UK: Hillsborough: The failure of scrutiny
01 May 1998
On 15 April 1989 Liverpool Football Club played Nottingham Forest at Hillsborough Stadium, Sheffield, England in the semi final of the national FA Cup. Half an hour before the 3pm kick-off the crowd outside the stadium at the Leppings Lane end of the stadium began to build up. It soon was obvious that the old turnstiles could not deal with the numbers waiting to enter the stadium.The South Yorkshire Police decided not to postpone the kick-off and opened a massive exit gate (Gate C) to relieve the congestion.
In a few minutes over 2,000 Liverpool supporters walked into the stadium through Gate C, unstewarded and with no police direction. They walked across a concourse area and down a one in six gradient tunnel into the rear of two already overcrowded pens. In the pens the fans stood on terraced steps divided only by old crush barriers. They were trapped by a wall and fence to the front,which had a narrow locked gate up onto the perimeter track, and to the sides by lateral fencing.
As more fans came down the tunnel those at the front were gradually asphyxiated, their screams drowned by the roar of the crowd. Those at the back were unaware of the plight of those at the front. The police on the perimeter track did not open the narrow gates in the fence until it was too late. 96 died,400 were hospitalised, 750 were injured and thousands traumatised. It was the UK's worst sporting disaster.
The Police Match Commander lied to the soccer officials and the media when he accused Liverpool supporters of breaking down Gate C and causing an inrush into the two central pens - Lord Justice Stuart-Smith referred to it as a "disgraceful lie" (p83 para 100). The truth was that opening Gate C without first closing off the tunnel and redirecting fans to the empty side pens caused the fatal crush.
Further, the failure of the police to act quickly in rescuing fans and evacuating the pens contributed to the deaths and injuries. When those in the pens were carried out there was an absence of adequate medical facilities. It is now clear that many of those who died could have been saved. Only 14 of the 96 were taken to hospital.
A Government Home Office Inquiry under Lord Justice Taylor found that police mismanagement of the crowd was the main reason for the disaster. He also criticised the Stadium, its owners, safety engineer, and the local authority. Damages were subsequently awarded against the police for "liability in negligence". The Director of Public Prosecutions, however, ruled that there was insufficient evidence to mount a prosecution against any police officer and the inquests returned a verdict of accidental death on all who died. These verdicts were upheld in the Divisional Court. In February 1998 a Judicial Scrutiny, under
Lord Justice Stuart-Smith has upheld these decisions.
Research by Professor Phil Scraton and a team from the Centre for Studies in Crime and Social Justice, Edge Hill University College, has exposed the depth of the miscarriages of justice which contextualise the Hillsborough Disaster. In its implications the analysis goes well beyond Hillsborough. It involves the unusual procedures through which police officers systematically "reviewed" and "altered" statements, the injustices of the inquest procedure and the ineffectiveness of police disciplinary processes which enabled senior officers to escape internal disciplining for "neglect" of duty. What follows is Phil Scraton's recent briefing paper for MPs in response to the Judicial Scrutiny.
The Hillsborough Scrutiny: Briefing and Response
It is a matter of profound concern that after nearly nine years of investigation,inquiry and scrutiny the bereaved and survivors of the Hillsborough disaster remain burdened by a deep sense of injustice. They are persistently reminded that the South Yorkshire Police were allocated, and accepted, the main proportion of blame in the judgment of the civil action for damages and in the findings of<