Please note: this observatory is no longer updated.
Latest news and documentation (Statewatch terrorist lists site, updated 18 September 2009).
September 2009 – Terrorism Lists, Executive Powers and Human Rights (flyer) International conference, Brussels, 20 October 2009. For more information see www.ecchr.org.
June 2009 – EU renews terrorist list – Common Position 2009/468/CFSP of 15 June 2009 (pdf)
June 2009 – Court of First Instance follows Kadi and annuls annulled the listing of Omar Mohammed Othman (aka Abu Qatada) (Court Press release, 11.6.09 pdf): Despite the ruling it is explicitly assumed that the Council will now re-list him following the new procedures introduced in the light of Kadi (see further below). The full text of the judgment is available here.
June 2009 – Blocking Faith, Freezing Charity: Charitable Giving and the “War on Terrorism Financing”: The American Civil Liberties Union has released a comprehensive report documenting the consequence of U.S. government actions on American Muslims’ exercise of their right to profess and practice their religion through charitable giving. The ACLU’s research shows that U.S. terrorism financing policies and practices are seriously undermining American Muslims’ protected constitutional liberties and violating their fundamental human rights to freedom of religion, freedom of association, and freedom from discrimination.
May 2009 – Libyan included on UN sanctions list submits new case at EU Court (pdf): Case T-127/09, Abdulbasit Abdulrahim v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities.
May 2009 – Staggering 65-year sentences given to Directors of US Charity in Hamas aid case (Al Jazeera, 28.5.2009): A US court has sentenced the former heads of a Muslim charity to 65 years in prison for providing aid to the Palestinian group Hamas. The sentences have been appealed. See also ACLU: Designating Non-Profits As Terrorist Organizations Without Due Process Undermines Security And Humanitarian Aid (link, American Civil Liberties Union press release, 27.2.02) and “Terror Prosecutions Shed More Heat Than Light” on a previous prosecution of the Holy Land Foundation for ‘material support’ for terrorism.
May 2009 – USA: Justice Dept. Finds Flaws in F.B.I. Terror List (link: NY Times, 6.5.09): The Federal Bureau of Investigation has incorrectly kept nearly 24,000 people on a terrorist watch list on the basis of outdated or sometimes irrelevant information, while missing people with genuine ties to terrorism who should have been on the list.
May 2009 – Overdue Process: Protecting Human Rights while Sanctioning Alleged Terrorists (pdf): Report from the Fourth Freedom Forum and Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame to CORDAID arguing that practices used by the United Nations Security Council in the name of countering terrorism have led to serious concerns about violations of human rights and limitations on the work of civil society groups. The use of blacklisting has eroded due process rights and discredited elements of the international fight against terrorism. Enhanced efforts to create clear and fair listing procedures are urgently needed and long overdue.
May 2009 – Home Office publishes list of ‘bad people’ banned from entering the UK (link, Guardian 5.6.09). See also Shock jock banned from UK vows to sue Jacqui Smith (link, Guardian 6.6.09).
April 2009 – European Parliament Study: Overview of European and international legislation on terrorist financing (pdf)
April 2009 – Lawsuits Challenge Charity Blacklisting (link, antiwar.com, March 2004): In two court cases that could test the limits of the Barrack Obama administration’s executive authority as well as its commitment to transparency, human rights lawyers are challenging the government’s right to use information obtained through warrantless wiretapping as evidence and to shut down charitable organizations without allowing them to defend themselves. In one case, the government shut down the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, a Saudi charity, in 2004, allegedly using information obtained though illegal wiretaps. In the other, also involving a Muslim-oriented charity, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is challenging the constitutionality of government programs that designate organizations as “terrorists” and close them down without providing these groups a way to contest the decision in court.
April 2009 – Multilateral Sanctions Against Terror Suspects and the Violation of Due Process Standards (International Affairs, Chatham House, March 2009): Report by Monika Heupel finds that “that court decisions and proceedings and, in the case of the UN, falling commitment from member states, have prompted the UN Security Council and the Council of the EU to implement limited reforms. However, courts did not challenge the sanctions regimes per se and there was no substantial pressure from civil society actors. Moreover, owing to the competences and working methods of the UN Security Council and the Council of the EU, powerful member states could fairly easily deflect reform proposals from disaffected states and other UN and EU bodies”. See also UN and EU Sanctions: Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism – The Kadi Case, International Law Discussion Group Summary Chatham House, February 2009.
