Law - new material (48)
01 March 2004
Sooner or later they will have to admit there is no evidence, Anthony Scrivener. Independent on Sunday 22.2.04. The former chairman of the Bar Council considers the "no-man's-land" of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and the cosy relationship between the UK and US governments. He points to the "obvious problem" of a US government sending "a national of a friendly state to be tried by a military tribunal, which has the power to impose the death penalty, in defiance of all principles relating to human rights and international law." Considering the repercussions of this problem, Scrivener concludes: "To justify detention you need to have evidence. The non-existence of this evidence is not a justification for allowing a conviction without evidence on the say-so of some unidentified politician or state official, or on a lower standard of proof: it is only a justification for release and a verdict of not guilty. Sooner or later both governments will have to face-up to this long-established principle. It is all part of the rule of law and helps explain why we are a democracy."
Recent developments in UK human rights law, Nicholas De Marco. Legal Action March 2004, pp16-20. A review of recent domestic human rights law cases between April and November 2003.
Test case litigation and the Human Rights Act, John Halford. Legal Action March 2004, pp21-23. "Assesses the untapped potential the HRA offers for test case litigation and judicial review."
"Let the people decide", Stuart Weir & " House of Correction", Adam Tomkins. Red Pepper March 2004, pp18-21. With Hutton representing the most recent in a long line of judges heading inquiries to act as a "safe pair of hands" in upholding the interests and will of the government, it is clear to Weir and Tomkins that "government-appointed investigations headed by establishment judges cannot hold the executive to account". As Weir points out this is certainly not a recent trend, nor is it, according to Tomkins, necessarily the fault of the judges: "it is not the job of judges to hold the government to account in respect of politically sensitive actions or decisions taken in the interests of national security" (p20). In the light of this, both articles offer alternatives for existing democratic institutions capable of performing this task. Weir advocates the use of juries, a "cornerstone" of the British justice system, sitting with a judge or expert advisor. He believes them to be suitably placed to "strengthen and democratise public enquiries" (p19). In contrast, Tomkins argues that Britain has a parliamentary system unique both in its capability to hold the government to account and its unwillingness to do so. Currently the most effective use of this ability is being exercised through the work of House of Commons select committees. This is where Tomkins believes accountability must come from. The problem he identifies is that although under Blair the quantity of parliamentary scrutiny may have increased, the quality of said scrutiny is unprecedentedly poor. The majority of those who become MPs do so not to embark upon a career sitting on select committees, nor do they see it as their job to hold the government to account. Rather they aspire to ministerial positions, achievable only through pleasing government whips. It is these damaging elements of the party system that Tomkins argues need be addressed, or "we will have no one to hold the government to account save for the dismal likes of Lords Hutton and Butler" (p21).