITALY
The Strait of Sicily, the Strait of Sardinia and the Strait of Otranto.

LATVIA
Latvia is especially interested in the areas close to the borders with Russia and Belorussia, countries of the Baltic Sea Region and third countries which cause the possible high risks of illegal immigration.

LITHUANIA
Russia (borders with Lithuania, Poland, Latvia and Estonia), the Baltic Sea, Belarus and Ukraine; other information should depend on the data of the general border intelligence picture, routes of illegal migration and conclusions of risk analysis.

THE NETHERLANDS
The North Sea, the English Channel, Scandinavia.

NORWAY
Areas of interest to us is Russia.

POLAND
Eastern sections of the EU external border.
PORTUGAL
No specific areas, although of course Africa would be a priority. Worldwide information should be available since there are always changes in the future migration flows.

ROMANIA
The entire external border presents interest for our country, but we focus to a greater extent on the borders with Moldavia, Ukraine and Turkey.

SLOVAKIA
NUCIM:
Countries of origin of illegal migrants that transit through the territory of Slovakia e.g. Ukraine, Moldova, Afghanistan, India, China, etc.

CASM:
We are especially interested in events around the Ukrainian border with PL, HU and SK. Information regarding situation at the external Schengen border and in some third countries could be useful, too.

SPAIN
In the case of Spain the geographical areas of interest are in Africa (Western Coasts and the Maghreb countries). Anyway and taking into account the movements of the facilitators and the would be migrants and the constantly changing flows (routes and settlements) to have information from the Turkish – Greek external border could be of interest for our side.

SWEDEN
African Horn, Middle East and the Caucasus Area. As regards cross-border crime not directly related to illegal immigration there are more areas of interest.
12. Who are the intended recipients of CPIP information in your State in the future? Apart from the NCC, are there more units/services planned to be involved (both internally and externally)? Are they new communities when it comes to exploitation of CPIP-type information? How do this/these possible new communities ‘match’ with or relate to those already making use of such information?

BELGIUM
Police, Army (Defense), customs, OCAD, Security of the State.
No new communities
The border guard units are a part of the police. Within the police it is DAO/IMM who are responsible for the coordination and support of the border guard units.

BULGARIA
- When needed the information will be provided to „International operational cooperation” Directorate, Customs Agency and State Agency for National Security.

CYPRUS
Intended recipients of information gathered by the CPIP apart from the NCC will be some units of the Police, the Department of Merchant Shipping, the Department of Fisheries, Customs & excise Department, Intelligence Service and possibly the National Guard. There will be constant communication between those authorities.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC
NCC does not exist in the Czech Republic.
FPS Directorate and OCU would certainly be involved and may play the role of NCC in the future.

ESTONIA
There are no more intended recipients planned for the future. NCC remains as only recipient of CPIP information and responsible for further distribution of it.
FINLAND
Apart from the NCC, are there more units/services planned to be involved (both internally and externally)? Are they new communities when it comes to exploitation of CPIP-type information? How do this/these possible new communities ‘match’ with or relate to those already making use of such information?

Border Guard, Police, Customs, Immigration office, Foreign Ministry, Defense Forces + other relevant authorities (these must be surveyed out thoroughly), there are no significant problems within Finland which comes to the information sharing between the authorities

FRANCE
All departments concerned, especially for strategic key information as they will respectively be responsible within their specific duty (border police headquarter, customs national Directorate for Intelligence, Customs Investigations,…), all MOC at regional level and the “Management information center of the Coast Guard Function” for the NSP

Apart from the NCC, are there more units/services planned to be involved (both internally and externally)?

Yes, at least all MOC of maritime prefect and navy and others operational centers of departments involved in maritime surveillance of our approaches with capability of intercepting suspicious targets (gendarmerie, customs, …)
Are they new communities when it comes to exploitation of CPIP-type information? How do this/these possible new communities ‘match’ with or relate to those already making use of such information?

The Coast Guard Function gathers all the administrations able to enforce the law at sea. There are others public partners in order to organize the continuum between land and sea but they don’t need to access all the information. The relevant information will be rerouted according to its nature, classification,…, to the relevant department or authority for processing it.

GERMANY
The recipients of CPIP type information would be those authorities that are represented in the GASIM (cf. question 1 b)). The GASIM structure is well-proven and successful. All relevant partners are represented.
HUNGARY
The main recipients will be the NCC and the regional and local units. The local and regional units have already involved to collect CPIP information.

ITALY
In our view, the operations rooms of agencies helping to combat illegal immigration by sea and conduct border surveillance (navy, coastguard, and customs and excise [Guardia di Finanza]) and in particular the relevant operational headquarters should be able to have access to the CPIP. Those organizations participate in and provide input for the SIA and for information exchange with the national coordination centre. Access to the CPIP could also be extended to other organizational units of the Interior Ministry (e.g. the anti drugs unit) and of other ministries (e.g. customs) invited to take part in the Eurosur pilot project. Arrangements for interaction with those units can be established and tried out during the pilot project.

