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# The European Council and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

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Orientation and  
implementation in the field  
of crisis management  
since the Lisbon Treaty

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STUDY

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Author: Suzana Elena Anghel  
**European Council Oversight Unit**  
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# The European Council and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP): Orientation and implementation in the field of crisis management since the Lisbon Treaty

## **Abstract**

This study assesses the planning, command and control of civilian and military CSDP missions and operations, progress made in developing civilian and military capabilities, particularly rapid response capabilities in the form of the EU Battlegroups, as well as challenges encountered during the force generation process. In recent years, the European Council has repeatedly called for further progress in all of these areas.

The study concludes that, despite recent progress in reviewing crisis management procedures, operational planning remains cumbersome and slow. The findings indicate that the chain of command for CSDP military operations would benefit from further streamlining, possibly through the creation of a Follow-up Centre for Missions and Operations placed under the supervision of the European Union Military Staff. 'Modular' configurations specific to high-readiness alert units should also be explored as a priority when further developing rapid reaction military capabilities. The study also shows that, for civilian CSDP, the delays encountered in the force generation process could be reduced by further developing national rosters of experts deployable on missions and operations.

## **AUTHORS**

- Introductory analysis written by **Suzana Elena Anghel**, European Council Oversight Unit.
- Study analysing the orientation and implementation of European Council conclusions in the field of crisis management since the Lisbon Treaty written by General **Jean Paul Perruche**, former Director-General of the European Union Military Staff.

To contact the Unit, please email: [EPRS-EuropeanCouncilOversight@ep.europa.eu](mailto:EPRS-EuropeanCouncilOversight@ep.europa.eu)

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## List of acronyms

CCDP = Civilian Capability Development Plan  
CFSP = Common Foreign and Security Policy  
CMC = Crisis Management Concept  
CMP = Crisis Management Procedures  
CONOPS = Concept for Operations  
CPCC = Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability  
CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy  
CSO = Civilian Strategic Options  
EDA = European Defence Agency  
EEAS = European External Action Service  
EU = European Union  
EUAM Ukraine = European Union Advisory Mission Ukraine  
EUAVSEC South Sudan = European Union Aviation Security Mission in South Sudan  
EUBAM Libya = European Union Border Assistance Mission in Libya  
EUCAP Nestor Somalia = European Union Maritime Security Capacity Building Mission in Somalia  
EUFOR RCA = European Union Force in the Central African Republic  
EUFOR Tchad/RCA = European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic  
EULEX Kosovo = European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo  
EUMAM RCA = European Union Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic  
EUMS = European Union Military Staff  
EUNAVFOR Atalanta = European Union Naval Force Atalanta  
EUNAVFOR MED Sophia = European Union Naval Force - Mediterranean Operation Sophia  
EUTM Mali  
EUTM Somalia = European Union Training Mission in Somalia  
FGC = Force Generation Conference  
HQ = Headquarters  
HR/VP = High Representative/Vice President of the European Commission for the Common Foreign and Security Policy  
IMD = Initiating Military Directive  
MSO = Military Strategic Options  
NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
OHQ = Operation Headquarters  
OPCEN = Operations Centre  
OPLAN = Operations Plan  
PSC = Political and Security Committee  
UN = United Nations

## Introduction

The European Union (EU) has a large range of policy tools at its disposal for international crisis management, including humanitarian aid, development, economic and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) instruments. The European Council [considers](#) CSDP missions and operations to be 'an essential element' of the EU's contribution to international crisis management. The Heads of State or Government have *inter alia* [called](#) to improve the capacity to plan and conduct CSDP missions and operations, particularly by developing civilian and military capabilities conducive to rapid deployments. This study examines the extent to which the European Council's orientations on operational planning and rapid capabilities readiness have been implemented since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force.

## 1 Objective, methodology and structure of the study

The purpose of this study is to assess the planning, command and control of civilian and military CSDP missions and operations, progress made in developing civilian and military capabilities, particularly rapid response capabilities in the form of the EU Battlegroups, as well as challenges encountered during the force generation process. In all of these areas the European Council has repeatedly called for further progress in recent years. The study comprises an introductory in-house analysis by the European Council Oversight Unit and an external study commissioned from General Jean-Paul Perruche, former Director General of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS).

The introductory in-house analysis:

- focuses on the European Council conclusions on operational planning, rapid reaction capabilities development, including the EU Battlegroups, and on the EU's capacity to rapidly and effectively deploy to CSDP civilian and military missions, while considering their implementation status;
- touches upon the main arguments outlined by scholars, analysts and practitioners when assessing progress made in strengthening operational planning, rapid reaction capacities and the force generation process;
- provides an overview of the external expert's key findings and recommendations;
- considers the views of the European Parliament, based on an analysis of Parliament's resolutions on security and defence aspects adopted since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

The external study (Annex 1) provides:

- a synthesis of the existing planning, command and control procedures for civil and military CSDP missions and operations, followed by an assessment of their sustainability;
- an overview of the evolution and an assessment of the EU's rapid response capacity, focussing on the EU Battlegroups concept;

- a presentation of the force generation process, including an evaluation of its fluidity and fitness to allow the rapid deployment of personnel to CSDP missions and operations.

The external study also provides a comprehensive overview of capabilities development, as well as of the preparation, launching, implementation and assessment (lessons learned) of CSDP civilian and military missions and operations, based on existing open sources (predominantly, EU primary and secondary legislation) and interviews with key EU policymakers and planners (seven in total) involved in different stages of the decision-making process.

## 2 European Council conclusions on CSDP missions and operations

Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has focused on security and defence at four meetings held in [December 2012](#), [December 2013](#), [June 2015](#) and [June 2016](#) (the latter dealt only with EU-NATO cooperation in view of the July 2016 [Warsaw NATO Summit](#)). The European Council [decided](#) on three lines for CSDP action, namely: 1) effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP; 2) the development of civilian and military capabilities; and 3) the strengthening of the European defence industry and defence market.<sup>1</sup> It has systematically endorsed progress outlined in the successive Council conclusions on CSDP and [called](#) for work to continue on a 'more effective, visible and result-oriented CSDP'.<sup>2</sup>

Under the effectiveness, visibility and impact of the CSDP's line of action, covered in part by the present study, the Heads of State or Government [called](#) *inter alia* for action to:

- improve the capacity to conduct CSDP missions and operations;
- strengthen the EU's ability to rapidly deploy the appropriate civilian and military capabilities to CSDP missions and operations;
- develop adequate, future-oriented civilian and military capabilities;
- improve the EU's rapid response capabilities, including the EU Battlegroups; and
- foster defence cooperation to allow key capabilities maintenance and development, while ensuring that shortfalls and redundancies are overcome.

Two progress reports issued in [2013](#) and [2015](#) by the successive High Representative / (European Commission) Vice-Presidents (HR/VPs) Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini, and several Council conclusions (Ministers of Foreign Affairs/Ministers for Defence format) give an account of the steps undertaken in implementing the European Council conclusions, including the adoption, amongst other initiatives, of:

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<sup>1</sup> For an overview of the commitments made by the European Council on the CSDP since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and their implementation status, see EPRS Briefing '[Implementation of European Council conclusions in Common Security and Defence Policy \(CSDP\) since the Lisbon Treaty](#)' (January 2016).

<sup>2</sup> Council conclusions on CSDP are adopted, most often, approximately one month ahead of the Heads of State or Government meeting covering security and defence issues.

- [the EU's Comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises](#) followed by an [Action Plan](#), aimed at ensuring coherence between Member States and EU action in various countries and regions;
- an updated [Civilian Capability Development Plan \(CCDP\)](#) (2012) exploring, *inter alia*, means of improving the force generation process for civilian missions;
- reviewed [Crisis Management Procedures](#) (CMP) (2013), introducing a 'fast-track' procedure aimed at accelerating the planning of CSDP missions and operations (not used to date);
- a new [Military Rapid Response Concept](#) (2015) aimed at enhancing the EU's Military Rapid Response capacity;
- an [EU Concept for Force Generation](#) describing the procedural steps to be followed when constituting the force for military CSDP operations and missions;
- an updated [EU Framework Nation Concept](#) (2015) setting the basis for the planning, launch and conduct of autonomous EU-led military operations/missions for Framework Nation (FN) initiatives.

The European Council pointed out that, unless a sufficient level of expenditure is allocated to defence by the Member States, capabilities will decline and there is a risk of shortfalls impacting the conduct of CSDP operations. It acknowledged the financial constraints Member States have been facing in recent years, resulting in an overall decline in military spending, estimated by some [analysts](#) to be [9%](#) for the decade ending 2014 (EU28). After years of defence spending cuts, collective European defence expenditure [increased](#) in 2014 by 2.3% leading to 0.6% real growth (EU27).<sup>3</sup> In 2015, only four Member States, namely Estonia, Greece, Poland and the United Kingdom, [met](#) the 2% defence expenditure target set at the [2014 NATO Wales Summit](#) to be reached by all NATO members by 2024. [France](#) and the [United Kingdom](#) announced their intention to increase their defence budgets in the aftermath of the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, and were followed by [Belgium](#) in June 2016.

[Analysts](#) argued that the lack of consultation between Member States over their defence budget cuts increased the risk of capabilities shortfalls. Decreasing defence expenditure has impacted the number of deployable troops. EDA data for 2014 shows a [decrease](#) in the total numbers of deployable troops (417 000 deployable (land) and 79 000 sustainable (land) forces), representing the lowest figures since 2006.<sup>4</sup> However, spending more on defence does not necessarily mean spending more effectively: enhanced coordination between Member States on capabilities development could prevent unnecessary duplication, avoid shortfalls, ensure better value for money and facilitate economies of scale.<sup>5</sup>

The expert community saw the Lisbon Treaty as a game changer, allowing for more [flexibility](#) and as possibly fostering CSDP [cooperation](#) with the introduction of

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<sup>3</sup> Data presented by the European Defence Agency (EDA). Denmark is not a member of the EDA.

<sup>4</sup> Reported figures comprise all international deployments, including deployments to coalition type missions, CSDP missions, NATO missions or UN missions.

<sup>5</sup> See the EPRS Study on '[Cost of Non-Europe in Common Security and Defence Policy](#)'.

permanent structured cooperation (Articles 42(6) and 46 and Protocol No 10 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)), enhanced cooperation (Article 20 TEU), the expansion of the [Petersberg tasks](#) (Article 43 TEU) or by entrusting CSDP operations to a group of Member States (Article 44 TEU). The Heads of State or Government have [called](#) in their conclusions for the full implementation of the Lisbon Treaty's CSDP provisions. With the exception of the mutual assistance (defence) clause (Article 42(7) TEU), activated after the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, other provisions introduced by the Lisbon Treaty have yet to be implemented.<sup>6</sup>

### **3 The European Union's capacity to conduct civilian and military CSDP missions and operations**


#### **3.1 CSDP missions and operations: state of play**

CSDP missions and operations are often regarded as the most visible expression of European security and defence cooperation and the most tangible contribution of the Member States to international crisis management efforts. The EU has launched 32 missions (21 civilian and 11 military) since 2003. Fifteen have been completed and 17 are on-going.

Figure 1 shows an overview of the number of civilian and military CSDP operations/missions launched to date. Three phases can be identified. The initial phase (2003-2008) led to the launch of 21 missions and operations, showing Member States' commitment to EU crisis management. The second phase (2009 - 2011) was characterised by a loss of momentum in EU crisis management, with only one mission launched in 2010 i.e. the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia). The financial crisis and the establishment of the European External Action Service following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty are factors, which account, to a certain extent, for this loss of momentum. The third phase (2012 - 2015) saw a renewal of interest in EU crisis management, with 10 civilian and military CSDP missions/operations launched over the past four years; in North Africa and the Mediterranean (EUBAM Libya, EUNAVFOR MED Sophia), the Sahel (EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali), Central Africa (EUAVSEC South Sudan, EUFOR RCA followed by EUMAM RCA), the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor Somalia) and Eastern Europe (EUAM Ukraine).

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
<sup>6</sup> For an overview see the EPRS Briefing on the ['Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy'](#) (February 2016).



**Figure 1 - Number of CSDP missions/operations launched since 2003**

Source: Author's own calculation based on [EEAS](#) data

The number of personnel for civilian and military CSDP missions/operations has remained stable during the past three years at around 6 000. A decrease in the number of personnel for civilian missions is to be noted, mainly due to the reduction in size of the EULEX Kosovo mission (from 2 065 in [2013](#) to 1 436 in [2014](#)), by far the largest civilian mission. The number of troops deployed in CSDP military operations is marginally on the rise, but remains globally low in comparison to the size of earlier operations (for example, EUFOR Althea disposed of [7 000 troops](#) when launched in 2004). The increase in military personnel contributions from 2013 to 2014 was principally due to the launch of EUFOR RCA (872 personnel) in 2014. 2015 saw the end of EUFOR RCA followed by the launch of EUMAM RCA (only 70 personnel) and the launch of EUNAFOR MED Sophia (1 408 personnel).



**Figure 2 - Number of personnel in CSDP missions/operations**

Source: Author's own calculation based on [2014](#), [2015](#) and [2016](#) data in the EU ISS Yearbooks of European Security

### 3.2 Features of the CSDP decision-making process for missions and operations

Scholars have focused increasingly on the decision-making process for CSDP missions and operations and have [argued](#) that the 'planning process is key to understanding how an operation works because it provides the conceptual bridge between the political aims and objectives on the one hand and the operational means and resources on the other'. They have [underlined](#) that steps undertaken in shaping planning, command and control were 'largely the result of compromises between France, Britain and Germany'. Furthermore, Member States' political will to engage (or not) in CSDP missions and operations is [said](#) to prevail over their capacity to commit capabilities.

The [expert community](#) and practitioners alike have called increasingly for more flexibility in CSDP planning. The latest update of the [Crisis Management Procedures](#) (CMP) in 2013 met this call for flexibility by introducing the 'fast-track procedure' aimed at speeding up the planning process linked to CSDP missions and operations. The effectiveness of the 'fast track procedure' remains to be tested in practice (see the external study in Annex 1).

### 3.2.1 Planning, command and control

The [EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political Strategic Level](#) (last reviewed in 2015) indicates that CSDP missions/operations are conducted at four levels: 1) Political and Strategic level (EU institution level); 2) Military Strategic level (Operation Commander and Operation Headquarters (HQ)); 3) Operational level (Force Commander/Force HQ) and 4) Tactical level (Component HQ level and below). The [Crisis Management Procedures](#) (CMPs) (last reviewed in 2013) outline the decision-making process linked to planning, launching and conducting CSDP missions and operations. [Analysts](#) have argued that NATO planning procedures heavily inspired the CMPs (first developed in [2001](#), and reviewed successively since) based on the lessons learned from CSDP missions and operations.

The CMPs, described in detail in the external study, comprise five planning phases. In the **first phase** the crisis is 'identified' and different solutions for EU action, including CSDP related options, are considered (Figure 3). This phase makes it possible to move from the early monitoring of crises (Situation Awareness, Early Warning) and generic planning of capabilities (Advance Planning) to Crisis Response Planning, leaning towards tailor-made responses to crises. Once a CSDP option has been decided upon, the Political Security Committee (PSC) tasks the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) with the drafting of a Crisis Management Concept (CMC).





Figure 3 – Instruments available for EU action

Source: [EEAS](#)

The **second phase** includes the development of the Crisis Management Concept, followed by Military Strategic Options (MSO) or Civilian Strategic Options (CSO), depending on the type of CSDP mission or operation envisaged (Figure 4). Based on these documents, following a recommendation from the PSC, the Council decides to establish the CSDP mission or operation. In the case of military operations, the Council decision sets the objectives and the mandate, appoints the Operation Commander, designates the Operational HQ and the Force Commander, entrusts the PSC with the follow-up of the implementation of the mission, invites Third States to participate and sets the provisional budget for the mission. A different Operation Commander is appointed for each military CSDP operation while, in civilian CSDP missions, the Head of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) acts as Operation Commander for all missions.

For military CSDP operations, the Council decision sets the financial reference amount for common costs, funded through the ATHENA mechanism, estimated to cover between 10-15% of total cost. For civilian CSDP operations, the Council decision specifies the financial reference amount for the common costs supported by the EU budget (the Budget Impact Statement – BIS).



