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Statewatch/TNI: Submission to the European Commission public consultation on EU funds in the area of security

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09 March 2018

Submission from Statewatch and the Transnational Institute to the European Commission's public consultation on EU funds in the area of security, March 2018.

About this submission

1. This submission responds to the European Commission’s public consultation on EU funds in the area of security. It sets out our concerns about the security components of the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (hereafter MFF), with particular reference to funding for internal security, migration and border control, and security research.
2. The submission does not respond directly to the questions in the European Commission’s questionnaire because the process appears primarily concerned with eliciting support for the EC’s activities in this area to date and its future proposals, rather than promoting a genuine and desperately-needed debate about the impact, legitimacy and effectiveness of EU security funding.
3. We also note that the timeframe for this consultation renders it extremely unlikely that the responses to it can be meaningfully considered by those responsible for drafting the proposals establishing the different elements of the MFF. With proposals for the MFF due at the beginning of May, the European Commission has allowed itself just 8 weeks to analyse, digest and incorporate the wealth of analysis and hundreds of suggestions that will likely be put forward in response to the consultation. It is therefore both highly improbable and most regrettable that the consultation will play anything more than a symbolic, legitimising role in respect to EU policy development. This process is itself representative of the abject failure to meaningfully take into account the views of civil society in the development and implementation of security funding instruments over the past two decades, and this shortcoming will only be further reinforced by the stated goal to have the financial instruments approved by the time of the next EP elections in May 2019.
4. This submission is divided into four sections. The first provides a broad, critical analysis of EU security funding and policies it has supported to date. This provides the context for the analysis of specific policy areas provided in the second section. A third section examines some overarching themes common to EU security policies and funding programmes. The fourth section contains recommendations for overhauling the way in which EU security funding programmes are currently developed and implemented. Annex 1 provides a list of detailed reports that we and others have produced over the past 10 years showing how EU security funds have been spent, showing in painstaking detail the concerns put forward in this submission.

Who are we

5. The Transnational Institute (TNI) is an international research and advocacy institute committed to building a just, democratic and sustainable world. For more than 40 years, TNI has served as a unique nexus between social movements, engaged scholars and policy makers. Statewatch is a non-profit-making voluntary group founded in 1991 that encourages the publication of investigative journalism and critical research in Europe the fields of the state, justice and home affairs, civil liberties, accountability and openness.

Our demands

6. A fundamental recalibration of priorities towards human and societal security and new mechanisms to provide for basic democratic control, enhanced transparency and meaningful accountability over EU security funding.

Section 1: Overview: prioritising security, to the detriment of freedom and justice

