

SN 2540/98

RESTREINT

NOTE

from: General Secretariat of the Council

to: CIREA

Subject: Draft summary of discussions on Iraq

In accordance with the Action Plan on the influx of migrants from Iraq and the neighbouring region (document 5573/98 ASIM 13), CIREA has been requested to provide for an exchange of information tailored to the specific needs of Member States on factual information and its analysis. Consequently a questionnaire was sent to Member States (telex No. 738 dated 18.02.98 and No. 757 dated 19.02.98). The replies of Member States to the questionnaire were included in document 6611/98 CIREA 25 + ADD 1 and 2 (RESTREINT). Updates will be produced on a monthly basis concerning questions 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, 10 and 12 (see telex No 1494 dated 30.03.98).

CIREA already held discussions on Iraqi asylum-seekers on 30 September 1996 (summary in doc. 9747/1/96 CIREA 40 REV 1 (RESTREINT)). More recent information was supplied by the Member States in October 1997 (see doc. 12383/97 CIREA 95 + ADD 1 and 2 (RESTREINT)). A summary of this information, together with the oral statements by the Member States on the subject, is contained in doc. 12704/97 CIREA 97 RESTREINT + COR 1 (RESTREINT).

At its meeting held on 17-18 March 1998, CIREA carried out an examination of the situation in Iraq, based on an analysis of the replies in document 6611/98 CIREA 25 + ADD 1 and 2 (RESTREINT). Representatives of UNHCR attended part of the meeting. UNHCR had provided preliminary observations on some asylum-related aspects of the EU Action Plan on the Iraqi influx (see document 6651/98 CIREA 26 ASIM 68).

The Netherlands delegation provided a note on the situation of Christians in Iraq (see document 11973/97 CIREA 82).

Delegations will find attached for approval a draft summary of the above-mentioned examination, based on the analysis of Member States' replies. It incorporates the main elements of the discussions held at the CIREA meeting on 17-18 March 1998 (the additions and changes to this analysis are underlined).

1. Member States' statistics for nationals of Iraq for 1997 (January to December 1997 inclusive)

The table at Annex A refers.

In the period 1996-1997, four Member States recorded significant percentage increases in the numbers of applications for asylum submitted by Iraqi citizens (from +120% to +287%).

Concerning the particularly high proportion of Iraqi asylum applicants in five Member States three of these Member States suggested that the influx must be due to the high degree of recognition and/or protection that could be obtained in their countries and which might be a determining factor for applicants or their facilitators calculating enough to work this out. One of these Member State has, however, registered a drop in asylum applications in the first months of 1998, possibly because it started using the notion of internal flight alternative for Iraq at the end of 1997. Another Member State had registered a noticeable fall in the number of Iraqi applicants from 1996 to 1997, which had to be seen in relation to the increase in 1996 immediately after the PDK attack on the UPK zone of influence with the support of Iraqi troops.

One Member State reported a significant increase in the number and percentage of successful applications (+5,799 or +157% since 1996), and a noticeable increase in the numbers and percentage of decisions (+7,250 or +167%) although the recognition rate remained similar (85% in 1996, 82% in 1997). Two Member States reported considerable percentage decreases in recognition rates (from 50% to 29% and 71% to 39% respectively).

One Member State reported a significant increase in the grant of residency on humanitarian or other grounds (+159 or +116%), and a large increase in outright refusals (+54 or 96%), although the numbers of applications or total decisions had not risen considerably.

2. How the applicant left Iraq

Most Iraqi asylum seekers use facilitators, mainly in order to obtain falsified travel documents (according to nine Member States), or assistance with tickets and/or travel (according to four Member States) when leaving Iraq. One Member State reported that many of the facilitators used were affiliated to the PDK.