**Figure 4 – Planning process for CSDP missions and operations**

Source: Author's own compilation based on the [Crisis Management Procedures](#)

In the **third phase** the Initiating Military Directive (IMD) is prepared, defining, in military terms, the objectives set for the mission/operation. The IMD, approved by the EU Military Committee (EUMC), serves as basis for drafting the Concept for Operations (CONOPS) and Operations Plan (OPLAN). These documents are submitted to the Political Security Committee for evaluation prior to the Council's approval. The CONOPS indicates the line of action chosen to accomplish the political mandate. The OPLAN considers the operational details for the implementation of the line of action identified by the CONOPS. As outlined by the external expert, the preparation of the CONOPS and OPLAN is an interactive process involving the strategic military level (Operation Commander), the operational level (Force Commander) and the different component levels (Components Commanders). For civilian CSDP missions, the CPCC Director (Operation Commander) and the designated/appointed<sup>7</sup> Head of Mission, prepare the CONOPS and OPLAN with the support from EEAS services.

<sup>7</sup> For example, Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP to [establish](#) EUCAP SAHEL Mali was taken on 15 April 2014, followed one month later, on 26 May 2014, by the [appointment](#) of the Head of Mission by PSC decision.

Negotiations linked to the generation of forces take place during the third phase (see also point 3.2.2). This is also the moment when consultations take place with the UN, with other international/regional organisations, and possibly, with participating third states. Fact finding missions might be organised, although in practice they might take place earlier in the process, during phases 1 or 2. The decision to launch the military CSDP mission or operation is taken by the Council.

The recently introduced 'fast-track procedure' aims at facilitating deployments within days after the approval of the CMC. Only the OPLAN and, in the case of military operations/missions, the IMD, are prepared in parallel to the preparation of the draft CMC. The 'fast track procedure' has not been used to date.

The time allocated to phases two and three varies between the different CSDP missions and operations. For example, in the case of EUCAP Sahel Mali, less than one month elapsed between the approval of the CMC (17 March 2014) and the moment the Council established the mission (15 April 2014) ([Decision \(CFSP\) 2014/219](#)). The mission was formally launched nine months later, on 15 January 2015 ([Decision \(CFSP\) 2015/76](#)). As underlined by the external expert, personnel sent to civilian missions are recruited on an individual basis and must undergo specialised training prior to deployment, hence the lengthy process of force generation.

In the case of EUNAVFOR MED Sophia, the decision-making process was even faster. At its 23 April 2016 (extraordinary) meeting, the European Council mandated the Commission's HR/VP to undertake the necessary steps in view of establishing a military CSDP operation in the Mediterranean. The Council established the operation on 18 May 2015 ([Decision 2015/778/CFSP](#)) and launched it on 22 June 2015 ([Decision 2015/972/CFSP](#)), ahead of the European Council meeting of 25 and 26 June 2015. EUNAVFOR MED Sophia illustrates the importance of political will and consensus built by Member States when deciding on a CSDP operation. The operation was established and launched with the caveat that the different operational phases established in its mandate should be implemented progressively and that work would continue to secure a UN mandate or consent from the Libyan authorities (the 'coastal-state concerned') to operate on its shores.

The **fourth phase** is the deployment phase. The PSC exercises political control and strategic direction of the CSDP mission or operation under the supervision of the Council and the Commission's HR/VP. The HR/VP is responsible for the implementation of the Council decision establishing the CSDP mission or operation. Inter-institutional cooperation with the Commission takes place both in Brussels and on the ground, as appropriate. The conduct of an operation supposes directing/steering and controlling the actions of forces in view of implementing operational objectives. In the **fifth phase**, a review of the CSDP mission/operation takes place leading to the redefinition of the mandate and/or the termination of the mission.

Command and Control (C2) are intertwined with the planning process. The generic chain of command comprises, as outlined above in this section, four levels – Political and Strategic, Military Strategic, Operational and Tactical - defined in the [EU Concept for](#)

[Military Command and Control](#). In the absence of a standing military Command and Control structure or permanent Operational Headquarters, an ad-hoc command and control structure is set up for every military CSDP mission or operation. This is [said](#) to fragment planning into politico-strategic and operational sequences with an impact on the celerity of the planning process as well as on communication between the different operational levels during both operation planning and conduct (see the external expertise for an overview).

The EU has several options when establishing the chain of command for military CSDP missions and operations, depending on both [political](#) (Member States' willingness to commit to individual operations) and operational considerations. The options available include: 1) recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, based on the [Berlin Plus agreements](#), 2) recourse to an EU Framework Nation, provided that one of the Member States pledging to the EU a national Operational Headquarters (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland (forthcoming) or the United Kingdom) wish to assume responsibility for an EU-led military operation, or 3) recourse to the Brussels-based [EU Operations Centre](#) (OPCEN), declared operational in 2007. The EU used the [Berlin Plus agreement](#) framework for EUFOR Althea. It has also used the National Operational Headquarters several times for the conduct of its military missions. In 2015, the Italian OHQ in Rome was activated in support of EUNAVFOR MED Sophia. In 2012, a nucleus of the OPCEN was activated to coordinate civil-military activities in the Horn of Africa (EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor (civilian mission)). [Since](#) 2014, the OPCEN has supported missions in the Sahel. According to the external expert, the results of the activation of the OPCEN are unsatisfactory, owing in part to the progressive obsolescence of its infrastructure and the lack of personnel. Recent military CSDP missions, particularly small scale ones, have had a Mission Headquarters combining the Operation Headquarters and the Force Headquarters functions, which features increasingly as an additional solution to the three options outlined above. An example is [EUTM Mali](#) with Mission Headquarters located in Bamako performing the functions of both Operational Headquarters and Force Headquarters.

### 3.2.2 Force generation for CSDP missions/operations

The force generation [process](#) is a negotiation over resources pledged by Member States to individual EU-led military and civilian missions and operations. Third States may contribute to CSDP missions or operations, provided they have [signed](#) a Framework Participant Agreement. [Experts](#) estimate that, up to 2015, 30 non-EU countries have contributed to CSDP missions and operations.

The [EU Concept for Force Generation](#) details the rules applicable to the generation of forces for military CSDP missions and operations. An early informal evaluation of capabilities available takes place in parallel to the planning process under the guidance of the EUMS, as shown in Figure 5. At this stage, Member States only declare their capabilities (*Force Sensing*) without committing them. Consultations with potentially participating Third States may also take place. This initial scoping of potentially available forces allows Member States to determine their positions and envisage possible

contributions. The military advice offered by the EU Military Committee to the Political and Security Committee prior to the adoption by the Council of the CMC takes into account information gathered during this informal phase, and has a possible influence on the planning process.




Figure 5 – Correlation of Force Sensing/Generation with CSDP planning

Source: EEAS, [EU Concept for Force Generation](#)

The force generation process formally begins once the CONOPS is adopted. The Operation Commander calls for a Force Generation Conference (FGC). Negotiations take the form of one or more FGCs where Member States and Third States formally commit capabilities. [Analysts](#) have often assessed the force generation process as being slow. Before launching EUFOR Tchad/RCA in 2008 (force strength [3 700 troops](#)), one informal and five formal force generation conferences were needed spanning [10 months](#). The Operation Commander was asked to review his initial list of capabilities and view the resources pledged by the Member States, while Third States were invited to fill certain capability [gaps](#) (for example, Russia contributing [four helicopters](#)). Several other operations have encountered difficulties during the force generation process, including smaller-scale ones. A recent example is EUMAM RCA, a mission launched in March 2015, estimated to comprise [60 staff](#) of which [12 were still to be deployed](#) in June 2015.<sup>8</sup>

Civilian CSDP missions follow a similar and more simplified force generation process led by the CPCC. The process is deemed to be too lengthy due to the persistence of [poorly](#)

<sup>8</sup> EUMAM RCA gained full operational capacity in 2015, with 70 personnel deployed (31 December 2015).

coordinated national strategies for capabilities development. The [Civilian Capability Development Plan \(CCDP\)](#) (2012) advanced *inter alia* the idea of increased sharing of the financial burden of civilian CSDP missions (common costs are funded by the CFSP budget while Member States fund certain operational costs, principally linked to seconded personnel). Several [proposals](#) have already been discussed to speed up the deployment of expert personnel to civilian missions, including the creation, in April 2016, of a Mission Support Platform intended to facilitate rapid deployment, better management and inter-institutional coordination between the EEAS (CPCC) and Commission financial services. At the time of writing, it is too early to assess the impact of the Mission Support Platform in speeding up deployments.

In a 2014 note, the Politico-Military Group pointed to the political, military and financial factors that influence Member States' decisions to take part in CSDP missions and operations. Similarly, [analysts](#) have considered that the lack of common strategic objectives, combined with overstretched capabilities and diminishing budgetary means, explain Member States' hesitations to engage in civilian and military CSDP missions and operations. The expert study in Annex 1 distinguishes between political and technical solutions (for example, further developing the roster of experts deployable to civilian missions) to speed up the force generation process. Political solutions are of the essence and the expert stresses the need to clarify the prerequisites at political level, including an assessment of Member States' commonly shared strategic interests.

### 3.2.3 CSDP rapid reaction capabilities

In its conclusions, the European Council has [called](#) repeatedly for action to strengthen the EU's capacity to rapidly deploy adequate civilian and military capabilities to CSDP missions and operations. [Scholars](#) welcomed the introduction of a 'fast-track procedure' in the 2013 CMPs as an encouraging step in favour of more rapid and coordinated deployments, while deploring the insufficient progress in addressing the absence of rapidly deployable, adequately trained personnel, particularly to civilian CSDP missions. They considered that the latter required attention from both EU institutions and Member States as a priority.

In May 2015, the [Council](#) (Foreign Affairs Ministers) recognised that the [Civilian Capability Development Plan \(CCDP\)](#) had not yet been fully implemented and that more efforts were needed both from Member States and the EEAS, particularly regarding the rapid deployment of expert personnel on civilian missions. Ministers expressed the view that the [June 2000 Feira European Council's headline goal](#) (that 5 000 police officers, of whom 1 000 should remain on high alert, be deployable within 30 days) could be revisited, in the light of new threats to security and in line with the requirements of different CSDP missions.

A new [Military Rapid Response Concept](#) was adopted in 2015, taking into account the EU's Military Rapid Response capacity. The [EU Battlegroups](#) – battalion-size national or multinational standby forces (1 500 troops) – having reached full operational capacity in 2007, but not yet used in an operational context, remain the EU's primary 'rapid response'

capability. Two EU Battlegroups are on standby for six months by rotation. A new [schedule](#) for the EU's Battlegroups, outlining those that will be on standby until 2020, was agreed in October 2015. [Experts](#) consider this to be a revival of the Battlegroup concept, with Member States presenting their contributions well in advance after several years of reduced interest (2012-2015). Furthermore, the recent [review of the Athena Mechanism \(common costs for CSDP military operations\)](#) introduced the possibility to fund deployment transportation costs for EU Battlegroups. The 2016 review of the 'Declaration on the EU Battlegroups' strategic transport costs' is expected to clarify the implementation measures.

As argued in the attached external expertise, the use of EU Battlegroups is supposed to overcome both political and operational constraints. At the political level, Member States have to agree on the use of Battlegroups in certain crisis settings. At several informal meetings, Ministers (Foreign Affairs and/or Defence) have discussed the possibility of using EU Battlegroups, however no clear outcome has been reached owing to [diverging national positions](#). Regarding operational constraints, the external expert indicates that the Battlegroup concept was heavily inspired by the design of Operation Artemis (launched in 2003). In practice, each new operation requires a tailor-made approach when defining the force needed, hence the importance of developing modular forces such as the high-readiness alert Guépard French units.

The [Global Strategy](#) presented to the Heads of State or Government in June 2016 underlines that the full spectrum of defence capabilities is required in support of a coordinated and coherent approach to external crises (in the East and in the South). Capabilities remain national, with national choices often prevailing over coordinated European choices when developing them. [Scholars](#) have argued that enhanced cooperative programmes in respect of capabilities would speed up the EU's rapid response to crises, ensure better value for money as regards defence expenditure, prevent technological shortfalls and ensure that interoperability is not hampered.

## 4 Key findings and recommendations from the commissioned study

The external study draws attention to the limits of the planning, command and control mechanisms, to the challenges encountered in developing rapid reaction capabilities as well as to the constraints faced in the force generation process. This section summarises its key findings and recommendations, presented in full in Annex 1.

The study's **key findings** are that:

- The visibility and effectiveness of CSDP action is hampered by the absence of a **clear strategic framework** and of **well-defined objectives**, commonly shared by the Member States. Solutions at technical or operational level, although important and helpful in order to implement Member States' political decisions, cannot replace them; hence the importance of clear strategic guidelines at the political level. It is too early to assess the capacity of the [Global Strategy](#) in

building a consensus on a clear strategic framework, as Heads of States or Government only 'welcomed' the presentation of the document at their [June 2016](#) meeting and invited the HR/VP, the Commission as a whole, and the Council to 'take the work forward', without specifying any timeline or direction to be followed;<sup>9</sup>

- The **planning process** for CSDP missions and operations continues to be **cumbersome and slow**, despite the recent review and the introduction of a 'fast-track procedure'. The number of institutional actors involved (the Council, the PSC, EU Delegations, the CMPD, the CPCC, the EUMC, the EUMS, Commission services), sequencing rather than parallel planning (see Figure 4) and the amount of preparatory documents (CMC, MSO/CSO, IMD, CONPOS, OPLAN, Council decisions) impact on the fluidity and rapidity of the decision-making process for CSDP missions and operations;
- Despite recent reforms, the existing **institutional setting** of the EEAS continues to be prone to a duplication of tasks (for example, in certain situations, between the CMPD and the EUMS);
- The absence of a **permanent military Operational Headquarters**, on which Member States hold diverging views, is said to hamper rapid crisis response, particularly as the EU has to rely on one of the five (soon to be six) national OHQ or the Brussels OPCEN (recently partly activated but with disappointing results). If a political solution could be found, a permanent military OHQ could help streamline the chain of command, enhance civil-military synergies, expedite deployments, reduce costs and ensure better value for money;
- The **civilian missions** have permanent structures and unity of command between the political and operational level, with the CPCC Director acting as Operation Commander for all civilian CSDP missions.
- The **force generation process** is often **cumbersome and slow** on account of political constraints – Member States' lack of willingness to commit capabilities – rather than procedural flaws as the process allows for a certain degree of flexibility, with both informal and formal negotiations taking place at different stages.

The study puts forward the following **key recommendations** aimed at improving the current situation:

- The internal EEAS **decision-making process** linked to CSDP missions and operations **planning** could gain in coherence, fluidity and speed by conferring certain tasks currently located at CMPD level on the Deputy Secretary-General for CSDP and crisis response. The external expert is of the opinion that the suggested institutional change could contribute to better coordination throughout the planning process between, in particular, the CMPD, the CPCC and the EUMS, while avoiding a duplication of tasks.

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<sup>9</sup> For example, [experts](#) consider that a CSDP sub-strategy or white paper on EU defence, stemming from the Global Strategy, would enable Member States' commitments to European defence cooperation to be clarified.

- The EU has a [Military Rapid Response Concept](#), a [Maritime Rapid Response Concept](#) and an [Air Rapid Response Concept](#) at its disposal but not a robust **Capstone Concept for Joint Operations** (*Concept général interarmées d'emploi des forces*). The latter would make it possible to streamline operations' **planning and conduct** in the event that the EU should wish to engage in the full spectrum of CSDP operations, as defined in Article 43 TEU.
- A **Follow up Centre for Missions and Operations** (*Centre de Suivi des Opérations et Missions de la PSDC*) would, if created, allow the questions or concerns raised by Operation Commanders during the conduct of operations to be addressed rapidly and would streamline command and control. The Centre could be placed under the supervision of the EUMS and the authority of the HR/VP.
- 'Modular' configurations inspired by high-readiness alert unit models (for example, the Guépard French units) should be explored as a priority when further developing **rapid reaction military capabilities**.
- For civilian CSDP missions, the delays encountered in the **force generation process** could be reduced by further advancing work on the national rosters of experts who may be deployed.

## 5 European Parliament views

Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament has voted over 20 resolutions where it has systematically [called](#) for enhanced European defence cooperation. Some of its resolutions were adopted in [response](#) to the annual reports on the CFSP submitted by the HR/VP while others allowed Parliament to focus on specific issues (for example, the [development of civilian-military capabilities](#), the [EU's military structures](#) or the [financing of the CSDP](#)).

