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EU support for violent and authoritarian regimes: no end in sight

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14 October 2024

Migration across the Central Mediterranean has been a consistent topic in the EU for over a decade. In July, the Council’s Working Party on the External Aspects of Migration discussed a paper drafted by the Hungarian Council Presidency. Focusing on Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, it argues that challenges have “deepened and become more complex in 2023.” This includes dangers at sea and shortcomings in living conditions, infrastructure and humanitarian assistance on land. As is customary, there is little mention of the role played by EU migration policy in generating these “challenges”.

Image: Amine Ghrabi, CC BY-NC 2.0

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Data: a three-year increase in central Mediterranean border crossings

Document:

• Overview of the Central-Mediterranean Route - Presidency paper (pdf)
• Outsourcing borders document archive

In 2023, central Mediterranean irregular border crossings increased for the third consecutive year. The following number of people were registered as making the crossing:

• 2021: 67,724
• 2022: 105,561
• 2023: 158,020

The main nationalities registered were Bangladeshi, Egyptian, Guinean, Tunisian and Ivorian. There are also a growing number of Burkinabe, Malian and Sudanese people. There were decreases in arrivals of North African nationals in 2023:

• -57.2% of Algerians
• -45.1% of Egyptians
• -1.8% of Tunisians

Libya has become the main country of departure, with 56% of the total, taking over from Tunisia. An increase in arrivals from March 2024 followed the decrease in the third quarter of 2023. Seasonal differences, also dependent on weather patterns, are not uncommon. However, the rate of increase was lower than the previous year, the document notes.

Primary factors behind recent changes

The Hungarian Presidency links these changes to a few primary factors. First is the EU’s “comprehensive partnerships” with Egypt and Tunisia, covering policy areas in migration and mobility. It also attributes them to the “anti-smuggling and border protection efforts of the Libyan and Tunisian authorities.”

The paper also relates the intensification of measures against irregular migration in these countries to endogenous factors. Examples include a “tense economic situation” and “negative public perceptions on migration”. Promoting deportations from north African countries is “expected to remain a priority.”

The EU’s support for these factors is also set to remain a priority despite the appalling consequences for human rights. This includes ongoing efforts to increase police cooperation with North African states. The document notes an EU policing action plan that calls for the detection and disruption of organised crime groups involved in smuggling, by creating dedicated “investigative/operational” task forces.

The action plan also features efforts to:

• improve real-time information and intelligence exchanges with Europol and Eurojust; and
• improve investigations in “source, transit and destination countries” along the Central Mediterranean.

On investigations, the Presidency’s document says a Europol Mediterranean Operational Task Force (OTF), set up as part of the ten-point plan for Lampedusa agreed in 2023, is “leading to fruitful results”. It is considered a means to “enhance operational cooperation” with member states and beyond.

Egypt’s reluctance toward agreements and cooperation with Europol

Despite these warm words, it seems that not all the EU’s partners in North Africa are so keen on intensified police cooperation. The document notes that Egypt is reluctant both to agree to a statement on migration and mobility and to increase its cooperation with Europol.

The document describes Egypt as having a “large migrant stock,” but without significant departures since 2017. However, it is a transit country for people wanting to reach departure points, primarily in Libya. The paper says “statistics with numbers from 2022” place Egyptian nationals amongst the top ten non-EU nationalities suspected of involvement in human trafficking. It is not clear whose statistics are cited.

The emergence of “hybrid smuggling packages” is also noted. These comprise legal, semi-legal and irregular travel through Egypt to other departure points. Additionally, a Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership was launched in March 2024 and backed by €7.4 billion in funding from 2024 to 2027. It covers six pillars:

• political relations;
• economic stability;
• trade and investment;
• migration and mobility;
• security and demography; and
• human capital.

Since then, the Commission has proposed a joint statement on migration and mobility to cover border management, counter-smuggling, counter-trafficking, returns (of Egyptian nationals from the EU, and voluntary returns from Egypt to countries of origin) and reintegration, legal migration, labour mobility, and asylum.

Despite these measures, the Hungarian Presidency’s note says “the Egyptian side has not yet shown interest in concluding a joint statement on migration and mobility”. Similarly, it “has not shown much interest” in negotiating a deal for “the exchange of personal data with Europol.”

It is perhaps because of this reluctance that EU Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, travelled to Cairo in early September to try to persuade Egyptian ministers. The Hungarian foreign minister was there the following week, setting rather a different tone to Johansson. He said, “Brussels represents danger, while Cairo is Europe’s protector when it comes to migration.”

Discussions will also have taken place in other fora: a High-Level Migration Dialogue with Egypt involving the European External Action Service and two Commission Directorate-Generals was scheduled for 16 July 2024.

Tunisia: tackling increase in departures, disregarding authoritarian crackdown

People arriving from Tunisia reached record levels in Italy in 2022 (32,371 people). This followed an authoritarian turn under President Kais Saied. The trend continued in 2023, when people arriving rose three-fold to 99,000. These numbers, amongst other things, led to the EU pushing for a “strategic and global partnership” with Tunisia, agreed in July 2023.

The agreement builds on the EU-Tunisia Association Agreement and has five “pillars”:

• macroeconomic stability;
• trade and economy;
• green energy transition;
• people to people contacts; and
• migration and mobility.

The Hungarian Presidency paper notes that the migration pillar “is of high priority”. At the same time, information exchange and transparency “remain key”. Yet, like Egypt, Tunisia has not shown interest in concluding an information exchange agreement with Europol, despite ongoing negotiations based on a Council authorisation dating back to 2018. 

Regardless, EU funds are flowing into the country.

