Annual report on MI5
01 July 1992
In his annual report on the Security Service (MI5) the Commissioner, Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, says MI5 no longer destroys any of its records even those it opened erroneously, in case the Security Service Tribunal (which investigates complaints by members of the public) wants to see them.
Three cases considered by the Commissioner raised the issue of whether or not MI5 acted unreasonably in retaining files on the complainants and this led him to enquire into MI5's policy on holding records on people. The general policy, he reports, "is to retain records indefinitely in case they are of relevance any time in the future...and they [MI5] cannot accurately predict when files will ever be needed again. In my opinion as a general policy this is acceptable."
MI5's procedure is first to open a "temporary" file, with a maximum life of three years where they are uncertain if a permanent one is required. Then a "permanent" file is opened using a system of colour coding which controls how files are used. Once the "permanent" file is opened there is a period coded green when the person is put under surveillance. At the end of the "green" period it changes to "amber" when further inquiries are prohibited but new information can be added. After the designated "amber" period a file is coded "red" when inquiries are prohibited and are any substantive additions.
Finally, after a period of "red" coding the file is microfilmed and the hard copy destroyed. At this point the computer index entry in MI5's central registry index is moved from the "Live Index" to the "Research Index". The Commissioner concludes that in the great majority of cases retention of a file on microfilm will be justified but that MI5's must assess each case on its merits (it is not clear whether the Commissioner is referring to new entries at the microfilm stage to be assessed or whether it refers to old records).
The logic of the Commissioner becomes quite tortuous when he comes to consider records held by MI5 which, but for the Security Service Act 1989, would have been destroyed. "Temporary" files which do not become "permanent" files would previously have been destroyed after three years so too would "permanent" files on individuals and organisations erroneously opened - now they are retained in case the Tribunal wants to see them at some undefined point in the future and "in appropriate cases make an order for the destruction of the records."
MI5 holds records on those it vets or places under surveillance. These fall into several broad categories: those vetted for jobs in the Civil Service, defence industry, police and other sensitive areas; those thought to be engaged in espionage on behalf of a foreign power, and their perceived supporters or "sympathisers"; those suspected of involvement in terrorism; a broad spectrum of those perceived to be in positions of power and influence (including prospective parliamentary candidates, academics, leading industrialists and journalists - "agents of influence" in CIA parlance); and those considered to be "subversives" or a potential threat to national security (this last category is said to contain more than 1 million names according to a report in the Guardian).
The report gives no details of the warrants issued by the Home Secretary to "interfere with property" (to secretly enter homes or to bug office/homes). In the first year of the Security Service Act there were 52 complaints to the Tribunal, none of which were upheld and in the second year 29, none of which were upheld.
Report of the Commissioner for the Security Service for 1991, Cm 1946, HMSO, 1992; Guardian, 21.5.92.