7. The EU is committed to creating of an area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ), yet it is widely agreed by civil liberties groups, fundamental rights experts, and critical social and political scientists that the EU has consistently prioritised security at the expense of freedom and justice. This trend, which began to accelerate following ‘9/11’, has become even more marked following terrorist attacks and the large-scale arrival of refugees and migrants in EU territory in recent years. The impact of this imbalance is discussed further below.
8. The European Commission has pointed to the results of Eurobarometer surveys undertaken in recent years to argue for greater EU involvement in security policy, interpreted primarily as concerning terrorism, organised crime, cybercrime, border management and natural disasters. The results do undoubtedly show growing concern over these issues. However, what has not been publicly acknowledged by the Commission is the clear evidence that people also feel that their fundamental rights and freedoms have been unduly restricted by measures adopted in the name of fighting crime and terrorism,[1] and that apparent support for restrictive migration control measures may not be as well-founded as surveys suggest.[2]
9. While the Member States retain primary responsibility for security issues (and sole competence over “national security”, understood as relating to their security, intelligence and paramilitary agencies), the role of the EU should not be understated. The EU legal and policy framework has expanded significantly over the last decade, as has the level of funding made available to support its implementation.
10. Both the substance of this funding, and the procedures for allocating it, give cause for concern. The growing importance of this policy area and citizens’ concerns over the implications it has for their rights mean that it is crucial to question the type of security that is being pursued. Equally, given the nature of the policies in question, which increasingly impinge upon fundamental civil liberties and individual rights, ensuring transparency and accountability is of the utmost importance.
11. The EU’s approaches to security issues are, unsurprisingly, in many ways a reflection of those adopted by the Member States, although the nature of EU institutions and agencies adds further complexities. It is recognised that much of the ‘added value’ provided by EU funding comes from enhanced transnational coordination and cooperation, strengthening state powers in novel ways. There are few who would dispute the benefits of such coordination and cooperation – in political as well as financial terms – to deal with the complex issues facing European and global societies, but the approach taken by the EU and the Member States raises important public policy questions.
12. Overall, this policy area is characterised by a strong focus on ‘hard’ security measures that emphasise the neutralisation of ‘threats’ over tackling the root causes of insecurity in the 21^st Within this broader trend can be seen a shift from reactive to proactive and “intelligence-led” policing (underpinned by a strong emphasis on various types of surveillance measures), excessive and over-broad criminalisation, restrictions on civil liberties, the targeting of ‘suspect communities’ and the expansion of executive powers. EU security funding both directly and indirectly supports such measures. The implications for individuals and for society more broadly should not be underestimated, given the resurgence of nationalism and creeping authoritarianism in Europe and beyond that is now plain for all to see.
13. These concerning developments are taking place as state bodies and agencies are increasingly networked, in both operational and policy terms, particularly through EU funding initiatives. However, alongside innovative means of enhanced cooperation among EU member state agencies and other public bodies comes a greatly increased role for the private sector. This gives rise to new and as-yet unresolved issues concerning democratic control, accountability and transparency.

Section 2: Specific issues

Counter-terrorism

14. There can be no doubt that the counter-terrorism policies pursued by the EU and its Member States have had and continue to have an adverse impact on fundamental rights. As Amnesty International wrote in January 2017 in a report on the impact of counterterrorism in Europe: “Brick by brick, the edifice of rights protection that was so carefully constructed after the Second World War, is being dismantled,”[3] a result of the introduction of emergency laws and the undermining of the principle of legality; the rights to privacy, freedom of expression, liberty and freedom of movement; the stripping of nationality; and the principle of non-refoulement.
15. The EU, despite the Commission’s fundamental role as the guardian of the treaties and thus the human rights and democratic standards on which they are based, has proven either unwilling or unable to make any meaningful interventions to prevent this state of affairs. Indeed, EU funding supports such counter-democratic measures, whether directly (for example by assisting in the implementation of EU law and policy in the context of diminishing rights protections) or indirectly, by providing the responsible national agencies with some measure of financial and operational support.
16. More recently, under the banner of ‘countering violent extremism’, the counter-terrorism lens has been widened from terrorist groups and suspicious individuals to ideologies and behaviours, exacerbating the process of securitisation. Counter-terrorism, security and migration policy have become increasingly intertwined, casting suspicion over both non-EU nationals and EU citizens, particularly those of ethnic minority backgrounds. Thus counter-terrorism has come to affect more and more areas of public policy and material life, with a host of public and private actors – from educators to financial service providers, transport companies to social media companies – given law enforcement responsibilities. This too has far-reaching implications for democracy and human rights.
17. The need to pursue policies in the area of counterterrorism is self-evident, and many of the measures pursued by the EU and the Member States are no doubt well-intentioned. Yet their negative impact on fundamental rights has been consistently dismissed or downplayed, as Amnesty rightly notes, diminishing the human rights framework on which European societal security must be founded.
18. Future EU security funds should put a far greater emphasis on taking seriously the root causes of terrorism and radicalisation. In this respect the EU’s research programmes are crucial, and should not be instrumentalised for policy purposes, particularly in respect to the anti-democratic manoeuvres discussed below. The provision of EU security funds for counter-terrorism measures must also consider the broader context in which those measures will be exercised, with meaningful human rights impact assessments and review mechanisms and the possibility to withhold or withdraw funding on the grounds of fundamental rights, the rule of law or democratic standards.