LATVIA
The first authority which will receive the information will be the SBG, because it will administrate NCC. Through NCC information will be provided to other participants (Navy, Customs, Police). All competent state institutions already collect the information in their fields of duty, which could be used for the construction of CPIP.

LITHUANIA
The major recipient would be the SBGS, and it would be possible to send information, according to cooperation plans, to other law enforcement bodies (to the police, and tactical sea imagery to the military if a national decision is taken with regard to the latter, AIS to the LSLA)

THE NETHERLANDS
NCC (Coast Guard Centre). Maritime Information Node (info-gathering/analysis centre by Coast Guard Partners). They are no new communities.

NORWAY
We have not established an NCC in Norway yet, and are still considering the cooperation arrangements between the different authorities with responsibilities at the external borders.
POLAND
CPIP will be used beyond the NCC, also at the regional (Border Guard Regional Units) and local (Border Guard Posts) level. If necessary, information will be forwarded to other national services, such as mentioned in point 1.

PORTUGAL
Because the Portuguese NCC is not yet fully established there is room for adaptations regarding entities involved.

Due to his exclusive competences when it comes to migration and borders, SEF has a very important role in this context.

ROMANIA
The intended recipients of CPIP information in our state in the future are represented by the structures with competence in coordination of border actions. Other units apart from NCC will be involved, but they are not new communities when it comes to exploitation of CPIP-type information. They will be integrated through RBP Information System.

SLOVAKIA
The access should be guaranteed only for institutions which meet the security criteria. At this time, it is the Bureau of Border and Alien Police of the MoI SR and its subordinate units (Department of Alien Police, Department of Border Police, Centre of Analysis and Strategic Management, National Unit Combating Illegal Migration) and several special departments of the MoI SR. The involvement of other institutions depends on adjusting a range of information.
We do not expect a further expansion of users will be necessary.

SPAIN
Not totally decided nowadays

SWEDEN
Please see the comment to general remarks.
13. And how do the recipients of CPIP information relate to the communities working closely with different Frontex units such as FRAN, FOSS, NFPOCs and other networks? What kind of tasks and competences do they have and for which purposes would they be using the information/analysis?

BELGIUM
DAO/IMM: National point of contact on illegal migration. They analyze and summarize the information. It is used as a guideline for the operational and as a support for the policy.
MIK: is the executive unit
OCAD: evaluation of the terror threat
Border Control units: support and direct their operations

BULGARIA
- Border police participate in Frontex’s risk Analysis Network (FRAN) and interacts with various Agencies through the National Frontex Point of contact (NFPOC), which coordinates the joint activities and participation in Joint Operations. On regular base analytical information is provided to Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU).

CYPRUS
The NCC operates under the umbrella of the police. FRAN, FOSS and NFPOC also operate under the police. Therefore, there is constant communication between these services. The Department of Merchant Shipping, the Customs & Excise Department and other authorities will have access to the CPIP to use information according to their needs.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Relevant information from the above mentioned sources are used also in the framework of information exchange by means of the FRAN network.

ESTONIA
NCC in Estonia operates as NFPOC and due to its placement in the organisational structure (under the same bureau where risk analysis division- national RAU is located) works closely with above-mentioned structures/information exchange communities.
FINLAND
We are working with those authorities on daily basis.

FRANCE
- All information transiting in the EUROSUR system will have operational criteria requesting either immediate reactions or post reactions in contrary with the information available through other networks (FOSS, FRAN etc…). as explained before, the relevant information will be rerouted according to its nature, classification,…, to the relevant department or authority for processing it, authority maybe already in charge of FOSS, FRAN… so that we are sure that she has all the information of her competency whatever the source is.

- Updating data base and comparing different sources of information would be an advantage when it comes to deal with a general or particular problem in relation with the cross border crime fight.

GERMANY
The counterpart of Frontex in Germany is the Federal Police. The main channel of communication is the German NFPoC located at the Federal Police headquarters. However there are additional communication channels for FRAN, return matters and training issues.

The NFPoC is responsible for the cooperation of all operational matters in terms of organising and planning e.g. Frontex joint operations and focal point activities etc. The NFPoC is not involved in the actual implementation of these activities. Its task is to prepare and manage the implementation Frontex operational activities, while FRAN is connected with our analysis unit. The analytical Unit would be the main recipient and contributor of CPIP type information. All units are located within in Federal Police headquarters. In addition, Federal Police is very well linked with other authorities in the field of combating irregular migration and cross border crime (GASIM).

