Report to the Home Secretary of Independent Oversight of Prevent Review and Strategy
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Introduction

1. I was asked by the Home Secretary The Rt. Hon. Theresa May M.P. to provide independent oversight of the Government’s review of its policy and strategy towards the Prevent strand of counter-terrorism activity. This is my report in that role.

2. In the fulfilment of my task I have been extensively assisted and facilitated by Ministers and officials. I have been consulted and kept informed throughout the process. I have visited several locations in England where Prevent activity was taking place, and have been able to view the activity in action. I have been provided with written materials. I have also had the benefit of the views of practitioners, and of external observers of Prevent.

3. As I have stated in my preface to the strategy document, I strongly support it. In this short report I shall highlight the reasons for that support. I shall refer too to some areas that, in my judgement, require special and continuing attention.

4. The new strategy differs considerably from the old, and represents extremely detailed analysis of the work to date. It recognises that there have been some very valuable programmes of work, but that others have been less productive. The strategy correctly avoids political argument; all counter-terrorism [CT] work beyond the technical is the product of experience and reflects the changing CT scene. It is art not science. In this kind of work mistakes will be made and are often understandable. This is not an area in which, generally speaking, excoriating criticism of Ministers across the floor of either House of Parliament is helpful. All bar extremists should be on the same side, and where differences of opinion occur they should be debated calmly to produce the best outcome in the national interest.

5. I expect this strategy to endure for several years. However, I hope that whatever Government is in office, they will be as flexible as circumstances suggest. In CT work, in order to protect citizens, the State pits itself against extremist and often heretical ideologies and their sometimes cruel manifestations. Such ideologies are often best challenged by the dynamic use of ideas, rather than by opposing ideologies. However, at the root of this Prevent strategy is the basic assertion that extremism breeds terrorism; and that extremism is the vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs1. This includes any stance which seeks to justify or excuse attacks on British armed forces and other British citizens who act within the rule of law.

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1See the strategy Annex A, Glossary: Extremism
6. The new strategy must be delivered in an atmosphere and legal setting strongly compliant with civil liberties. It must be achieved without in any way undermining the value and proper values of British Muslims or their religion, or of any other group of people identifiable by a shared faith or other connection. Policy must be free from allegations of snooping, targeting communities or any other form of discrimination. It is a given that Muslims are no less law-abiding and no less British than any other citizens. Terrorism, as well as being a crime, is an aberration disliked by the vast majority, whatever their faith or none.

7. My specific comments on the substantive parts of the strategy are set out below.

The context of Prevent (Chapter 5)

8. The context of Prevent is accurately described. There is a range of terrorist threats, the most serious being from Al Qa’ida. It is rightly stated that some, but by no means all, of those who have been radicalised in the UK had previously participated in extremist organisations.

9. The available evidence, which is considerable, shows that it remains true that many radicalised young people become extremists with violent aims after spending time in terrorism training camps, especially in Pakistan. The death of Usama Bin Laden has thrown into sharp relief the ambiguities evident in the political life of Pakistan, where there is considerable publicly stated support for Al Qa’ida amongst clerics and others. My own observations on a visit to Pakistan included that there are large ungoverned spaces: these include, for example, an almost complete lack of educational control over (or even quality assurance of) large numbers of small madrassas. Some of these act too as orphanages, with unlimited influence over the minds of their charges. Doubtless many are excellent, but some are breeding grounds for terrorism.

10. Although there is serious work to be done in relation to Northern Ireland-related terrorism and extreme right-wing terrorism, the bulk of current activity is in relation to Islamist extremism as well as terrorism.

11. Support for extremism is often associated with a perception of discrimination, and in some cases with experience of racial, social or religious harassment. It is also a consequence of a sense of victimhood sometimes created, and always preyed upon by extremists. The dissipation of this sense of victimhood, which is rarely justified in any objective way, is a proper and important part of CT activity. Actions and language that may exacerbate mistaken perceptions should always be avoided. Where such things occur, we should not be afraid to challenge them with confidence.

