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A very British death: inquest returns unlawful killing verdict on outsourced deportation death of Jimmy Mubenga by Trevor Hemmings

01 February 2014

Jimmy Mubenga died while being restrained by Detention Custody Officers working for the private security firm, G4S. The coroner heavily criticised the company’s operational practices and identified a culture of racism endemic at G4S and other companies to which immigration functions are outsourced.

On 9 July 2013, a majority inquest jury found that Jimmy Kelenda Mubenga (46), who died from cardiorespiratory collapse during his deportation to Angola on a British Airways commercial flight from Heathrow to Luanda in October 2010, had been unlawfully killed while being restrained. Passengers on the flight had claimed that “excessive force” was used against him by three civilian Detainee Custody Officers (DCOs) employed by the Anglo-Danish private security company G4S. The company, as well as the Home Office, originally claimed that Mubenga had been “taken ill” while on the plane after complaining of breathing problems. In July 2012, a Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) review of evidence gathered by the police found that there was insufficient evidence to charge any G4S staff or the company itself. [1]

The inquest jury’s verdict statement said:

“…Mr Mubenga was pushed or held down by one or more of the guards, causing breathing to be impeded. We find that they were using unreasonable force and acting in an unlawful manner. The fact that Mr Mubenga was pushed or held down, or a combination of the two, was a significant - that is more than minimal - cause of death. The guards, we believe, would have known that they would have caused Mr Mubenga harm in their actions, if not serious harm.”

Mr Mubenga’s family have now launched civil proceedings at the High Court against the multinational security company, with the family’s solicitor confident that: “The evidence has clearly come out that the guards used unreasonable and dangerous force…” The Stop G4S campaign, which has supported Jimmy’s wife, Makenda Adrienne Kambana, throughout her ordeal, has called on the CPS to press charges against the three DCOs responsible for the death and to weigh up the possibility of bringing charges of corporate manslaughter against G4S. [2] The Corporate Manslaughter and Homicide Act 2007 was extended in September 2011 to include police forces, prisons and immigration detention centres. This means prosecutions against public or private bodies following a death in police or private security custody, which includes forced deportations, are now possible if it can be proved that the way these facilities were managed amounted to a breach of the duty of care and caused the death.

The campaign described the result as “a damning verdict not only of the three security guards responsible for Jimmy’s death, but of G4S and the UK’s privatised immigration system that allowed this tragedy to happen.” Stop G4S went on to question the appropriateness of using profit-making multinational companies for the deportations of vulnerable people:

“The death of Jimmy Mubenga and the plight of his family are yet another example of how companies like G4S would always prioritise profit over the life and well-being of vulnerable people put in their care. The guards callously ignored Jimmy’s pleas for help and that he could not breathe. Their only concern was to keep him quiet by suffocating him to death so that they wouldn’t lose their bonuses. People like these and companies that employ them are simply not fit for the purpose of being in charge of deportation.” [3]

No significant changes to the approved methods of the use of force while carrying out detention and deportations have been introduced in the three years since Jimmy Mubenga’s tragic death.

A death foretold

The charity INQUEST, which provides free advice to the relatives of individuals who have died contentiously in custody, has identified a “culture of secrecy that pervades the use of force on detainees.” The charity’s co-director, Deborah Coles, has pointed out that “The risks of positional asphyxia have been well-known since the April 2004 restraint death of 15-year old Gareth Myatt in the secure training centre at Rainsbrook.” [4] In April 2011, INQUEST published a detailed investigation into the death of Jimmy Mubenga which called for a parliamentary committee inquiry into the use of restraint and force in deportations. [5]

In 2008, a report jointly published by solicitors Birnberg, Peirce & Partners, Medical Justice and the National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns, titled Outsourcing Abuse, detailed approximately 300 instances of mistreatment involving “an alarming number of injuries sustained by asylum deportees at the hand of private ‘escorts’ contracted by the Home Office.” It cited well documented evidence for the “widespread and seemingly systemic abuse of vulnerable people who have fled their own countries seeking safety and refuge.” The report alleged that claims of assault against employees of private security companies had been “brushed off” by their employers at the Home Office. [6]

The extreme vulnerability of asylum seekers and undocumented migrants was further investigated in a project by Harmit Athwal for the Institute of Race Relations, titled Driven to Desperate Measures: 2002-2010, which catalogued 77 asylum seekers and migrants who died either in the UK or attempting to reach the UK. [7]