HUNGARY
The CPIP information from different sources will be a part of the national situational awareness.
ITALY
The CPIP is a tool which can, of course, be used by a number of communities, both for preventive measures and for operational counter measures, also working with other Member States or with third countries with which there is smooth cooperation in this area. As mentioned in reply to question 3, the risk assessment section (a FRAN member) and the national coordination centre both come under the same department.
In technical/operational terms, at any rate, an incident potentially of interest to more than one community/network should be entered once only, irrespective of the number of networks in which the information is expected to be available (e.g. an intelligence report concerning a possible departure of vessels carrying illegal immigrants from a third country, heading for the EU's shores, entered in Eurosur).

LATVIA
See the answer under the 16th question.

LITHUANIA
The FRAN national contact officer is a staff officer of the SBGS central quarters responsible for the organization of risk analysis, and information exchange between Frontex Risk Analysis Unit and NCC is established. The NFPOC functions are performed by staff of the SBGS AOB Operational Management and Operations Division who are on duty on a round-the-clock basis and are to form the basis for an established NCC. FOSS activity is coordinated by the SBGS central quarters (International Cooperation Board) but the number of access points from Frontex is limited. Information exchange may be carried out through ICONet as a secure network. The Centre is established at the SBGS central quarters as well.

THE NETHERLANDS
The NCC can share information and communicate with the Criminal Investigation Department, that deals with FRAN (FOSS and NFPOCs out of scope) and vice versa if deemed relevant by the sharing partner.

NORWAY
Not determined yet.
POLAND
NFPOC and all cooperation with the FRONTEX Agency in Poland is the domain of the Polish Border Guard because of the wide range of competence of the service. Representatives of the Polish Border Guard are working closely with the FRONTEX Agency in many forums. They are active members of the bodies like FRAN and FOSS.

PORTUGAL
SEF is the national contact point with Frontex due to it’s competences in immigration and border control. Because two authorities perform EPN patrols (European Patrols network) both GNR and the Navy have access to FOSS, and all entities communicate with Frontex via the NFPOC.

ROMANIA
The Risk Analysis Unit within General Inspectorate of Romanian Border Police is a FRAN member, and using this quality it sends statistic data through ICONet network (Informational and Coordination Network for Illegal Migration Management Units of MS). Also, Risk Analysis Unit selects the most representatives illegal migration cases, which are posted on ICONet network as incident reports, and every two months it elaborates analysis concerning illegal migration phenomenon on the format pre established by FRAN, which are also posted on ICONet network. The received information is used in order to realize risk analysis concerning illegal migration phenomena which could jeopardize MS internal security. Further, based on these analyses, decision factors could adopt, aware of the situation, effective and efficient prevention and combating measures.

SPAIN
This item should be decided by all MS and FRONTEX Agency in a unified form to work in the same way

SWEDEN
The recipients of CPIP information will receive it on a need to know basis and the information will be used within their competence. The Police has the general responsibility for border control and contacts with Frontex. The Swedish Coast Guard has an independent role regarding border control at the sea borders and is also active in international operational cooperation such as Frontex Joint Operations. The Coast Guard will need relevant information in order to effectively carry out its border surveillance duties.
14. How would you place, in this structure the role of EU Member State Liaison Officers in third countries?

BELGIUM
They can be a first point of contact in the relation and the exchange of information between their home country and the third country in both ways. They can also enrich the collected information.

BULGARIA
- Liaison officers’ responsibilities are to exchange additional operating information for crime and illegal migration detection, which will be provided to the NCC.

CYPRUS
The role of EU Member State Liaison officers in third countries could be considered as very important. The direct flow of information from a third country is valuable for the purpose of combating illegal immigration and other forms of cross border crime.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Liaison officers deployed in third countries should be included in this structure.

ESTONIA
In our opinion MS LO’s (ALO’s) could be treated as single (individual, as representing only its own MS) information and particularly intelligence source, that participate in information exchange as individually, via NFPOC or any other communities referred in paragraph 13 as well.

FINLAND
EU Member State Liaison Officers are important sources of information because of their connections with local authorities.

FRANCE
EU Member State Liaison Officers are of the responsibility of their States and department, the information gathered by them must be sent to the MS first and the dissemination of their information is then decided by the national authority. They contribute for a large part to the establishing of the risk analysis and CPIP.
**GERMANY**
In this structure MS Liaison officers are another important source of information. Information and data gathered by Liaison officers could give useful and valuable input to complement the CPIP at national level.

**HUNGARY**
They have already sent reports on yearly level about those countries where they are deployed. These reports are useful sources of the strategic key information.

**ITALY**
Member States' liaison officers in third countries are a valuable, irreplaceable source of information helping to make up the CPIP. The reports sent in, or parts of them, may be included in the CPIP by the NCC.

