Study of European internal security
01 July 1995
The Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael" on behalf of the Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (BVD) security service recently completed a study on the influence of European cooperative structures upon the BVD's autonomy. It concludes that the chances of more permanent and dedicated structural arrangements developing in the field of internal security in the near future are small. The report draws attention to the fact that at present, no dedicated structure exists within the European Union which deals specifically with security and intelligence matters. However, the present practice of mainly bilateral working contacts between likeminded "sister services", independent of existing European and international fora, could be expected to develop into ad hoc "coalitions", operating jointly both in operational matters and in policy-implementing bodies such as the European Union Working Group on Terrorism.
The author of the report, Mrs J Pouw writes that at present, cooperation in the police area is the most important for security services and the best guarantee for influencing decision-making is participation in those forums. As long as there is no centralization of competencies and powers in the police and justice areas there seems, she concludes, to be no need to come to a dedicated European forum of consultation on internal security matters.
Mrs Pouw describes the intensive participation of the Dutch security service in a large number of commissions that prepare the Dutch positions in European fora such as the Schengen consultations and a wide range of other working groups on policing matters and issues such as organized crime, terrorism, customs and narcotics matters. She discusses the possibility of forming a separate security intelligence "cell" within Europol which would allow security services to exchange sensitive information, but recognizes that major obstacles are still in the way. Security services could adopt the Europol model for their own information exchange needs, but the general fear of losing control over sensitive information is likely to prevent such a development in the coming decade, unless Europol itself turns out to be a complete success. According to Mrs Pouw, security services could opt for active participation instead of mere consultation in the Europol Working Group now that terrorism will become part of Europol's mandate.
Security services do participate fully in certain EU forums, such as the EU Working Group on Terrorism that meets several times a year, but according to the "Clingendael" report these meetings are of little practical value. Although the Trevi Secure Fax Network (TSFN), in operation since 1987, is still considered secure and reliable, it is cumbersome and a more sophisticated crypto E-mail system is under preparation. The Working Group has expressed criticism on the security of confidential information transferred through the Commission Secretariat to the various "Bureaux de Liaison" in the national security services. Within the Secretariat such documents are being xeroxed in large numbers, thus increasing the risk of leaks. Although the threat analyses produced in the Terrorism Working Group are largely based on publicly available materials, they are classified as "Secret". The apparent lack of trust in such international arrangements does little to improve the quality of information exchanged through these channels, thus undermining the whole endeavour.
The European Commission Office for Security (ECOS) also has the ambition of growing into a European Security Service. Its director Mr Pieter De Haan has repeatedly expressed his views on this and many employees of European security services, hoping for a fast track career, have taken up positions in the ECOS offices. Its present role however is limited to the securing of the European Union's bodies, mainly through vetting their employees in close cooperation with the national security services, and Mrs Po