Law enforcement

19. It is also abundantly clear that policy and practice in the realm of counter-terrorism and national security have acted as a ‘pick-lock’ and contagion in EU and national criminal justice systems, normalising ‘exceptional’ measures and paving their way for their use in ‘ordinary’ policing.
20. Manifestations of this approach can be seen not only in the normalisation of exceptional legal measures but in the ongoing acquisition of, and attempts to develop, new technologies for use in routine policing work that rely on practices and powers that would traditionally have been considered reserved for intelligence agencies. While this is in part a result of the decreasing cost of new technologies, the practical efficacy of novel methods of surveillance, identification, tracking and analysis needs to be more carefully considered in light of their broader implications for society.
21. The substance and effects of EU security laws, policies and new technologies and the ways in which they are developed and implemented – for example, through expert networks and working groups – frequently give cause for concern with regard to fundamental rights. EU funding should be predicated on strict respect for human rights safeguards and pro-active and maximal transparency.

Border control and migration

22. In the name of preventing irregular migration, whether of ‘economic migrants’ or refugees, border control and migration have been increasingly integrated into security frameworks. The role of EU security funding in this area has steadily grown in significance to the point that it now plays a central role in the ongoing attempt to develop a comprehensive European ‘integrated border management’ system.
23. The EU’s response to the ‘refugee crisis’ – which to Europe’s enduring shame is ultimately a ‘refuge crisis’ – has been built upon some 30 years of ever tighter and increasingly-externalised border controls, restrictive refugee policies and toughening measures against ‘irregular’ migrants
24. The ‘Fortress Europe’ approach gives precedence to investments in the security apparatus over those that would ensure compliance with the EU’s and Member States’ human rights obligations. Despite the vast number of actions taken and funding provided, this approach can only curb migration at tremendous human cost.
25. The militarisation and externalisation of borders has resulted in widespread deaths and increased violence (both physical and psychological) against individuals. The containment of people in border, buffer and transit states, and cooperation measures with repressive and authoritarian governments, continues to result in large-scale violations of migrants and refugees’ rights, and frays the social fabric of societies both within and without the EU.
26. Legal migrants and so-called ‘bona-fide’ travellers are also subject to drastically enhanced surveillance measures, with practically all non-EU citizens entering the bloc foreseen to be fingerprinted by 2020, and to be subject to a variety of forms of data collection, profiling and analysis. Existing and planned databases – particularly in the context of the EU’s ‘interoperability’ initiative – will create a formidable surveillance architecture and tangibly change the character of open, liberal democratic societies. As the EU’s data protection supervisor put it in 2008, in a critical response to a raft of EU border control proposals that fell largely on deaf ears, the “underlying assumption” is that “all travellers” should be “considered a priori as potential law breakers” and “put under surveillance.”[4]
27. If the EU is to take seriously its responsibilities in upholding fundamental rights and international law, the model of border security pursued and funded in the name of both preventing irregular migration and facilitating regular migration must be re-examined and re-founded on an approach that enables the EU to meet its humanitarian obligations while providing durable solutions to mixed migration flows.
28. In this context the wholly disproportionate provision of funds for border security policies based on control and deterrence must be fundamentally reconsidered. With regard to the development of new technologies and practices, the aims and uses of the EU’s research funds are crucial. Furthermore, the accountability required for funding in this sensitive area is poorly-served by existing oversight and transparency measures and the use of multiple instruments and budgets for migration-related purposes.