One Member State reported that some applicants travelled by road to Jordan and then arrived in their territory having used properly issued Iraqi passports, containing visas issued in Amman or Baghdad. Another Member State reported that some Iraqi asylum seekers were believed to have used their properly issued passports for travel, but had not presented these documents on arrival. According to a third Member State the asylum seekers travelled "legally", usually from Istanbul, to the Member State's territory, where the false passports were then surrendered to a member of the facilitator organization accompanying the group before they applied for asylum. Passports had occasionally been produced.

Transit routes used by Iraqi asylum seekers included:

Overland:

Two Member States reported that the majority of applicants had travelled by road from Turkey, usually clandestinely. Another Member State reported that several applicants had travelled by road from Turkey, via Eastern Europe, and then by train to Western Europe.

Combined Land and Air:

Ten Member States reported that this was the most common route used, involving the applicant travelling by road to either Turkey or Jordan, and then by air to Europe. Three Member States reported that the applicants tended not to fly direct to their territory, but had arrived from other EU Member States by train (mentioned by two Member States), or via the former Soviet Union (one Member State). According to a fourth Member State, apart from direct flights from Turkey to its capital, the applicants also travelled concealed in goods vehicles through Eastern Europe or by car or train via the former Soviet Republics. Many Iraqis entered the Member State in question from a neighbouring Member State, where they had an earlier application pending or have already obtained a residence permit.

Some Member States reported that a number of applicants had travelled from Iraq by land to Turkey or Jordan, and then by air to the Member State via North Africa (mentioned by one Member State), the Far East (two Member States), or Central or Eastern Europe (one Member State).

Sea or Combined Sea and Land:

Five Member States reported that some Iraqi asylum seekers left Turkey by sea with two Member States reporting that some Iraqi asylum seekers had travelled to their territory, by road or rail, via another EU Member State.

One Member State indicated that the asylum applicants used all types of navigable craft (boats, inflatable dinghies, speed boats, etc.) and in some cases sailed or piloted the boats themselves and sank them to destroy the evidence after landing. According to the same Member State it had been established that the more important Turkish ports situated in the vicinity of the cities and towns of Istanbul, Bodrum, Kusadasi, Kas and Tsantarli Ali Aga served as assembly and transit points, and the areas around the cities and towns of Istanbul, Diyarbakir, Mardin, Ipsala and Uzun Kopru in Turkey and Zakho in Iraq served as assembly and transit centres for illegal immigration into the Member State's territory.

Iraqi asylum seekers have stated that their journey from Iraq to Member States cost between US\$ 1,000 and US\$ 10,000, with one Member State reporting that one Iraqi asylum seeker stated that he had paid US\$ 1,000 for an EU passport. Another Member State indicated an amount of US\$ 10,000 for a family group. According to a third Member State the money was obtained by selling all belongings, with financial assistance from the immediate family or by borrowing money from friends.

3. Basic procedures for scrutinizing applications

All Member States interview Iraqi asylum seekers as a matter of routine except one who stated that all on-entry applicants were routinely interviewed, but in-country applicants were interviewed selectively, dependant upon the contents of a written account. Two Member States commented that an applicant may not be interviewed if there was sufficient reason to believe, on the basis of the evidence submitted in the application for asylum, that the applicant is entitled to be granted asylum.

One Member State reported that, if an application for asylum was refused, the national legislation allowed for a grant of a residence permit on the basis of the need for protection or pressing humanitarian reasons.

4. Treatment of asylum applicants whose applications are refused

One Member State stated that no Iraqi asylum applicants were refused whereas another reported that asylum and residence permit applicants from Iraqis had not generally been refused outright. A third Member State reported that there had been no decisions to refuse Iraqi asylum seekers as all applications by Iraqi citizens had been withdrawn prior to determination.

The majority of Member States did not return failed Iraqi asylum seekers to Iraq, some of them pointing to the international embargo imposed on Iraq by decision of the UN Security Council, others to the general situation in Iraq. One Member State specified that for applicants from Iraqi Kurdistan, the general rule is not to return them to the country of origin for humanitarian reasons in view of the socio-economic and security situation in the area. One Member State indicated that they would consider repatriation if it was deemed that the applicant posed a security risk. Another Member State commented that repatriation would be effected if it was shown to be legally and practically viable.