Further evidence of the abuse of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers was submitted to the Home Affairs Select Committee, and published by the Guardian newspaper in 2011. The newspaper cited statements from four G4S whistleblowers who revealed that they had warned their managers repeatedly that illegal restraint techniques were being used by DCOs. Their evidence also alleged that security guards were not properly trained, were criticised by management for showing compassion and ostracised if they voiced concern. The whistleblowers asserted that the use of excessive force by DCOs was so commonplace that uncooperative asylum seekers were subjected to what guards nicknamed “Carpet Karaoke” – in which the handcuffed victim is forcibly bent over in their seat with their head forced between their legs. The practice is prohibited because it can lead to positional asphyxia, a form of suffocation. Because of the frequency of its use the practice has also become known colloquially as “privatised manslaughter.” [8]

In November 2010, INQUEST and Medical Justice organised a joint public parliamentary meeting, chaired by Lord Ramsbotham, the former Chief Inspector of Prisons from 1995 to 2001. The meeting concluded that there needed to be an urgent parliamentary inquiry into the use of force during deportations. In a House of Lords debate on 19 July 2012, Ramsbotham was highly critical of the Crown Prosecution Service’s decision not to prosecute G4S over the death of Jimmy Mubenga, saying: “I find the CPS decision, at kindest, perverse.” A 2012 study by the National Independent Commission on Enforced Removals [9], chaired by Ramsbotham, made four recommendations concerning deportation for profit:

-The setting up of a panel for complex returns.

-More robust licensing of security staff.

-Independent oversight of the enforced removal process.

-A review of restraint techniques appropriate for use during enforced removals.

“Carpet Karaoke”

Jimmy Mubenga and his wife Makenda Adrienne Kambana, both Angolan nationals, entered the UK in 1994 and made a claim for asylum. Mubenga had been a student activist in Angola and was forced to flee government persecution. Their asylum applications were refused but they were granted exceptional permission to stay in the UK and set up home in east London where they had five children. In early 2006, Mubenga was convicted of assault after a fight broke out at a bar and was later sentenced to a two-year term of imprisonment. He had no previous convictions and his wife explained in court that he was not a violent man but had been arrested because “he was in the wrong place at the wrong time.”

As a result of his conviction, in March 2007 Mubenga was notified that a decision had been taken to deport him back to Angola. On 9 September 2010, authorisation was given to separate him from his family and to detain him pending removal. He was moved to various detention centres, the final one being Brook House which was outsourced to be run by G4S under contract with the UK Border Agency (UKBA). Mr Mubenga was detained by the UKBA on 27 September 2010 pending his planned removal on 12 October 2010. Four G4S DCOs were given the task of escorting him. They were Colin Kaler, Terence Hughes and Stuart Tribelnig, and the driver, Ian Duckers. Mubenga was driven to Heathrow Airport and on arrival was escorted to a British Airways flight to Luanda. Three of the DCOs boarded with Mubenga before the other passengers were allowed to embark.

The inquest heard that a struggle ensued between Jimmy Mubenga and the DCOs, during which he was restrained, rear-handcuffed and placed in a seat. The restraint continued for more than half an hour and Mubenga was heard by passengers to repeatedly shout that he couldn’t breathe and that he feared for his life. He then fell silent and became unresponsive. The guards informed the cabin crew that something was wrong and arrangements were made to get the plane back to its stand so paramedics could board and administer any care that was required. Mubenga received no first aid from either the custody officers or the cabin crew, all of whom were trained to deal with such emergencies. An ambulance was called and emergency treatment, including cardiopulmonary resuscitation, was belatedly administered on the plane by paramedics. By this time it was much too late and Mubenga died from cardiovascular collapse, in which the heart stops beating and the individual stops breathing.

“Securing your world” with G4S

The multinational security company, G4S, was born out of the merger between the Danish Group 4 Falk and British Securicor in 2004. The biggest security company in the world, G4S employs nearly 650,000 staff and has operations in 125 countries. Over 50% of the company’s revenue derives from ‘manned security services’ (guarding the property of private companies and wealthy individuals), with approximately 25% coming from public contracts (running prisons, immigration detention centres, policing, welfare to work programmes etc.) and nearly 20% from transporting cash. Nearly 50% of its business is in Europe and around a quarter in the USA. Among its international operations, G4S supplies ‘security’ equipment and services for use in Israeli prisons (where Palestinian political prisoners are held and tortured in breach of the Geneva Conventions) and the controversial checkpoints and settlements in the West Bank. [10] In the USA, the G4S subsidiary, Wackenhut, has faced repeated claims of security lapses at military bases where it is contracted to provide services. [11] In October 2013, the South African authorities announced that they would be taking over the management of Manguang correctional centre after G4S “lost effective control of the facility.” [12] The multinational was voted the third worst company in the world at the Public Eye awards for 2013 after Goldman Sachs and Shell. [13]