Section 3: Overarching themes

Mass surveillance

29. Mass surveillance goes far beyond the communications monitoring and hacking capabilities of EU member states’ security and intelligence services revealed by whistle-blower Edward Snowden. Mandatory biometric profiling, travel surveillance, so-called smart borders, research into enhanced biometric technologies for law enforcement agencies, and ongoing demands in EU proposals for interoperable biometric databases for both migration and law enforcement purposes are fundamentally changing relationships between the state and the individual.
30. As the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights whilst countering terrorism argued recently, in remarks that are highly pertinent to EU policy, “we should be deeply concerned when expansive and intrusive data collection is being mandated for all states across the globe without considered national consultation on constitutional or legislative protections for privacy, and without ascertaining the views held by all affected governments and civil society within most states on the collection of broad swathes of such personal and identifiable information (and widely sharing citizen information with other countries)”.[5]
31. The Court of Justice of the EU has proven an important bulwark against over-intrusive surveillance measures and has established important standards for protecting the rights to privacy and data protection, which along with EU and international law should provide the basis for assessing all measures impinging on those rights. But these fundamental principles are not being respected in the deployment of EU funding in pursuit of ever-more surveillance measures and technologies whose necessity, proportionality and efficacy can be fundamentally questioned.
32. This default resort to surveillance measures as a ‘solution’ to complex social problems must be reconsidered, taking into account both how those measures actually effect individual rights, and how they may be deployed or ‘re-purposed’ in the future for originally-unforeseen purposes.

Shrinking space for civil society

33. In a growing number of EU member states, security policies have also contributed to what has been called the “shrinking space for civil society”, legitimising attacks on human rights advocates and activists[6] at a time when their work is needed more than ever.
34. This situation was confirmed in a report published in January 2018 by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), which stated: “Given the vital role civil society plays in upholding democratic processes and in promoting human rights, decision makers need to ensure the important work of civil society is not undermined through policy and legal changes and funding cuts”.[7] FRA Director, Michael O’Flaherty, demanded that: “Addressing this unacceptable situation should be a high priority for policy makers at EU and national levels.”
35. The FRA’s report highlighted: threats, physical and verbal attacks against activists, as well as smear campaigns; legal changes that negatively affect civil society, such as freedom of assembly restrictions, often a by-product of counter-terrorism laws; shrinking budgets and increased difficulties in getting funding; and the lack of appropriate involvement of civil society in law- and policy-making.
36. At a time when civil liberties are under threat in a way that Europe has not seen in decades, civil society is being marginalised and excluded from key decisions and debates. These developments not only restrict hard-won rights but are also leading to fundamentally disproportionate security policies. The EU must take action to address this grave situation by re-purposing a significant proportion of EU security funding to support the participation, pluralism and independence of civil society.

Nationalism, xenophobia, racism and discrimination

37. As the aforementioned Amnesty report suggested: “fear, alienation and prejudice are steadily chipping away at the cornerstones of the EU: fairness, equality and non-discrimination”.
38. The discourse around counterterrorism frequently overlaps with concerns about migration and refugees, both of which have been ruthlessly exploited by the far right. The rhetoric and practice of the ‘war on terror’ has fuelled Islamophobia by perpetuating the idea that Muslims are dangerous, and that Islam/multiculturalism is the problem.
39. While the EU is legally committed to counter such trends and also supports initiatives against xenophobia, racism and discrimination, the measures it proposes in the security realm – such as proposals for new databases designed to address terrorism and migration management, or “counter-radicalisation” measures – frequently reinforce and renew stereotypes and problematic discourses.
40. EU initiatives and funding for both EU and national measures should entail ongoing, meaningful and effective consideration of the impact they may have on ethnic minorities and non-EU nationals and other specific social groups. Significantly more funding to counter threats to these groups’ security must be made available, in ways that do not instrumentalise such groups in the pursuit of other security aims and objectives.

