Border management
Frontex 2026/2027 risk analysis confirms route displacement in West Africa
The EU’s border agency gave a presentation on the migration outlook for 2026 and 2027 to the 10 September meeting of the Working Party on Frontiers.
The presentation, based on the recently released Frontex risk analysis for 2026/27, highlights “fragmented governance in Libya”, “ISIS’s growing operational tempo in Syria”, as well as the “US-Israeli war on Iran” among the geopolitical developments that could affect the EU’s external borders in the coming years.
It also refers to risks associated with the recently begun Entry-Exit System. Along with teething problems involved in getting the system operational, which could lead to bottlenecks at the border, it warns of smugglers resorting to “adaptive response(s)” as a result of the stricter controls.
The presentation also notes that “intensified cooperation between Spain, the EU, and key West African states successfully suppressed departures from Mauritania, Morocco and Senegal.” As a result of this, “smuggling networks moved operations to The Gambia and Guinea resulting in longer and more dangerous routes”.
The presentation recommends, among other things: strengthening partnerships with North African countries, keeping Frontex operations flexible and enhancing coordination with other agencies (reflected in the recent Frontex proposal), as well as “sustained investment in advanced surveillance technology, intelligence-sharing frameworks and targeted capacity-building programmes”.
There was also a presentation on the new working arrangement between Europol and Frontex.
Council warns IS fighters might infiltrate migration flows to Europe
In a paper to Brussels delegations sent 5 March 2026 and entitled “Managing the infiltration of individuals posing potential terrorist threat to EU internal security”, the Irish presidency of the Council of the EU warns that the evolving situation in Syria could see foreign terrorist fighters attempting to enter the EU (see also the Frontex risk analysis above). This is of some small relevance to externalisation, in light of the recent opening of a MOCADEM action file on Syria, as previously covered by Statewatch.
The paper also discusses the various digital systems (SIS, VIS, ETIAS, EES, etc) being used to control for this imagined danger, as well as a proposed “post-hit procedure” for EU-wide information sharing out of the Schengen Information Service.
Human rights at the heart of EU externalisation, at least on paper
Statewatch has acquired a copy of “The Human Rights-Based Approach in Migration and Forced Displacement”, a guidance paper produced by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA).
The guidance addresses European officials involved in EU-funded migration interventions around the world. It was written following a report by the European Court of Auditors criticising the EU’s external funding instrument the EU trust fund for Africa. Among other issues, the ECA had concluded that “human rights risks were not comprehensively addressed” in the implementation of that fund.
The guidance describes the “human rights-based approach” (HRBA) that must be followed in designing, implementing and closing migration-related interventions in partner countries. Divided into several parts, it first breaks down the HRBA concept, and then goes on to explain how it can be applied in various migration contexts as well as risk management, and provides checklists for users to follow.
Most notable here are the discrepancies between what the guidance prescribes for human rights safeguards in external action and the degradation of such safeguards that has been seen in recent EU legislation, notably those covering deportations, safe third countries and safe countries of origin. Put simply, the guidance sets standards for human rights protection that existing EU externalisation projects would fail miserably.
The document presents a studied ignorance of the human impact of the EU’s existing externalisation projects, presenting these impacts as hypothetical problems to anticipate, rather than the current reality:
“Unintended or secondary effects of EU-funded interventions should be considered from a human rights perspective, and any solution to counterbalance negative consequences of these measures should be studied and discussed to prevent potential interference with human rights standards”
While it suggests various “strong” measures to enforce human rights compliance with partners, the guidance leaves plenty of flexibility for implementing managers. It also appears to stop short of directly addressing when partnerships should be suspended or terminated. For example:
“If a risk is identified, it does not mean that the intervention must be avoided, but mitigation measures should be identified and put in place, unless the risk is so high that it makes mitigation impossible, in which case the viability of the interventions should be reconsidered.”
The full “Human Rights-Based Approach” guidance paper is on the Statewatch website.
Deportation and readmission
EU pushes for Nigeria and neighbours to take “ownership” over “reintegration”
A presidency paper addressed to the 11 September meeting of the Working Party on External Aspects of Asylum and Migration, “Reintegration in Nigeria”, gives an update on deportation cooperation with Nigeria, as well as the status of a pilot project to have Nigeria and other countries in West Africa take “ownership” of post-deportation support.
