EU: "Crowd control Technologies": an assessment
01 January 2001
"Crowd Control Technologies - An Assessment Of Crowd Control Technology Options For The European Union" (EP/1/IV/B/STOA/99/14/01) [The following are extracts from the executive summary from the final report on "Crowd Control Technologies (an appraisal of technologies for political control) by the Omega Foundation.]
This study grew out of a 1997 STOA report, "An Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control" and takes that work further. Its focus is two fold:(i) to examine the biomedical effects and the social & political impacts of currently available crowd control weapons in Europe; (ii) to analyse world wide trends and developments including the implications for Europe of a second generation of so called "non-lethal" weapons. Seven key areas are covered by the report's project: (a) a review of available crowd control technologies; (b) relevant legislation at national and EU levels; (c) the relative efficiency of crowd control technologies; (d) their physical and mental effects on individuals; (e) the actual and potential abuse of' crowd control technologies; (f) an assessment of future technologies and their effects; and (g) an appraisal of less damaging alternatives such as CCTV.
The report presents a detailed worldwide survey of crowd control weapons and the companies which manufacture supply or distribute them. It was found that at least 110 countries worldwide deploy riot control weapons, including chemical irritants, kinetic energy weapons, water cannon and electroshock devices. Whilst presented as humane alternatives to the use of lethal force, the study found examples in 47 countries of these so called "non-lethal" crowd control weapons being used in conjunction with lethal force rather than as a substitute for it, leading directly to injury and fatalities.
It suggests their use should be limited and provides a number of options to make the adoption and use of these weapons more democratically accountable. Three guiding principles were used in formulating these options, namely (i) the precautionary principle that health and safety considerations should be consistently applied across the EU and these should be independently and objectively assessed; (ii) assertions that a particular crowd control technology is safe within particular rules of engagement should be given legal force, both in terms of the accountability of the crown control personnel and the alleged quality control and technical specification of a particular weapon; and (iii) human rights considerations should guide the licensing of all exports of crowd control weapons to countries which have a track record of violating them.
Assessments of maintaining the status quo option are compared with the benefits of options which take a more pro-active approach to implementing the provisions of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty agreements on creating areas of freedom, security and justice for both citizens who enjoy such rights and the officers who are charged with ensuring their protection. These options include licensing and independent evaluation of the biomedical impacts of such weapons via a formal process of "Social Impact Assessment"; legal limits on weapons which are exceptionally hazardous or lethal; legally binding rules of engagement; better post incident inquiry procedures and more effective, accountable and transparent export controls. The report and the comprehensive appendices provide considerable documentation in support of the policy options presented in Section A: Briefly -
GENERAL PRINCIPLES - LICENSING Within Europe, the study found that biomedical research necessary to justify the deployment of certain crowd control technologies was either absent, lacking or incomplete and that there was inadequate quality control at production level to ensure that adverse or even lethal effects were avoided. Currently, alleged non-lethality of any crowd control weapon is dependent on its purported technical specification presented by the manufactu