Two Member States indicated that they did not remove Iraqis to safe third countries. A third Member State stated that expulsion to third countries could only take place in cases where the person concerned had an entitlement to residence there and was not in danger of return to Iraq. A fourth Member State would remove failed Iraqi applicants to safe third countries provided there was a guarantee they were not then liable to be returned to Iraq under conditions which might put their safety at risk.

The majority of Member States reported that temporary or permanent residence on humanitarian or other grounds would be granted to failed Iraqi asylum seekers if they were unable to be removed, some of them also pointing to the current situation in Iraq.

5. Extent to which practical difficulties in returning persons to Iraq are a factor in Member States decisions to grant temporary or subsidiary protection to those who do not qualify for asylum

One Member State commented that, as removals were not an option for overall protection reasons with failed Iraqi asylum seekers, there were, as a consequence, no practical problems that had been encountered in relation to enforced returns.

One Member State pointed to practical obstacles because applicants were not in possession of travel documents or exit visas.

Six Member States specifically mentioned that subsidiary protection was allowed for failed asylum-seekers due to practical difficulties in carrying out returns:

- one Member State reported that the provision for subsidiary protection existed as a result of a Ministerial Circular, issued on 10 October 1997, which allowed failed asylum seekers to remain in its territory who were subject to expulsion orders, provided they could adequately demonstrate that they were unable to comply with the order. However, no Iraqi failed asylum seeker had, as yet, taken advantage of this provision, due to its recent implementation;
- a second Member State indicated that the practical difficulties associated with returns to Iraq and the current situation facing people of Kurdish origin in Iraq had led to the

decision to grant tolerance to stay, but without the normal rights of other aliens;

- a third Member State commented that, where removal of a failed asylum seeker proved impractical, suspension of expulsion (stay on tolerance, but with no social rights) would be allowed, although there was no automatic grant of residency;
 - a fourth Member State indicated that, as return to Iraq was physically impossible, national legislation allowed for tolerance to be demonstrated towards rejected asylum applicants;
 - in a fifth Member State a decision might be taken not to return the person if there were insuperable practical obstacles;
 - according to a sixth Member State the objective impossibility for the competent authorities of returning Iraqi nationals to Iraq was certainly a factor in their being granted temporary residence on humanitarian grounds, but other criteria were also taken into account, such as e.g. family situation, elderly persons, women, minors, etc.
6. Territories in the region of Iraq considered by Member States as being a safe third country

According to one Member State Jordan could be considered a safe first country of asylum for Iraqi nationals, but under certain conditions: the person must have left Iraq legally and entered and left Jordan legally, he/she must not have committed a crime in Jordan or be deemed a security risk and furthermore must be in possession of a passport. This view on Jordan is currently under review on the basis of the prevailing situation in the area (reported cases of torture in Jordan).

All other Member States considered that there were no safe third countries in the region.

However:

- one Member State could consider the countries bordering on Iraq to be safe third countries only where the person concerned had a permanent entitlement to residence in those countries and thus did not risk return to Iraq;
- a second Member State reported that, under national legislation, an asylum seeker could be returned to a country of earlier residence, if there was evidence that the asylum seeker would be admissible there until permanent protection could be found elsewhere. The possibility of considering Jordan as a country of earlier residence was being investigated;
- a third Member State had been given guarantees by Jordan in the past that Jordan would not return asylum applicants from Iraq. Greater caution needed to be exercised however before sending applicants back to Jordan, since the country had begun to return those who were not in a legal situation in Jordan;
- a fourth Member State considered that the viability of the neighbouring territories as safe third countries could be assessed on an individual basis, but did not, generally consider any of the countries to be safe third countries.