**LATVIA**
Each Liaison Officer has connections with the law enforcement authorities of the home country and can send actual information to these authorities, which collect, analyze and use it for CPIP needs.

**LITHUANIA**
To seek to facilitate better cooperation, border surveillance and installation of new technologies, and provide consultations to diplomatic or consular offices in the issues of visa issuance and document authenticity. In the issues of visa and document authenticity, to provide consultations to agencies in third countries performing border control functions. In the scope of legal possibilities, to provide information for the general border intelligence picture. Information received from liaison officers would form part of CPIP.

**THE NETHERLANDS**
Liaison officers in third countries usually report to the strategic level (trends in criminal activities, migration routes, …) but not to the NCC (tactical/operational level). Cases of a more operational nature can always be forwarded to the NCC.
NORWAY
No comment.

POLAND
EU MS Liaison Officers accredited in Third Countries should constitute an important link in the exchange of operational and strategic information on the situation in those countries and the possible risks that may affect the security of EU external borders.

PORTUGAL
As a major source of information and a feedback recipient.

SLOVAKIA
The Slovak Republic has no immigration liaison officer (ILO). The Slovak Republic does only have generalists – PAs (police attachés) – handling all matters under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior; partially also immigration matters.
The agreement between the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic on cooperation in posting police officers to the Slovak Embassies in order to fulfill tasks within the frame of control of travel documents entered into force on 1 June 2007. Currently, police officers are placed and permanently present at the Consulate General of the Slovak Republic in Uzhhorod – Ukraine, and they perform control of documents provided by the citizens applying for visa.

SPAIN
Our experience tell us the role of all of them should be placed on the top of the source. They can obtain valuable information in the countries of transit / origin to be depurated, treated and enabled after at the NCCs.

SWEDEN
Liaison officers in third countries will be attached to a MS embassy. They will primarily collect operational and strategic information and work close with local authorities and travel industry.
PART III. THE ROLE OF FRONTEX:

15. Can you describe your expectations regarding the role of Frontex and its input in monitoring security environment/pre-frontier area/third countries?

BELGIUM
Describe the evolutions, search and give more information on the possible evolutions and tendencies, enrich the input of the member states.

BULGARIA
- Expectations of the Border Police as regards the role of Frontex Agency and its contribution concerning the situation / pre-frontier area / third countries should be closely related and linked to the Agency’s responsibilities stipulated in Regulation 2007/2004. Frontex must continue the risk analysis reporting for providing the Community and the Member States with relevant information which allows taking the appropriate measures or to monitor threats and risks in order to improve the integrated management of external borders. In cases of difficulties in the cooperation between Member States and third countries regarding border issues the Agency must mediate and assist through bilateral or trilateral cooperation agreements.

CYPRUS
Geo-data such as satellite and other images on the pre frontier area should be managed by Frontex and be distributed on a need-to-know, need-to-share basis to interested Member States. Frontex is the appropriate agency for the gathering of such information and should be the point of contact among the MS at European level. The cost of such information should be covered by Frontex within its annual budget. In addition, Frontex could explore/develop the possibility of operating directly with third countries where bilateral agreements are in place.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Frontex should play role of central body for information collection and analysis.
ESTONIA
In our opinion Frontex should work more on the visualisation aspects of situational picture. Information on interactive (real-time) maps should not be based only on open source data but also include data on incidents with least delay and reports from on-going JO’s on the daily basis and where available also alerts, warnings, assessments etc. with reference to area of impact.

FINLAND
Frontex has an essential role in the field of coordinating and developing the information exchange between the Member States. The regular basis risk analysis information exchange between Frontex and the MSs, meaning FRAN (Frontex Risk Analysis Network) should be maintained and further developed.

Via more coordinated ILO – activities Frontex could gain additional comprehensive and coordinated source of information, regarding to the third countries.

Frontex has built up good contacts to the countries in pre-frontier area/third countries (for example Western Balkans, North-Africa) to monitor different phenomenon in border security.

Frontex could act in the strategic level and an information “source” for MS

FRANCE
FRONTEX is expected to organise and coordinate joint operations with Member States who need a reinforcement at their external borders or in area where the risk is high.
Reports regarding risk analysis could be very interesting, as well as those provided by the liaison officer network, and also any alert issued from data gathered directly by Frontex. Moreover, FRONTEX has to act for CPIP as for the other aspects of Eurosur, a network management role.

GERMANY
Frontex as a coordinating body could gather all relevant information and data provided by MS in order to produce a reliable and accurate CPIP reflecting both, the actual situation at the EU external borders and providing an outlook of possible future threats and risks.
HUNGARY
More detailed information about the migration routes, trends, modus operandi and cross border criminality etc. High resolution satellite images about the pre-frontier area on seasonally base.