12. Even the remarks of Mohammed Abdul Bari MBE, former Secretary of the Muslim Council of Britain, have included the extravagant warning that the treatment of Muslims in Britain might eventually lead to comparison with the Nazis of Germany: remarks of this kind have the effect, however inadvertently, of feeding assertions of victimhood, and are unhelpful. More generally, a recent event in London on 21 May 2011 advertised itself as part of the “campaign against anti-Muslim hatred in Britain”, an infelicitous use of implicit language which could be questioned strongly as whether it is constructive, and certainly merits challenge. On another occasion, the Muslim Association of Britain [MAB] was described by a Foreign Office Minister in Parliament in November 2010 as the “[Muslim] Brotherhood’s representative in the UK”: it is not for me to judge that comment, as such comments do not matter for Prevent purposes, as long as proportionate care is taken in decisions about working with any
given group, whether it be the MAB or anybody else.

13. There is a great responsibility on all, especially respected senior figures, to emphasise the benefits of the cohesiveness of Britain, and to heal divisions where they exist. This applies equally to politicians, commentators and others who, even accidentally, demonise Muslims or others, as this feeds prejudice, and undermines Prevent and other activities designed with a healing purpose.

14. The strategy makes the important link between Prevent work in the UK and that performed overseas. This overseas activity is essential. I have been left with the impression that the Prevent activities of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have not always fulfilled their necessary role as part of a holistic strategy. For example, the removal of a Prevent specialist from a particular High Commission appeared to have more to do with immediate economies than long-term CT judgements. Further, in my view some of the messages given to visa applicants, especially those applying for student visas, could be harder and clearer. I see no difficulty in providing applicants with material that places beyond doubt the key messages that (a) student visas are only available for real study, (b) any form of terrorist activity is severely punished by the Courts in the UK, and (c) nothing damages the British Muslim population more than terrorism by a small minority of extremists who purport to act in the name of Islam within the UK. The purpose of this approach is not to make visitors to the UK feel unwelcome: rather, it is to ensure that their visits are enjoyed in a congenial British atmosphere, which as far as possible they are able to understand before arrival.

15. It is correctly said that Prevent overseas must wherever possible have a demonstrable impact on UK domestic security in general and the domestic Prevent agenda in particular. I agree that it must focus too on external risks related to our national security.

16. Chapter 5 realistically recognises that the line between extremism and terrorism is often blurred; and that what appear at first sight to be non-violent extremist ideologies are drawn upon by terrorists to justify violence. This is why extremism is broadly defined in Annex A, and has to be addressed by the strategy.

A framework for Prevent (Chapter 6)

17. In the summary at the beginning of Chapter 6, the strategy emphasises that the Government remains committed to protecting freedom of speech. But it is noted that preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremist (and non-violent) ideas that become or may become part of a terrorist ideology. Prevent will also mean intervening to try to stop people progressing from extremism to terrorism.

18. This should not be seen as an attack on freedom of expression. Young people naturally explore and debate ideas, some radical, and can be inspired by notions they would and do reject without difficulty in later life. However, there is a legitimate public interest in protecting the public where individuals reach, or pass over, the cusp between the development of ideas, and extremism that leads to terrorism.

19. The new framework proposes that policy and programmes to deal with extremism, and with extremist organisations more widely, are not part of Prevent, and will be co-ordinated by the Department for Communities and Local Government [DCLG] rather than the Home Office. This is a reasonable and sensible division of activity, provided that the departments ensure a high degree of consistency the one with the other, and
operate with a shared sense of values and purpose.

20. It is recognised that evaluation of projects has in the past been poor, and that some money has been wasted. It is plainly stated that funding and other forms of support will not be provided to extremist organisations: neither government departments nor the police will rely on extremists to address the risks of radicalisation. This will require a higher standard than before of non-financial due diligence. Government, local authorities and the police do not need (if ever they have needed) to facilitate or work in partnership with extremists: a steady stream of new and non-extremist groups, with the knowledge and integrity to assist the authorities in the aims of Prevent and associated work, is stepping up to the plate. The mission statement all should share is to make extremism, as well as terrorism, unattractive to rational individuals; and thereby to remove some of the most inimical aspects of racism and discrimination from society.