The paper asserts that experience shows “sustainable reintegration outcomes depend on strong national systems rather than time-limited external assistance alone”. It therefore recommends the phasing out of one-off programmes such as those funded by the Migrant Protection, Return and Reintegration Programme (MPRR), and moving to a situation where origin countries are responsible for ongoing support. The rationale is surprisingly direct:
“In recent years, considering the high costs and limited evidence of the sustainability of the project-based individual packages of reintegration assistance as well as their potential rippling effects – including in terms of perverse incentive risk, commercialisation of services and programmes’ integrity, there has been a clear shift towards moving away from this type of individual support.”
(The cost element here is particularly noteworthy, considering recent reporting that the EU Reintegration Programme has run out of money).
The paper reports efforts to move numerous countries to “ownership” of reintegration, with projects ongoing or planned in Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Somalia, Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Chad, The Gambia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Morocco and Tunisia.
Looking at Nigeria specifically, the paper reports a pre-existing €12m component of the EU-funded “Support to Migration Governance in Nigeria” programme for “enhancing national ownership and capacity in sustainable reintegration.” A further €10m is to be put to the same effort via the Individual Measure “Managing Migration Better in West Africa“. This is to be implemented by the German GIZ development agency and the German government is reported to be contributing an unspecified amount to the project.
Nigeria has been chosen by the EU for a pilot project on transitioning to “ownership” of reintegration, along with Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. The pilot has an ambitious list of regulatory, technical and logistical tasks to be accomplished by the end 2027, at which point it is hoped these countries will have taken over reintegration support. After 2027, these four countries will no longer be eligible for individual reintegration support via the MPRR.
An accompanying presentation on Nigeria by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development offers plenty of technical information on the proposed transfer of ownership and intended structure of Nigeria’s reintegration system.
Migration partnerships
Cooperation with Lebanon as a priority third country
In April, delegates at the Working Party on External Aspects of Asylum and Migration discussed Lebanon and in particular how to strengthen migration cooperation and prevent irregular departures.
The presidency presented delegates with a background paper on cooperation with Lebanon in order to guide the discussion. After outlining the general context, the paper refers to various actions the EU has on migration in Lebanon, including:
- A €55 million package for internal and border security. While this appears to be the same €55m package that was announced at the end of 2025, the presidency paper reports that it is only to be contracted in the coming months.
- A €7m integrated border management project in Lebanon. The financing decision issued by the EU for this project in 2023 estimated a high likelihood that the recipients of these funds (Lebanon’s security forces) may lose operational capacity as the economic crisis in Lebanon worsened. It also saw it moderately likely that those same forces would violate peoples’ human rights.
- Frontex is reported to have launched negotiations on a working arrangement with the Lebanese Armed Forces and the agency is “already engaging” in Lebanon as part of the regional EU4BorderSecurity project.
Cooperation with Somalia
A presidency paper produced 23 May 2026 for the Permanent Representatives Committee similarly outlines EU cooperation with Somalia on migration matters.
The paper, entitled “External dimension of migration: cooperation with Somalia”, first outlines the EU’s work with Somalia on security and migration matters. It then notes what it describes as a “significant increase” in irregular migration of Somali citizens into the EU. The first half of 2026 saw a 69% increase compared to the first half of 2025, according to the paper. This comes after the number of people from Somalia irregularly crossing into the EU doubled from 2024 to 2025.
These developments, according to the paper, are “all the more worrying” given poor cooperation on deportations. (In June 2026, a few months after this paper was produced, the EU imposed visa sanctions on Somalia to coerce greater deportation cooperation.)
The paper goes on to list some of what the EU is doing to trying to prevent people leaving. These include:
- the Better Migration Management (BMM) programme and the Regional Operational Centre in Khartoum (ROCK), both regional initiatives;
- a Somalia-specific programme on migration governance funded by the €200m migration and displacement flexible mechanism, launched end 2025. This appears to correspond to a €15m project “Support to Migration and Forced Displacement Management in Somalia” which appears on a Commission external spending spreadsheet;
- a €12m project for border management, with an apparent focus on deportations and reintegration, also launched in 2025;
- another programme, co-financed by the EU and Germany is to begin in 2026, to “further strengthen Somalia’s migration management, including to foster national capacities in the area of protection and reintegration”.
The ICMPD looks for further opportunities in Egypt
A presentation from the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) to the EMWP meeting of 11 September offers insights into EU-funded migration collaboration with Egypt.
The presentation accompanied a broader discussion on cooperation in Egypt which was covered in the previous bulletin. It shows the ICMPD at the heart of the EU’s work moulding Egypt’s asylum and migration systems to its will. Entitled “Delivering migration cooperation with Egypt”, the presentation emphasises the need for Egypt to take ownership of its own systems, while at the same time pointing out all the ways the EU and ICMPD are involved.