G4S does not seem to be any more competent in the UK, where outsourced contracts have led to a plethora of complaints alleging a lack of accountability, incompetence and even fraudulent practice, although this has not made the slightest dent in the company’s capacity to win essential government contracts. To cite just two recent examples, G4S informed the government that it was unable to fulfil its brief of providing 10,400 trained security guards for the London 2012 Olympic Games, necessitating members of the armed forces to be called in to replace them. [14] Labour MP Keith Vaz said that this showed “a lack of management accountability” within the firm. [15] In its most recent controversy, in July 2013, British Justice Secretary, Chris Grayling, asked the Serious Fraud Office to investigate G4S for overcharging for the tagging of criminals in England and Wales, claiming that it, and rival company Serco, charged the government for tagging people who were not being monitored, including some who were in prison or out of the country and even some who had died. The firm has admitted overcharging on its contract, but its offer to issue a £24 million ‘credit note’ to set the matter straight has been rejected by government ministers. [16]

Although G4S lost its detainee escort contract to Reliance Secure Task Management Ltd in May 2011 after Jimmy Mubenga died, G4S still operates other ‘businesses’ within the immigration and asylum ‘market.’ For example, the company runs two immigration detention centres, Tinsley House and Brook House, as well as Cedars Pre-Departure Accommodation, the family detention centre. In October 2012, the Chief Inspector of Prisons, Nick Hardwick, published an inspection report into Cedars in which G4S was criticised for using “non-approved techniques” and unacceptable levels of force (in an incident in which a pregnant woman’s wheelchair was tipped up whilst her feet were held, causing significant risk to her baby). [17]

G4S is one of three multinational security companies, alongside Serco and Tascor, which took over provision of asylum accommodation in the UK in 2012 under UKBA’s COMPASS asylum housing contract. The G4S contract covers 11,000 asylum seekers in the Midlands and north of England and is worth £30 million a year to the company. According to the Joseph Rowntree Foundation in its evidence to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee on Asylum in April 2013, [18] the “new [COMPASS] contracts were to be less detailed ‘strategic partnerships’ compared with the previous contracts, monitored against performance indicators. The contract terms made little reference to cohesion and no reference to longer term settlement and integration goals, only to requirements to liaise with the local authority and the strategic migration partnerships on issues of ‘social tension’ and with the voluntary sector to provide support services.” The JRF evidence indicated that tendering took place:

“…through a crude form of reverse auction, with bidders reducing their bids until only one was left. This enabled private bidders to drive down prices, below levels acceptable to the previous consortia, with little or no account taken of their experience or of the wider social value offered by bidders. Contracts were awarded exclusively to large private companies, with SERCO, G4S and Clearel each gaining two contracts.” [19]

The JRF’s evidence continued:

“In practice, the imperative for contractors was to secure accommodation quickly at the lowest possible cost. This often resulted in people being concentrated in the same low-cost areas already housing other vulnerable people…Knock-down prices inevitably produced a low-grade service. Little consideration was now given to asylum seekers’ wider needs beyond accommodation. And in both the transition period and when the contracts were fully underway, serious problems emerged with the accommodation itself….With the contracts now fully underway, problems still occur….”

The Inquest and Coroner’s Rule 43 report

The inquest into the death of Jimmy Mubenga was conducted by assistant deputy coroner, Karon Monaghan QC, at Isleworth Crown Court between 13 May and 9 July 2013. The inquest jury returned a majority verdict (nine to one) concluding that Mubenga had been unlawfully killed (unlawful act killing). Following the verdict, Monaghan issued a Rule 43 report under the Coroner’s (Amendment) Rules 2008 which is relevant when the evidence “gives rise to concern that circumstances creating a risk of other deaths will occur, or will continue to exist, in the future” and when “action should be taken to prevent the occurrence or continuation of such circumstances, or to eliminate or reduce the risk of death created by such circumstances.” [20]

The Coroner’s Rule 43 report summarises five key factors that emerged from the month-long inquest. [21] These points cover the following areas:

-Detention and Custody Officers: powers and accreditation

-The Provision of Overseas Escorting Services: the contractual agreements

-Racism: culture and personnel

-Use of Force

-First Aid

Detention and Custody Officers: powers and accreditation

Under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, DCOs must be accredited by the Secretary of State in the form of a certificate of authorisation stating that they can perform escort and/or escort and custodial functions. Monaghan describes the officers’ powers to detain and remove by force as ranking “amongst the most coercive powers afforded by statute” and sees “no doubt why those upon whom such powers are conferred are closely circumscribed by the requirement to be certified in accordance with the statutory scheme” (Point 26). However, one of the DCOs involved in the deportation of Jimmy Mubenga was not accredited, his certification having expired four months earlier. This meant that the officer:

“…had no power to escort Mr Mubenga for the purposes of removal from the UK, or to take any steps to keep him in custody pending removal or to use or threaten the use of force to secure the removal of Mr Mubenga.” (Point 28)

Moreover, the evidence presented to Monaghan at the inquest indicated that this practice was part of an agreement between G4S and the Home Office:

“…this state of affairs did not result from individual oversight or administrative error, but formed part of a practice agreed between G4S and the UK Border Agency. This practice has as its purpose and effect the informal authorisation of unaccredited G4S staff to carry out custodial functions and the removal of detainees from the UK (with threatened or actual force where necessary).” (Point 28)

The need to dispense with accreditation was intended to:

“…address delays within the UK Border Agency in processing applications for accreditation. The evidence presented to me following enquiries that I made about this practice indicates that in 2005 approximately 50% of DCO’s (although not properly described since they had no extant accreditation) working in the Overseas operation for G4S were ‘awaiting their accreditation letters to come through from UKBA.’” [emphasis in original] (Point 28)

Indeed, by mid-2006, the UKBA had provided a “dispensation” allowing employees to work as DCOs provided a letter of accreditation had been applied for. According to Monaghan, this informal agreement for dispensation for first-time employees was “never withdrawn or amended.”

Monaghan rejected the Home Office’s assertion that an informal agreement between G4S and UKBA permitted officers to exercise the functions of DCOs without the statutory accreditation necessary as “impermissible” under the law. However, the coroner had no information on how frequently “unaccredited DCOs used or threatened force to effect removals” and pointed out that a detainee’s legal advisors would not have been aware of the absence of accreditation “and the impact that might have on the legality of any detention or escorted removal.” (Point 30)

The coroner insisted that:

“It is the responsibility of the Home Office to ensure that DCOs exercising the coercive powers afforded by the [Immigration and Asylum] Act are indeed accredited in accordance with the requirements of Section 156.” (Point 31)

She continued:

“It cannot be known now whether the “dispensation” did create a risk to the health and safety of detainees and deportees, not least because there appears to have been no enquiry (yet) into it…The minimum guarantees in the Act are intended to ensure the safe exercise of detention and removal functions and they were not respected for a significant period of time.” [emphasis in original] (Point 32)

Monaghan concluded by recommending:

-An inquiry into the circumstances in which the dispensation was granted to G4S to ensure that no such arrangements are currently in place and that they will not be reinstated.

-A review to audit compliance and to ensure that only accredited DCOs perform escorting and removal functions.

Contractual arrangements for the provision of Overseas Escorting Services

The coroner was highly critical of the Home Office/UKBA contract with G4S under which “payment was largely by results” and the fees payable were in large part based “on the number and duration of the escorted movements (including removals), comprising an hourly rate in respect of escorts.” These arrangements meant that:

“…if a job was aborted, payment would be made for the hours actually worked ending with the return of the escorts to the mustering location, not the anticipated hours that would have been worked on, for example, a lengthy overseas return journey.” (Point 35)

Performance measures were designed to “incentivise successful removals” through a points system that was given a monetary value that could be deducted from invoices submitted by G4S. One of these measures required that “detainee[s]…leave UK on scheduled transportation on the first attempt.”

