Dutch police and security service at odds (1)
01 January 1991
Dutch police and security service at odds
artdoc August=1991
On May 1, 1991, the Dutch commission Blok installed in March 1990
by the heads of the Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (BVD) and the
Centrale Recherche Informatiedienst (CRI) to advise on the
cooperation of the two services in the field of counter-terrorism
published its findings. To the present day, the two services
have been quarrelling over questions of competence and priorities
caused primarily by the ambiguity in their respective mandates.
This conflict now seems to have been settled, with the police and
the justice department gaining in influence over counter-
terrorist policy and operations. The commission has decided that
the Bijzondere Zaken Centrale (BZC, Special Branch of the central
police information service CRI) has a legitimate interest in
proactive information gathering, that is running informants and
conducting other operations without concrete indications of
serious preparatory activities for terrorist operations (which
include violent political activism). This in spite of the fact
that the administration explicitly stated in parliament four
years ago that the BZC should not have such a mandate since it
is not an intelligence service.
Since the legitimization of proactive BZC operations by the
commission confirms the existence of a grey area where both
services have competence, an intensification of cooperation
between BVD and BZC is sought. At a policy level, the heads of
both services should have periodical discussions. At the
operative level, coordinating meetings should be intensified,
with the national public prosecutor for terrorism holding a
leading position. Also, the separate services should no longer
supply information to the justice department and (local) police
without first consulting their counterpart. Shortly before
publication of the report it was decided to replace the top of
the BZC, the commissioners B.N. Barendregt (head of BZC), C
Feenstra (deputy head) and J. Mast (coordinator). Official
sources refused all comment, but it seems likely that the
officers had to make way for a new team in order to facilitate
the intensified contacts with the BVD. In the near future, the
BVD too is expected to announce several replacements in its upper
strata. One BVD director recently commented off-record to
Intelligence Newsletter: `this is not a booming business at
present.' Now that there are still career opportunities in the
international field, several top officials are considering
leaving for Brussels or other promising European posts.
The recent developments could be interpreted as supporting the
views expressed by both BVD officials and some leading
parliamentarians that the dangers of excessive intelligence
operations in Holland are more virulent in the growing number and
intensity of pro-active police operations than in BVD activities.
Also, the leading role of the public prosecutor could result in
a dominance of the justice department's views on counterterrorism
policy, thus weakening the long-term approach favoured by the
intelligence service.
Statewatch no 3 July/August 1991