April 2009 – Sison case returns to Court in ongoing challenge to EU terrorist blacklist: Press release from European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights in advance of the ‘Sison II’ hearing in Luxembourg on 30 April 2009 (case T-341/07). Sison is challenging the accuracy and legitimacy of the ‘statement of reasons’ upon which the Council of the EU now bases its decision to freeze his assets and included him in the ‘terrorist list’. See also pre-hearing report of the court rapporteur, abbreviated defence application and www.echr.eu.
April 2009 – Commission proposals in response to Kadi (COM (2009) 187, 22 April 2009). The European Commission has presented its eagerly anticipated proposal to amend the EC Regulations implementing the UN ‘terrorist list’ in response to the celebrated EU Court of Justice ruling in Kadi and Al-Barakaat of September 2008. If adopted, the proposal would introduce the equivalent listing and de-listing procedures for those followed for the EU’s own ‘terrorist list’ since the ECJ ruling of December 2006 in the PMOI case. The proposal would require the UN Security Council’s Sanctions Committee to communicate a ‘statement of reasons’ explaining any decision to designate a group or individual as a ‘terrorist’ (or ‘terrorist supporter’/associate) for the purposes of asset-freezing to the European Commission. The Commission will then decide on the basis of this statement whether to transpose the UN sanctions committee decision into EU law. If it does so – and there must be little, if any, expectation that it will refuse – it will then communicate the statement to the affected party, which will in turn be given the opportunity to make representations to the secret EC Committee that will assist the Commission in preparing its decisions (this committee will presumably be comprised of the same officials as the secret working party which assists the EU in preparing its ‘proscription’ decisions). Since neither the EU Council nor the European Commission is yet to provide any meaningful response indicating consideration of representations challenging a ‘statement of reasons’, applicants will inevitably turn to the EU Courts (which is precisely what has happened in the fresh proceedings launched by Kadi and Al-Barakaat; see cases referred to below). Groups and individuals listed prior to the new ‘post-Kadi’ regime will have to apply for a statement of reasons from the EC (and must provide a postal address other than a PO Box). The new regime will create a somewhat bizarre situation in which groups, individuals and businesses who are included on the United Nations’ terrorist list and resident/operating in the European Union will have more rights in practice than those outside of the EU – a situation which can hardly be squared with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other UN ‘founding principles’. Ben Hayes comments: “In the light of the Kadi ruling, this proposal represents the absolute minimum that the European Commission could have done. But both the EU and the UN still have a very long way to go before they can claim to respect the fundamental rights they upon which they were founded”. Those who wish to examine the Commission proposals in detail will need to refer to Regulation 881/2002/EC to make sense of the planned amendments.
March 2009 – Danish T-shirt sellers convicted of financing terrorism (link: guardian.co.uk, 25.3.2009). Six Danish activists who sold T-shirts bearing the logos of two groups classified by the EU as terrorist organisations have been found guilty of financing terrorism. Denmark’s supreme court ruled that the six – all members of the Fighters+Lovers collective – were found to have contravened the country’s anti-terror laws by selling T-shirts to help fund the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). For background see: Rebellion case.
March 2009 – New pending cases at EU courts: Case C-27/09 P, Appeal by France against judgment in Case T-284/08 (see PMOI, below); Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Commission; Case T-45/09 (application not yet listed), Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Commission (for background see update of November 2008, below).
February 2009 – ACLU: Designating Non-Profits As Terrorist Organizations Without Due Process Undermines Security And Humanitarian Aid (link, American Civil Liberties Union press release, 27.2.02). Several of the USA’s top non-profit humanitarian and philanthropic organizations have submitted arguments to a federal court stating that the government’s authority and conduct in freezing a charity’s assets undermines critical humanitarian aid and the government’s own anti-terrorism efforts. See Amicus Brief filed in support of due process rights for KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Development, Inc. in a case brought by the American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU of Ohio and several civil rights lawyers.