€53 million in funding for migration-related projects was contracted in 2024, of a €105 million commitment from the EU’s aid and development budget, the Neighbourhood, Cooperation and International Development Instrument (NDICI). This comes on top of “around EUR 200 million of ongoing programmes.”

To back this up, the Presidency highlights the second “Talent Partnership” round table held in Tunis in June 2024, as an example of a success, potentially leading to agreement on a joint roadmap and a third round table in 2025. “Talent Partnerships” are intended to facilitate labour migration to the EU.

Alongside supporting Tunisian authorities in intercepting attempted sea crossings, EU funding has enabled more “voluntary returns” of people from Tunisia to countries of origin. This resulted in 3,300 people “voluntarily” returned between January and May 2024. This is a substantial increase compared to the 2,500 undertaken in 2023.

Meanwhile, the situation in the country has got worse. The provision of basic services by UNHCR has been hampered by a “deterioration of the situation for migrants in Tunisia,” the paper says. This is a rare acknowledgement of harmful developments in the North African country. Yet, there is no mention of responsibility for this deterioration. Likewise, there is no link made with EU migration policy externalisation despite the many calls made by civil society.

Libya in a disjointed context

The Presidency notes that Libya’s political situation makes it difficult to achieve peace and stability. It relates this to the presence of two executive authorities: the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity and the Government of National Stability in the east. It neglects to mention that the country’s “coast guards” are similarly fragmented.

Despite this, bilateral engagement between the EU and the Tripoli authorities increased after the Commission’s November 2023 conference launching a “Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling.” The Presidency’s note says many areas may see enhanced cooperation, including:

• border management;
• search and rescue operations;
• prevention of departures;
• effective migration governance;
• increasing “voluntary humanitarian returns”;
• improving international protection; and
• human rights and cooperation in the field of labour migration.

Member states, the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) have proposed caution, graduality and effective implementation monitoring as a basis for cooperation with Libya. Yet, it seems that exchanges have been intense.

In February, the Commission’s Directorates-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME), Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) and the European External Action Service travelled to Tripoli to exchange views with Libyan authorities. The Libyan side indicated an interest in improving cooperation in the country’s south and east. They conveyed “a particular emphasis on strengthening reception centres and increasing voluntary returns.”

In May, a Libyan delegation visited Brussels. Here, they confirmed openness to cooperation on “the fight against illegal migration, strengthening search and rescue operations and increasing access to reception centres for international organisations and support for refugees.” The EU side spoke of alternative solutions to detention and simplifying procedures to increase “voluntary” returns.

From 29 June to 2 July, an EU delegation travelled to both Tripoli and Benghazi. In Tripoli, they discussed a comprehensive migration agenda. Relations were dynamic and “positive”. In Benghazi, the meeting was between competent authorities and strictly technical .

Hidden in plain sight: what is left unsaid

First, the Presidency paper heavily emphasises law enforcement and control measures, without considering their effects. It ignores the possibility that the EU migration policy model and authoritarian regimes’ persecution of their citizens may be the root of existing “challenges”.

Yet, while ignoring this obvious possibility, it claims:

“In the coming months, it may become clearer whether the cooperation efforts undertaken so far can address the root causes of illegal migration and not just the consequences.”

Second, there is little acknowledgement of the EU partnering with dangerous groups. While it makes a passing reference to Libyan militias as “armed groups”, it ignores others. This includes institutions infilitrated by, or intertwined with, militias. This collusion became more obvious after the killing of Abd al-Rahaman al-Milad (also known as Bija). A commander of the Libyan coastguard in Zawiya, Bija was also accused of membership of criminal groups linked to trafficking. He was killed in a gangland-style shooting on 1 September in Tripoli. The EU’s support for such organisations and individuals may serve to increase their profits. This is due to repeated crossing attempts by the same people stuck in a cycle of interception at sea and detention in Libya.

Ongoing court cases are also trying to highlight the illegality of EU and member state action. In September 2024, the sea rescue organisation Mediterranea filed a case before the International Criminal Court (ICC) against Italian interior minister Matteo Piantedosi. Piantedosi had boasted about 16,220 people being intercepted and returned to Libya in 2024. In early October, Refugees in Libya and Front-Lex filed a case against Frontex. They are demanding Frontex stop communicating the location of boats in distress to Libyan authorities. Despite this, cooperation between Frontex and the Libyan coast guard continues unabated.

Third, it is contradictory that the section on Tunisia says that all activities funded by the EU “should be anchored within the respect of human rights and human dignity of all migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, in accordance with International Law.”

Tunisian authorities have launched a wave of repression against political dissent, civil society, the media and lawyers, alongside racist statements and outright violence against the country’s Black population, people on the move and people acting in solidarity with them. Human rights abuses, particularly those endured by people travelling through Tunisia, worsened after the signing of the “strategic and global partnership.”

Moreover, the Tunisian coastguard endangers lives through “illegal and violent practices,” says the organisation AlarmPhone. The group argues that “strengthening the interception capacities of the Tunisian National Guard” is designed “to set up a regime of non-assistance at sea and ‘push back by proxy’.”

Civil society organisations on both sides of the Mediterranean, have condemned the EU’s support for Tunisia and called for it to end. It remains to be seen what effect – if any – President Saied’s 90% vote tally in recent elections will have on the EU’s support.

Fourth, cooperation with Egypt is troubling for several reasons, not least the al-Sisi regime’s targeting of political opponents. There have also been large-scale pushbacks of refugees to Sudan, despite the raging armed conflict.

Finally, any agreement allowing personal data exchange between Tunisia, Egypt and Europol is likely to involve unreliable or persecutory information. Fed to the EU’s policing agency, these would form part of the data sources used for screening or asylum adjudication procedures. This could jeopardise people’s lives and their right to seek asylum.