21. I welcome that Chapter 6 plainly states that, in future, neither Prevent funding nor support will be given to organisations that hold extremist views or support terrorist-related activity of any kind. This represents a strengthening of policy, consistent with the views expressed by the Prime Minister in his speech at the Munich Security Conference on 05 February 2011. Choosing friends wisely is an important consideration for all involved in Prevent. For example, I harbour doubts about some parts of the product of the Islam and Citizenship Education Project [ICE], which has enjoyed funding and other support from existing Prevent. Other organisations have been the subject of analytical criticism as to the firmness of their opposition to violent jihad. These include Islamic Forum Europe, which has supported changing the “very infrastructure of society, its institutions, its culture, its political order and its creed ... from ignorance to Islam”. There is evidence that some organisations have espoused the writings of Syed Abdul ’Ala Maududi, who founded Jamaat-e-Islami. One faith leader in Birmingham stated in 2007 that MI5 had some part in the London bombings of 07 July 2005, a demonstrably absurd and inflammatory suggestion. The point I wish to make is that all official level engagements should follow careful scrutiny of the views of those engaged, their history, and their attitude towards extremism (which of course may have changed over time with experience and altered judgement), and scrutiny of how representative bodies claiming a representative capacity really are.

22. The comments in the previous paragraph are a reflection of the fresh clarity of emphasis contained in the Prime Minister’s Munich speech. This places a considerable responsibility not merely on government, but on Muslim and other organisations, however ostensibly authoritative or senior, to bring order to their own houses before securing partnerships or other co-operative arrangements with government. They must read the strategy and the definitions within it, and they must know they must work within the law. Some significant organisations have been less punctilious than they might have been about the platforms they have provided, and the people who have appeared upon them.

23. The strategy states that Government policy on Ministerial or official engagement regarding groups who may be associated with extremism will be coordinated by DCLG. It is my view that Ministers and officials should not share platforms with extremists, save in formats such as BBC Question Time where the chair is neutral and the debate deliberately balanced. There were difficulties over Ministers of the previous Government attending a particular event in London in 2008: I hope that such problems need not
arise in the future, given that guidelines were issued following that event and subsist.

24. The strategy review concluded that significant funding was provided to local authorities without sufficient guidance, accountability or oversight. I entirely agree with this observation, and with the conclusion that, in future, Prevent programmes should be more tightly focused. Throughout the strategy the stated determination recurs that there should be fuller and more rigorous accountability of programmes, spending and outcomes.

25. Measuring outcomes in this kind of CT work is difficult, because empirical evidence on outcomes is difficult to achieve in terms of methodology. I suggest that this should be given further and more detailed consideration. If one takes the CHANNEL project as an example, if all events in the project (such as all meetings with individuals taken into the project) were evaluated even subjectively on a simple effectiveness scale, and recorded electronically, the sheer volume of assessments would enable better overall evaluation.

26. In the course of Prevent work, there are occasions when local authorities, statutory partners or the police identify someone who may already be engaged in illegal, terrorism-related activity. It is rightly emphasised in the strategy that such activity should be referred to the police, and that any ensuing investigation should not be conducted under the auspices of Prevent.

27. It is clear that Prevent can never be permitted to be a cover for such activity or for extremism, and that funding should not reach extremist groups. It is envisaged that greater rigour must be employed to ensure that funding decisions are measured against PREVENT objectives: rightly, the focus will be on impact and outcomes, both at home and overseas.

A new Prevent strategy (Chapter 7)

28. The new strategy is founded upon the guiding principles set out in Chapter 5. In Chapter 7 it is again emphasised that funding will not be provided to extremist organisations; and that it will not be part of the strategy to use extremists to deal with the risk from radicalisation.

29. Chapter 7 contains real and important discussion about the internet. My experience, in more than 9 years as independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and my work in connection with Prevent, has convinced me of the importance of the internet as an instrument of both terrorism and CT. Just as non-extremist young men and women access the web to access and express their social, emotional and material needs, so do extremists. There is a huge amount of extremist material available on the web, including names, places and other details of extremist groups. For the motivated, the journey between a bedroom computer in the UK and a suicide belt may be covered merely in weeks, with devastating consequences for the individual and his/her victims.

30. In my judgement the internet must be developed more imaginatively as a CT tool than has occurred so far. The Research Information and Communications Unit [RICU], which is referred to extensively in the strategy, has done some valuable work in this context, as have other parts of government. The strategy promises a more imaginative approach to the internet, including partnership with expert private sector actors. To protect our society, we must be prepared to use the internet as a tool of good governance: internet radicalisation must face a competing narrative, with the good facing up to the bad on equal terms, using the same or better technology and methods.
31. Thus I applaud the assertion that the internet is vital to Prevent work, not just because we need more effectively to disrupt terrorist use of the internet, but also because of the range of opportunities it provides to challenge extremist ideology.