February 2009 – Europe opens covert talks with blacklisted Hamas (link, Independent, 19 February 2009)
January 2009 – PMOI finally removed from EU “terrorist list”. In its latest update of the “terrorist list”, adopted on 26 January 2008, the EU has finally removed the People’s Mujahadeen Organisation of Iran (PMOI) from the list of proscribed organisations. The EU placed the PMOI on the list in 2002 and has until now refused to remove the group – despite three rulings from the EU’s Court of First Instance (CFI) that the PMOI’s proscription was unlawful. The first successful challenge to EU terrorist list by PMOI in December 2006 led to modest reforms by the EU (the “statement of reasons” and the possibility of appeal to the EU’s secret terrorist proscription working group). This was sufficient for the EU to argue that it had remedied the earlier human rights infringements and maintain the PMOI in the updated lists it adopts every six months; the PMOI appealed each of these decisions to the European Courts. In 2007 a UK court also ruled that the PMOI’s inclusion on the UK terrorist was unlawful and in 2008 the government lost its appeal. With the national decision that “justified” the EU decision in the first place now unlawful as well, it took two further rulings by the CFI before the EU Council (comprised of member states governments) finally relinquished. Some 7 million euros in frozen assets belonging to the PMOI will now be released. France has appealed the latest Court ruling. An earlier request by France to delay the Court’s annulment of the relevant EC Regulation was rejected (France had argued that the three months the Court gave the EU to respond to its ruling in Kadi (below) had set a precedent).
Here is a chronology of the seven year proceedings:
17 June 2002 – EU includes PMOI in list of “terrorist groups”
26 July 2002 – PMOI lodges first application (case T-228/02)
12 December 2006 – CFI rules PMOI inclusion on terrorist list unlawful (case T-228/02)
[EU maintains PMOI on the terrorist list]
9 May 2007 – PMOI submits new case (case T-157/07)
16 July 2007 – PMOI submits new case challenging continued inclusion (case T-256/07)
30 November 2007 – UK Court rules inclusion of PMOI on UK terrorist list unlawful
7 May 2008 – UK government loses appeal against PMOI decision
21 July 2008 – PMOI submits new case at ECJ challenging continued inclusion on grounds of UK rulings (case T-284/08)
23 October 2008 – CFI rules PMOI inclusion on list unlawful (case T-256/07)
4 December 2008 – CFI rules PMOI inclusion on list unlawful (judgment in case T-284/08). See also Court press release.
22 December 2008 – CFI rejects request by EU Council and France to delay annulment of Council Decision (case T-284/08)
23 December 2008 – PMOI appeals parts of the judgment of the Court of First of 23 October 2008 (Case C-576/08 P)
21 January 2008 – France appeals CFI ruling (Case C-27/09 P)
26 January 2009 – PMOI officially removed from EU terrorist list
January 2009 – Updated EU list of terrorist organisations adopted 26 January 2009.
January 2009 – Kadi sues Paulson and US Treasury (complaint filed 16 January 2009, full-text): Saudi citizen Yassin Abdullah Kadi has sued Henry Paulson, Adam Szubin, and the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control challenging his “wrongful and unconscionable designation” as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” in October 2001. Kadi describes his experience as a “Kafkaesque journey without due process”, as he argues that “the designation is not supported by the administrative record, and that the designation and review process violated his First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (source: http://www.nefafoundation.org/).
January 2009 – UK: “Britain’s financial Guantanamo” enshrined in Counter Terrorism Act 2008 (link to Act, full text): Following Justice Collins’ ruling in April 2008 (below) that measures introduced to freeze terrorist assets were unlawful because they had not been authorised or sanctioned by Parliament, the government incorporated (and extended) the controversial Treasury asset-freezing regime into its latest Counter-Terrorism Bill (introduced 24 January 2008, the government’s fifth Bill in eight years). The-Counter Terrorism Act (2008) entered the statute on 26 November 2008. The relevant powers for the Treasury in respect to terrorist financing and money laundering (note the function creep) are set out in Parts 5 and 6 and Schedule 7 of the Act. The Act applies to all existing Treasury powers in respect to terrorist financing: the “Terrorism” and “Al-Qa’ida” Orders (those struck down by Collins), Part 2 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) and the new powers in Schedule 7. The Treasury is empowered to give directions – orders to freeze assets or prohibit financial and material support in respect to specific persons, entities or countries – on the grounds of designation of a “non-cooperating country” by the Financial Action Task Force (an unaccountable intergovernmental body) or where it “reasonably believes” that terrorism financing (very broadly defined in effect), money laundering or the development/production of CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear] weapons is taking place. UN Security Council and EU decisions “designating” persons and entities as terrorist financers are also enforced by the Treasury.