ITALY
As also stated in the appended summary of the Eurosur technical study, the agency's task should be to harmonise and combine all information received from Member States (via their national situational picture (NSP)), so as to issue both a European situational picture (ESP) and a common pre frontier intelligence picture (CPIP). Monitoring would cut out any duplication of information, while also checking on reliability of sources and improving circulation of information. The volume and comprehensiveness of information distributed to Member States should be such as to make it possible to adopt, more quickly and as effectively as at present, the countermeasures necessary to tackle illegal immigration, both in relations between Member States and with third countries.

LATVIA
Frontex must administrate Common data exchange system and ensure the working capability of this system in 24/7 regime. Frontex must also provide Member States with the information which could be actual and useful for evaluation of the current situation.
Frontex must only support Member State activities but not to administrate them. Frontex could administrate only common operations.

LITHUANIA
Frontex could administer a system integrating the CPIPs of all EU MSs, carry out analysis of the whole EU external border and initiate joint operations.

THE NETHERLANDS
Frontex should bring about uniform risk analysis and assist in order to fit systems together.

NORWAY
We expect that Frontex will provide relevant and updated information regarding the area beyond the external borders of Schengen.
POLAND
FRONTEX Agency, being responsible for creating CPIP should also convey high quality products of risk analysis of the EU the external borders, including the most significant threats, new trends, identified modus operandi of groups engaged in cross-border crime. FRONTEX Agency should also provide EU MS with high-resolution satellite images of border areas most vulnerable to criminal activity. The Agency should also be a provider of GIS software for creating images of national situational pictures (NSP).

PORTUGAL
We are used to cooperate with Frontex in joint operations and information exchange regarding illegal migration.

ROMANIA
Frontex should:
- offer an IT platform for data exchange
- represent an interface/partner and also a liaison between European Commission organism (Joint Research Centre) and Member States participating to EUROSUR Project.
- assure the common pre-frontier intelligence picture and the European situational Picture implementation and timely disseminate to Member States the obtained results.

SLOVAKIA
Our expectations are high - based on previous experience we have with FX. Monitoring of security environment has to be done by a unit running EUROSUR project. FX could be the authority that would be responsible together with MS to monitor, evaluate and then distribute conclusions between MS and all involved authorities (parties).
FX has some valuable experience – from JO, etc., how to deal, gather, evaluate and use information from third countries to perform border surveillance and border check more effectively and on higher level.
**SPAIN**
On this regard, FRONTEX could act somehow as a central node for exchange of information between Member states, always on the same level within the infrastructure of a horizontal organization.

Its inputs would be to provide harmonization between information exchanged among MS’s.

**SWEDEN**
The role of Frontex would be to coordinate and analyse information that is gathered from different sources as MS, open sources and collected from EU representatives (possible future Frontex liaison officers).
16. What type of content should Frontex make available? Please specify what kind of information services, analytical products etc. it should provide.

BELGIUM
All the four types of information that are mentioned. Certainly risk analysis with a perspective on the future tendencies of all kinds of illegal traffic.

BULGARIA
- In future Frontex have to combine if possible the already established FOSS products and Virtual Aula in a common information portal providing referential and analytical information accessible by GOs participating in joint operations, FJST members and the Agency’s point of contacts situated in the Member States. All Research and Development Unit’s Projects must be completed. As regards the operational situation at the external EU borders, the Agency must continue drawing comprehensive analyses and evaluations of the situational picture in terms of irregular migration, stolen vehicles, goods smuggling etc.

CYPRUS
It is expected that Frontex will manage the European Situational Picture. In that respect FRONTEX, when asked, should make available to interested Member States on a need-to-know/ need-to-share basis operational, analytical and strategic information related to illegal immigration and other cross border crimes for the area of interest of that particular Member State.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Because the Czech Republic is now not involved into EUROSUR Pilot Project and in any CPIP working group, it is difficult to answer this question.

ESTONIA
We consider that the list and range of products provided by Frontex by the beginning 2011 is sufficient taking into account Frontex capacity for production and MS capacity and resources to provide necessary input for these products.
FINLAND

Current products as Annual Risk Assessment (ARA), Semi-Annual Risk Assessment and Tailored Risk Analysis Reports are good and relatively comprehensive selection of risk analysis products. More efforts should be put to Tailored Risk Analysis Reports, from target and timing point of view. Frontex should be able in future also to launch “Phenomenon Alerts” to Member States. These alerts would have short preparation time and they would be based on information collected about certain observed phenomenon during 1-3 months. This would be more dynamic product and action in the field of risk analysis, comparing the current abovementioned products.