32. Of course, in order to be fully effective in dealing with extremism on the internet we require the co-operation not only of the internet service providers, but also of the countries from which they operate. International co-operation in this context is vital, especially with the United States, from which a great many offending sites originate. Internet ‘flags of convenience’ should not be permitted to undermine public safety.

Challenging the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it: Objective One (Chapter 8)

33. In Chapter 8 the strategy sets out what must be its first and main objective: to challenge the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it. In the new direction proposed, the emphasis is placed on combating the ideas espoused by extremist groups which reach individuals who are susceptible to terrorist ideas and actions. Rightly, the strategy tells us that this should not be done in a judgemental or discriminatory way, and that it should work in partnership between the Home Office and others better equipped to disprove and challenge the claims made by extremist organisations and their acolytes.

34. I agree that challenging apologists for terrorism is vital. Where propagandists break the law by encouraging or approving terrorism, it must mean arrest and law enforcement. In this new Prevent strategy those who condone or connive should expect prosecution.

35. Important too is that where people seek to enter this country to engage in activity in support of extremist as well as terrorist groups, the Home Secretary’s powers will be used to exclude them. Thus a clear evidential burden is placed on those who wish to bring questionable applicants into the country to, for example, speak at student meetings; to justify their presence in the UK.

36. Those who can expect to be excluded will include individuals whose public speaking or published material foments, justifies or glorifies terrorist violence or fosters hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the UK, or otherwise can be demonstrated as providing support for extremists.

37. Thus the strategy has identified the importance of identifying extremist ideologues, ensuring that they cannot take advantage of the freedoms in this country to peddle their messages freely. If they are present here lawfully, the aim should be to challenge and rebut, prosecuting them when they have broken the law and restricting their access to the country where appropriate.

38. In that context it is a proper function of Government to address claims made by extremist as well as terrorist groups. The assertion that the West is at war with Islam is misleading: it could not be less true: Muslim British people are just as equal citizens as Christians, Jews or adherents of any other racial or religious group (as well of course as non-religious people). Government can be a blunt instrument when the function in question depends on deploying a narrative that can respond to changing events. Government sometimes finds it difficult to drill down to the level of community activity at which the counter-narrative needs to be delivered. Therefore I agree with the conclusion that challenging extremist and terrorist narratives is best addressed in Prevent by the people and communities.
within our society whose own experiences often best disprove the claims made for and about them. This includes individuals who have experienced, then rejected, extremism.

39. In acting as described above, the State should not make assumptions about who those people and communities are. Government should be wary of the self-appointed, the merely affluent, and the big: they may be as prone to extremist infiltration as others. Such groups should be self-critical in order to ensure that they do not allow their proper aspirations to be undermined from within.

40. RICU is examined in some detail in Chapter 8. It is criticised for limited effectiveness, and positive and useful suggestions are made for its role. My brief engagement with RICU during the review left me with the clear impression that RICU is staffed by men and women of real talent, who could achieve significantly more; but I feel that it may possess a less than clear sense of direction or mission. RICU is a young organisation, so such deficiencies are unsurprising. As with much activity in the area of communications and IT, there is a strong argument that senior managers should have genuine, practical experience of the technology they manage. Within the new strategy, RICU should be able to achieve the Review’s stated ambition of, “much sharper and more professional counter-narrative products ... with capacity to innovate and experiment with counter-narrative campaigns, making best use of emerging information and communications technology”. I regard the desire to bring a new lease of life for RICU as one of the most important features to emerge from the strategy, directed towards solid results and presenting value for money. RICU has considerable potential for confirming the link between extremist propagandists and terrorism, in this country and overseas: with that link clearly made, the counter-narrative is more easily made effective.

Protecting vulnerable people: Objective Two (Chapter 9)

41. There is evidence from a number of cases tried in the UK and elsewhere that vulnerable individuals can become radicalised towards terrorism. That they are vulnerable makes them no less dangerous than others: indeed, they may become the ready and unthinking deliverers of extreme violence. To access and achieve results with such individuals, the strategy correctly states that organisations must be credible and able to engage with them: however, working with extremists for this (or any other) reason is neither appropriate nor productive.