In addition to orders to freeze assets and prohibit financial transactions mandated by the UN, the directions that the Treasury can impose on the commercial and public sector include obligations to perform or enforce “due diligence”, surveillance, “systematic reporting” and winding-up orders (to shut-down businesses) in respect to designated persons. The directions that the Treasury can impose on the designated persons themselves, their families and associates are open-ended and draconian, see “Britain’s Financial Guantanamo”. The Act also allows police officers to enter and search any premises they suspect are being used by or for a designating person without a warrant. The Act includes a right of judicial review of the Treasury’s actions for any person affected by financial restrictions decisions. However, the rights the Act grants with one hand, it systematically dismantles with the other, introducing special proceedings (SIAC/POAC style tribunals), special non-disclosure rules (secret evidence) and special advocates (court appointed lawyers). The Act also allows, for the first time in British criminal proceedings, the use of telecommunications intercept evidence. In sum, the new Act has significantly extended the “exceptional” legal regime introduced by ATCSA, Control Orders and “national security” detentions and expulsions.
Finally, the Act reserved powers to the Government over implementation and future extension of the scope and function of the regime. This included powers for the Lord Chancellor to make changes to the UK’s civil procedural law to implement the new Act’s special procedures. See Statutory Instrument No. 3085 (L.26) 2008, made: 2 December; laid before Parliament: 3 December; entered into force: 4 December 2008. See also explanatory memorandum on SI 3085 (L.26) 2008.
December 2008 – United Nations Human Rights Committee finds inclusion of Belgian citizens on UN “terrorist list” in violation of ICCPR (HRC Decision, 29 December 2008, full-text). The complaint was bought by Mr. Nabil Sayadi and Ms. Patricia Vinck (both Belgian citizens), the director and secretary of Fondation Secours International [reportedly the European branch of the Global Relief Foundation, an American association that has been on the sanctions list since 22 October 2002], against Belgium. Following a criminal investigation by the Belgian authorities, their names were placed on the lists appended to the Security Council resolution (23 January 2003), the European Union Council Regulation (27 January 2003) and a Belgian ministerial order (31 January 2003), but they were not given access to the relevant information justifying their listing. The authors submitted several requests in 2003 to Belgian ministers and the Prime Minister, the European authorities, the United Nations and the Belgian civil authorities. The ministers invoked the Belgian States international obligations, the European Commission said it had no authority to remove the names of the plaintiffs from a list drawn up by the Sanctions Committee, and the Prime Minister simply referred to the fact that an investigation was under way to examine new evidence – neither of the plaintiffs had been charged with a criminal offence. On 11 February 2005, they obtained from the Brussels Court of First Instance an order requiring the Belgian State to initiate the procedure to have their names removed from the Sanctions Committees list. While there was relevant information to hand – namely the absence of any indictment of the authors in February 2004 – the Belgian State did not initiate the de-listing procedure. The Court ordered the Belgian State to urgently initiate a de-listing procedure with the United Nations Sanctions Committee and to provide the petitioners with proof thereof, under penalty of a daily fine of ¬250 for delay in performance. Pursuant to this order, on 25 February 2005 the State party requested the Sanctions Committee to delist the authors. Over a year later, no decision had been taken by the Sanctions Committee so their lawyers lodged a complaint with the UN Human Rights Committee asserting violations of their human rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Judges Chambers of the Brussels Court of First Instance also confirmed the plaintiffs innocence, dismissing the case on 19 December 2005 after more than three years of criminal investigation. Neither of these two decisions has been appealed. In its Decision, published 29 December 2008, the Committee concluded that there had been breaches of the two Belgian’s rights under articles 12 and 17 of the ICCPR [Article 12 covers freedom of movement and the freedom to leave any country while article 17 recognizes the right of everyone to protection against arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, and against unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation].The Committee found that “the facts, taken together, do not disclose that the restrictions of the authors rights to leave the country were necessary to protect national security or public order” [article 12] and ruled that “even though the State party is not competent to remove the authors names from the United Nations and European lists, it is responsible for the presence of the authors names on those lists” and “an unlawful attack on the authors honour and reputation” [article 17]