“A failure to ensure the removal of a detainee on the first attempt, therefore, would result in an adverse financial consequence (the witness who dealt with this for the Home Office preferred not to use the word “penalty”).” [emphasis in original] (Point 36)

The allocation of performance points “had the potential to encourage removals where they might not otherwise go ahead (especially when not set off by other risk-reducing incentives, such as rewards for a reduction in the use of force.)” (Point 36)

Monaghan was also critical of the use of zero-hours contracts with DCOs, under which they are not guaranteed any work or pay but are allocated work as needed and then only paid for the hours actually worked. The coroner noted her concern that such inappropriate methods lead to the rise of dangerous practices:

“…the completion of removals by monetary award necessarily carries with it the risk that removals will go ahead in circumstances where otherwise they might be aborted. Having a financial interest in getting the job done does give rise to real concerns that inappropriate methods might be used to that end. Some dangerous practices have developed…with the specific purpose of ensuring that disruption by a deportee prior to take-off does not prevent removal. This may be symptomatic of the chosen arrangements for paying contractor and in turn employee. This is obviously very concerning indeed.” (Point 38)

The following recommendations are made regarding contractual arrangements:

-Performance measures should be aimed at promoting safe removals.
-Outsourced contractors should adopt pay schemes that do not incentivise removal at the expense of safety.

Racism: culture and personnel

Racist material (comprising around 86 text messages) was found on the private mobile phones of two DCOs involved in the attempted removal that led to the death of Jimmy Mubenga. Some texts made extreme derogatory references to ‘immigrants’, advocating their deportation and worse. The texts had not been deleted despite their offensive content and some had been forwarded to other DCOs. Monaghan described the texts as evidence of “pervasive racism within G4S”. Testimony from one of the DCOs suggested that such texts were commonly shared among work colleagues.

Following the death of Jimmy Mubenga, one of the DCOs accompanying him posted a racially offensive picture on his Facebook page. According to the Rule 43 report, “The Facebook postings were illustrative of what appears to be a casual widespread racism” and demonstrated a lack of awareness or disregard to the significance of race in the events surrounding Mr Mubenga’s death. Responses to the post from other DCOs indicated that the comments “were not isolated” and some of the DCOs who responded worked for another company, Reliance, demonstrating that simply changing contractor will not “eliminate these cultural problems.”

Witnesses at the inquest provided evidence of an “unhealthy culture” at both G4S and Reliance, which created environments “where women, ethnic minorities and those of diverse religions” would not feel comfortable.

“It seems unlikely that endemic racism would not impact on all service provision. It was not possible to explore at the inquest the true extent of racist opinion or tolerance amongst DCOs or more widely. However, there was enough evidence to cause real concern, particularly at the possibility that such racism might find reflection in race-based antipathy towards detainees and deportees and that in turn might manifest itself in inappropriate treatment of them. As it was put by one witness, the potential impact on detainees of a racist culture is that detainees and deportees are not “personalized.” This may, self-evidently, result in a lack of empathy and respect for their dignity and humanity potentially putting their safety at risk, especially if force is used against them.” (Point 46)

Monaghan continued:
“If the experience of being subject to immigration law is not to be felt as a mere experience in racism, considerable care needs to be taken to ensure that those subject to its adverse consequences do not feel the sting of racism in its application.” (Point 48)

The coroner also drew attention to the lack of “racial balance” in the workplace. In 2010, G4S recorded 8.27% of its DCOs as Black or Asian against a non-white population of 40.2% in London “which can properly be assumed to form part of the pool from which workers employed to service Heathrow and Gatwick are drawn.” One of the reasons non-white workers are not applying for jobs at G4S is that recruitment is aimed at the police and military, organisations in which ethnic minorities are also underrepresented. There was a near absence of performance indicators or contractual requirements directed at promoting equality or compliance with anti-discrimination law.

The coroner makes the following recommendation:

-The Home Office should introduce measures to provide “non-discriminatory” escorting and custodial services and address staffing issues.

The Use of Force

The Rule 43 report found that:

“Between 2009 and 2012 approximately 10% and 12% of escorted removals involved the use of force and 20% of these took [place] on board the aeroplane. All DCOs were trained in ‘Control and Restraint’ (C&R) techniques and at least 10% were trained in ‘Physical Control in Care’, which is approved for use on children. C&R techniques can be found in the Use of Force training manual which is used by G4S instructors to train DCOs in various holds, locks and pain compliance [techniques].”

Monaghan identified five areas of concern in relation to C&R:

1. Scenario-based training: There was a lack of clarity about whether the Use of Force manual allowed for any departure from its contents to permit the provision of training in specific environments, such as on board a plane. This was “undesirable” and constituted a “significant training gap”, despite having been recommended in the 2008 review by the National Tactical Response Group for UKBA.