As to the protection provision in the neighbouring countries UNHCR had after an analysis of the situation found that none of Iraq's neighbouring countries could be regarded as a first country of

asylum or as a safe third country for Iraqi asylum-seekers and refugees. In all these countries Iraqis were generally exposed to serious threats to their security, in some cases they were exposed to refoulement (cases have been reported from Turkey and Jordan), and the highest level of protection they could expect was a tolerated status pending resettlement. The conclusion therefore was that there was no possibility of permanent stay or integration in the neighbouring countries (despite the fact that large numbers of Iraqis have been there for a long time, e.g. in Iran, but that was a different situation since they fled the war about 10 years ago).

As far as returns to Iraq were concerned UNHCR's policy was that, in principle, asylum-seekers who are properly rejected through fair procedures using the criteria appropriately could be returned. For Iraq there were however practical obstacles. In the case of Iraqis from government-controlled areas extreme caution was recommended. To avoid a particular negative focus on the individuals by the national authorities, returnees must be sent back via third countries (but they often disappear or the third country refuses transit). In the case of Northern Iraq UNHCR considered that return was not a viable option because of obstacles of humanitarian nature.

Concerning returns to the neighbouring countries the governments of the region were generally not prepared to receive large numbers of Iraqis any more. The situation might change however. Iran and Syria had accepted Iraqi refugees on political reasons (if they were opponents to the regime), but not on humanitarian reasons. Consultations had taken place with Jordan and Iran to find a regional solution to the problems of Iraqi refugees and strengthening their protection. The goal was to set up a system comparable to that of the CIS countries (legislation and institution building, etc.). UNHCR worked on a plan to analyze the possibility of the international community to take action to change the attitude of the governments to make Northern Iraq more safe.

As far as relations with Turkey were concerned UNHCR were in constant contact with the Turkish authorities to improve their use of the 1994 Regulation relating to asylum. The current regime for asylum-seekers in Turkey (five day rule, presentation of travel documents within 15 days) was an obstacle. The ultimate aim was to have the geographical reservation lifted, but in the short term UNHCR tried to relieve the situation of the refugees and improve their registration and reception conditions. The problem was that the Turkish authorities had a different view on how frontier reception centres should operate.

Asked about local screening procedures and recognition rates in respect of the territories neighbouring Iraq UNHCR reported that last year the recognition rate in the UNHCR office in Ankara was 28 %. In the neighbouring countries the majority of asylum-seekers originally came from the South or the Centre of Iraq (even if there was no war, the economic sanctions put hard pressure on the population in those parts of Iraq). However, according to a survey from January 1998, 75 % of applicants to Europa came from Northern Iraq and the remaining 25 % from the South and the Centre of Iraq. Thus two different case loads were being dealt with. UNHCR referred to a survey of February 1998 in four European countries that had revealed that the majority of Iraqis coming to Europe seemed to have Convention-related reasons to leave (fear of persecution and/or the situation of violence in Northern Iraq). They therefore had a valid claim in UNHCR's view.

Concerning the migrants screened out in the countries of the region UNHCR had incomplete statistical information, but promised to send more information as soon as possible. UNHCR determined the refugee status according to their mandate and considered the recognition rate to be fairly high. If a person was rejected, he would be expelled from most countries in the region. Even a recognized refugee was not totally safe.

7. The Member States views and practices with regards to the application of Internal Flight option within Iraq

Most Member States did not consider that internal flight could be applied with regard to Iraq, although one Member State is reviewing the suitability of the internal flight option in Iraq. According to one Member State internal flight might in principle be applied to Iraqi Kurds living outside Kurdistan, provided that they had some family or economic connection with Kurdistan and had no grounds to fear for their safety. In practice however, that alternative was not considered viable by this and a second Member State for socio-economic reasons and on grounds of general security within the region. Two other Member States considered that, in some cases, protection could be sought from either of the two main Kurdish parties.