Several of Parliament's resolutions have urged Member States to [pledge](#) adequate financial means for security and defence in order to rapidly '[meet](#) NATO capacity targets, which require a minimum level of defence spending of 2 % of GDP and a minimum 20 % share of the defence budget for major equipment needs, including for research and development'. Parliament has [called](#) for more cost-effective defence spending, conducive, not least, to the rapid development of civilian and military capabilities geared to the needs of CSDP missions and operations. It has also [urged](#) Member States to do more to share resources and assets through pooling and sharing programmes.

In recent years, Parliament has followed developments in relation to the EU Battlegroups closely and [invited](#) the Member States to reflect upon a 'more effective and flexible use of the Battlegroups so that they can also serve as a reserve force or as a partial substitute in the event of a disappointing force generation process'. It has [called](#), ahead of the June 2015 European Council, for a 'modular approach' to EU Battlegroups, capable of increasing their adaptability to the needs of CSDP operations. This argument had already been put forward in a 2013 resolution where it was [stressed](#) that 'existing military structures within the EU, at Union, multinational and national level, must continue in the transformation process to build modular, interoperable and deployable armed forces adapted to multinational operations'.

The European Parliament's resolutions have also referred to planning, command and control. As regards planning, Parliament [considers](#) 'that the internal structures of the EEAS need to be reformed so as to enable it to assist the HR/VP in all her roles and enable her to advance strategic planning and coordinate political processes within the Council and Commission'. With respect to command and control, nine European Parliament resolutions have called for the establishment of a [permanent military Operational Headquarters](#).<sup>10</sup> The Parliament considers the existing Operations Centre as 'a largely insufficient step' and has asked that use be made, if necessary, of the permanent structured cooperation mechanism as a first step in establishing permanent command structures. It [deplores](#) the 'strong resistance by some Member States' and stresses that a permanent OHQ could [improve](#) rapidity of response in times of crisis, contribute to the development of a common strategic culture, [enhance](#) civil-military coordination, ensure follow-up during and between crises, [foster](#) the interoperability of forces and equipment, and enhance [cost-effectiveness](#) in comparison with cases when ad-hoc nationally pledged OHQs are used in support of CSDP operations.

More recently, in two resolutions adopted in March 2015 and April 2016, Parliament [calls](#) for an effective and ambitious European foreign and security policy based 'on a shared vision of key European interests', urges Member States to define policy objectives based on commonly shared interests and [holds](#) that a White Paper on EU Defence should be adopted based on the [Global Strategy](#). If Member States were to overcome their [diverging views](#), a [White Paper](#) could set a comprehensive long-term roadmap for European defence cooperation and clarify outstanding issues linked to planning, command and control at both political-strategic and operational levels.

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<sup>10</sup> Two of the nine resolutions mentioning a possible permanent OHQ – ([European Parliament resolution of 19 February 2009](#) on the European Security Strategy and ESDP (2008/2202(INI)) and the [European Parliament resolution of 19 February 2009](#) on the role of NATO in the security architecture of the EU (2008/2197(INI)) – were adopted prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.



## **ANNEX I**

### **The European Council and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP): crisis management approaches and implementation since the Treaty of Lisbon**

#### **AUTHOR**

This study has been drawn up by General **Jean Paul Perruche** (former Director-General of the EU Military Staff) and was commissioned by the European Council Oversight Unit, Directorate for Impact Assessment and European Added Value (European Parliamentary Research Service – European Parliament Secretariat).

#### **ADMINISTRATOR RESPONSIBLE**

**Suzana Elena Anghel**, European Council Oversight Unit

To contact the unit, please write to

[EPRS-EuropeanCouncilOversight@ep.europa.eu](mailto:EPRS-EuropeanCouncilOversight@ep.europa.eu)

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List of acronyms

ACTORD: Activation Order

ACTWARN: Activation Warning

AFNORTH: Allied Forces North

AFSOUTH: Allied Forces South

ATCREQ: Activation Requirement

BG(s): Battle Group(s)

CILMA: Civilian Lessons Management Application

CMB: Crisis Management Board

CMC Crisis Management Concept

CMPD Crisis Management Planning Directorate

CONOPS: Concept of Operations

CSO: Civilian Strategic Option

DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo

DSACEUR: Deputy SACEUR (second in command)

ELMA: EUMS Lessons Management Application

EUCAP: EU Capability (mission)

EUCCIS: EU Command and Control Information System

EUFOR: European Force

EUMAM: EU Military Assistance Mission

EUNAVFOR: EU Naval Force

EUTM EU Training Mission

FHQ: Force Headquarters

IMD: Initiating Military Directive

INTCEN: Intelligence Centre

IOC: Initial Operational Capability

ISS UE: Institute of Security Studies of the European Union

KFOR: Kosovo Force

LOGFAS: Logistic Functional Area System

LOGIS: Logistic Information System

MSO: Military Strategic Option

NRF: NATO Response Force

OHQ: Operation Headquarters

OPCEN: Operations Centre

OPLAN: Operations Plan

OPSWAN: Operational Wide Area Network

PFCA: Political Framework for Crisis Approach

PJHQ: Planning Joint Headquarters

PMG: Political Military Group (group of experts working for the PSC)

PSOR: Provisional Statement of Requirements

SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SATCEN: Satellite Centre

SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe

SOFA: Status of Force Agreement

SOLAN: Secure Office Local Area Network

SOMA: Status of Mission Agreement

SOPs: Standing Operational Procedures

TCN: Troop Contributing Nation

TOA: Transfer of Authority

## Summary of the study

The people living in the countries belonging to the European Union (EU), as surveys have regularly shown, favour a Europe-wide approach to their defence; they deplore Europe's poor performance in the numerous present-day crises and can see that the statements emanating from the European Council are at odds with reality.

This summary outlines the key points of a study that sets out to explore the reasons for that inconsistency at operational level. The study discusses the organisation, structures, and operational capabilities provided for by the CSDP, but confines itself to the planning and command of civilian and military operations, the EU's ability to respond rapidly to crises, and the generation of forces needed to meet its commitments. Proceeding from thorough consideration of the current reference documents and drawing also on conversations with senior officials about their implementation, it pinpoints the shortcomings and suggests ways of improving matters. Focusing primarily on technical military aspects, it seeks to go beyond the substantial body of writings that has already arisen out of CSDP missions.

- *Planning*

The process now used by the EU to plan operations is well ordered, but cumbersome and therefore slow<sup>11</sup>, given that very large numbers of persons are involved in what is an intergovernmental system and a great many bodies are encompassed within the global approach which the EU applies to crisis management. It can be speeded up when there is an emergency, but only up to a point, as time has to be allowed in order to devise a sound concept based on effective forms of action supported by such means as might be deemed appropriate.

Some improvements could, however, be made by rationalising the present structure of the European External Action Service (EEAS): the Deputy Secretary-General level could encompass the tasks of political synthesis, coordination, and organisation of the overall approach, which would thus be shifted upwards from the entity currently handling them, the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD). The Deputy Secretary-General responsible for the CSDP would in that way exercise authority directly over three specialised entities, namely the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), and the Intelligence Centre (INTCEN). This would, to some extent, eliminate the overlapping between the CMPD and the EUMS.

It would also be useful for the EU to have a general joint force deployment concept, since the fact that it does not is at present casting doubt on its ability and willingness to conduct enforcement operations.

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<sup>11</sup> Since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force (in 2009), the time lag between the approval of the crisis management concept and the decision to launch an operation has ranged from 40 days to 1 year.

- *Operation/mission command*

The fact that there is no complete permanent military command chain is undermining the EU's credibility as a guarantor of security. It means that EU operations cannot aspire to a level of ambition beyond the responsibilities that a lead nation can accept, whether in political terms or in terms of capability. It causes additional delays and to that extent weakens the EU's ability to respond to crises. It is inconsistent with the global approach because it translates into separate civilian and military chains of command. It has the effect of overburdening the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the only permanent European military body, which is compelled to overstep its powers in order to meet all the demands being made on it. It runs counter to a genuinely European operational culture. It entails extra costs and complicates command and communication equipment plans, as there are many options available (NATO, five lead nations, Operation Centre). Furthermore, because of the 'complexity of the Brussels machine', military operation commanders are less likely to know who to approach in Brussels when they have urgent needs as regards intelligence, situation analysis, logistics, administrative and financial procedures, etc. The Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is responsible for political scrutiny and strategic management of operations, can hardly act in real time, and the Chair of the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), though termed the 'first contact point', has no personal authority to respond. This situation implies a need not only to set up a permanent single command and control centre for EU operations, but also to review the role and responsibilities of the EUMS in the conduct of operations. Another point to note is that much of the Operations Centre (OPCEN) facilities located within the EUMS have gradually been rendered unavailable because they have not been activated since 2007; the Centre could not, therefore, be activated without a delay even if the Council were to take the necessary decision.

- *EU rapid response capability and battle groups*

A capability allowing the EU to respond rapidly to crises was a need that found expression as soon as the CSDP came into being and is also covered by a specific concept updated in 2015. Since 2004 this need has translated first and foremost into battle groups (BGs), which are formed by Member States and placed on stand-by according to a plan that they have approved in advance.

The advantages of this concept lie in the fact that it encourages European armed forces to move towards deployability, as well as multinational and regional military cooperation. The concept attempts to offset the EU's inertia - caused by the lack of a permanent command structure - by supplying units at high readiness. It has failed, however, to cement the EU's operational credibility, as no political decision has ever been taken to deploy a BG. Improvements should therefore be sought in the first place at political level by determining shared security interests, in particular among near neighbours, and forecasting force commitment scenarios so as to enable a list of commitment probabilities for Member States to be drawn up in advance. A further subject to consider alongside this should be the implementation of defence and security solidarity among Member States<sup>12</sup>, the object being to prevent those willing to commit themselves from being unduly penalised.

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<sup>12</sup> As laid down in the Treaty of Lisbon.

In addition, the BG concept should be made more flexible, so as to enable the size of the groups to be adjusted according to the circumstances, without being limited to the numbers in a reinforced infantry regiment (1 500 men). One final unanswered question is the financing of operations: given that shared costs are not properly taken into account, contributing nations have the impression of being penalised three times over in that they have to run political risks in relation to the international community, they risk the loss of human lives, and they bear 80% of the cost of the operation.

- *Force generation*

When Member States have to generate the forces necessary for the civilian and military operations that they have decided to launch within the EU framework, the process involved is, more often than not, a laborious one. The main reason is the lack of political will on the part of Member States. In itself, however, the process, which is largely modelled on the NATO equivalent, offers a great deal of flexibility in that the choice of operating procedures and the intentions to contribute are linked together at every stage of planning.

As regards civilian operations, pools of 'earmarked' experts (police officers, judges, observers, etc.) should help greatly to shorten response times.

When the progress of, and the prospects for, the CSDP in the operational sphere are compared with the European Council's guidelines, the findings do not seem altogether impressive. There is a yawning gap between avowed intentions and the reality of the steps taken by Member States. The chief obstacle to an effective CSDP is of a political nature, and that cannot be compensated for by technical operational measures alone. The Treaty of Lisbon entails an unambiguous commitment by the EU Member States to developing a CFSP in an integration process whose explicitly intended outcome is to establish common defence. The policy is supposed to be based on mutual solidarity among Member States and to complement their national policies. Some of the Treaty provisions have yet to be implemented. The global approach, a cornerstone of the EU intervention capability, must not cause military forms of action to be undervalued and underused.

An effective CSDP needs a strategic framework setting out specific objectives and political assumptions for the use of armed force, themselves derived from the common interests of the Member States, and hence making it possible to prepare for ways of managing potential crises at European level. The priority at this stage should be to draw up a European white paper adopting a holistic approach to the defence of our continent in order to bring the Member States' policies into the necessary coherent complementary relationship and make the EU a credible, effective guarantor of security.

## Introduction: Context and Aims of the Study

Whilst a majority of EU citizens have, for many years, been in favour of a European approach to their defence<sup>13</sup>, the EU's common security and defence policy (CSDP) enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon does not seem to meet their expectations. The reason can most likely be found in the feeling Europeans have had of collective powerlessness<sup>14</sup> in the crises that have occurred during the past five years: failure to reach a consensus during the 2011 Libyan crisis, a belated, minimal response to the 2013 crisis in Mali, laborious planning and force generation in the context of the launch of the EUFOR RCA operation in 2014<sup>15</sup>. Arnaud Danjean MEP has noted that '*compared to expectations there are a certain number of frustrations due either to lack of visibility, deadlines, or mission implementation conditions, but also and above all to the lack of political will among Member States or the EU institutions themselves to define a genuine security and defence policy and then commit to it.*'<sup>16</sup>

Today, however, against the backdrop of the very serious deterioration in the security situation in the European Union's neighbourhood, both to the east and to the south, the merits and relevance of a common and concerted European security policy seem to be more obvious than ever. The conclusions of the European Councils of [2012](#), [2013](#) and [2015](#) confirm this.

In fact, although a significant number of [operations and missions](#) (21 civilian and 11 military)<sup>17</sup> have been launched by the EU since the instruments for the CSDP (forerunner of the European security and defence policy prior to the Lisbon Treaty) were created, the policy has only ever had a minor impact, judging by the brief duration of most of the military engagements<sup>18</sup>, the small numbers of personnel deployed and, above all, the essentially non-coercive nature of the operations involved, which have not so far targeted any specific enemy or envisaged the use of armed force to achieve the goals set.

As for the establishment of a real technological and industrial base for European defence, essential if the EU's strategic autonomy is to be safeguarded, this idea is still in its infancy.

There is in fact a sizeable gap between the European Council's declarations and guidelines and the reality of the CSDP, whether in regard to its ambitions, its capabilities or its resources. '*The picture of an overly cautious, powerless and inactive Europe overtaken by the events of globalisation and stripped of the slightest influence over its international*

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<sup>13</sup> Reference to the Commission's annual Eurobarometer surveys. The most recent Eurobarometer survey carried out by the Commission in autumn 2014 revealed that three out of four Europeans (76%) are in favour of a common security and defence policy. They are not quite so keen on a common foreign policy (66%), very lukewarm concerning the euro (only 56%) and hostile to enlargement (only 39% in favour of further enlargement) (quoted by [B2Pro](#)-January 2016).

<sup>14</sup> The results of a public opinion poll published in France by 'La Dépêche du midi' on 21 April 2016 revealed that 81% of French people consider action by the EU (in general) ineffective and 77% think that the migration crisis is jeopardising the EU's future.

<sup>15</sup> A total of 71 days elapsed between approval of the engagement concept and the decision to launch an operation involving 700 troops (source EUMS 2015).

<sup>16</sup> Danjean, A. (2011), 'La Politique de Sécurité et de Défense Commune, ambition civile et militaire', in Bouterin G. et Goffi, E. (dir.), *L'Europe et sa Défense*, Choiseul, p. 152.

<sup>17</sup> See Annexes IV and V for a list of CSDP missions and operations.

<sup>18</sup> Apart from operations ALTHEA in Bosnia, launched in 2004, and ATALANTE in the Red Sea, launched in 2008, which are still ongoing.

*environment is still the most widely spread view,*' affirms Nicole Gnesotto.<sup>19</sup>

Taking this widely shared point of view as a starting point, and working within the frame of reference established by the Lisbon Treaty and the European Council's guidelines, this study aims to assess the EU's civilian and military crisis management capabilities in the operational field, to analyse why goals set are not being met and to propose ways of improving matters.

The study looks at the organisation, structures and operational capabilities of the CSDP, focusing on the planning and command arrangements for civilian and military operations, the EU's ability to respond rapidly to crises, and the generation of the forces needed to meet its commitments.

Research focused on:

- analysis of planning procedures for ongoing operations/missions, with a view to identifying strengths and weaknesses;
- identification of the specifically civilian and military aspects of operations/missions and their respective logistical requirements, as well as the EU's ability to learn lessons from its operational commitments and capitalise on them;
- assessment of the organisation, structures and command and control assets in EU operations/missions;
- analysis of the concepts and arrangements made to enable the EU to respond rapidly when called upon to manage crises that affect it (does it have suitable assets ready for deployment when required?);
- assessment of the force generation procedure for EU operations/missions, how smoothly this runs and how fast its forces can be mustered and deployed.