2. Use of C&R on an aircraft: G4S trainers had raised concerns about the suitability of C&R in the confines of an aircraft. C&R and the Use of Force training manual were developed in the context of prisons and prison vehicles, not for use on an aircraft: “restraint on a scheduled flight with passengers and crew in very close proximity and in particularly narrow spaces may represent very specific challenges.” A review of C&R, including considering its use on an aircraft, will not be finished until 2014 and will then require an implementation plan. Three years after the death of Jimmy Mubenga “no changes have yet been introduced.” Monaghan also emphasised the “need to show due respect for the dignity of those to whom these methods may be applied.”

3. Bad practice: Evidence to the inquest covered the practice known as carpet karaoke, a means of controlling “disruptive” deportees in an aircraft seat by pushing their head downwards (“singing to the carpet”) to prevent any sounds from disturbing or upsetting passengers or causing the captain to abort the removal. In 2008, G4S issued a notice to staff warning against the use of this position because it could increase the risk of positional asphyxia. The findings of the Jimmy Mubenga inquest jury gave rise to the question of whether carpet karaoke is still in use.

4. Handcuffing to the rear: The dangers of rear-handcuffing, as opposed to handcuffing at the front, particularly on an aircraft, have been widely documented. In particular, it can restrict breathing under certain circumstances, which led G4S to instruct DCOs not to leave a detainee handcuffed to the rear for an extended period of time and to move the handcuffs to the front as soon as possible. Unlike aircraft cabin crew, who are prohibited from restraining by rear-cuffing because it would impede a passenger’s ability to save themselves in the event of an emergency, there was no such restriction for DCOs.

5. Restraint / positional asphyxia: DCOs had been warned about the risks of positional or restraint asphyxia and this will need to inform the formulation of any new restraint techniques and training packages.

The coroner recommended:

-A rigorous review of approved restraint methods specifically for overseas removals with appropriate techniques for an aircraft should be introduced expeditiously.
-That any new use of approved techniques should take into account rear-handcuffing on an aircraft.
-That there was a need for clear guidance on any new force policy.

First Aid

When Jimmy Mubenga became unresponsive no one administered first aid to him, despite the three DCOs and all of the BA cabin crew having first aid training: “Mr Mubenga died in front of a number of people without anyone stepping in to see if he could be helped.” BA cabin crew deferred to the DCOs and BA has not conducted an inquiry into whether their staff should have intervened and, according to the Rule 43 report, still does not consider such an inquiry to be necessary. Monaghan argues that: “Cabin crew need to fully understand their responsibilities, even in cases where escorts are failing to intervene to assist a deportee in medical danger.”

According to an expert witness, Dr Deakin, there are weaknesses in the first aid training delivered by G4S to DCOs, and this training needs to be reviewed.

Monaghan made the following recommendations:

-Home Office should review instruction and guidance given to DCOs about the need to administer first aid in a medical emergency.

-Home Office should review first aid training (re. Dr Deakin)

-Home Office should review arrangements with scheduled airlines so that cabin crew / DCO responsibilities are clear.

-BA should conduct a review into the actions of cabin crew at the time of Mr Mubenga’s death (and their failure to administer first aid).

Conclusion: ‘Incentivising’ deportations

Twenty years ago, 40-year old Jamaican housewife, Joy Gardner, died after an early morning raid by police and Detention Custody Officers who were attempting to serve her with a deportation order. Accompanied by her 5-year old British-born son and unwilling to leave, she was handcuffed, restrained using a body belt and gagged with 5 metres of tape. She subsequently fell into a coma and died in hospital. The officers involved in her death were cleared of manslaughter charges. Joy Gardner’s death led to mobilisations by black communities and the launch of a campaign against brutal and excessive state force that demanded justice for her and her family. Joy Gardner’s death was commemorated in a poem by Benjamin Zephaniah in 1988, The Death of Joy Gardner, the opening lines of which are:

“They put a leather belt around her
13 feet of tape and bound her
Handcuffs to secure her
And only God knows what else,
She’s illegal, so deport her
Said the Empire that brought her
She died,
Nobody killed her
And she never killed herself…” [22]

The equally callous death of Jimmy Mubenga shows that little has changed over the intervening two decades in relation to the practices of outsourced coercive state agencies responsible for deportations. This is despite repeated warnings of the consequences of a programme of escalating privatisation of critical infrastructure that began under Thatcher’s Conservative government, was renewed under New Labour and continues unabated under the Conservative / Lib Dem coalition.