Technological determinism

41. EU home affairs and research funds both demonstrate a profound reliance on new technologies and, as noted, surveillance measures as a response to complex social issues. While new technologies can and should play a crucial role in addressing the problems faced by European and global societies, they should only ever be deployed in a transparent, accountable and proportionate manner that is consistent with the EU’s fundamental rights obligations.
42. The Commission presents new technologies as neutral way of pursuing its policy objectives, yet the required balance is yet to be struck. Whereas privacy and data protection are frequently taken into account, to varying degrees, in new EU policy and research initiatives, the issues involved go far beyond this to core questions around the legitimacy and desirability of maximum security societies.
43. As long as technology is presented as the ‘solution’ to security problems, it is inevitable that fundamental rights and other values will be sacrificed in the rush to develop new technologies. This is due in no small part due to the influence and motivation of the private sector, which now generates vast profits from the development and implementations of security and surveillance technologies, and which inevitably places ‘efficiency’ and profit ahead of other values and interests such as accountability, democratic control and human rights protection. The widespread deployment of any given technology in society should be the result of rational, democratic, deliberate choices.
44. Beyond such fundamental concerns, the evaluations of the FP7 and H2020 security research programmes have also demonstrated that in their fundamental goal of developing new technologies for sale on the ‘security market’, the programmes have not been successful and do not represent value for money. This too points towards the need for alternative approaches.

Pre-empting the democratic process

45. This technological determinism – the premise that because technology exists and promises more security it must be used – has at times fundamentally undermined the democratic process. At the EU level, decisions have been taken to fund the development of specific security technologies and applications, leading to legislators being presented with an effective fait accompli.
46. This is precisely what happened with the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), the Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive and the ongoing “smart borders” initiative. In each case substantial EU funding was provided for development and implementation of these systems before the primary legislation had been agreed. In the case of PNR and smart borders these funds were allocated and spent in direct opposition to the wishes of the European Parliament, which had at the time rejected the initial Commission proposals.
47. This issue is closely related to wider problems of democratic control and transparency related to EU security funding (see further below). With regard to both the internal security funds and the research programmes, there is therefore an urgent need to halt their use in the implementation of new technologies underpinning EU initiatives before any foreseen legislative measures have been proposed and agreed.

Democratic control and transparency

48. The EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ is both long-standing and well-known, and is being exacerbated by the demand for swift decisions on new legislation and a reliance on a relatively small pool of specialist contractors and consultants to provide policy advice. In a number of cases this advice has been substituted for genuine impact assessments, which should be undertaken for all measures with significant social implications.
49. Furthermore, once the legislation governing EU funding programmes has been agreed, there is a significant lack of democratic control or accountability over how money is spent. This is the case for both the internal security/home affairs funds and the funds disbursed through the security research programme.
50. With regard to the EU’s internal security funds specifically, changes are needed to ensure that EU citizens and residents are able to know what is being done in their name and with what is ultimately their money. The current method of implementing and monitoring home affairs funds makes this extremely difficult, if not impossible. Furthermore, the tardy and limited nature of evaluations of these programmes makes it difficult even for legislators to know whether funding programmes function as intended, leaving them with little credible information on which to base decisions regarding future budgets.
51. With regard to the security research programme, once the broad priorities have been set by the legislators there is no space for further democratic accountability during its implementation. This is particularly concerning given the heavy reliance, in the research agenda-setting process, on the expertise of public and private organisations that are major beneficiaries of the programme. The general lack of transparency around how the research agenda is set has also been highlighted as a problem in the recent mid-term evaluation of the Secure Societies programme.
52. In this regard, recent proposals from civil society organisations to increase the direct involvement of citizens in the different thematic research agendas is very welcome and needs to be seriously considered. This would allow a more plural debate around what exactly should be prioritised in the programme, and would encourage greater transparency over decision-making. However, any such consultations must move beyond the EU’s current predilection for asking European citizens about sources of ‘insecurity’ and using this as a justification for all things ‘security’. Independent expertise from the fields of human rights, civil liberties and social and political sciences must also be meaningfully consulted.
53. There are further problems regarding the transparency and accessibility of the findings of research projects. This is the case both within the projects themselves, where the use of security classification has been noted as a way to prevent all participants having equal access to research findings, and ‘externally’. For example, the “disappearance” of project websites, often the only place where research findings are hosted, is a problem that could be easily remedied.