The methodology chosen consisted in first examining the (public) documents produced by the main EU institutions to govern the operational aspects of the CSDP listed above. This database was then supplemented by interviews (7) with people responsible for preparing CSDP operations and missions at various levels<sup>20</sup>. These interviews were based on questions concerning the CSDP's effectiveness, the quality and suitability of the reference documents in force (concepts, doctrines), the practices employed in implementing those documents and the results achieved. Lastly the author drew on his personal experience, in particular as EUMS Director-General and Head of the French Military Mission to Supreme Allied Commander Europe, to carry out a critical analysis of the current situation and make recommendations. In choosing to focus more on technical-military expertise in complex operational matters, this study seeks to go beyond the wealth of literature that already exists on the subject of CSDP missions.

Thus, after a brief introductory review of the CSDP's scope and frame of reference as laid

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<sup>19</sup> Gnesotto, N. (2014), *Faut-il enterrer la défense européenne ?*, La Documentation Française, p. 118.

<sup>20</sup> The list of persons interviewed for this study is confidential. Their names have been coded R1 to R7.

down in the Lisbon Treaty, and the relevant European Council guidelines and decisions, the study takes an objective look (using the reference documents in force) at the EU's operational planning process and how operations are commanded and controlled, before going on to provide a critical analysis of the political and technical strengths and weaknesses identified. It then addresses the problems inherent in conducting rapid response operations, on the basis of the concepts validated by the EU and, in particular, the Battlegroups (BGs), before undertaking a critical analysis, from both a political and technical-operational point of view, of the shortcomings in these concepts, and making recommendations as to how these shortcomings might be remedied. Lastly, it looks at operational force generation by the EU and its Member States, and analyses the reasons for the weaknesses identified. The study concludes by making some general recommendations designed to improve the overall performance of the CSDP.

## 1. Review of the scope and general frame of reference laid down for the CSDP by the Lisbon Treaty

The overall objective is made clear straightaway in the Preamble to the [Treaty on European Union](#) (TEU): the signatories declare that they are '*resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence*'. The CFSP is defined in Title V of the TEU, where it is presented as part of the EU's external action, the aim of which is to '*safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity*' (Article 21(2)(a) TEU). The need for a comprehensive, uniform approach to external policy is emphasised: '*The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies,*' and the Council, the Commission and the High Representative are made jointly responsible for this (Article 21(2) TEU).

Mutual political solidarity among the Member States lies at the heart of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) outlined in Article 24 TEU, and the Preamble also makes the implementation of such a policy an objective, after enumerating a series of matters of general interest and emphasising the need for convergence between national policies.

Another recital in the Preamble sets out the political aims underpinning the European integration process: the signatories state that they are '*resolved to mark a new stage in the process of European integration undertaken with the establishment of the European Communities ... thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world.*'

While Article 4 TEU reiterates that, '*national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State,*' Article 5 TEU stipulates that, '*under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States....*'

In short, the Lisbon Treaty incorporates an unambiguous commitment on the part of the EU Member States to develop a common foreign and security policy, one stage in an integration process explicitly intended to culminate in the establishment of a common defence.

The central role in pursuing this policy falls to the European Council, which has the task of identifying the EU's strategic goals and interests, including for matters with defence implications (Article 26 TEU).

By comparison with previous treaties, the Lisbon Treaty contains [further-reaching](#) provisions concerning the CSDP:

- the High Representative is at the same time a Vice-President of the Commission;
- the EEAS (European External Action Service) liaises between the Council, the Commission and the Member States in the field of external policy;
- it extends the scope of the CSDP to cover terrorism and disarmament;
- it confirms the central role of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in developing

capabilities;

- it introduces permanent structured cooperation as a new means of moving the CSDP forward (Article 26 TEU). This cooperation may concern: the level of investment expenditure on defence equipment, pooling capabilities (training, logistics, deployment), enhancing interoperability, making good shortfalls in capability, development of joint programmes, etc.;
- the Council may entrust the implementation of a mission to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability to perform such a task (Article 44 TEU);
- the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU);
- the solidarity clause: to deal with instances of terrorism and natural disasters, including using military resources (Article 222 TFEU);
- it strengthens the parliamentary dimension of the CSDP (Article 36 TEU): *'The European Parliament may address questions or make recommendations to the Council or the High Representative. Twice a year it shall hold a debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy, including the common security and defence policy.'*

It should be noted, however, that while acknowledging NATO's existence (Article 42 TEU) and the fact that the CSDP must reflect the need for complementarity between NATO and the EU, the Treaty does not make clear how this should be done. While the implicit recognition of NATO's primary role in guaranteeing collective defence does point to an unstated division of responsibilities, the very complex nature of the issues involved in EU security (geography, types of action, etc.) makes a hard-and-fast allocation of roles difficult. The only real distinction reflects NATO's power and the American leadership associated with it, which seems to mean that large-scale operations involving the use of force remain the province of NATO<sup>21</sup>.

What is more, EU and NATO decision-making processes remain independent of one another, and, given that some Member States belong only to one organisation and not the other, dialogue between the Councils is problematic, particularly since Cyprus joined the EU in May 2004. Turkey (a NATO member) refuses to allow Cyprus access to NATO information, thus blocking open discussions between the two Councils on the major security problems of the moment<sup>22</sup>. This makes political cooperation and the implementation of the Berlin+ Agreements<sup>23</sup> moot, even if 22 European countries are

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<sup>21</sup> Comparison:- NATO: SFOR in Bosnia: 32 000 troops in 1996, KFOR in Kosovo: 50 000 in 2002, ISAF in Afghanistan 55 000 in 2009 (source [NATO](#)). EU: EUFOR ALTHEA relieving SFOR in Bosnia: 7 500 troops in 2005 (now down to 862), 3 700 in 2009 for EUFOR Tchad /RCA, 2 200 for ARTEMIS in DRC in 2003 (source: [EEAS](#)).

<sup>22</sup> The agendas for meetings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC)/COPS are often monopolised by Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia (Cyprus does not take part in this operation which started before it joined the EU).

<sup>23</sup> Exchange of letters between the NATO and EU Secretaries-General in 2003 providing for NATO collective assets (basically HQ and communications equipment) to be made available to the EU on request and if available (not involved in a NATO operation).

members of both organisations. But even before the 2004 enlargement, when the EU had only 15 Member States, it still took eight months to plan the EU takeover from NATO in Bosnia (operation ALTHEA), and two months just to resolve the problem of the operational reserve! The Framework Nation approach has been employed in all EU military operations launched since 2004.

## 2. European Council guidelines and decisions (2012, 2013 and 2015)

After a four-year period (2009-2012) marked by very little discussion of defence matters, at the December 2012, December 2013 and June 2015 summits the European Council made clear its willingness to strengthen defence cooperation in Europe. This involves action in three specific fields specified in a roadmap that is updated at every defence summit:

- increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of the CSDP;
- developing European civilian and military capabilities;
- strengthening Europe's defence industry and the defence market.

Within the field of interest of this study, we will keep in mind the request for a definition of a new strategy tailored to the present-day security context, the need for a comprehensive, consistent – and complementary – approach to security issues on the part of the EU and the Member States, and the availability of effective civilian and military capabilities that can be rapidly deployed. A document issued by the European Parliamentary Research Service in January 2016 provided an initial assessment of the main measures taken at EU and Member State level to implement the European Council conclusions<sup>24</sup>. Those measures include: the Joint Communication issued by the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) and the Commission in December 2013, and endorsed by the European Council, on 'The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises'<sup>25</sup>; the Action Plan adopted in April 2015 on coherence between the Member States and the EU on action in different countries and regions, evaluation of which is scheduled for 2016; and the preparation of a 'strategic framework for security sector reform' due to be published in 2016. On the Commission's side the formation since 2014 of the Commissioners' Group on External Action – chaired by the HR/VP and meeting every month – should also be noted, as well as the activation (for the first time) in 2012 of the nucleus of a civil-military Operations Centre to coordinate operations in the Horn of Africa<sup>26</sup>.

The European Council's has failed to anticipate emerging crises, however. As Sven Biscop from the Institut Egmont emphasises, the main reason for this is that the EU does not have a genuine foreign policy, because its Member States have different interests, depending on their geographical situation, their level of ambition and their capabilities: *'military strategy entails the development of capabilities, but also the ability to take decisions. Establishing responsibilities and priorities enables faster decision-making in the event of a crisis, facilitating action by Member States that are militarily capable and politically decided to act under the aegis of the European Union.'*<sup>27</sup> Because no EU White Paper analysing the global security context and defining common security interests has yet been drawn up, in most cases the European Council simply responds to situations which could have been dealt with more

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<sup>24</sup> EPRS, ['Implementation of European Council conclusions in Common Security and Defence Policy \(CSDP\) since the Lisbon Treaty'](#), January 2016.

<sup>25</sup> 'The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises', December 2013.

<sup>26</sup> ATALANTA, EUCAP NESTOR and EUTM SOMALIA.

<sup>27</sup> Revue Défense Nationale summer 2013, 'Où va l'Europe Militaire ?', p. 106.

effectively at an earlier stage. It is rare for the European Council to consider potential crises at its ordinary meetings; it does so [instead](#) at extraordinary emergency meetings.

This study will therefore analyse the operational aspects of the preparation and conduct of the EU's civilian and military engagements in the light of the Lisbon Treaty and the European Council guidelines summarised above.

### **3. Operational planning and command and control systems**

*'The planning and conduct of CSDP missions and operations are still an area where progress is needed'* (European Council conclusions, June 2015). This statement by the Heads of State called for a review of the way in which the planning of military and civilian missions and operations is designed and carried out in the EU<sup>28</sup>. CSDP missions and operations are characterised in particular by the number of personnel deployed: in the dozens or hundreds in the case of missions, and several thousand in the case of operations.

#### **3.1 Current situation with regard to the EU's planning of operations/missions**

The EU's management of external crises takes the form of a synergy-based, coherent and complementary global approach using the various instruments available to it<sup>29</sup>. This includes the commitment, within the framework of the CSDP, of military capacities from the Member States and civilian capacities from the Member States and the EU.

##### **3.1.1 Operational planning procedures**

The planning of operations aims to prepare and organise the commitment of capacities to achieve the political objectives set by the Council. Operational planning is an iterative process requiring an analysis of all the factors that might influence the attainment of these political objectives.

The planning of operations is carried out at the four levels that make up the chain of command:

- at political-military strategic level, i.e. the institutions in Brussels;
- at military strategic level, i.e. the operation or mission commander and his headquarters: the OHQ (Operation Headquarters);
- at military operational level, i.e. the force or mission commander and his headquarters: the FHQ (Force Headquarters);
- at tactical level, i.e. unit commanders (land, air and sea) and below.

The planning carried out at these four levels is of course interdependent and must as far as possible be carried out in parallel in order to avoid harmful delays. The system outlined below is geared to the most demanding operations; it may be simplified for military missions or civilian operations and missions.

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<sup>28</sup> Reference documents: EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political Strategic Level (EEAS 02246/8/14 REV 8 of 20 February 2015); Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations (7660 REV 2 /CIVCOM 115, PESC 315, COSDP 258, RELEX 231, JAI 217, PROCIV 41 of 18/6/2013).

<sup>29</sup> Political, economic, humanitarian, security and military.

The chronology of planning at political-military strategic level (the Brussels level) is divided into five different phases:

- phase 1: identification of a crisis and development of an overall approach.

Based on strategic analysis and the country-specific goals defined by the EEAS in cooperation with other EU actors and submitted to the Foreign Affairs Council, EU preventive action can be identified along with potential missions within the framework of the CSDP. As a matter of routine, regular exchanges of information take place between the Member States, the Commission, the PSC (Political and Security Committee) and the EEAS, including the EUMS (Military Staff of the European Union). This makes it possible to monitor potential sources of crises (situation awareness) and issue early warnings in the event of an emerging crisis in any part of the world. Advance planning can then be undertaken at the request of Member States or at the initiative of the EEAS.

When the first signs of a crisis appear, a Crisis Management Board (CMB) comprising decision-makers from the bodies concerned can be convened to define the political framework for planning in coordination with the Commission. Within the EEAS, a crisis platform chaired by the HR/VP or her representative identifies the options and organises the decision-making process and exchanges of information among participants. It is at this stage that the Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) is defined, in close collaboration with the local offices concerned. The PFCA assesses the nature of the crisis and reasons for EU intervention (interests at stake), as well as possible instruments for action ranging from economic sanctions to humanitarian aid through diplomatic action and the CSDP. The PFCA is at the heart of the overall approach.

Within the CSDP, the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) is responsible for defining the political framework and coordinating the work of the various civilian and military instruments. The EUMS is responsible for the military contribution at political level, for proposing military options and for contingency planning. The CPCC is responsible for the civilian resources to be contributed. The various EEAS offices contribute where necessary. The CMPD works with Council and Commission bodies in this advanced planning, along with delegations, agencies and where necessary partner organisations such as the UN, NATO, the African Union (AU) and third countries. The HR/VP is responsible for programming the use of funds earmarked for development and for action taken under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace<sup>30</sup>. The Commission nevertheless remains responsible for implementing these funds.

Based on this information, the PSC then instructs the CMPD to draw up a Crisis Management Concept (CMC). This process begins by compiling relevant information provided by all the competent bodies, including the Torrejón satellite centre (SATCEN). Where necessary, the DGEUMS can request additional resources or outside expertise to prepare the available options.

At the same time, a crisis information strategy with key messages is drawn up by the EEAS communication cell, in cooperation with the Council's services.

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<sup>30</sup> A fund resourced and managed by the Commission, set up to support EU crisis management operations; it can be mobilised immediately.

- phase 2: development of a crisis management concept (CMC).

The CMC is built up around options for possible actions within the framework of the CSDP. It is drawn up by the CMPD with support from the EUMS and CPCC, the Member States, the Commission and the Athena mechanism. Care is taken to ensure consistency with other actions undertaken by the EU, the Commission and the Member States. Initial (informal) contact is made with the Member States at this stage with the aim of assessing their intentions as regards engagement and possible contributions, prior to the designation of an operation commander, OHQ and FHQ.

With assistance and contributions from working groups with particular expertise, the Military Committee, Civilian Committee (CIVCOM) and Political Military Group (PMG), the draft CMC is submitted to the PSC for approval and subsequent forwarding to the Council, which may decide: to invite the Commission to propose action in support of the objective sought and invite the Member States to act, to appoint a special representative for the crisis and to authorise the PSC to approve the concept of operations (CONOPS).

Once the CMC has been adopted, on the civilian side, the PSC instructs the CPCC director to propose differentiated civilian strategic options (CSO), where necessary, or, in his capacity as future operation commander, to start work on operational planning and recruit the head of mission and planning team for the following phases. This includes analysing the requirements in terms of additional CPCC staff. On the military side, the PSC gathers the Military Strategic Options (MSO) and, once an option has been chosen, seeks and pre-identifies an operation commander and OHQ. At the same time, the PSC, in accordance with the procedures in force<sup>31</sup>, makes provision for financial measures that will enable deployment to start without delay with the necessary resources. As soon as possible, the EEAS agrees a declaration with the host nation that will guarantee the immunity and rights of members of the operation (SOFA or SOMA)<sup>32</sup>.

The MSO and CSO, drawn up, respectively, by the EUMS and CPCC, with support from the CMPD, are differentiated scenarios or types of action accompanied by an assessment of their viability, risks, costs, command structures and requirements in terms of capacity and forces. The strategic options are then evaluated by the Military Committee and CIVCOM and ranked in order of priority before being submitted to the PSC for its approval.

The Council then takes the decision to launch the operation (mission), on the basis of the PSC's proposals and the strategic option chosen. In particular, it:

- establishes the objectives and mandate;
- appoints the civilian and military operation commanders and designates the operation headquarters (OHQ);

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<sup>31</sup> CSDP civilian operations and missions are financed from the (European) CFSP budget, while military operations receive specific funding from the Member States (Athena mechanism); only a small proportion is provided through common financing however, and around 90% of the cost of engagements is financed by contributing countries according to the principle 'costs lie where they fall'.

<sup>32</sup> Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) or Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

- where appropriate, authorises the PSC to take the necessary action to enable it to exercise political control and strategic direction of the operation;
- where appropriate, invites third countries to participate in the operation;
- orders the signing of a SOFA/SOMA;
- fixes the provisional budget for the operation and the financing mechanism.

This Council decision marks the start of phase 3.

- o phase 3: operational planning and decision to launch the operation.