42. I agree with the review that evaluation of these programmes has not been fully effective, and that it should be enhanced. Radicalisation should be seen as a process, not an event, and programmes designed for vulnerable people should be seen in that context. Considerable attention must be paid to civil liberties issues in the devising and deployment of such activity. It should not be used specifically for the purpose of data collection about other people, and any suspicions about others should be passed to the relevant authorities and not dealt with as part of Prevent. Continuing improvement of training is an imperative. The review describes the CHANNEL project in a useful critique, emphasising its key value to the strategy and the need to provide stronger criticism and evaluation of its activity. Training to a very high and consistent standard is emphasised as a crucial requirement. The WRAP training project has been the major instrument for disseminating the practice of CHANNEL interventions. It is recognised that some of the organisations funded to provide interventions to people of particular backgrounds and in some geographical areas have held views that are not consistent with mainstream British values, and that this will not occur in the future.
43. In future, CHANNEL, a project designed to deal with individuals not organisations, will be prioritised around areas and places of higher risk. The broader community cohesion work will be dealt with by DCLG, within comparable and compatible principles about engagements and working with others. Intervention providers within the project come from a diverse range, and the best offer extremely good results, as I have seen as part of my independent oversight. They are in a position of great influence over the people with whom they are working. They must be credible. Some will have their own radical and even rejected extremist histories. There must be clarity about how they are selected, and how their results are assessed. Whilst this necessarily involves some flexibility of approach, I agree with the strategy’s repeatedly expressed view that no funding will be provided to intervention providers who promote extremist ideas or beliefs: they are neither suitable nor necessary partners.

44. In education, attention is given to out of school learning, of which there is a great tradition – for example Sunday Schools. Madrassas offer a similar, wide programme of religious instruction, at various levels of intensity.

47. In education, attention is given to out of school learning, of which there is a great tradition – for example Sunday Schools. Madrassas offer a similar, wide programme of religious instruction, at various levels of intensity.

48. A great deal of work in education, described in the review, has been done in the Prevent context by Government, local authorities, police and others. Awareness of Prevent in schools has increased. However, such awareness should not lead to referrals to CHANNEL or other preventative programmes unless there is clear evidence of radicalisation and the desirability of an intervention.

49. Much can be done by schools, whether in the State or private sector. School governors bear a heavy responsibility. The idea that one can set up a school to promote a particular and extremist doctrine, if such an idea exists, is unacceptable. To this end, the Department for Education has led the field by setting up a Preventing Extremism Unit to conduct effective financial and non-financial due diligence in order to minimise the risk that unsuitable providers could set up Free schools. Such schools must be inclusive, and their promoters and governors must demonstrate that they support UK democratic values including support for individual liberties within the law, equality, mutual tolerance and respect. Teachers and all school staff must know what to do when they see signs that a child is at risk of radicalisation. The Charity Commission bears an important responsibility to scrutinise educational charities in order to ensure that they comply with charity law within the principles described above. The ensuing balance should ensure that excellent faith schools can thrive.

50. Similar principles apply to Further Education and Higher Education. The further education...
sector has been sensitised to the need to be watchful, and performs well in this context.

51. Universities, however, have been slow or even reluctant to recognise their full responsibilities. There is unambiguous evidence to indicate that extremist organisations have been active, and successful, in extremist and radicalising activity in British universities. There is evidence too that The Federation of Student Islamic Societies [FOSIS] could and should do more to ensure that extremists will be no part of any platform with which it is associated, alongside demonstrating that it rejects extremism. Any group purporting to represent students can be expected to take a clear position against extremism, as well as terrorism.

52. I have urged and have no doubt about the strategy’s conclusions that universities, including all working in them, owe a duty of care to each student a member of staff teaches or tutors, and to the student body in general. This does not mean that every essay and tutorial should be measured against a radicalisation template. Universities are where students have every right to assess, discuss and test (sometimes to destruction) ideas and ideologies. Nevertheless there is a clear duty to take proportionate action if there is material to justify the reasonable concern that a student is tending towards extremist activity. Every university should provide its staff with guidance as to how to deal with such cases, the aim always being to ensure the safe continuation of studies (unless, of course, there is evidence of criminal offences).