Section 4: Recommendations

Substantive issues

Priorities and agenda-setting

• New EU legislation governing the multi-annual financial framework and more specific components such as the successors to the Internal Security Fund and the research framework programme should take individual rights as their starting point. There must in turn be an equal emphasis and vastly increased funding for the protection of the fundamental rights that underpin the EU area of freedom, security and justice.
• The increasing reliance on surveillance measures as the foundation of EU security policies and budgets must be reconsidered in light of the implications for individual rights and the broader context of constructing maximal security architectures. Surveillance must be limited to what is necessary and proportionate must be under democratic control, and there must be a much greater emphasis on and investment in alternatives to mass surveillance.
• The long-standing emphasis on new technologies, and particularly surveillance technologies, as a panacea for complex social problems is short-sighted and serious consideration should be given to alternative ways of achieving research and policy goals.
• All new legal, policy and funding measures should be accompanied by in-depth fundamental rights impact assessments that meaningfully explore and give genuine consideration to different policy options.
• The current framework for ethics assessment and monitoring must be extended from individual projects to working programmes and annual calls for proposals, so that complex ethical issues can be meaningfully assessed and mitigated before funding is committed to particular security frameworks in ways that pre-empt or nullify such concerns.
• The role of the private sector, interior ministries and other state agencies and major research institutes must be meaningfully balanced with that of national and transnational civil society organisations, academia, legal experts and critical thinkers, both before, during and after the development and implementation of new laws, policies, funds, priorities and projects. This will require dedicated funding for civil society if it is to be able to participate on an equal footing.

Policy areas and implementation

• EU funding for counter-terrorism policy should not been used to assist in the implementation or reinforcement of emergency laws or exceptional measures that run counter to fundamental rights, the rule of law and democratic standards, and the EU should take an active stance in assisting Member States to reverse and delimit such measures.
• The use of new technologies for the extension and novel deployment of ‘normal’ law enforcement powers and the increasing reliance on pro-active and “intelligence-led” policing must only be undertaken where strictly necessary and proportionate and where no less intrusive alternatives are feasible, and EU security funds directed towards these ends (whether at EU or national level) should be assessed in this light.
• The provision of funds for border control and migration management policies (and the development of associated technologies and practices) based on control, deterrence, surveillance and profiling must be fundamentally reconsidered and replaced by a new approach based on respect for fundamental rights, international law and the EU’s humanitarian obligations. Saving lives must take precedence over ‘border security’. As a starting point, baseline assessments in the context of the successor of the Internal Security Fund should outline national priorities for asylum and migration and describe how the EU security funding can add value and complement these objectives. Baseline assessments should incorporate data from human rights institutions and non-governmental actors and sources.

• The security research programme should be redirected from seeking the implementation of existing policies and laying the groundwork for future ones, towards examining ways to address the root causes of insecurity (at home and abroad) and begin to counterbalance the overwhelming focus on increasing security of the last decade with measures to restore civil liberties, preserve fundamental rights and enhance accountability. All of these initiatives could be addressed as part of a much broader human and societal security research agenda.

• The broader social context in which funds will be spent on implementing policy and developing and deploying new technologies – for example in relation to rising xenophobia and racism, the shrinking space for civil society, and the undermining of the rule of law – must be taken into account in both policy development and implementation, with the aim of defending and extending equality, freedom and justice as genuine priorities. Systematic and meaningful use of impact assessments and the employment of ‘counter-expertise’ when contracting policy studies would be useful in this respect.
• Neither EU internal security budgets, security research, nor any other funding programme, should be used for the pre-emptive implementation of measures requiring EU legislation.

Procedural issues

Decision-making on EU security funds – indeed, all EU decision-making – should be based on the principles of openness, democracy, inclusiveness and transparency during the preparatory, negotiating, implementation and review phases of all legal, policy and funding measures. If the EU wishes to ‘do more’ in the field of security (and elsewhere), then the long-standing ‘democratic deficit’ must be addressed alongside the development and implementation of laws, policies and projects that respect, uphold and extend fundamental rights.