For military operations, the EUSM produces an Initiating Military Directive (IMD) for the designated operation commander designed to enable the operation's objectives and direction to be translated into military terms. Once it has been approved by the Military Committee, this document serves as a reference on the basis of which to plan the concept of operations (CONOPS) and the operation plan (OPLAN), reference documents which are then submitted to the PSC for its approval. It might be pointed out that the CONOPS and the OPLAN<sup>33</sup> are drawn up in parallel with the (maximum) three levels of operational planning (military-strategic, involving the operation commander; operational, involving the force commander; and tactical, involving unit commanders on the ground). The operation commander, liaising with the EEAS (EUSM), then conducts the process of generating the necessary forces in cooperation with the Member States. Once the OPLAN has been approved, the Council takes the decision to launch the operation and indicates the starting date.

For civilian missions, the procedure is simplified. The CPCC Director, in his capacity as designated operation/mission commander, draws up the CONOPS in liaison with the designated head of mission, the level corresponding to the force commander<sup>34</sup> on the military side, with support from the EEAS.

During this phase, technical-assistance missions or fact-finding missions may be undertaken in the theatre to gather useful information for decision-makers and planners. Where necessary, such missions may also be launched at any point in the planning process.

Where an emergency situation demands urgent deployment, a fast-track planning process may be implemented following a PSC decision. This procedure requires only the approval of the CMC, the Council decision to launch the operation and the approval of the operation plan (OPLAN); in the case of military operations, approval of the initiating military directive (IMD) is also required.

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<sup>33</sup> The concept of operations (CONOPS) is a conceptual document setting out the nature and conduct of the operation, while the operation plan (OPLAN) provides specific detail on actions, their implementation points and chronology along with the rules of engagement and possible restrictions.

<sup>34</sup> The operation commander and his HQ (OHQ) work outside the theatre of operation, while the force commander and his HQ (FHQ) are deployed inside the theatre of operation.

- phase 4: deployment and conduct of the operation or mission.

In accordance with the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, the PSC exercises political control and strategic direction of operations/missions, under the responsibility of the Council and the HR/VP. The Commission keeps the PSC informed of the measures taken or envisaged in order to support the operations. The CPCC Director is the commander of all civilian operations, while each military operation is under the command of a different operation commander. The hierarchical chain thus leads directly from the operation commander to the PSC (acting for the Council). CIVCOM and the Military Committee nevertheless monitor the conduct of operations and are able to bring their assessments and recommendations to bear at any time.

The remaining actors are:

- the operation monitoring cell (watchkeepers), available 24/7 within the EUMS;
  - the EU special representative (EUSR), where one has been appointed, and the EU delegations in the host countries, who are able to provide information, supply local political knowledge and liaise with the host country authorities;
  - the Member States, which inform the PSC of the measures taken at national level;
  - the Committee of Contributors, which monitors and manages contributions from the Member States and third countries taking part in the operation.
- phase 5: strategic review and exit strategy.

The PSC decides on the need for, frequency and timing of a strategic review to decide on an adjustment to the crisis management concept (CMC) for an operation under way or to prepare for the end of an operation. Responsibility for conducting these reviews rests with the CMPD<sup>35</sup>. The PSC's proposals, supported by information provided by the various actors, are then submitted to the Council for its approval. The decisions taken are communicated to the lower levels for implementation.

### **3.1.2 Specific characteristics of civilian operations/missions**

Civilian missions and operations under the CSDP differ from military missions and operations (R5) chiefly in the way in which they are financed; they are mainly financed from the European budget (CFSP budget), while military operations are financed by contributions from the Member States following an intergovernmental procedure. There is a simplified planning procedure for CSDP civilian operations and missions. PSC (or Council) decisions are required: to launch the mission, which allows the necessary spending to be committed for reconnaissance and mission set-up, and then to establish the mission, i.e. to achieve initial operational capability (IOC). The levels of hierarchy are reduced to two: the EEAS/CPCC level, which is responsible for analysis and monitoring at political-strategic level and mission/operation command, and the level corresponding

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<sup>35</sup> As specified in the EEAS document 'Crisis Management procedures for CSDP Operations' of June 2013.

to the head of mission/operation deployed on the ground. In spite of this simplified procedure, it frequently takes a very long time to launch a civilian mission (in the case of EUCAP/Sahel/Mali, around a year between deciding to launch the mission and achieving operational capacity). This stems from the fact that, in contrast to military operations which mobilise units that have already been set up and trained and are ready for action, the staff of civilian missions are recruited on an individual basis; they have not been prepared for that task by their organisations of origin and need to be given specific information/training on their mission before taking up their duties. The CONOPS and OPLAN are contained in a single document drawn up after the decision has been taken to launch the mission. The mission's relationship with the host countries is often the subject of lengthy negotiations to define each party's responsibilities and take due account of the involvement of local administrations. Staff participating in EU missions do not generally have executive responsibilities but may be armed for self-protection (decision of the contributing states)

### **3.1.3 Specific aspects of operational planning in the field of logistics<sup>36</sup>**

Logistics encompasses all the actions necessary to support forces engaged in an operation from set-up to disengagement. This involves, in particular, movement (transport), food and medical and sanitary support, the necessary supplies in all areas, and the maintenance of vehicles and weapons systems.

Planning the logistical aspects of an operation is an integral part of the operation itself, its objectives, its modes of action and its rules of engagement, but it presents a number of specific features that are set out below. It plays a key part in determining the success of the mission.

Logistical manoeuvres establish the framework for operational manoeuvres; they start before them and end later. The logistical function therefore needs to be anticipated. Wherever possible, logistical units are deployed, at least in part, before the arrival of the force and leave after it. Logistical planning is incorporated at all levels of operational planning (political-military strategic, military strategic, operational and tactical) and interacts with it; the composition of the force to be deployed is directly influenced by the conditions under which its logistical support will be provided.

In a multinational EU or NATO operation, logistical manoeuvres are the result of cooperation between the multinational headquarters (in particular the OHQ and FHQ) in charge of operational planning, and the contributing nations responsible for supporting their troops. It is thus a collective responsibility that requires close coordination. The operation commander is responsible at all times for stating needs, setting logistical priorities, and coordinating activities to avoid duplication and interference; he is responsible for movements and transport in the theatre; logistical manoeuvres are described in a specific chapter of the CONOPS and the OPLAN.

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<sup>36</sup> 'EU Concept for Logistic Support for EU-led Military Operations' EEAS/EUMS No 3853/11 of 4 April 2011.

Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) bear most of the logistical burden: equipment and transport of troops to the theatre, accommodation infrastructure, supplies, health support, materials and repatriation at the end of the mission. Arrangements may nevertheless be made between two or more nations so that support can be integrated to a greater or lesser degree by setting up multinational logistics units. Some general interest logistical functions can be shared between nations. For example, France was responsible for fuel supplies to the force deployed for EUFOR Tchad / RCA in 2008.

As is the case for operational planning, the EUMS (R3) plays the main role in logistical planning until the operation commander is in a position to carry out his responsibilities. As soon as work starts on the CMC, the EUMS assesses the logistical issues involved in the various military options: infrastructure, supply conditions, and partnerships with the host nation and possibly with other international organisations. Experts working in its logistics division are of course involved in fact-finding missions. Logistics may also rest on a global approach, in particular where one or more civilian missions are to be deployed at the same time as a military operation.

Logistical manoeuvres are coordinated at various stages of planning, at logistic planning conferences which bring together the main actors in the HQs involved and the contributing nations. A logistic information system (LOGIS) makes it possible for contributing nations and HQs to exchange information (on needs and resources) in real time, which is indispensable in order to anticipate the action to be taken and avoid any logistical breakdowns. It might be pointed out that logistical planning standards derive directly from those of NATO. This applies in particular to the LOGFAS system (LOGistic Functional Area System), which enables the main logistics functions to be planned, implemented and monitored. This system has nevertheless benefited from some improvements drawn from the lessons learned in EU operations.

### **3.1.4 The EU's Lessons Learned process**

The PSC has instructed the CMPD to produce practical proposals aimed at ensuring that the lessons learned from CSDP operations and missions are effectively implemented<sup>37</sup>. The proposed method involves collecting (verified) raw data from the various actors and then identifying the possible political or operational impact. Data is collected by the CMPD, EUMS and CPCC within their respective areas of responsibility. The various stages of the lessons learned process are set out in the EUMS military lessons learned concept<sup>38</sup>:

- lesson observation: findings that could have an impact on operational output or that could become a lesson learnt;
- lesson identified: the nature of the (observed) problems for which remedial action is needed;
- remedial action: action aimed at correcting an identified issue;

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<sup>37</sup> Suggestion on a way forward on the implementation of lessons learned, including in field operations EEAS/CMPD No 2065/13 of 7/10/2013.

<sup>38</sup> EU Military Lessons Learnt at the Political Strategic Level Concept EEAS 02422/6/14 REV 6 of 8/7/2015 updating the EU Military Lessons Learned Concept EEAS/EUMS 8562/11 of 1/7/2011.

- lessons learnt: effective action taken to correct problems that have been duly identified and analysed;
- best practice: a procedure or method that has the potential to make an action more effective;
- intellectual capital: collection of all the information resources that can be used to improve effectiveness.

Lessons observed are uploaded to the ELMA and CiLMA software applications<sup>39</sup>. The process then continues on a cyclical basis: the raw data are analysed by the competent services and converted into lessons identified that define the nature and source of the problem, after which remedial action is proposed. Finally, the lessons learned are implemented in the form of adjustments to concepts, planning documents, training documents or operational procedures.

Updated in 2015, the EU Military Lessons Learnt at the Political Strategic Level Concept drawn up by the EUMS identifies the key areas that will benefit from the lessons learned process: the overall approach, operational planning, capacity development, action to improve concepts and procedures and exchanges of experience with other international organisations.

The concept clearly defines the central role played by the EUMS in the lessons learned process. The terms of reference of the EUMS<sup>40</sup> include responsibility for contributing to the lessons learned process with the aim of improving the EU's operational output, including the definition of future capacity requirements and concepts.

Responsibility for observing dysfunctions and identifying lessons naturally rests with the entire chain of command, as well as the bodies involved in operations and missions: EUMS, OHQ, FHQ, OPCEN, BGs, ATHENA and Member States. Each level is responsible for identifying the lessons to be implemented in its own area of responsibility. The EUMS's role is thus confined to the lessons learnt at the political and strategic level. At the start of each year, DG EUMS submits a report to the military committee for validation on lessons learned and best practice (at its level); as part of the comprehensive approach, this report is then supplemented by the report on civilian operations/missions supplied by the CPCC. Classified information is collected on a special portal that is available on the classified communication networks.

## **3.2. Command and control (C2) of CSDP operations/missions<sup>41</sup>**

### **3.2.1 Organisation**

Command of an EU operation/mission is carried out by commanders designated for that purpose at the four hierarchical levels described at the start of the chapter on planning,

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<sup>39</sup> ELMA (EUMS Lessons Management Application)/CILMA Civilian Lessons Management Application).

<sup>40</sup> EU Military Staff Terms of Reference and Organisation; Council Decision 298/CFSP of 7/4/2008.

<sup>41</sup> EU Concept for Military Command and Control / EEAS 02021/7/14 REV 7 of 5/1/2015.

hierarchically linked from the highest level to the lowest<sup>42</sup>. Control is the responsibility borne by the head of a given level for actions that do not come directly under his authority but under the authority of his subordinates. The command and control system (C2) for an operation/mission involves the appointment of those responsible, the organisation and structures of the hierarchical chain (HQ) and the necessary means of communication and transmission.

The reference document defines:

- a generic command and control structure (C2) for CSDP operations and missions;
- C2 requirements for the planning and execution phases;
- the criteria to be met by HQs;
- civilian-military coordination.

As noted above, the political control and strategic direction of EU operations is exercised by the PSC, acting on behalf of the Council. It is thus responsible for establishing chains of command for civilian or military operations.

Given that the EU has not yet taken a decision to set up its own complete and permanent military command structure, an ad hoc command structure must be set up when any military operation is launched. Operations are governed by the following principles:

- unity and continuity of command; responsibility for the planning and execution of operations rests with a single commander (the operation commander); in the case of operations of long duration, any substitution should not affect these principles; the chain of command must be clear for everyone;
- a comprehensive approach to crisis management, characterised by interoperability between the military command system and other (civilian) instruments deployed by the EU, as well as partners (NATO, third countries). A mixed chain of command may be set up comprising NATO and ad hoc HQs;
- three pre-identified options for the setting-up (on request) of a European chain of command:
  - o cooperation with NATO under the terms of the Berlin+ agreement; the OHQ is established close to SHAPE and D-SACEUR acts as operational commander;
  - o use of a framework nation (Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Greece and shortly Poland) that has declared a 'multinationalisable' OHQ; advance measures to identify (augmented) personnel from Brussels and other capitals who could be assigned to these potential HQs upon activation;

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<sup>42</sup> Political-military strategic: HR/VP and OSC: OpCdr, military operational: Force Cdr and tactical: unit commanders.

- activation of the operation centre pre-installed in the EUMS around a permanent core (around a dozen people) responsible for maintaining infrastructure and communication resources. This option is reserved a priori for civilian-military operations in situations where the remaining options cannot be used;
- HQs at the various levels (strategic, operational, tactical) must be activated simultaneously;
- the schedule for establishing the chain of command must be consistent with the schedules for force deployment; this applies in particular to the Battlegroups concept.
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### **3.2.2 Communication capabilities and resources**

Routine communications relating to the CSDP are conducted through two internet-type networks (R6):

- the SOLAN network (SECURE OFFICE LOCAL AREA NETWORK), an internal EEAS IT network, secure up to 'secret' level<sup>43</sup>, linking the various bodies in Brussels (CMPD, EUMS, CPCC);
- the OPSWAN IT network (EU OPERATIONS WIDE AREA NETWORK). This network was originally created to provide a basis for the planning of operations, linking the EUMS, SATCEN and OHQs. FHQs (at their national base) have also been included. This network is now being extended to include all the remaining Member States for the purposes of generating forces and exchanging classified geospatial data. It is secure up to 'EU secret' level.

The general principle regarding responsibility for communications in military operations is that the higher level takes charge of communication with the lower level. In the case of EU operations, this is confirmed by the *EU Concept for Military Command and Control*<sup>44</sup>.

This means that the EU must be in a position to guarantee its link with the OHQs (which must in turn guarantee their link with FHQs, etc.). Bearing in mind the various possible options with regard to the chain of command (NATO, framework nations and OPCEN), the situation is as follows:

- when a European OHQ is activated at SHAPE, with D-SACEUR as operation commander, communication resources are supplied by SHAPE (as in the case of

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<sup>43</sup> The protection of information is governed by the Decision of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 April 2013 on the security rules for the European External Action Service (2013/C 190 /01). Annex A to that decision (see annex I) defines four levels of protection according to which information is classified depending on how sensitive it is: top secret, secret, confidential and restricted. Responsibility for deciding on the level of classification rests with the issuing authority.

<sup>44</sup> Note/ EEAS 02021/7/14 REV 7 of 5/1/2015.

the ALTHEA operation in Bosnia); the downside is that the EU must adapt to complex operating procedures over which it has no influence;

- when the 'framework nation' option is chosen, the EUMS communicates with the 'Europeanised' OHQs through the OPSWAN network (referred to above);
- if OPCEN (OHQ within the EUMS) is activated, the EU will use a specific application within the SOLAN network known as EUCCIS (EU COMMAND and CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEM). In such cases, however, it must also be able to guarantee communication between OPCEN and the corresponding FHQ. The EEAS therefore has four shelters enabling an FHQ to be equipped with secure links up to 'secret' level. These resources are operated by EEAS experts, if necessary with additional Member State personnel (augmentees), who receive annual training in order to maintain capacity at a guaranteed minimum level;
- there is also a specific case that is becoming increasingly frequent: CSDP military training missions, or EUTM (EU Training Missions), where OHQs and FHQs form a single HQ deployed in the theatre. EUCCIS is used in this case too. A non-classified version exists for missions led by the CPCC<sup>45</sup> which do not require any classification.

Responsibility for communication resources rests with the EEAS. When it was set up, the EEAS received a somewhat motley collection of classified systems from the Council and Commission (R6). Most of these systems are technologically outdated and do not meet the needs of the EEAS, even though there has been some progress on making its communications more secure. The EEAS has launched a programme aimed at enhancing the security of its communications with the EU delegations in particular (encrypted telephone up to 'secret' level). This system will be interoperable with the system that is currently in the process of being deployed by the Council, which will enable secure communications between foreign ministries and delegations. In the final stage, this system will be interoperable with those deployed in CSDP missions.

