Controlling the airwaves (1)
01 January 1991
Controlling the airwaves
artdoc July=1994
The Clinton Administration has announced that it plans to proceed
on every front to make the Clipper Chip encryption scheme a
national standard and to discourage the development, sale and
export of alternative devices. Clipper is an encryption chip that
the National Security Agency and the FBI hope will one day be in
every phone and computer in America. It scrambles communications,
making them unintelligible to all but their intended recipients,
except the government. It would hold the `key' to the chip and
would legally be able read any communication. The implications
are far-reaching and is equivalent to insisting that all current
postal mail was put in transparent or unsealed envelopes and sent
to their recipient via MI5 or MI6.
The US administration hopes to impose the Clipper not through
statute but by manipulating market forces. By purchasing massive
numbers of Clipper devices they intend to induce an economy of
scale which will make them cheap while the export will render all
competition either expensive or non-existent.
Many other countries are likely to follow suit. It has emerged
that the Dutch Department of Justice has been pressing for
legislation on encryption. A Parliamentary Committee is currently
working on a proposal that would effectively outlaw possession,
use, and trade in encryption devices. It is considering a
proposal which would tie a license to use of government approved
encryption devices. The proposal is being prepared in secrecy but
some details have already been obtained and they include fines
for the use of encryption on a telephone line and the loss of the
telephone connection for a number of days.
The British government also is reported to be on the verge of
adopting a modified Clipper chip strategy on the advice of GCHQ.
Users would be able to use strong encryption devices but there
would be procedural control which would allow officials to
overcome the effects of the encryption. It is suggested that the
`key' would be held with a `third party' making it accessible to
security services.
Wired, April 1994; Computing 5 May 1994.
Statewatch, vol 4 no 3, May-June 1994