53. Chapter 10 deals extensively with the internet industry. I have made my views clear above. Engagement with the internet industry is crucial, and on an international basis.

54. The strategy speaks of a dialogue with faith institutions which are under threat from extremist and terrorist organisations, irrespective of the faith concerned. I support the steps described in detail in the text. This includes encouragement of faith groups and organisations to play a full role in local Prevent coordination groups; and taking law enforcement action when faith groups or other organisations are supporting terrorism, and challenging any faith groups regarded as extremist. Islamic faith groups range far more widely than mosques: there is evidence that many young people who are radicalised regard the mosques attended by their parents as not relevant to their radical ideas, which they may share and develop in groups outside the mosque.

55. The section on health in Chapter 10 challenges the Department of Health to face more directly the dangers of terrorism and extremism. In the employment of staff, especially those who may be taken on for temporary periods through locum or similar arrangements, and in relationships with patients, the NHS must be ready to deal with evidence and indications of extremism. This may arise in the mental health sector, where extremist ideation may become manifest. Ensuring that staff know what they should do, and that they do it, may be important both for the individual causing concern and for the wider public. This must all be compatible with the relationship of trust that exists between patient and clinician.

56. Thus clear guidelines are needed for all healthcare employers and workers to ensure that cases of radicalisation are given the attention they deserve.

57. I support in its entirety and without comment or gloss the section in Chapter 10 setting out the approach to be taken in the future in the criminal justice sector. A great deal of expertise has been developed in this field by the various agencies involved.
58. The section dealing with charities merits comment. I have a good deal of sympathy for the Charity Commission. It has lost a significant proportion of its staff, and as constituted has little prospect of carrying out the fullest inquiries where there are allegations of sophisticated money laundering which channels charitable funds to terrorist groups abroad.

59. The strategy emphasises that, where such suspicion arises, there should be reports to the police or Serious Fraud Office, who should lead any such investigations.

60. The Charity Commission has a very important role as guardian of the governance of charities. They must be seen to take robust and vigorous action against charities involved in terrorism and extremism. Trustees must be left in no doubt of their responsibilities. Further discussion and work between central government and charities is needed to secure the reputation of the Commission as a valuable participant in this area of work.

Prevent delivery (Chapter 11)

61. Chapter 11 reminds us that Prevent is not a police programme, and that it should not become one. The police have done valuable work in the context of Prevent, and the benefits of that input must not be lost. There may have been a tendency for communities to regard views expressed by the police as the views of Government: this is to overstate the position of the police.

62. For the future, delivery will be mainly through local authorities working with communities, police, and activity overseas. Whilst the responsibility for Prevent will remain with the Home Office, other Government departments will continue to have their own teams responsible for delivery of their contribution to the strategy.

63. I am pleased that the strategy has adopted a view I expressed at an early stage concerning governance. Despite the excellent work done by Parliamentary Select Committees, a more permanent and methodical overview of governance is required. The strategy provides for the establishment of a permanent, non-executive Prevent board to oversee Prevent strategy and its local implementation. A significant part of its work will be the scope to look at DCLG’s ongoing work to promote integration and tackle extremism. This non-statutory board will be jointly chaired by the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government.

64. There remains an important role to be played by Members of Parliament, who from time to time as individuals and in Committees will wish to scrutinise the effect and effectiveness of Prevent and related activity.

65. Coordination and delivery are considered in some detail, with a sound agenda. The police will not be left in the position of taking responsibility for local delivery of the strategy. A great deal of trust has been built between communities and many police officers, but occasionally there has been suspicion that the heavy involvement of the police was evidence of snooping. Local authorities will take a much greater responsibility in the future: this is entirely consistent with the decisions of many local authorities, of all political persuasions, that it makes sound practical sense to devolve their own service delivery to communities and wards.
66. Glossary of terms: Annex A

67. The glossary of terms may give rise to some comment. Consistent with the Prime Minister's Munich speech, extremism is defined broadly, as are some other terms. In my view the descriptions used represent a reasonable foundation for the basic presumption, namely that citizenship excludes undermining the foundations of British society.

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May 2011