With a view to the medium term (2017-2019), the EEAS has embarked on an ambitious programme to modernise and rationalise its classified systems. A tender procedure is currently underway. The general idea behind this programme is to set up a common platform across the entire EEAS (HQ, delegations, missions) for individuals who are required to handle classified information (need to know) and individuals who are required to share it between different communities (need to share).

The single platform will deliver common services and support niches that are accessible only to certain communities of interest (e.g. EUMS, Intelligence, etc.). It will replace the current systems. It will be highly secure and authorised up to 'secret' level.

This project includes a facility that can be deployed to link CSDP missions and operations up to 'secret' level, but it is not designed to substitute or replace deployed forces' computerised command systems. It will simply provide an anchor point connected to no more than a couple of work stations and/or items of equipment. Provision is also being made for a mobile component using laptops and tablets, but this component will not be

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<sup>45</sup> As a general rule, communications in civilian operations are not classified (exceptions being EULEX Kosovo and the missions in Ukraine and Afghanistan).

available until a later stage. EUCCIS will be transferred to this new platform. New tools will be introduced, for intelligence purposes in particular. In the medium term, and provided that it does not encounter any unexpected budgetary constraints, the EEAS should have a modern and highly secure platform making it possible to exchange EU classified information up to 'secret' level between all its component parts by 2018.

### **3.3. Critical observations on planning and on command systems for civil and military operations under the CSDP**

*'The EU needs to reassess its entire approach to crisis management' - Jolyon Howorth<sup>46</sup> (2014)*

#### **3.3.1 Planning**

The EU's operational planning process is well organised but rather cumbersome and therefore slow. It is well organised because it makes it possible to analyse situations and take decisions with 28 participants for civil operations and 27 for military operations<sup>47</sup> using an intergovernmental procedure even where only a limited number of Member States are willing to put boots on the ground; it enables all parties concerned within the Commission, Member States or Council to be involved at an early stage; it entails a comprehensive approach to crisis management, taking in not only measures to deal with specifically, urgent phenomena but also their underlying causes. However, it is quite cumbersome, involving no fewer than five decisions by the PSC or the Council between the early warning and the approval of the operational plan (see Annex IV), which makes it sluggish, even though expedited procedures are intended to speed up certain stages (fast track: see Annex V). An analysis of the operations launched by the EU since the establishment of the EEAS shows that, between the approval of the CMC and the launch of the operation, it took: 38 days for EUNAVMED SOPHIA, 57 days for EUFOR CAR, and 83 days for EUMAM CAR (R4). On the civil side, a year passed between the approval of the CMC and the operational capacity of EUCAP Sahel-Niger (R5). The crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2014 is illustrative in this respect; after the risks of genocide in the CAR had become apparent at the end of 2013, action was deemed appropriate on 15 January 2014. The Crisis Management Concept (CMC) was approved and the OHQ designated on 20 January (Larissa in Greece). The commanding officer for the operation was selected on 10 February. The decision to launch the operation was made on 1 April (i.e. after nearly three months had elapsed). The initial operational capacity was announced on 30 April and the full capacity on 15 June, i.e. after five months. Seven force generation conferences were needed in order to establish the force between 13 February and 22 July 2014<sup>48</sup>.

The planning architecture is complex because of the number of bodies and parties involved at various stages and in various capacities: 27 Member States, around ten Directorates-General at the Commission, the intergovernmental decision-making structures (Council, PSC, PMG<sup>49</sup>, EUMC, CIVCOM, etc.) and 135 EU Delegations in foreign countries. This point is underlined by Eva Gross, a researcher at the EU Institute

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<sup>46</sup> Howorth, J. (2014), *Security and Defense policy in the EU*, Palgrave, p. 189.

<sup>47</sup> Denmark is not participating in the military dimension of the CSDP (having an opt-out clause).

<sup>48</sup> Source: EUMS 2015.

<sup>49</sup> Political-Military Group (group of experts available to the PSC).

of Security Studies (EUISS) in the report of October 2013 on the CSDP<sup>50</sup>. The EEAS, whose role is precisely that of ensuring united action and coordination among these numerous parties involved in decision-making on European foreign and security policy, has itself become a cumbersome structure<sup>51</sup> with a complex internal organisation (R2). Improvements were made when the new High Representative, Federica Mogherini, arrived, with the establishment, in particular, of a clearer hierarchy at the top of the structure, with only one Secretary-General and three Deputy Secretaries-General answering to him or her, one of whom is responsible for the CSDP and crisis response. However, the structure assigned to the CSDP would gain from rationalisation (R1), which should involve raising to Deputy Secretary-General level the tasks of political synthesis, coordination and organisation of the overall approach which are currently entrusted to the CMPD and giving the same Deputy Secretary-General authority over three separate entities, namely the EUMS, the CPCC and INTCEN (the Intelligence Centre). The CMPD, which is responsible for coordinating the overall approach to planning, has no real authority over the Commission Directorates involved (R2). Duplication and lack of resources can coexist at the EEAS. For example, the distribution of planning tasks between the CMPD and the EUMS is not clear, and there is often pointless duplication (R3). The CMPD, which is responsible for the overall approach to planning but which has no terms of reference (setting out its duties as the EUMS), tends to use its military experts to do what is done by the EUMS, both during the preparation of the CMC and afterwards. Meanwhile the EUMS, which is the EU's only permanent military structure (with around 200 staff) and its only source of information in this field, is called upon from all sides to meet the need for expertise for the numerous internal or external EEAS actors listed above, concerning a very wide range of subjects. The EUMS is often compelled to engage in tactical analyses because of the lack of a permanent military strategic level such as exists at SHAPE or in the framework nations<sup>52</sup>. It follows that, although it does not have any identified responsibilities for the conduct of operations under the CSDP, the EUMS has to monitor their conduct in order to be ready to reply to the numerous questions that it receives from the PSC, the Military Committee and other bodies in Brussels (R3).

The EU's lack of ambition to engage in coercive operations has not so far favoured a joint engagement concept, and this remains very embryonic (R7). Numerous specific concepts exist which could be included in a general joint force commitment concept<sup>53</sup>, but no such concept has been established. On the subject of rapid response, documents have been drawn up defining the possible action which could be taken by the various services (land, sea and air), particularly in support of the BGs, but their scope is limited, and they are no substitute for a genuine general joint force commitment concept.

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<sup>50</sup> 'More care has to be taken in the planning phase to acquire this in-depth knowledge through fact-finding missions and coordination among EU actors in Brussels and the field for sharing of information', CSDP report, EUISS, October 2013, p. 41.

<sup>51</sup> Some 4 200 people, including 2 000 in Brussels, while the remainder are at the 135 EU delegations.

<sup>52</sup> In France, the Centre for the Planning and Conduct of Operations (CPCO) not only performs the function of OHQ for the Armies' Chief of Staff for the various operations in which France is involved, but also manages operational interactions and their consequences at political level between the various operations and the rationalisations which are possible between them, particularly in the field of logistics.

<sup>53</sup> Maritime operations concept, concept against improvised explosive devices (IEDs), concept for support to military operations, concept for special operations.

In military missions (advice, training, etc.), the heads of mission, who are also forces commanders, are preoccupied with operational and practical problems, are remote from Brussels, and can lose sight of strategic aspects (R7) and hence of the political purposes of their actions.

The EUMS learns political/strategic lessons from operations/missions, but the lessons learned from operations at military level by the ephemeral OHQs are not readily transferable and are therefore put to little use. Experience suggests that the military lessons learned at EU level and accepted by the Member States are not much taken into account by them, with the risk that the same errors may be repeated in subsequent operations (R4).

On the other hand, an analysis of the lessons learned from civil operations/missions for 2015 has identified three areas in which it is desirable to make improvements (R5):

- as the Project Cells for civil missions, which are responsible for organising the financing of specific projects to provide direct support for the performance of the mission mandate, are of proven effectiveness, it is suggested that they should be used to assess specific needs and to identify local needs. For this purpose, they need the right experts with a knowledge of all fields of responsibility covered by the mission;
- support staff for civil missions provided by Member States must have appropriate training (knowledge of EU procedures, particularly in the financial field, acquisition of resources, internal audits and financial control);
- as the environment in which civil missions are conducted is becoming increasingly risky, greater support for the security of civil missions is needed; to that end, cooperation between the security services of the EEAS and of the CPCC needs to be stepped up so as to develop mutual coordination and support systems.

### **3.3.2 Command and control of operations**

The lack of a permanent operational headquarters (OHQ) in Brussels seriously damages the credibility of the CSDP, and the present palliative measures have only limited success in remedying the situation (R7). The various options for establishing a complete operational chain of command make it necessary to communicate with 7 potential OHQs<sup>54</sup> (which will soon become 8), which however are not permanent, by different means (as indicated above). This is an additional constraint in comparison with the situation in NATO, which has a clear, single and permanent hierarchical system. The real question is whether the EU genuinely wishes to establish an autonomous capacity to conduct military operations, including coercive operations. If the answer is affirmative, the EU cannot continue to accept the absence of a centre for the planning and conduct of CSDP operations/missions (along the lines of the CPCC in France, the Planning Joint Head Quarters in the United Kingdom or the equivalent at SHAPE) and of a permanent operation command HQ. The current situation, which has the advantage of motivating

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<sup>54</sup> SHAPE, OPCEN and the five OHQs of the framework nations (soon to become six with Poland).

the potential framework nations (France, Germany, the UK, Italy and Greece) to establish and maintain credible operation command and control capacities (OHQ), also has many disadvantages. 'The initial flexibility afforded by voluntary contributions from States for OHQs and FHQs comes at the price of effectiveness and speed',<sup>55</sup> observes General de Langlois, Director of Research at the Strategic Research Institute of the Military College (IRSEM). In fact it reflects a lack of will on the part of the Member States to equip the EU with such a capacity.

The first adverse effect of this lack is felt with regard to *responsiveness* to an emerging crisis. An analysis of the reference documents concerning operational planning in the EU indicates a need to develop planning in parallel at the various levels (political/strategic, military/strategic, operational and tactical) of the chain of command. This is what happens at national HQs or NATO (SHAPE, AFNORTH, AFSOUTH). In the EU, an operation commander and his OHQ cannot be designated until the CMC has been approved, while the planning of the CONOPS and of the OPLAN (for which the operation commander is responsible) cannot begin until the Initial Planning Guidance has been approved, which happens after the approval of the CMC. Unofficial or informal contacts can be established with the prospective appointees if they are known, but it seems difficult to avoid an initial delay of at least a fortnight or so (and it can be considerably longer if any difficulty arises in making the military appointments).

This situation necessitates far greater involvement of the EUMS in planning at lower levels (in relation to which it theoretically has no powers), which gives rise to an additional workload for its staff and dispersion of their efforts, to the detriment of their official responsibilities (R4). During the initial debates of the PCS concerning the desirability of launching a CSDP operation in DRC in 2006<sup>56</sup>, the questions raised by ambassadors concerning the situation in the theatre compelled the EUMS to send two fact-finding missions to Kinshasa to inquire into tactical aspects for which operational HQs would normally be responsible. That raises the issue of an unexpected excess workload for the EUMS and the skills of its staff (not provided for in job descriptions).

The second problem lies in the lack of coherence of the existing system between the civil and military chains of command. Since the establishment of the CPCC, its director (like his colleague, the DG EUMS, on the military side) has provided the expertise for political/strategic planning, but has also been the designated operation commander for all civil operations. Continuity of command between the political and operational levels is thus constantly ensured for civil missions/operations, which is not the case for military operations, where each operation is conducted by a specific chain established ad hoc on the basis of Council decisions. This lack of coherence is particularly damaging to the overall approach which is presented as central to the EU's crisis management. When civil and military operations or missions are launched simultaneously in a theatre, the distance between the commander of civil operations (the CPCC in Brussels) and his military counterpart, either at SHAPE or in a framework nation, is an aggravating factor. It should also be noted that the creation of specific chains of command for each operation prevents overall management of concomitant EU operations and of their interactions. The imbalance between the permanent command structures of civil operations (CPCC) and the ad hoc military command structures for military operations/missions (established on a more random basis) promotes a scaling-down of the EU's military ambitions. In this

<sup>55</sup> de Langlois, M. (2015), *L'Europe, une grande puissance désarmée*, Economica, p. 122.

<sup>56</sup> Author's experience as DG EUMS.

context, the overall approach may reduce the EU's military capabilities, regarding them as subsidiary to civil capabilities (R4).

Because of the 'organisational complexity in Brussels', military operation commanders have difficulty in identifying their contacts there. The PCS is an intergovernmental panel of ambassadors responsible for the political scrutiny and strategic management of each operation, but when it comes to the day-to-day conduct of operations, the operation commander needs dialogue partners that he can inform about his urgent needs for information and analyses of situations, logistics, administrative and financial procedures, etc. Although the Chair of the EUMC is designated as his 'first contact point', he has no personal authority to reply; he can only forward requests from the PCS with the opinion of the EUMC; nor does he have a general staff to study practical issues, so that he has to seek the expertise of the EUMS, which however does not form part of the chain conducting operations (according to its terms of reference); all this often causes delays which are anything but compatible with the urgency of certain requests. Obviously, in Brussels there is no monitoring centre for CSDP operations answerable to the DG EUMS (who is himself supervised by the EUMC and the HR), which could reply effectively to operation commanders and heads of mission in real time<sup>57</sup>. It is clear that the optimal solution would be for the operation commander himself to be located in Brussels with a permanent OHQ<sup>58</sup>, but the previous proposal would already constitute a significant improvement. A first step would be to designate DG EUMS as commander of non-coercive CSDP 'missions', but not operations (R4). As these missions are limited in terms of both ambition and personnel, and involve short chains of command, they could be managed by a special unit within the EUMS and would only require a small increase in the staff establishment. Regrettably, the activation of a nucleus of OPCEN in 2012 (12 people) to coordinate the various CSDP operations and missions in the Horn of Africa did not produce the results anticipated because of the shortage of staff and the lack of authority over the commanders of these operations/missions (the commander of ATALANTA in Northwood, of EUCAP NESTOR and EUTM in Somalia). All in all, this partial activation of OPCEN, which might have appeared to be a first step in the right direction – that of operational command from an HQ in Brussels – will have served only to derail this project by showing up its ineffectiveness (R7). It would seem, moreover, that the measures planned for the activation of OPCEN as a civil and military OHQ with all its staff (a minimum of 88) by Council decision are no longer operational, in view of the additional needs for premises and resources which have emerged since 2008 and which have greatly reduced the capacities and infrastructure planned but unused for OPCEN (R4).

Another major disadvantage arising from the lack of a permanent European operational structure is the absence of a genuinely European operational culture among military personnel from the EU countries. Collective effectiveness in an international – and therefore European – format is acquired by means of the various shared experiences. But the lack of ambition and motivation on the part of Member States which is expressed in the lack of a permanent command structure leads to a lack of collective confidence in its capacities, which is damaging to the EU's credibility as a guarantor of security. Professionalism requires permanence. The current situation helps to maintain the conviction on the international scene, but also within the EU, that the Europeans can only

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<sup>57</sup> This centre could be both civil and military on condition that it is answerable as follows: to the DG EUMS for military operations/missions, and to the Head of the CPCC for civil operations.

<sup>58</sup> This would correspond to the position of OPCEN (pre-positioned within the EUMS but not permanent) if it were activated, which has never happened yet.

act through their soft power instruments and that their common military capabilities are virtually non-existent.

As regards the specious argument of non-duplication with NATO, it must be strongly rejected, as the development of the security context in Europe and its neighbourhood shows that the Europeans need to be able to shoulder part of their responsibilities autonomously, particularly those which the Americans no longer wish to bear. Incidentally, there is nothing to prevent arrangements being made with NATO which would permit the EU, once it has become a militarily credible actor, from either acting autonomously or participating in NATO operations and finally becoming the European pillar of that organisation. The staff needs of such a European structure (of the order of 200 people) would be quite minimal in comparison with those of NATO (9 000) and the cost of meeting them would be amply justified by the benefits that the structure would confer. This 'duplication', which would not be very costly, is not only worthwhile but necessary.