The same two Member States considered that the Northern Kurdish Area of Iraq could be regarded as suitable for internal flight in some individual cases as this region was not directly controlled by the Iraqi central authorities. Similarly, a failed asylum seeker, who was an ordinary member of either of the two main Kurdish parties, and who returns to Northern Iraq, would not necessarily attract persecution as the result of a long absence from Iraq, or following an application for asylum according to one of these Member States. The second Member State did not accept that internal flight could be applied to an applicant who was regarded as having had high-profile political or military involvement.

As for the existence of jurisprudence in Member States with regard to the availability of protection in Northern Iraq one Member State reported that only little jurisprudence existed. The administrative court that had been seized on the question of whether or not Northern Iraq could be regarded as a safe zone had considered that there were not enough reasons to refuse the possibility of internal flight in Northern Iraq. Nor could the economic conditions justify that internal flight should be excluded for Northern Iraq. The Member State's Parliament had not reacted to this jurisprudence. However this appreciation did not exclude individual examination of the cases. A second Member State followed the same practice. Two recent decisions taken by administrative courts (on 20 January and 20 February 1998) confirmed the possibility of internal flight in Northern Iraq, and most asylum applicants from that area were therefore rejected, but only after individual examination.

In UNHCR's opinion there was no internal flight alternative in government-controlled territory for refugees from this part of Iraq due to the reports of serious and systematic violations of human rights. UNHCR did not find that the notion of internal flight alternative could be used for Northern Iraq either at the moment. This appreciation was based on the volatility of the situation and the continual shifting of power over different areas, towns and villages between the various factions involved in the conflict. The prevailing conflict was complex and external factors intervened (e.g. the possibility of intervention by Turkey). Consequently people fleeing Northern Iraq had no realistic possibility of seeking protection in the rest of Iraq. If they were rejected, they were expelled or remained illegally, but UNHCR had no statistics, as they had no access to an official source of information.

8. Any significant trends noted by Member States in the nature of asylum applications submitted by Iraqi asylum applicants

One Member State noted an increase in the number of applicants who claimed to be Iraqis, as well as a small increase in the number of Iraqi Armenian Christian applicants. Another Member State stated that Christian Iraqi asylum seekers, of Assyro-Chaldean origin, generally suffered less discrimination than other communities (e.g. Kurds), and therefore, applied stricter standards when assessing such claims. A third Member State had registered a small percentage of applicants who claimed persecution on religious grounds (Chaldeans - Alawites - Sunnites).

Two Member States reported that there had been an increase in the number of applications submitted by Kurds, usually claiming to be a militant affiliated to either the PDK or the UPK, although one of them also indicated an increase in the applications submitted by Shi'ites. One Member State had registered applicants claiming persecution on political grounds because they were not members of the Government Ba'ath party. Two Member States reported that most Iraqi asylum seekers had left Iraq as a direct result of repression by the Iraqi authorities, giving their ethnic Kurdish origin as the main reason according to one of these Member States. Two Member States reported that a significant number of applicants claimed to have left as a result of rivalry between the two main Kurdish parties. One of these Member States now expected Iraqi asylum seekers who claimed to be affiliated with the PDK to give an account of their relations with the Iraqi authorities as a result of the collaboration between the Iraqi authorities and the PDK.

One Member State reported that most of Iraqi asylum applicants came from professional backgrounds, such as teachers and doctors, and that doctors usually feared persecution as a result of their work with the military. Two other Member States stated that most applicants had not left Iraq as a result of any particular problem with the Iraqi authorities, but rather as a result of the current economic and social problems, coupled with the instability in Northern Iraq.

One Member State stated that very few applicants cited personal political activities or fear of military service as being the reason for leaving Iraq. In another Member State, however, the great majority of young Iraqi male asylum applicants gave as a reason the fact that they did not want to do military service or had deserted from the army. The political activities of close family members or the general situation in Iraq were other motives according to this Member State.