In 2005, the UN Committee Against Torture expressed concerns over “allegations and complaints against immigration staff, including complaints of excessive use of force in the removal of denied asylum seekers.” [23] For a decade, practitioners and organisations involved in migration issues have repeatedly highlighted the dangers faced by vulnerable people in detention. Reports by such organisations have warned of the “culture of secrecy” that pervades the use of force on immigration detainees and the risks of death through the use of dangerous restraint techniques. Expert testimony from medical and legal practitioners, such as solicitors Birnberg, Peirce and Partners, INQUEST, Medical Justice and the Institute of Race Relations, has been bolstered by nearly 400 case studies to authenticate these concerns.

Further evidence has been presented by whistleblowers employed by private security firms on the realities of the introduction of competitive practices to the deportation ‘business.’ Their evidence to the parliamentary Home Affairs Committee alleged that managers repeatedly ignored warnings about the use of illegal restraint techniques by DCOs and the inadequate training they receive. Their allegations that the management of these outsourced immigration ‘businesses’ criticised and ostracised members of staff who expressed concern bolsters the claims made by medical and legal experts, and the detainees themselves, and demonstrates the dangers of profit making companies running such activities. ‘Carpet Karaoke’ is an entirely logical outcome of such competitive practices.

The privatisation of the UK’s immigration and deportation system - which is impacted by the outsourcing of other state apparatus, such as prisons, policing (in part), housing and the criminal justice system - demonstrates that commercially driven private companies can be relied upon to maximise profit, whatever the cost. According to the Joseph Rowntree Foundation in its evidence to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee on Asylum regarding the provision of asylum accommodation, outsourcing has resulted in “knock-down prices [that] inevitably produced a low-grade service.” In fact, the treatment of Jimmy Mubenga is much worse than this, and demonstrates that G4S has a callous disregard for human life. But it is also a measure of the institutional racism of a company whose zero-hours contract staff carry racist jokes about deportation on their mobile phones and had 773 complaints (including 48 claims of assault) filed against it by detainees in 2010. [24]

Endnotes

[1] See: “The Death of Jimmy Mubenga: “Securing your world” through “privatised manslaughter”, Statewatch Volume 21 no. 1

[2] “Campaigners call for corporate manslaughter charges against G4S following ‘unlawful killing’ verdict in Jimmy Mubenga inquest”, Stop G4S website. The website can be accessed at: link

[3] Ibid.

[4] Letter to the Guardian newspaper , 10.2.11. INQUEST website: link

[6] Birnberg Peirce & Partners, Medical Justice and the National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns “Outsourcing Abuse: The use and misuse of state-sanctioned force during the detention and removal of asylum seekers”: link

[7] Harmit Athwal “Driven to Desperate Measures: 2002—2010” (Institute of Race Relations) 2010: link

[8] The Guardian “Security firm was warned of lethal risk to deportees”, 9.2.11

[9] Lord Ramsbotham “National Independent Commission on Enforced Removals: Additional findings and recommendations (Citizens UK) 2012: link

[10] See: Corporate Watch “G4S: A company profile” (2012) link

[11] link

[12] Ruth Hopkins “South Africa government ‘sacks’ G4S from prison.” The Guardian 10.10.13.

[13] link

[14] Simon Neville “G4S Olympic security contract losses increase to £88m” The Guardian 12.2.13: link

[15] “G4S ‘are incompetent, amateurish and irresponsible’” Daily Telegraph 17.1.12: link

[16] Alan Travis “G4S faces fraud investigation over tagging contracts” The Guardian 12.7.13: link
Alan Travis “Ministers reject G4S offer to repay £24 m after it admits tagging fiasco” The Guardian 20.11.13.

[17] HM Chief Inspector of Prisons “Report on an announced inspection of Cedars Pre-Departure Accommodation 30 April - 25 May 2012” (Crown copyright 2012): link

[18] Joseph Rowntree Foundation “Evidence from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the Housing and Migration Network” (Home Affairs Committee Inquiry into Asylum) April 2013: link

[19] Ibid

[20] Karon Monghan QC “Report by the Assistant Deputy Coroner Under the Coroner’s Rules 1984, Rule 43”

[21] Ibid

[22] “Death of Joy Gardner” Benjamin Zephaniah: link

[23] United Nations Report of the Committee Against Torture, 3 October 2005, para 39 (i).

[24] Stop G4S website.