Another adverse consequence of the lack of a permanent and visibly European OHQ lies in the political field. If one accepts, as is self-evident, that the use of the Berlin+ agreements between two autonomous organisations of different natures (despite 22 States in common) is a cumbersome and complex process which will be very difficult to carry out in future, particularly when a rapid response is called for, the most likely option for the establishment of a European OHQ is to use one of the five framework nations (soon to be six with Poland) which have declared a national OHQ to the EU. Experience demonstrates that, in such a situation, whichever nation volunteers to be the framework nation is seen by the international community as bearing the true responsibility for the operation undertaken under the European flag. This means that the EU's maximum ambition, and particularly acceptance of the risk involved in a military operation, is limited to what its framework nations can accept individually. A clear illustration of this limit was witnessed during the crisis in southern Lebanon in 2006, when, although the EU countries contributed 80% of the intervention forces, those countries were not able to act under a European chain of command, as no framework nation had agreed to provide its OHQ, for fear of the risks attached to the operation and because its duration was unpredictable. Ultimately it was the UN that had to set it up (FINUL 2).

Setting up a permanent operation command structure in Brussels would also have a positive economic impact because fewer personnel would be needed to man a single permanent OHQ of modest size (200) than to operate on demand one or more national OHQs (in the event of two simultaneous military operations). This arrangement would not prevent those Member States that so wished from keeping an OHQ suited to their national ambitions. It may be noted, furthermore, that the various OHQs of the framework nations are heterogeneous; they do not all have the same capacities, the same skills or the same format. The idea that it is possible to choose among them is therefore less simple than it seems (R4). The OHQs of the framework nations operate under procedures decided and formulated by themselves at workshops (Standing Operating Procedures or SOPs); these SOPs are then approved by the DG EUMS. But common SOPs do not take account of all the fields in which OHQs operate, particularly the administrative and financial aspects, where differences exist. On the other hand, in the field of planning, the method is common to all. The Council does not impose any particular (European) standards on OHQs. The preparation and training of each OHQ remain the responsibility of the State which establishes it. Be that as it may, the staffing

and precise composition of these OHQs always have to be adapted slightly, in accordance with the specific features of each operation.

### **3.3.3 Command resources (C2)**

There are 12 classified communication systems in the EU, which are not interoperable. This situation needs to be improved (R6).

As regards deployable signals communications capabilities, the EUMS (R4) has identified certain lacunae which exist at present: as things stand, the personnel available (one commissioned + five non-commissioned officers) and only one shelter (a container equipped with signals equipment) can only be deployed at several weeks' notice and operate for a maximum of six months. The deployment of two or more shelters can be considered only if the number of qualified personnel available is increased to 18 for two shelters by means of reinforcements from the Member States. An alternative solution would be to delegate the operation of the shelters to a framework nation for the duration of the operation. The costs of deploying and operating these shelters must inevitably be covered from the ATHENA budget, as no other procedure exists at this stage for meeting them. However, the latest revision of the arrangement has not yet systematically incorporated it.

Progress may be noted with regard to civil missions, with the creation of the civil Mission Support Platform, which brings together Commission and EEAS staff qualified to draw up contracts and invitations to tender, to keep accounts and to carry out administrative monitoring, including after the return of the personnel. This measure should improve the management of civil missions and permit swifter and more effective deployment of those missions. On the other hand, there is no specific command/control/information and intelligence (C3I) system for civil operations, and the CPCC does not have any resources of its own, which could delay the launch of missions.

## 4. Rapid response and Battlegroups (BGs)

### 4.1 Existing rules on rapid response

After the need for rapid response to crises was expressed at the Helsinki European Council (1999), an initial rapid response concept was approved by the EUMC in 2003 (revised in 2009).

The EU Military Rapid Response Concept of 2015<sup>59</sup> identifies the main elements of rapid response:

- the necessary initial decisions;
- the procedures and measures facilitating emergency response;
- the early identification and activation of a chain of command;
- a modular approach to the necessary forces, enabling a flexible response;
- a clear distribution of tasks between the different rapid response tools.

It is a model which encompasses the subordinate concepts of planning at the political and strategic level, military command and control, and force generation. It provides a coherent framework for action for joint or single-service operations (land, air or sea). Initially limited to land-based operations, it was supplemented in 2007 by sea<sup>60</sup> and air<sup>61</sup> components.

Compared with the capacity to deploy up to 60 000 men within two months, which is the standard confirmed by the 2010 target<sup>62</sup>, the rapid response posture is defined as a process aimed at mobilising a force within 30 days, a period which includes five days between CMC approval and the decision (taken by the Council) to launch an operation, then 25 days between that decision and the deployment of the mission in the theatre. It implies the acceleration of preparatory actions in all areas: acquisition of the necessary intelligence, reaching a decision, planning, force generation, deployment, establishing a chain of command – all of which must be carried out, as far as possible, simultaneously. It also stresses the need for such forces to have at their disposal a good risk analysis and significant autonomy so that they can act effectively as soon as they are deployed, with particular reference to intelligence and logistics, including medical support.

This rapid response capacity must be adapted to the five illustrative scenarios set out in the 2005 requirements catalogue (produced by the EUMS), ranging from the separation of the parties in a conflict by force to humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention, evacuation of nationals or stabilisation and reconstruction of states in crisis. At that stage, some missions mentioned in the EU Security Strategy (from 2003, updated in 2008), such as the fight against terrorism, organised crime or weapons of mass destruction were not included in the 2005 Rapid Response Concept.

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<sup>59</sup> 'EU Military Rapid Response Concept' of 8/1/2015.

<sup>60</sup> EU Maritime Rapid Response Concept (15294/07 of 15/11/2007).

<sup>61</sup> EU Air Rapid Response Concept (16838/07 of 21/12/2007).

<sup>62</sup> EU Civilian and Military Capability Development beyond 2010 No 17127/10 of 17/12/2010.

In order to reduce operation planning periods, the PSC may decide to activate the accelerated 'fast track process'<sup>63</sup> described above. On the basis of the illustrative scenarios, a list of generic tasks was drawn up by the EUMS and approved by the EUMC. These tasks were linked to generic units (forces) likely to be provided by the Member States, having been declared by them and listed in a forces catalogue, thus facilitating preparedness in advance. However, it became apparent in 2003 that this was not enough to meet rapid response needs and that specific forces had to be prepared for this purpose. Thus the concept of '1500 Tactical Group', better known as the 'Battlegroup' (BG), was approved by the PSC in 2004 (subsequently updated in 2006) and included in the documentation on rapid response<sup>64</sup>.

## **4.2 The Battlegroup concept at the heart of the CSDP rapid response**

It was thus necessary to establish, during peacetime, specific deployment-ready units the size of a reinforced infantry regiment (roughly 1500 men) that could be deployed several thousand kilometres away in less than 15 days (five days between the CMC and the decision to launch + 10 days until operational deployment in the theatre). These units, which are capable of operating autonomously, must be able to remain in their theatre of engagement for one to four months without relief.

They can be national, but an international format around a homogenous infantry battalion is encouraged. Once they have been declared to the EU, the Battlegroups will enter standby duty for six months, during which time they must be able to take action in the circumstances set out above. Two BGs are normally on standby simultaneously so that it is possible to conduct two separate operations if the need arises. The multiannual plan for standby tours is regularly updated. Most of the time, the BGs are attached to a pre-identified OHQ, with which they can train, thus facilitating the establishment of a chain of command if a decision to deploy is taken. Their detailed composition and means of support shall be established as soon as possible in advance.

## **4.3 A critical look at the EU's rapid response capabilities**

### **4.3.1 Positive aspects of the Battlegroup concept**

This is a tool to stimulate the transformation of European armies (R7). Although the forces of European countries are large in number (around 1.5 million soldiers across 28 Member States), only a small proportion of them are able to participate in distant interventions outside their country of origin (according to estimates, in the order of 100 000)<sup>65</sup>. The Nordic countries have been pioneers in this regard. Since 2004, Swedish defence planning has been redefined around the concept of BGs (types and numbers of arms systems for the future). The requirement to be able to field a BG continually has

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<sup>63</sup> See: suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP operation (7660:2:1 »Rev.2 of 18/6/2013).

<sup>64</sup> 'EU Battlegroup Preparation Guide' CCM 12904/1/08 of 8/9/2008; 'EU Rapid Response Capabilities and EU Battle groups': Note from the EEAS approved by the PSC on 15 November 2013; 'EU Military Rapid Response Concept' of 8 January 2015.

<sup>65</sup> Source: Global Firepower Ranks 2016; this estimate is imprecise since the criteria for quantifying deployable forces/territorial forces vary depending on the country.

served to keep the volume of deployable forces to a minimum, equip them to operate far from Swedish territory in a hostile environment, and also increase interoperability between the Nordic countries' forces (Sweden and Finland are not members of NATO).

It is also a tool to stimulate multinational (often regional) cooperation by encouraging neighbouring countries or countries with special ties to get to know each other better, work together and strengthen their interoperability.

Finally, it's a way to compensate for the difficulties the EU faces in anticipating external crises and the time required for taking a political decision. There is thus a hope that some of the time required of politicians can be offset by bringing gains in terms of operational deployment time.

However, the concept of BGs also suffers from shortcomings that explain why these units have not yet been used, even though they have been operational since 1 January 2007.

#### **4.3.2 Limits and operational capacity deficiencies of EU rapid reaction**

The root of the problem is political. It is linked to a lack of appetite among European countries (and their leaders) for armed European deployments due to lack of interest, motivation, or simply capacity. The security policy ambitions of the majority of EU Member States are limited to their territory and their close neighbourhood. The EU's neighbourhood is currently unstable in all directions (particularly East and South) and presents growing risks for the EU's security. However, these risks are felt differently by Member States depending on their geographic position, giving rise to different defence priorities. In the absence of approved solidarity mechanisms at European level, these risks rarely lead to European military initiatives. This reluctance is reinforced by the existence of NATO, which is seen by most European countries (finding themselves in a beneficial culture of dependency) as the sole guarantor of security in the event of a serious threat. These countries therefore do not want to consider alternative options that could suggest to the Americans that the EU has its own autonomous operational capabilities. The target of 2% of GDP for EU Member States' defence budgets discussed at the NATO summit of September 2014 is far from being achieved in many countries.

In the current situation, it is unlikely that many EU Member States will be keen to take political risks in support of a European operation which would not be backed up by the United States (which explains the preference for a clear NATO framework during the Libyan crisis). This lack of political appetite for EU enforcement operations translates into minimal commitments in low-intensity, low-risk and limited-duration operations, and into a clear preference for civilian operations (21 civilian operations launched and only 11 military operations<sup>66</sup>).

The need to give substance to the provisions of the Treaties and to the European Council Conclusions has been made a reality in the eyes of citizens by practical provisions encompassing the creation of potential action capacities (multinational HQs and units, Battlegroups, etc.), but these action capacities remain virtual in the absence of the political will to use them. 'What is certain is that the Europeans, collectively, need to reach

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<sup>66</sup> It is noteworthy that the operations launched after 2009 have involved fewer personnel on the ground than those launched between 2003 and 2008 (7500 in Bosnia, 3700 in Chad).

agreement on the role armed force will play in their external policy in the coming decades<sup>67</sup>, according to Jolyon Howorth, Political Science Professor at Yale University. It should also be added that the multinational character of BGs, which is an advantage in terms of interoperability, poses a problem for political convergence during deployment (the two, three or four nations party to the BG must be in agreement in order to deploy).

The second gap is structural and was brought to light at the concept presentation in 2004. The format of the BGs is copied from the force deployed for the ARTEMIS operation in the DRC in 2003. However, it is very rare for the same format of force to be adaptable to two different operations. In all military operations, the format of the force is defined according to the situation, the mission, the adversary, the characteristics of the country of deployment and of the environment. It is preferable to prepare the forces likely to be deployed in advance. Such forces must be modular and be able to combine flexibly. This is the case in France with the Guépard plan, which facilitates the rapid – even very rapid – deployment of units and of capacities formed on demand on the basis of standby units, ranging from the size of a company (150 men) to that of a brigade (3000 men).

Pursuant to the European Council Decisions aimed at making the CSDP more credible and more effective, a document approved by the PSC<sup>68</sup> in 2013 provides for a number of ways of improving the effectiveness of the concept of BGs and of EU rapid response in general. They include:

- improving support for the deployment of BGs (enablers);
- improving the capacity of BGs to work jointly by producing scenarios which make it possible to identify types of actions, tasks and generic needs;
- extending the scope of possible BG missions to include the training and advising of third armies (with reference to EUTM Somalia and Mali);
- deducing from these new needs the desired developments in terms of structures, resources, availability of forces and training;
- enabling the EEAS to send multidisciplinary missions on short notice in order to identify the most appropriate use of the EU's crisis-management instruments;
- investigating the possibility of extending the period of availability of BGs from six to 12 months in order to alleviate any possible shortfalls and to improve their training;
- increasing training exercises for BGs with a certification process associating other nations and the EUMS with the lead nation;
- making better use of advance planning in order to anticipate possible engagement situations during the standby period, including at the political level, through discussions on potential crises between those responsible at the different levels;

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<sup>67</sup> Howorth, J. (2014), *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 108.

<sup>68</sup> EU rapid response capabilities and Battlegroups; No 16289/13 of 15/11/2013.

- enabling the participation of the top management of BGs on pre-standby and standby in EEAS seminars (key leaders seminars) in order for them to learn more about the management and structures in Brussels;
- improving the sharing of the costs of BG operations by extending the common costs to include the costs of transport, deployment, acquiring critical information and capacities, and training exercises.

These 2013 PSC guidelines were unfortunately followed by too few specific applications, and they do not go far enough. The rigidity of the BG concept (force of between 1 500 and 2 000 men) also reveals the EU's low level of ambition, even if the 2010 target foresees the possibility of deploying 60 000 men under a European banner. It is shocking that the possibility of deploying two or three BGs together in the same theatre was not considered.

The third flaw is economic: the proportion of common funding for BG deployments remains abnormally low, despite modest improvements. The matter of transport costs has still not been addressed. For the lead nation, the deployment of a BG appears largely to be a triple punishment: it involves running political risks in relation to the international community, running risks in relation to public opinion (soldiers' deaths) and the cost of 80% of the operation.

### **4.3.3 Additional remarks concerning rapid response**

A certain lack of coherence may be identified at the level of the institutions in Brussels, given that rapid response demands are not met in the same way in different structures. Although a standby system exists within EUMS enabling an immediate reaction to any request for operational planning or to an event, the same cannot be said for the civilian bodies of the EEAS. However, it is within the EEAS that the political and geographic experts are found, as well as the deployable means of communication (transmission shelters and means of communication).

Another criticism could be made against the acceleration of the planning process (fast track process), which serves to reduce the duration of the various stages. According to the military experts (R 4), this could result in a superficial or incomplete analysis of MSOs (military strategic options), the effects of which could be very detrimental to the conduct of the operation.

## **5. Force generation**

### **5.1 Current provisions for generating necessary forces for CSDP civilian and military operations**

Given that the EU does not have its own forces at its disposal and the CSDP operates in an intergovernmental manner, its civilian and military operations are conducted with forces provided by its Member States and supplemented, if necessary, by those of invited third countries.

A concept for force generation for military operations, which was approved in November 2015, sets out the principles and procedures to apply in pursuing it.<sup>69</sup> The document states that force generation must be considered at different stages:

- identification of forces that are potentially available according to Member States' intentions to participate (Force Sensing) at a very early stage of planning; the capacities, means and forces necessary for an operation must have been identified before the Operations Commander can recommend launching an operation to the Council (PSC). Potential contributions from countries must be evaluated in conjunction with planning and, in particular, with the options being considered in the CMC, since they affect credibility. At that stage, the guidance provided by the countries is non-binding. It is largely the responsibility of the EUMS to conduct this investigation. An evaluation of countries' intentions to contribute forms part of the advance notification from the military committee (Military Advice) to the CMC.
- Force generation as such normally occurs following the dissemination of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) by the Operations Commander. It is carried out during one or several force generation conferences, which bring together the representatives of the Member States and, possibly, of invited third countries. The information provided by the countries in this context is binding. It shall include any restrictions (*Caveats*) imposed by countries on the use of their forces. The force generation conferences are directed by the Operations Commander assisted by the EUMS.
- The anticipation of forces (Force Anticipation) necessary for the relief or reinforcement of forces deployed in long-term operations (longer than 12 months or in excess of the originally planned mandate). It is placed under the responsibility of the EUMS in liaison with the Operations Commander.