December 2008 – Security Council 6043rd Meeting (AM), 15 December 2008 – no progress on implementing Kadi: “Jan Grauls (Belgium), speaking as Chair of the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions Committee said that resolution 1822 (a milestone in the life of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) on Al-Qaida and the Taliban – had introduced several important innovations with regard to the listing and de-listing procedures, the notification of sanctioned individuals and entities, the posting of narrative summaries of reasons for listing on the Committee’s website and the review mechanisms. Those improvements had added to the transparency, fairness and clarity of the sanctions regime. He said Committee members had committed themselves to transposing resolution 1822 in a new framework for the practical implementation of the new mechanisms before the end of the year. The new framework would form a solid basis for the next Chair. However, one could not ignore the international context in which those developments had occurred. Security Council sanctions regimes, increasingly under pressure, had recently been questioned, especially in light of the need for fair and clear procedures for listing, de-listing and granting of humanitarian exemptions. The Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions Committee had not made significant progress in that regard, but everyone must remain committed to ensuring that more attention was given to those concerns (source: The Lift)”.
December 2008: Commissioner for Human Rights: “Arbitrary procedures for terrorist black-listing must now be changed” (link): Thomas Hammarberg, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, adds to the critique of the international proscription regime, stating that “the UN and the EU must themselves respect the human rights standards on which they are based”.
November 2008: Court of Appeal overturns High Court decision to quash Treasury asset-freezing regime (judgment of 30 October 2008, full-text): The Court of Appeal has overturned April’s stunning High Court judgment, ruling that the statutory orders enacted by the government to implement UN regulations and facilitate domestic asset-freezing are lawful. For background see: Britain’s financial Guantanamo.
November 2008: Kadi and Al Barakaat maintained in EU and UN terrorist lists – Commission considers the listing “justified”: (Commission Regulation 1190/2008/EC of 28 November 2008). Despite the ruling of the European Court of Justice in September that the Council Regulation freezing their assets was unlawful, the European Commission has decided to maintain Yassin Abdullah Kadi and the Al Barakaat International Foundation in the EU “terrorist list” on the grounds that “the listing of [the parties] is justified for reasons of its association with the Al-Qaida network”. In response to the ECJ’s ruling, the European Commission “communicated the narrative summaries of reasons provided by the UN Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, to Mr Kadi and to Al Barakaat International Foundation and [gave] them the opportunity to comment on these grounds in order to make their point of view known”. Mr Kadi’s lawyers duly responded in a letter dated 10 November 2008, which the European Commission simply dismissed on the grounds that the “preventive nature of the freezing of funds and economic resources” justifies the ongoing violation of Mr. Kadi’s fundamental rights. The Commission, effectively acting as judge, jury and executioner, states that its response “compl[ies] with the judgment of the Court of Justice”. With the Swiss Attorney general having dropped all investigations into Mr. Kadi’s finances (a Swiss Court cleared him of any links to 9/11 in December 2005), the international courts to which the case will now inevitably return are unlikely to agree that this justifies the continued denial of access to his $9 million and other ongoing damages. “It would have been better to have this system at the U.N. level, for them to decide,” said Gilles de Kerchove, the E.U. counterterrorism coordinator. “Of course it would”, adds Ben Hayes of Statewatch, “but wouldn’t it have been better still for the EU’s executive to follow the convictions of Europe’s courts?”
November 2008 – Washington Post: Terrorism Financing Blacklists At Risk (link): Useful article on UN terrorist lists published 2 November 2008. Includes updates on the Kadi and Nada cases.