A third Member State mentioned for 1996 an important increase of applications from asylum-seekers who claimed to be Kurds and to have been obliged to fight other Kurds or to be suffering persecution from the victorious faction in the conflict between PDK and UPK (however it had been established in some cases that the applicants were in fact Turkish Kurds or, if they were Iraqis, had lived outside the country for quite a long time).

Two Member States indicated that most applicants were Kurds (70% according to one of them) from the autonomous region of Northern Iraq, and that very few applicants had documentation on arrival (according to the second Member State).

One Member State reported that approximately 80% of the total number of Iraqi asylum seekers were male, 84% of the total were Muslim, and 64% of the total were Kurdish. Another Member State believed that more than half of the influx was of Kurdish origin, but had no statistics yet on the basis of ethnic origin.

UNHCR mentioned that almost all Iraqi migrants arriving in Italy were Kurds.

9. Any significant changes in the appreciation of the conditions existing in Iraq

One Member State commented that the prevailing situation in Iraq had been a decisive factor in its decision to take a more favourable attitude to the assessment of Iraqi asylum applications. Another Member State indicated that an Iraqi citizen who returned to Iraq after submitting an asylum application, and who had not been persecuted prior to leaving Iraq, would not necessarily attract political persecution from the Iraqi central authorities. A third Member State mentioned that its assessment of the current political, economic and social situation in Iraq coincided with that contained in the September 1996 report from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

All other Member States reported no significant changes in their appreciation of the conditions existing in Iraq.

One Member State informed CIREA on a recent mission to Northern Iraq. The report was not yet official, but the experience gained from the mission seemed to indicate that the situation was more calm than in the period October to December 1997. Things seemed to be under control, and the demarcation line had been restored. The UPK faction had lost territory. The main obstacle to reconciliation between PDK and UPK was the fact that people were expelled if they were deemed to be supporters of the opposite camp, a second obstacle was the prisoners of war. The continuous exodus from Northern Iraq was due to several factors: the unstable situation and fear that Saddam Hussein's troops might return, continued fighting between PDK and UPK, though it was recently very localized (near the demarcation line), the economic situation and various groupings' fear of persecution. The report would be made available to CIREA once it had been officially approved by Parliament.

UNHCR was asked to give their current appreciation of the conditions existing in Iraq. UNHCR emphasized that in their opinion the present influx of Iraqi migrants into Europe was not a massive or large-scale influx compared with other movements of refugees in Europe and elsewhere in recent years (the distribution of the influx was very uneven though). According to a survey of January 1998 75 % of applicants came from Northern Iraq and the remaining 25 % from the South and the Centre of Iraq. The reasons of these migrants to leave are different and their applications are therefore examined differently. Many, but not all of those coming need international protection.

Information available indicated a continuous pattern of serious and systematic violations of human rights in the government-controlled part of Iraq. As to Northern Iraq information available indicated that since the outbreak of fighting between Kurdish factions in August 1996, the security conditions had deteriorated noticeably in all areas. Levels of violence had increased and there was no central authority to offer effective protection to the population. A meeting had taken place the week before with the head of the UNHCR regional office in Baghdad. The conclusions were that the situation was still very unstable, and negotiations had not yet given positive results. Some people who had experienced strong violence and had moved several times had at last decided to leave the country. UNHCR takes the view that Iraqi asylum-seekers arriving should have access to asylum procedures and either be granted refugee status or be allowed to remain on a temporary basis if they did not meet the Convention criteria.

UNHCR was asked about initiatives to be taken to stop the exodus. UNHCR welcomed EU efforts to improve the economic situation in the area to prevent further outflows. However, it was difficult to obtain rapid results. It had been difficult to make progress altogether, since this was a highly political issue that could not be addressed by UNHCR alone as a humanitarian organization (e.g. the question of a possible lifting of the embargo was a UN decision). Compared to the situation before the Gulf war the attitude of neighbouring countries has changed today and there was a lot of regional solidarity with the Iraq regime. Furthermore e.g. the Turkish

government's perception of the influx was linked to internal factors and some Iraqis who left Northern Iraq were perceived as terrorists. The refugee issue was used as part of the political discussion between the countries of the region.