Regarding the legislative process, there is a need for:

• genuine and meaningful public consultation on all major proposals and consistent use of independent impact assessments for all initiatives with significant social impacts, as foreseen in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making;
• making use of ‘counter-expertise’ in preparing feasibility studies and policy option evaluations;
• the elimination of secret trilogues and maximal transparency in and between all EU institutions and in their relationships with other public and private interests;
• where programmes require the establishment of national annual or multi-annual programmes (e.g. the internal security funds), ensure that negotiations on those programmes do not pre-empt democratic decision-making and that information and documentation relating to the negotiations and decisions is publicly available.

Regarding the implementation and evaluation of internal security funds:

• pro-active publication of reports by Member States and the Commission on the implementation and monitoring of funds deployed as part of national programmes and likewise for Union actions, including a breakdown of the actions and projects funded and their beneficiaries;
• the strict meeting of obligations for interim and final evaluations, which should also be subject to a more ambitious review process (during a seven-year programme reviews could feasibly be undertaken every two years or even annually if the structure of projects and actions permits);
• the creation of an independent and permanent mechanism for a thorough ex-post human rights impact assessment. Such mechanism could not only capture and measure the human rights impacts of the implementation of the fund, but also provide a useful source for the mid-term and final evaluations of the fund.

Regarding the implementation and evaluation of the security research programme:

• ensure that all interested parties are able to contribute and are able to understand where, how and why decisions have been taken in relation to the work programmes;
• open a debate on how better democratic input and scrutiny could be exercised over the security research programme, for example through a role for parliamentary committees;
• ensure that access to project deliverables is not unduly restricted by preventing the over-zealous use of security classification and establishing a requirement for the public archiving of all project deliverables on the CORDIS website.

Annex: relevant publications

• March 2018: The Globalisation of Countering Violent Extremism Policies (TNI)
• January 2018: Challenges facing civil society organisations working on human rights in the EU (Fundamental Rights Agency)
• November 2017: The industry of migration control: The Spanish winners of European Union border policies (executive summary in English, full report in Spanish) (PorCausa)
• September 2017: Security for Sale: The price we pay to protect Europeans (De Correspondent)
• August 2017: Market Forces: the development of the EU security-industrial complex (Statewatch/TNI)
• January 2017: Dangerously disproportionate: the ever-expanding national security state in Europe (Amnesty International)
• December 2016: Border Wars II (TNI)
• July 2016: Border Wars (TNI)
• April 2014: Review of Security Measures in the 7^th Research Framework Programme FP7 2007-2013 (European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies)
• February 2014: Eurodrones, Inc. (Statewatch/TNI)
• September 2009: NeoConOpticon (Statewatch/TNI)

Endnotes

[1] Special Eurobarometer, April 2015. The most recent Eurobarometer specifically concerned with security (December 2017) did not, unfortunately, concern itself with the issue of rights and freedoms.

[2] ‘European citizens want information on migration – not higher walls’, The Conversation, 3 August 2017, https://theconversation.com/european-citizens-want-information-on-migration-not-higher-walls-81129

[3] Amnesty International, ‘Dangerously disproportionate: the ever-expanding national security state in Europe’, 17 January 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur01/5342/2017/en/

[4] European Data Protection Supervisor, Preliminary Comments of the European Data Protection Supervisor,

Brussels, 3 March 2008, p. 5, available at: https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/08-03-03_comments_border_package_en.pdf.

[5] Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘The UN Security Council, Global Watch Lists, Biometrics, and the Threat to the Rule of Law’, Just Security, 17 January 2018, https://www.justsecurity.org/51075/security-council-global-watch-lists-biometrics/

[6] ‘On “shrinking space” – a framing paper’, Transnational Institute, 7 April 2017, https://www.tni.org/en/publication/on-shrinking-space

[7] ‘Civil society under threat, Fundamental Rights Agency finds’, Fundamental Rights Agency, 18 January 2018, http://fra.europa.eu/en/press-release/2018/civil-society-under-threat-fundamental-rights-agency-finds