FRANCE

- Updated risk analyses information for every ongoing operations (Land, Air and Sea border sectors), this should include countries of origin, numbers, sex, age…
- Details concerning the smugglers (if available)
- Details regarding the means of transport, engines, navigation equipments…
- Any other information which could be useful regarding over type of cross border crime.
- General or detail statistics concerning the lost of lives at sea in particular.
- Updated numbers of arrivals on each different sector.
- Whatever any other information regarding illegal traffics which are not all ready publish through the FOSS/Daily news network.

GERMANY

So far Frontex analytical products mainly follow a retrospective approach. A key factor would be to deliver accurate information at the right time (as early as possible) to the relevant stakeholder in order to enable MS to carry out appropriate counter measures at national level or jointly with other MS coordinated by Frontex. The aim should be to compile a forward looking analysis (prognosis) on possible threats and risks at the EU external borders.

HUNGARY

High resolution satellite images about the pre-frontier area on seasonally base. Analyzed information about the trends of illegal migration. Information about new modus operandi.
ITALY
The agency should provide services and products meeting the requirements set out in reply to the preceding question; they could take the form of daily and/or weekly bulletins, specific analytical products and uncorrelated satellite images.

LATVIA
The main role of Frontex could be providing the strategy and analytical planning. Frontex must ensure collection and analysis of received information about cross border activities at EU external border.
Frontex could also provide tactical warning and recommendations especially for countries which perform surveillance of EU external borders.

LITHUANIA
General situational awareness in MSs (i, ii, iii, iv).

THE NETHERLANDS
Modes of Operation.

NORWAY
We would like Frontex to make available information relevant to Norwegian threat/risk analysis.

POLAND
The answer was given in point. 15

PORTUGAL
The current analytical products from Frontex are enough as an awareness call. FOSS has the objective to perform an information dissemination service.

ROMANIA
Frontex should provide to Member States risk analysis, statistics, reports and information collected or elaborated, in order to allow them to select the information which present interest for the monitored geographical area /border domain.
Based on the information received through CPIP and Member States, Frontex could realize and provide to MS alerts regarding criminal phenomena and tailored risk analysis of new threats discovered at the Union external borders.

Also, Frontex should make available specific for each Member State information, about the situation at the external borders. Analytical products will be discussed subsequently, after the implementation of EUROSUR Project in our country.

**SLOVAKIA**

The content should be based on countries needs and their differences. There should be a common part for all countries involved, but always taking into account important differences of the areas (geographical, morphological issues, type of border, length, etc.).

Analytical products should be based on daily, weekly or monthly bases depending on several issues (type of border, third country, neighboring country, types of agreements, etc.)

Exchange of information is on adequate level so far, but with upcoming activities the sources will have to be widened and more flexible.

**SPAIN**

All the information that FRONTEX has trough it Risk Analysis Network, in other words, all the information provided by MS’s and any other sources, such as that one obtained trough third countries working agreements, once it is processed byFRONTEX experts

**SWEDEN**

From a border management point of view strategic reports which give an overview of the current situation of the EU border and third countries are of great interest. It is also of interest to get forward looking analyses of the situation at the borders. This is very important for the management of resources in general. The reporting system should reflect the current overview and information about incidents at EU borders and third countries which could effect the local/regional situation.

Preferably this system should give the picture of the last 24 hours and contain information on migration trends, profiling of migrants, document falsification, cross border crime and security issues. Information or alerts on possible immediate threats to the external border is also important.
17. What type of sources should be covered by Frontex?

**BELGIUM**
All

**BULGARIA**
- The information gained by the MS, including partners as Europol, Interpol, OSCE, etc., as well third countries with working agreements.

**CYPRUS**
Frontex should cover open Source Information, intelligence, strategic and basic Geo-Data.

**THE CZECH REPUBLIC**
Information and different products/reports provided by Member states, third countries, Europol e.g.

**ESTONIA**
Frontex in our opinion, while compiling and providing analysis, almost completely follows methodology of the intelligence analysis including source finding and source management and therefore we do not see necessity to underline any particular sources yet not covered but needing to be covered by Frontex.

**FINLAND**
Regular national statistics are just the skeleton of information sources which Frontex needs. Joint operations and pilot projects act as a one good source of operational information. ILO – network in the third countries could be linked as a new source of information to Frontex.

Frontex should also increase its resources concerning the media and other open sources information gathering (OSINT). Centralized action in this field would provide more compact situation awareness and save duplicate-resources in the MSs.
The key issue is that Frontex should have right to deal with the personal data. Only by this way Frontex is able to provide more useful and detailed risk analysis products for the operational needs of Frontex and the MSs.

Other sources could include other EU and International actors (EUROPOL, UN, Interpol, etc…), Police and specially Border Guard authorities in third countries (their situation analysis and development)

**FRANCE**
- To be efficient Frontex should have access to most of the sources which provide information regarding cross border crimes.
- The daily shipping and aircraft situation as position of national vessels or aircrafts patrolling for border surveillance purpose in an area which is part of Frontex general situation awareness concerning the sea border sector.
- Member State data base which are not protected by classified restriction. (Restricted, confidential or secret).