10. Any significant alterations in the Member States handling and processing of Iraqi asylum applications

Six Member States reported specifically that they had not significantly altered their handling and processing of Iraqi asylum applications. One Member State reported that, as a result of the Gulf War, during which there had been a rise in asylum applications submitted by Iraqi citizens, they had taken a very liberal view of Iraqi asylum applications. However, they now applied a more stringent approach to the assessment of claims. Another Member State commented that, as the result of the availability of an internal flight option within Northern Iraq, asylum within the terms of the 1951 UN Convention was not, as a rule, granted, other than in exceptional individual cases.

One Member State was reviewing the possibility of granting a greater number of residence permits for protection rather than for humanitarian reasons; the question had been taken up the Court of Appeal, which was still reviewing it.

11. Any specific methods of determining doubtful Iraqi applications including language testing

Seven Member States indicated that they used Check Lists (e.g. nationality-related questions) and/or language assessment in order to test an applicant's nationality, although one Member State indicated that the Check Lists had proved to be of limited value. Language tests were being evaluated by another Member State. In a third Member State approx. 10 % of the applicants who had been subject to language tests had been identified as not being Iraqis. One Member State reported that it had not received many cases submitted by applicants of doubtful nationality.

12. Member States statistics for other (non-Iraqi) third country nationals from the region being citizens of Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria or Turkey for 1997 (January to December 1997 inclusive)

The tables at Annex B - E refer.

Member States which received significant flows of migrants are as follows:

Iran: four Member States received between 376 and 3,838 applications in 1997.

Jordan: one Member State received 964 applications for asylum in 1997.

Lebanon: EU figures varied between 0 and 160 applications for asylum in 1997, with significant flows for four Member States.

Syria: two Member States received 485 and 1549 applications respectively in 1997.

- Turkey: four Member States have received between 1,135 and 16,840 applications for asylum in 1997.
- Iran: Two Member States reported an acceptance rate greater than 40%. Two other Member States reported granting leave on humanitarian or other grounds at a rate of more than 20%. Outright rejection rates varied between 48.6% (one Member State) and 100% (two Member States).
- Jordan: Three Member States had granted asylum, with the vast majority of applications for asylum on behalf of Jordanian asylum seekers received by Member States being refused outright. One Member State granted leave on humanitarian or other reasons at the rate of 50% of all decisions taken in respect of Jordanian applications for asylum.
- Lebanon: Most Member States refused outright the majority of applications for asylum submitted by Lebanese citizens. However, one Member State granted residency on humanitarian or other grounds in 60% of all decisions made in respect of Lebanese asylum applications.
- Syria: Acceptance rates varied between 0% (two Member States) and 40% (one Member State). Only one Member State granted leave to remain on humanitarian or other grounds at a significant rate (32%). Outright rejection rates varied between 54% and 98%.
- Turkey: Acceptance rates varied between 4% and 22.5%. Grants of leave on humanitarian or other grounds varied between 2% and 32%. Outright rejection rates varied between 62.8% and 95%.

Number of asylum applicants from other third countries in the region transferred under the terms of the Schengen Agreement or Dublin Convention.

Statistics for returns under the Dublin Convention or Schengen Accord were available for 8 Member States.

The greatest number of asylum seekers, for whom the transfer of responsibility for determination of asylum was effected under either the Dublin Convention or Schengen Accord, were Turkish citizens, with two Member States removing Turkish asylum seekers under the terms of the Dublin Convention, and one Member State removing Turkish asylum seekers under the terms of the Dublin Convention and the Schengen Accord. No Member States removed Jordanian asylum seekers under the terms of either agreement, and three Member States made no removals under either agreement.

