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EU: EU-FBI telecommunications surveillance extended to Internetand new generation mobile phones (feature)

01 November 1998

The Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA Council) of the European Union is to extend the EU-FBI telecommunications surveillance plan to the Internet and to new generation satellite mobile phones (see Statewatch, vol 7 no 1 & 4 & 5). At the same time EU Interior Ministers are seeking to resolve their differences over the legal powers they intend to give themselves to intercept all forms of telecommunications under the new Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance. In the US the same issues are being openly discussed - the Federal Communications Commission has deferred a decision on an FBI proposal to extend surveillance to the Internet.

The secret making of policy

Within the formal structures of the EU, under the Justice and Home Affairs Council, the work on the interception of telecommunications is carried out by the Police Cooperation Working Party (Interception of telecommunications). This Working Party in turn is represented on three non-EU "technical expert groups" - ILET (International Law Enforcement Telecommunications), STC (Standards Technical Committee) and the IUR (International User Requirements). The findings on these non-EU groups are in turn brought back within the EU structures through the Police Cooperation Working Party and presented to the K4 Committee, COREPER and the JHA Council as being:

"agreed by the law enforcement agencies as an expression of their joint requirements"

Meetings in Rome on 14, 15 and 16 July of the IUR and STC were reported back to the meeting of the EU's Police Cooperation Working Party on 3-4 September in Brussels. Further meetings of the IUR in Vienna on 20-22 October and in Madrid on 27-28 October led to a draft Resolution from the Austrian Presidency to the Police Cooperation Working Party, dated 4 November, on the "interception of telecommunications in relation to new technologies".

The effect will be to extend the Requirements to be placed on network and service providers adopted by the EU as the Resolution of 17 January 1995 (see Statewatch, vol 7 no 1). Under the plan telecommunications network and service providers would have to give access to communications from "mobile satellite services" (provided by multinationals like Iridium via their "ground station" in Italy, (see Statewatch, vol 8 no 5) and to e-mail sent and received via ISPs (internet service providers) in addition to phone calls and faxes sent through the traditional system (land and sea lines and microwave towers).

The EU's plans for the surveillance of all forms of telecommunications is being determined by non-EU bodies - ILETS, STC and IUR - on which the major players are: the EU (represented by the Police Cooperation Working Party and other experts), the USA (the FBI), Canada and Australia (New Zealand and Norway are also involved). The stakes for these governments are enormous. Just as important as the "law enforcement agencies" being able to set down the "Requirements" for intercepting every form of communication are the commercial profits to be made out of "agreed" standards, equipment and service provision. Once adopted, EU-US standards, are set to become "global". For example, Iridium, the first multinational to open a "ground station" in Italy to serve the EU with a global earth-satellite, "mobile satellite service" (MSS, or "Satellite Personal Communications System, SPCS) is using Motorola and Kyocera to make Iridium handsets. The initiative for creating Iridium came from Motorola. Moreover, the EU market is critical to Iridium's initial success because AT & T dominates the US with traditional land bases systems.

Spelling out "law enforcement" demands

Underneath the draft Resolution amending the 17 January 1995 EU Council Resolution is a detailed report ("Interception of telecommunications: recommendation for a Council Resolution in respect of new technology") explaining the need for "supplementary requirements and supplementary definitions in respect of new technologi