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Schengen Information System: SIS II - technical innovation pretext for more data and control

01 January 2001

Member states are using the construction of the "second generation SIS" not only to extend the capacity of the system, but also to introduce new technical and investigation possibilities.
First discussions on the present Schengen Information System were initiated in the late 1980's - at a time when the Schengen Implementation Agreement had not even been signed yet. In the SIS, all data is stored parallel, both in the central component in Strasbourg (C.SIS) and in national outlets (N.SIS). Thereby the C.SIS ensures the rapid transferal of alerts put in by one national SIRENE office to the other N.SIS. When the authorities carried out a feasibility study in 1988, they were far-sighted in that they predicted that apart from the then five Schengen members, more EU member states would join the club. The capacity of the system was therefore set at a level at which eight states could join the system. However, the planners were not far-sighted enough: when the SIS went online in March 1995, seven Schengen states were taking part - the five original ones (Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) plus Spain and Portugal. By the end of 1996, when Italy, Austria and Greece joined the SIS, it was being questionnned whether the system's capacity was sufficient. After all, ten states, two more than originally planned, were taking part. More candidates were, and still are, waiting in line: the Nordic EU member states Sweden, Finland and Denmark as well as the non-EU states Norway and Iceland. For the latter, the system had already been extended (SIS 1+). Britain and Ireland are to receive partial participation in the SIS. And then there's the many EU accession states, who have (and want) to implement the whole of the Schengen acquis, including the SIS.
The Schengen Executive Committee therefore decided in late 1996 to extend the SIS to SIS II. Recent papers by the Council's SIS Working Group and the Mixed Committee (which includes Norway and Iceland) prove that this extension will not only serve increased capacities but is supposed to open up new technological "functionalities", which in turn necessitate amendments of the Schengen Agreement. "On the basis of the work carried out over several years by the SIRENE working party, which has studied the new functionalities planned within the framework of the SIS II", the French presidency presented "descriptive sheets" in July last year, from which can be derived the aims, operational interests as well as the technical, financial and legal effects of the planned amendments. In October last year, the SIS working group referred these recommendations to the Article 36 committee. Only Italy had a "general scrutiny reservation" and France declared a partial reservation against the increased storage time of personal data.

Longer storage times - more data
Until now, there was a general three year limit for the storage of personal data after which the inputting agencies had to check if the data was still necessary. The only exception to this rule were alerts under Article 99: in cases of discreet surveillance, personal records could only be stored for up to one year. This curtailed storage time took account of the fact that as a rule, there was no concrete evidence of criminal offences against the people subjected to surveillance. The precondition for surveillance is generally a police prognosis on the person in question being likely to commit a crime in future. Requests for surveillance could also be made by national secret intelligence agencies. These kinds of alerts are one of the most contested aspects of the Schengen Implementation Agreement, because they link police interventions, which are not (supposed to be) known to the affected persons, to a mere suspicion of danger - a typical political police praxis. With the temporal extension of data storage, initial concerns are thrown over board, without even pointing to possible expectations towards police efficiency. After all, th