Two Member States reported removals of approximately 20% for citizens of two countries under these agreements. One of them removed 20% of the total number of Iranian applicants under the terms of the Dublin Convention, and the other removed 19% of the total number of Turkish applicants under the terms of both agreements. In contrast, 4 Member States removed no Turkish applicants under the terms of either accord, and only one other Member State removed an Iranian asylum seeker under the terms of the agreements.

NUMBERS OF APPLICATIONS FOR ASYLUMANNEX B

	IRAN	JORDAN	LEBANON	SYRIA	TURKEY
BELGIUM	95	9	47	84	466
DENMARK	158	15	48	17	87
GERMANY	3838	964	73	1549	16840
GREECE	139	-	7	5	172
SPAIN	168	2	1	2	5
FRANCE	133	—	25	13	1362
IRELAND	2	0	7	3	10
ITALY	-	-	-	-	-
LUXEMBOURG	6	0	0	0	2
NETHERLANDS	1253	11	139	458	1135
AUSTRIA	499	7	29	71	341
PORTUGAL	2	0	1	0	0
FINLAND	23	2	11	4	47
SWEDEN	376	27	109	191	306
UNITED KINGDOM	585	15	160	50	1445

NUMBERS OF GRANTS OF ASYLUM (1951 UN CONVENTION)

ANNEX C

	IRAN	JORDAN	LEBANON	SYRIA	TURKEY
BELGIUM	0	0	0	1	7
DENMARK	-	-	-	-	-
GERMANY	1166	1	30	308	3749
GREECE	17	-	2	5	31
SPAIN	5	1	-	-	2
FRANCE	67	1	5	9	330
IRELAND	0	0	0	0	0
ITALY	-	-	-	-	-
LUXEMBOURG	0	-	-	-	-
NETHERLANDS	466	0	7	67	70
AUSTRIA	97	0	1	1	23
PORTUGAL	0	0	0	0	0
FINLAND	1	0	0	0	2
SWEDEN	38	-	3	2	13
UNITED KINGDOM	155	-	10	15	85

NUMBERS OF GRANTS OF RESIDENCY FOR HUMANITARIAN OR OTHER REASONS

ANNEX D

	IRAN	JORDAN	LEBANON	SYRIA	TURKEY
BELGIUM	-	-	-	-	-
DENMARK	-	-	-	-	-
GERMANY	23	2	1	0	50
GREECE	87	-	17	17	76
SPAIN	12	2	1	1	2
FRANCE (1)	-	-	-	-	-
IRELAND	0	0	0	0	0
ITALY	-	-	-	-	-
LUXEMBOURG	0	-	-	-	-
NETHERLANDS	628	0	37	86	100
AUSTRIA (1)	-	-	-	-	-
PORTUGAL	0	0	0	0	0
FINLAND	34	2	0	2	11
SWEDEN	106	1	104	86	93
UNITED KINGDOM	25	5	35	*	25

(1) Statistics for grants of residency on humanitarian or other grounds unavailable

* Denotes number of applications either 1 or 2

NUMBERS OF OUTRIGHT REFUSALS

ANNEX E

	IRAN	JORDAN	LEBANON	SYRIA	TURKEY
BELGIUM	12	1	19	9	145
DENMARK	-	-	-	-	-
GERMANY	2718	76	1081	1175	16177
GREECE	-	-	-	-	-
SPAIN	-	-	-	-	-
FRANCE	71	-	20	28	1143
IRELAND	0	0	0	0	0
ITALY	-	-	-	-	-
LUXEMBOURG	0	-	-	-	-
NETHERLANDS	2301	18	187	473	1219
AUSTRIA	696	6	24	82	346
PORTUGAL	2	0	1	0	0
FINLAND	38	0	1	4	35
SWEDEN	315	15	65	180	179
UNITED KINGDOM	170	5	55	20	1475