**GERMANY**
Frontex could cover sources which have not been used by MS or at EU level so far, namely reconnaissance technology like “Unmanned Vehicles”, satellites etc.

**HUNGARY**
OSINT, satellite images

**ITALY**
We attach crucial importance to direct work by Frontex in third countries by way of cooperation agreements and scrutiny of open information sources. Frontex could take on the task of obtaining satellite images of areas of interest, for distribution to Member States.

**LATVIA**
1. All possible publicly available information that could be useful and actual.
2. All information which was received from Member State (data bases, surveillance systems etc.)
3. All actual and useful information which was received from third countries.
LITHUANIA
The following sources could be covered: open sources, border intelligence, geographic information, information from third countries, and information available at other NCCs.

THE NETHERLANDS
As many as possible.

NORWAY
No comment.

POLAND
The answer was given in point 15

PORTUGAL
OSINT, HUMINT and IMINT.

ROMANIA
Frontex should cover:
- all the information sources which it could access and disseminate in an integrate manner in order to support Member States which are in the impossibility to access certain sources.
- Frontex information sources which could provide necessary specific information in the EU maritime external borders surveillance and control activity field.
- open information sources (Frontex One Stop Shop and European Media Monitoring) specific information sources (analysis and statistic information provided by Member States, by EBRAN, WBRAN, AFIC and by liaison officers and other law enforcement agencies), and also specific proper sources (information obtained during joint operations coordinated by the Agency ).
SLOVAKIA
At least information and technical (from organizational point of view) sources.
- operational information
- strategic key information

SPAIN
All sources available for the Agency.

SWEDEN
In a CPIP context Frontex should cover sources which are not covered by MS such as for example surveillance by aid of satellite imaginary.
18. At what frequency – regular updates or when needed/ad hoc?

BELGIUM
Regular depending on the kind of information and ad hoc in some specific urgent cases.

BULGARIA
- The information have to be quarterly updated as the necessary technological time for processing this large information flows entering the Agency or by request in urgent and exceptional cases.

CYPRUS
All information could be available at regular intervals and/or on a need-to-know, need-to-share basis.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Both options should be combined.

ESTONIA
Taking into account Frontex capacity for production and MS capacity and resources to provide necessary input for these products we consider that the list, range and frequency of issue of main analytical products (ARA, SARA, FRAN Quarterly) is sufficient.

FINLAND
See answer 16.

Present frequency regarding the Risk Analysis products (for example quarterly Frontex Risk Analysis Network report) is good. Frontex could provide more ad hoc information to all member states (for example in case of new phenomenon of illegal migration in some member state, it is now reported by FRAN incident report of concerned member state).
FRANCE
All depending on the type of information itself (some could be daily, weekly or monthly).

GERMANY
Frequent and regular updates are welcome. In crisis situations flash reports would be useful.

HUNGARY
Regular: satellite images, media monitoring, monthly reports about the routes, trends
Ad-hoc: information about new modus operandi, information related to the cross border criminality, the human smuggling, and the trafficking of human beings.

ITALY
Frontex should both provide regular updates, e.g. on a weekly basis, even if there are no new developments or changes to report, and promptly supply information in response to requirements in connection with specific events.

LATVIA
1. Operational information - close to real time.
2. Other type of information 1/24h or on the request basis.

LITHUANIA
i – on a regular basis, ii – on a regular basis, iii – at intervals (1 or 2 times a year) and as necessary, iv – on a case by case basis and as necessary. Information that calls for immediate action should be supplied on a real time basis.

THE NETHERLANDS
Depending on the information: regular, when needed/ ad hoc.

NORWAY
We would like operational information to be provided 24/7, and strategic information on a regular basis, for instance every three months.
POLAND
Regular gaining of satellite imagery of the that are most vulnerable to illegal migration and other forms of transnational crime, with the possibility of “ad hoc” deduction in the case of identification of specific events / threats at the border; regular monitoring of "open sources".

PORTUGAL
As soon as possible and close to real time.

ROMANIA
Updates should be made regularly, with a high level frequency (weekly), but also in an ad – hoc manner, when needed.

SLOVAKIA
Regular updates (daily, monthly, and quarterly) – depending on situation, and awareness (dynamic factor, push/pull factors, etc.).

SPAIN
Monthly, and at any time something relevant came out.

SWEDEN
The updates must be regular on a daily basis. However, when there is an important incident it should be done at ad hoc basis.
19. Are there any specific areas of interest (geographical areas/countries) that you would point out as the ones that Frontex should focus on more?

**BELGIUM**
Countries that have a history as a source of illegal traffic, migration and areas on which there is almost no information.

