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Controlling the airwaves

01 May 1994

The Clinton Administration has announced that it plans to proceed on every front to make the Clipper Chip encryption scheme a national standard and to discourage the development, sale and export of alternative devices. Clipper is an encryption chip that the National Security Agency and the FBI hope will one day be in every phone and computer in America. It scrambles communications, making them unintelligible to all but their intended recipients, except the government. It would hold the "key" to the chip and would legally be able read any communication. The implications are far-reaching and is equivalent to insisting that all current postal mail was put in transparent or unsealed envelopes and sent to their recipient via MI5 or MI6.

The US administration hopes to impose the Clipper not through statute but by manipulating market forces. By purchasing massive numbers of Clipper devices they intend to induce an economy of scale which will make them cheap while the export will render all competition either expensive or non-existent.

Many other countries are likely to follow suit. It has emerged that the Dutch Department of Justice has been pressing for legislation on encryption. A Parliamentary Committee is currently working on a proposal that would effectively outlaw possession, use and trade in encryption devices. It is considering a proposal which would tie a license to use of government approved encryption devices. The proposal is being prepared in secrecy but some details have already been obtained and they include fines for the use of encryption on a telephone line and the loss of the telephone connection for a number of days.

The British government also is reported to be on the verge of adopting a modified Clipper chip strategy on the advice of GCHQ. Users would be able to use strong encryption devices but there would be procedural control which would allow officials to overcome the effects of the encryption. It is suggested that the key would be held with a "third party" making it accessible to security services.

Wired, April 1994; Computing 5 May 1994.