Of particular note is the slide on Egypt’s new asylum legislation, which has been heavily criticised in light of abuses against Sudanese and Syrian refugees (among others). The ICMPD presentation urges the EU support Egypt in “strengthening institutional and operational capacities” regarding the asylum system. It also appears to suggest that the ICMPD could get involved in managing Egypt’s asylum system itself, with tasks including capacity development, data and case management and “professionalisation of relevant authorities”.
The presentation also mentions Egypt’s relevance to various migration routes, with specific mention of Libya and Sudan. It highlights the need for information sharing in order to anticipate shifts in migration patterns “before they escalate”, as well as improving Egyptian operational cooperation and capacity. This slide ends with the baffling phrase: “The objective is to strengthen Egyptian institutions — not to reduce Egypt to a migration route.
Frontex checks in about cooperation with Ukraine
A short presentation from Frontex on Ukraine updates delegates at the EMWP about the current state of cooperation, including an overview of conflict areas and the status of various pre-accession objectives.
The report notes that Frontex is supporting the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine in strengthening border control and surveillance capacity. It also reports efforts to re-start “Frontex-led joint operations”. There is another slide describing a programme to harmonise Ukraine’s integrated border management system with EU standards.
A further Frontex project in Ukraine was to begin in October. The presentation also notes the planned renewal of the Ukraine-Frontex working arrangement.
€5m project for Pakistan border management
On 14 October, Home Commissioner Brunner attended an event in Pakistan marking the launch of a € 5m project aimed at integrated border management and risk analysis. “IBM PAK” is to be implemented with the ICMPD and Civipol and aims (according to a job ad related to the project) to, among others, strengthen operational border control capacity of Pakistan’s internal security forces and improve investigative counter-smuggling powers.
Externalisation committee to be streamlined
The MOCADEM committee, in a meeting of 25 June 2026, discussed ways to improve its own operations. This committee, officially the “Operational Coordination Mechanism for the External Dimension of Migration”, is a central part of the EU’s border externalisation regime.
According to someone familiar with discussions in MOCADEM meetings, there has been dissatisfaction among member state delegations at the way the committee has been managed so far. In particular, there is a feeling the Commission works unilaterally and then merely ‘debriefs’ member states. Delegates also appear to want MOCADEM to be more directly involved in operational matters as well as more coordination with other working groups.
In a heavily-redacted version of the accompanying paper, “The working methods of MOCADEM”, the presidency suggests ways to overhaul the committee. These include getting rid of the “unwieldy” style of region and action files (changes Statewatch would also welcome), more focussed discussions and more coordination with EMWP and the Permanent Representatives Committee.
Other
ICMPD advertises for MENA AI and automation role
The International Centre for Migration Policy Development, a core EU externalisation implementation partner, has re-posted a job ad for a Modernisation Officer – AI and Automation. The role is described as “supporting the identification, assessment, design, and implementation of fit for purpose AI enabled and automation solutions across projects” in the MENA region, particularly Jordan, Lebanon, Libya and Tunisia.
ICMPD also has a procurement call closing soon, for “Mobile Electro-optical Cameras” for use on Turkey’s eastern and south-eastern borders.
Readmission Expert Group meeting archive
In response to a Statewatch freedom of information request, the European Commission has released the minutes and agendas of meetings of the Readmission Expert Group, from 17 January 2025 to 17 July 2026. The discussions cover readmission cooperation assessments for most partners countries, as well as updates on readmission agreement negotiations and related matters.
EU partner celebrates counter-migration campaign targetting children
Seefar, a Brussels-based consultancy which delivers counter-migration information campaigns in the Global South, celebrated the delivery of a campaign to 29,000 school students in Senegal at an event in October. According to coverage, students were targetted as a “priority audience” due to the “idealised” images of migration they are subject to. Seefar CEO Paul Clewett, a Dubai-based entrepreneur, can be seen at the event.
The project, entitled SAFE-MIT, is funded entirely by the EU (via the ICMPD) and cost €1,354,295. It targets children in Senegal, Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya – attempting to dissuade them from migrating, including with an “escape game” that drives home the message. Seefar also produces similar online games and simulations.
“The one thing that I’ve learned about migration” says a Kenyan schoolgirl about her exposure to the programme, “is that we should not take shortcuts. We should follow the right procedure”.
EU-funded information campaigns such as these have been criticised in the past for targetting children and young people with emotional manipulation tactics and biased presentation of information. They also often have their European origin and funding obscured, presenting themselves as local ‘grassroots’ initiatives. There is also very limited evidence regarding their efficacy.