**BULGARIA**
- The Agency must keep focusing at the external Eastern and South-eastern borders. Projects related to organization and coordination of JOs with focus on container transport by sea must to be introduced as the possibility of their use for irregular migration and due to the fact that this is one of the least controlled transport types.

**CYPRUS**
Frontex is already focused on the main routes of illegal immigration. Apart from the areas of the common operations, special attention should be given at the pre-frontier area of the South and East Mediterranean. The main routes of illegal immigration flows that concern the Republic of Cyprus are the areas of the South Coast of Turkey, the main ports of Syria (Tartus and Lattakia) and the Coast of Lebanon. Special attention should also be given to the Modus Operandi of the illegal immigration networks. For the time being the vast majority of illegal immigrants come from Turkey. They arrive at the occupied areas and enter the Government controlled areas through the ceased fire line (green line).

**THE CZECH REPUBLIC**
As we have mentioned in answer to question no 11, countries being considered as risk areas are e.g. Vietnam, Nigeria, the Ukraine, Russia, Egypt, China and Mongolia. Therefore it would be convenient for us if Frontex pays more attention to those countries.
ESTONIA
It has to be underlined that Frontex has put a lot of efforts in involving main source and transit
countries (Russia, Belarus and Ukraine) in our geographical region into co-operational framework of
Frontex and particularly FRAN (i.e. successful launch of EB-RAN project). We consider, that by
these actions the main and particular interest of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Finland are
covered and additional actions are not needed

FINLAND
Caucasus, Central Asia, India, China and Russia. Phenomena concerning illegal migration by flight
routes to Europe are very important.

FRANCE
- Any countries surrounding the SAC including Bulgaria and Romania.
- Any African and Middle East countries where the internal political and humanitarian situation is
  precariously increasing the risk of illegal immigration and other cross border crimes. (This can also
  include the Far East countries)

GERMANY
Frontex should apply a customer orientated approach on monitoring migration and gathering
relevant information as well as producing intelligence. This is less a question of focusing on
geographical areas than on defining and using relevant indicators to be aware of possible changes in
migration flows towards the EU.

HUNGARY
Ukraine, Serbia

ITALY
Central and North Africa, the Middle East and Asia.

LATVIA
Frontex should focus more on:
1. EU external sea and land borders which are affected by risks of illegal immigration and cross
   border crime.
2. “Crust roads” regions near the EU external borders which are affected by illegal immigration cross border crimes.
3. Other territories by the request of the EU Member States.

**LITHUANIA**
The Kaliningrad Region of Russia.

**THE NETHERLANDS**
A threat indication should ideally be noticed as early as possible. That would mean a world wide monitoring system is the most valuable. Otherwise, the area as far away from Europe’s borders as possible, insofar that it can reasonably be observed.

**NORWAY**
We believe that Frontex should focus mostly on the areas with a high risk of illegal immigration and high risk related to internal security.

**POLAND**
Eastern sections of the EU external border.

**PORTUGAL**
None whatsoever.

**ROMANIA**
There are certain interest areas on which Frontex should focus more:
- mountain area from Northern Romanian border
- origin areas of the main citizenships involved in illegal migration and trafficking in human beings
SLOVAKIA
Newcomers to the Schengen area, and new Schengen external borders / operational areas. Borders between RO and third country neighbors, BL and third country neighbors, etc. There is another area of interest for FX in the future. Greece and their external borders, which are under constant pressure from illegal migration point of view. FX activities / RABIT made a huge change in prevention against illegal migration in this part of EU. Future activities from FX are more than needed and appreciated from MS.

SPAIN
Of course, those which nowadays are origin / transit of migration flows

SWEDEN
African Horn, Middle East and the Caucasus Area.

EUROPOL COMMENTS ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE

- Europol is keen to support Frontex and the MS in the production of CPIP and we believe that this task is an opportunity to illustrate the value of such fruitful cooperation.
- The current situation at the Greek-Turkish land border illustrates the importance that the CPIP will play in the future security of the EU external borders. The success of the RABIT deployment is also an example of the capacity of EU security structures to meet an emergency.
- Should Frontex acquire a limited right to process personal data in the near future, it should supply data from its operations directly to Europol for the purpose of input into the Europol Information System or as a contribution to an appropriate AWF. Europol will invite Frontex to join Europol’s analytical capacity (AWFs) to assist in the identification of trends and developments in cross border crime. This Europol analytical service could also be facilitated via the extension of SIENA access to FRONTEX via the secure line to be installed between the two organizations.
It is important the opportunity to provide operational data to Europol that may have been generated during the data collection phase of the CPIP is not missed. Furthermore, Europol’s Threat Assessments and Knowledge Products would benefit greatly from the provision of information of a strategic nature.