Dounreay's `lost' Uranium
01 January 1991
Dounreay's `lost' Uranium
artdoc August=1992
Northern European Nuclear Information Group [NENIG]
[Full text of report]
INTRODUCTION
The full story of Dounreay's apparent `loss' of Uranium 235,
announced in December 1991, is only just beginning to emerge.
Statements made by the operators, AEA Technology, and the UK
Government have failed to reveal the full picture.
The so-called incident was passed off as an accounting error and
official statements presented it as a lone-off, incident
discovered by an inventory of uranium.
But new evidence from the European Commission, the European
Parliament and the UK's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate
reveals
- concern from Euratom safeguard inspectors and Dounreay
throughout 1991 about the uranium recovery plant
- a design fault left an open cycle, allowing liquid to
escape from the plant
- a history of unrecorded transfers and discharges from
the plant
- failure of management due to commercial pressures
- disregard for safety by allowing the plant to operate
despite its faults
- inadequate records of nuclear material
- inadequate training for staff
- significant deficiencies in accounting, checking and
measurement procedures
- the need to improve site licence procedures
- inadequate monitoring of discharges into the sea
Despite these facts, the European Commission took the minimum
action possible - and issued a warning to AEA Technology - and
the UK's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate decided against any
legal action.
AEA Technology and the UK Government consciously misled the
public, and MPs, by laying false trails and encouraging the media
to follow them. The desire to try and maintain public confidence
in the nuclear industry, whatever the cost, was paramount. It
meant the full facts were carefully hidden from the House of
Commons, the media and the public.
1. BACKGROUND
1.1. Dounreay's fuel cycle complex includes fuel fabrication,
reprocessing, waste storage and uranium recovery plants. The
enriched uranium processing plant, known as D1203, is designed
to recover enriched uranium from old, materials such as residues,
ashes and scraps from fuel fabrication plants, uranyl nitrate
from Dounreay's two reprocessing plants, unirradiated fuel
elements and uranium/thorium oxide residues. D1203 produces
uranium oxides and metal. Its work does not involve irradiated,
or spent fuel.
The plant was built in 1958 and was rebuilt, upgraded and
refurbished two years ago, to support Dounreay's commercial
campaign for work with Highly-Enriched Uranium fuel. It restarted
in September 1990. Modifications were carried out in August 1991.
AEA says about 12 people are employed in D1203.
2. UK LICENSING AND EC SAFEGUARDS
2.1. A licence from the UK regulatory authority, the Nuclear
Installations Inspectorate (NII), covers the whole of Dounreay
and under the licence conditions any modifications to plant at
the site are categorised according to their safety significance.
NII notification is only needed for modifications in the top
category.
Dounreay's operators, AEA Technology, are responsible for
categorising their own modifications, according to the agreed
category policy. The modifications carried out on D1203 in 1991
were categorised by AEA Technology at a lower safety category
than required NII notification.
2.2. Euratom safeguards regulations [1] require Dounreay to:
"specify [to the European Commission] those important changes in
the basic technical characteristics for which advanced
notification is required. Any other changes ... shall be
communicated to the Commission...after the modification is
made".[2]
3. A REASONABLE AMOUNT TO LOSE ?
3.1. Material-Unaccounted-For, or MUF, is a common concept in
the nucl