The procedure for mobilising the forces declared by the countries for an operation is similar to the one used by NATO and also comprises three stages:

- Alerting countries of a need that is being defined (ACTWARN) on the basis of a Provisional Statement of Requirement (PSOR). It is implemented by the Operations Commander on the basis of CONOPS, and it specifies the date of the force generation conference.
- Notification of the statement of refined requirement (ACTREQ), to which the countries shall respond officially, indicating the level of their contribution and the preparedness of their forces (*FORCEPREP*). At the end of the force generation conference, the Operations Commander shall report on the balance between requirements and resources to the PSC via the Military Committee.

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<sup>69</sup> EU concept for Force Generation; EEAS(2015) 1237 REV 6 of 11/11/2015.

- Activation Order (ACTORD), which specifies the provisions for gathering and deploying forces, and the transfer of authority (TOA) over them, to the contributing nations. The transfer of authority signifies the moment when the forces sent to the theatre of operations come under the command of the Operations Commander. The nations shall be responsible for transporting their forces to the theatre of operations.

It should be noted that a general force generation conference is held annually under the guidance of EUMS in order to adjust the forces requirements of simultaneous CSDP operations.

In rapid response situations, the procedures are accelerated and there is an even stronger investment from the EUMS. In the event that a decision is made to deploy a BG on standby, the generation procedure would be simplified (and thus accelerated) since the forces and their chain of command, including the force commander, would already be identified and prepared for deployment.

As regards civilian operations/missions, the procedure is generally less cumbersome since personnel numbers are smaller and the employment framework is simpler, but it is also longer owing to the need for the individual recruitment of personnel (except in the event that units from the European Gendarmerie Force are deployed). Recruitment of personnel for civilian operations/missions is managed by the CPCC.

## **5.2 Critical analysis of the effectiveness of the force generation process and possible ways of improving the situation**

Force generation for CSDP operations/missions is proving to be difficult and laborious, despite their low levels of ambition and risk and their limited duration, but this is not to say that the concept and the procedures are necessarily to blame. One must go back to the 2004 operation ALTHEA in Bosnia to find a situation in which what the countries were offering exceeded the stated need (despite the significant number of 7 500 troops initially deployed). The EUFOR DRC operation of 2006 was almost not launched since no Member States could be found that were willing to contribute to the two doctor posts for the deployable hospital. Often, it is third countries that have to make up for the shortfall in contributions from the EU (Georgia for EUFOR CAR or Russia for EUFOR Tchad /RCA ). This shortfall points to a lack of interest and will on the part of EU Member States to make commitments in this context. It also illustrates the current gap between the European Councils' declarations (cited in the introduction) and the aforementioned actions.

It is also worth noting the central role of the EUMS in the force generation process, which is complicated by the absence of a permanent operational chain of command. The EUMS is required to simultaneously carry out the preparation of military options, to evaluate their feasibility by ascertaining Member States' intentions to contribute and to build a chain of command that could be linked to them (Operations Commander, OHQ, FHQ). This situation is even more critical when a rapid response is required, and this highlights the need to have units prepared for deployment, such as BGs, which have nonetheless never been used.

### 5.2.1 Ways to improve the situation

Given that the difficulty of generating forces for EU operations is political in origin, it is unrealistic to think that the issue could be resolved by operational measures. The rapid response forces established within NATO (NATO Response Force) or within the EU have never been deployed for operational purposes. If the will exists to build the EU's capacity to effectively undertake rapid response operations, it will be necessary to reflect on the political conditions that must be in place if this is to be achieved; this point is made in a report from the EU Institute of Security Studies (EUISS) from October 2013<sup>70</sup>. This will certainly include identifying common security interests which would justify doing so, anticipating scenarios while taking account of countries' security priorities and enabling a register to be prepared on countries' likelihood to commit. General de Langlois proposed making use of the opportunities provided by Article 44<sup>71</sup> of the TEU in order to increase the possibilities for deploying BGs<sup>72</sup>. A further subject to consider alongside this should be the implementation of defence and security solidarity among Member States, the object being to prevent those willing to commit themselves from being penalised doubly or triply (risks, costs and political consequences).

As regards the civilian operations preferred by the states (21 civilian missions/operations compared with 11 military operations since 2003), it is vital that the time taken to build forces for deployment on mission be reduced by forming reserves of qualified persons in each State that meet the needs anticipated on the basis of the many civilian operations already carried out. This 'earmarking' would make it possible to reduce response times considerably.

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<sup>70</sup> 'While the debate focuses largely on technical and operational aspects, the question of political will and commitment for missions ranging from member states commitment to staffing missions and providing political support for mission objectives, remains: there is little point in using the EU flag otherwise' excerpt from the EUISS report from October 2013. Gross, E., Menon, A. (dir.) (2013), [\*CSDP between internal constraints and external challenges\*](#), EUISS, Paris. p. 40.

<sup>71</sup> Article 44: Possibility for a group of willing Member States to launch an operation in the EU's name.

<sup>72</sup> de Langlois, M. (2015), *L'Europe, une grande puissance désarmée*, Economica, p. 69.

## 6 Conclusion

The conclusions of the European Council meetings in [2012](#), [2013](#) and [2015](#) reflect the willingness of the EU Heads of State or Government to take their European approach to defence further by, in particular, increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of the CSDP.

As this study into the operational aspects of the CSDP draws to a close, the verdict as regards progress and prospects, in the light of the European Council's guidelines, is mixed. Though there has been an increase in the number of operations launched since 2012 (five civilian and three military) over the previous three years (one civilian and one military)<sup>73</sup>, it has to be acknowledged that the operations/missions have been non-coercive and have had more to do with training and advisory duties than with restoring peace or engaging in combat. Overall, complements have been very limited (no more than 800 for EUFOR RCA). It should also be pointed out that most operational reference documents were updated post-2012 (see bibliography in annex).

Current military operational-planning procedures work, but are not very responsive, given the number of stakeholders: 27 Member States plus the Brussels bodies involved in global crisis management. Fast-tracking arrangements should be used with caution so that the quality of the groundwork for deployments does not suffer. There is scope for improvements, however, by rationalising the EEAS' CSDP-specific organisational arrangements and set-up and, in particular, by reviewing the complement for the EUMS in the light of the tasks it actually has to carry out when military operations are being planned and conducted. The EU still has no general joint force deployment concept, which suggests that that type of engagement is not envisioned.

The CSDP's main shortcoming remains the lack of a permanent command chain for military operations/missions, which is highly detrimental to the credibility of the EU as a military security actor; the adverse consequences of that - both politically and militarily - are patently obvious. The makeshift solution of setting up a non-permanent Operations Centre (OPCEN) within the EUMS - declared operational in 2007 - is demonstrably useless. Current command assets for civilian and military operations are incomplete, too, but ought to have been enhanced by 2019 as projected in the EEAS plan. It remains to be seen whether those assets will reflect technological progress and guarantee uninterrupted secure links in all circumstances.

CFSP rapid reaction capacities have also suffered because of the contradiction between intentions stated at the highest political level and the real world in which they are determined. In point of fact, those capacities are to be found almost exclusively in the Battlegroup concept, which both represents an ambitious force level (maximum complement of 1 500 to 2 000) and is inflexibly structured - a concept that has little chance of being tailored to the needs of operations whose features are not known in advance. To date, the recommendations of the Heads of State or Government as regards flexibility, modularity and funding have not really been acted on. The fact is that, for the time being,

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<sup>73</sup> Five civilian operations (EUAM Ukraine, EUCAP Sahel-Mali, EUCAP Sahel-Niger, EUCAP Nestor and EUBAM Libya) and four military operations (EUTM Mali, EUFOR RCA, EUTM RCA and EUNAVFOR MED SOPHIA) since 2012; one civilian operation (EUAVSEC South Sudan) and one military operation (EUTM Somalia) between 2009 and 2012.

the way in which personnel are recruited for civilian operations/missions rule out rapid-response deployment.

In view of the above inadequacies, which are sapping confidence in the EU's operational capacities, it is not surprising that Member States are not very keen on contributing to operations and that force generation conferences are more than laborious (though the procedure is not really being called into question here).

The fact is that the inadequacies of the CSDP stem from a fundamental political problem characterised by the ambivalence of EU Heads of State or Government: while they talk a good game, their specific commitments and actions remain modest or non-existent. Accordingly, many of the advances made in the Treaty of Lisbon have not yet been put into practice, e.g. permanent structured cooperation, enhanced cooperation or initiatives taken by a group of Member States acting on the EU's behalf (Article 44 of the Treaty of Lisbon). Likewise, hardly any tangible action has been taken in furtherance of what is set out in the preamble to the treaty: mutual political solidarity, convergence of national policies and integration. Operational measures cannot make up for a lack of political will, however. We must therefore break out of this vicious circle.

The minimum requirements for an effective CSDP are quite clear: a strategic framework for action, along White Paper lines, that sets out specific objectives and political assumptions for the use of armed force, making it possible to prepare for ways of managing potential crises at European level. As General de Langlois notes<sup>74</sup>, the Member States are most at odds with each other when it comes to the use of force. This top-down study is essential in order to set priorities, give tangible expression to solidarity and establish complementarities between Member States on a thematic or regional basis; it might provide a frame of reference for bringing national white papers into line with each other. What then must come are trained and equipped forces that can be deployed within a specified political framework (scenarios) and a permanent command structure in order not only to mount rapid responses, but also manage interactions between simultaneous EU military and civilian operations.

- Looking ahead:

Political discussions to make the CSDP more effective should also extend to the following issues, which, while not being covered by this study, potentially impact its conclusions:

- In its May 2013 outlook report<sup>75</sup> on European military capabilities, the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS) advocates five possible avenues for enhancing the EU's capabilities to meet security challenges over the following 10 years: consolidation, optimisation, innovation, regionalisation and integration. In a 21st century security context, those avenues merit more in-depth scrutiny, since they represent an innovative approach and could well provide what is needed to cope with new threats.
- The meaning of the term 'defence' in 'Common Security and Defence Policy' needs to be clarified, given that, to date, 'collective' defence has effectively been a

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<sup>74</sup> de Langlois, M. (2015), *L'Europe, une grande puissance désarmée*, Economica, p. 98.

<sup>75</sup> 'Enabling the Future; European military capabilities 2013-2025: challenges and avenues', European Union Institute for Security Studies, May 2013, p. 35.

NATO-only area. Accordingly, CSDP competences do not go beyond managing crises outside the territory of the EU's Member States. That is at odds with the acknowledged existence of an internal-external security continuum. The global approach at the heart of the EU's crisis management strategy therefore serves external interventions only; but it fails to address the problem of defence overall. The defence of EU Member States' major interests (territory, infrastructure and populations) is not a CSDP competence, though, conversely, a host of competences that interact with defence (e.g. research, industry, energy, justice and home affairs) are exercised by the Commission, which has no acknowledged defence-related powers. The fact that security responsibilities are fragmented makes for inefficiency. As Claude-France Arnould, the first Director of the CMPD, pointed out as long as 2010: '*The value of ESDP lies not only in the fact that it clearly complements CFSP; the security and defence policy must converge with all the policies of the Union.*'<sup>76</sup>.

- The basis for complementarity with NATO - portrayed as a given - needs to be spelled out. The tacit assumption seems to be that the current provisions appear to assign military operations to NATO only (cf. Libya in 2011). However, the natural complementarity of the two organisations ought primarily to be based on whether or not the United States is involved in operations for Europe's security and defence. In the absence of a European pillar within NATO, the EU must have capabilities to act autonomously if the United States does not want to engage. The EU needs to be involved in its own security and should be capable of acting within NATO (together with the United States) or autonomously (under an EU banner). For that reason, a permanent operational structure for the EU - at strategic military level - for forecasting, planning and conducting EU operations is essential.

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<sup>76</sup> 'What ambitions for European defence in 2020?', EU ISS report, October 2009, p. 92.

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## Annexes

Annex I: Extracts from Annex A to the Decision of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 April 2013 on the security rules for the European External Action Service ([2013/C 190 /01](#)).

### 'ANNEX A

#### PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS FOR PROTECTING EUCI

##### *Article 1*

##### **Purpose, scope and definitions**


1. This Annex sets out the basic principles and minimum standards of security for protecting EUCI.
2. These basic principles and minimum standards shall apply to the EEAS and to Staff placed under the responsibility of the EEAS as referred to and defined respectively in Articles 1 and 2 of this Decision.

##### *Article 2*


##### **Definition of EUCI, security classifications and markings**

1. "EU classified information" (EUCI) means any information or material the unauthorised disclosure of which could cause varying degrees of prejudice to the interests of the European Union or of one or more of the Member States, designated by an EU security classification.
2. EUCI shall be classified at one of the following levels:
  - (a) TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET: information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could cause exceptionally grave prejudice to the essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of the Member States.
  - (b) SECRET UE/EU SECRET: information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could seriously harm the essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of the Member States.
  - (c) CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL: information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could harm the essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of the Member States.
  - (d) RESTREINT EU/EU RESTRICTED: information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could be disadvantageous to the interests of the European Union or of one or more of the Member States.
3. EUCI shall bear a security classification marking in accordance with paragraph 2. It may bear additional markings to designate the field of activity to which it relates, identify the originator, limit distribution, restrict use or indicate releasability.

Annex II: Standard EU Military Crisis Response Planning Process (Annex A to the [EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political Strategic Level](#) (EEAS 02246/8/14 REV 8 – 20 February 2015))



Annex III: Fast Track EU Military Crisis Response Planning Process (Annex B to the [EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political Strategic Level](#) (EEAS 02246/8/14 REV 8 - 20 February 2015))



Annex IV: Ongoing civilian and military ESDP operations

Source: EEAS (last updated: May 2016)



Annex V: Completed civilian and military ESDP operations

Source: EEAS (last updated: May 2016)



Annex VI: Projected battlegroup rotation schedule

Enclosure 1: EU BG offers and commitments

As of 20 October 2015

**EU BATTLEGROUP OFFERS AND COMMITMENTS**

	Semester	MS (& TS)	BG POC	preferred OHQ
<b>Detailed commitments</b>	2015-2	FR, BE	FR	FR
		vacant		
	2016-1	PL, CZ, HU, SK, UA	PL	PL
		EL, BG, CY, RO, UA	EL	EL
	2016-2	UK, FI, IE, LT, LV, SE*, UA	UK	UK
		DE, AT, CZ, IE, HR, LU, NL	DE <sup>1</sup>	DE
2017-1	IT, AT, HR, HU, SI	IT <sup>2</sup>	IT	
	FR, BE*	FR	FR	
<b>BG Package Commitments</b>	2017-2	ES, PT, IT	ES	FR
		Vacant		
	2018-1	EL, BG, CY, RO	EL	EL
		NL, AT, BE, LU	BENELUX <sup>3</sup>	UK*
	2018-2	Vacant		
		NL, AT, BE, DE, LU	BENELUX <sup>4</sup>	UK*
2019-1	UK*	UK	UK	
	FR	FR	FR	
<b>Initial offer</b>	2019-2	PL, CZ, HU*, SK*	PL	
		ES	ES	
	2020-1	EL, BG, CY, RO	EL	EL
		IT*	IT	IT
	2020-2	DE, AT, CZ, HR, NL*	DE	
		IT <sup>5</sup> , ES	IT	IT
	2021-1	vacant		
		vacant		
2021-2	vacant			
	vacant			

\* Pending political decision

Source: [B2Pro](#), 12 March 2016





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This study assesses planning, command and control of civilian and military CSDP missions and operations, progress made in developing civilian and military capabilities, particularly rapid response capabilities in the form of the EU Battlegroups, and challenges encountered during the force generation process. In all of these areas, the European Council has repeatedly called for further progress in recent years.

The study concludes that, despite recent progress in reviewing crisis management procedures, operational planning remains cumbersome and slow. The findings indicate that the chain of command for CSDP military operations would benefit from further streamlining, possibly through the creation of a Follow-up Centre for Missions and Operations placed under the supervision of the EUMS. 'Modular' configurations specific to high-readiness alert units should be explored as a priority when further developing rapid reaction military capabilities. The study also shows that, for civilian CSDP missions and operations, the delays encountered in the force generation process could be reduced by further developing national rosters of experts to be deployed.

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