September 2008 – EU implementation of UN Security Council’s ‘terrorist list’ breaches fundamental rights – Kadi and Al Barakaat Foundation asset-freeze unlawful. In a judgment with far-reaching implications the European Court of Justice has today [3 September 2008] annulled the Council Regulation freezing the assets of Yassin Abdullah Kadi, a resident of Saudi Arabia, and the Al Barakaat International Foundation of Sweden, part of the ‘Hawala’ banking system used by the Somali Diaspora to transfer funds internationally.
June 2008 – The EU and UN terrorist lists and the European Courts: The slow road to procedural justice (seminar 19 June 2008). First in a series of four seminars on “Terrorist lists”, proscription, designation and human rights organised by Haldane, Statewatch and CAMPACC.
June 2008 – Lloyds TSB expects £180m bill for US blacklist breach (link, The Times, 6 June 2008). Lloyds TSB will take a £180 million hit to its first-half figures as it prepares to pay a multimillion-dollar settlement for breaking US rules on dealing with sponsors of terrorism. See also US Department of State list of “State sponsors of terrorism” (link).
May 2008 – UK Government loses appeal against de-proscription of PMOI – how long before the EU backs down? The Court of Appeal has refused to overturn a ruling that it must end the “perverse” listing of an Iranian opposition group as a banned terrorist group, ruling that there were “no valid grounds” to contend that the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission made legal errors when it ordered the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI) to be removed from the ‘blacklist’ (AP, 7.5.08). In December 2006, the EU Court of Justice ruled that the PMOI should be removed for from the EU terrorist list, partly on the grounds that the reasons for its inclusion were “unclear”. But the EU has steadfastly refused to remove them from the list, a position that now appears wholly untenable.
Breaking news 24 April 2008 – High Court quashes Treasury asset-freezing regime
In a High Court judgment today of the highest constitutional importance, Mr Justice Collins has ordered that Government measures introduced to freeze terrorist assets were unlawful and should be struck down as they had not been authorised or sanctioned by Parliament. The measures contained in the Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006 and the Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2006 were introduced directly by the Government through Orders in Council to implement United Nations Security Council Resolutions to strengthen domestic controls on the financing of terrorism and to comply with the British Governments international obligations to enforce UN Resolutions requiring such controls. They have never been scrutinised, debated or approved by Parliament.
Ben Hayes of Statewatch comments:
“The government has again shown itself all too willing to sacrifice basic freedoms in the ‘war on terror’ – the Orders declared unlawful today could scarcely have intruded further into the fundamental rights and liberties of UK citizens.
The High Court has sent an unequivocal message to the government: a regime of this nature should never have been introduced without consulting Parliament. It must be hoped that MPs will look very closely at the way the Treasury has been using these powers before endorsing such a draconian regime in future”.
On the Governments circumvention of Parliament, Mr Justice Collins said in his judgment:
Counsel for the applicants have submitted that the means used to apply the obligations imposed by the UN Resolutions is unlawful. Parliament has been bypassed by the use of Orders in Council. But in deciding the appropriate way in which the obligation should be applied and in particular in creating the criminal offences set out in the Orders it was necessary that Parliamentary approval should be obtained. Those submissions are in my judgment entirely persuasive.
On the extraordinary nature of the Treasury regime, Mr Justice Collins said:
“The very wide definition of economic resources makes it impossible for members of the family of the designated person in particular to know whether they are committing an offence or a licence is needed… A specific query arose, and it is a good illustration of the absurdity which can result, in relation to the loan of a car to an applicant to enable him to go to the supermarket to get the familys groceries. After some delay, the Treasury (in my view wrongly) decided that a licence was needed. The car was an economic resource and could be used to obtain or deliver goods or services. This was only resolved by the Treasury after seeking ministerial consideration. Similar concerns have been raised in relation to an Oyster card to enable the applicant to travel and any borrowing of items for any purpose. Since the possible penalty on conviction is severe, the concerns are understandable and the effect on the applicant and his family, whose human rights are also in issue, is serious”.
The government is to appeal and can be expected to demand an expeditious hearing on the grounds that the quashing of the Al-Qaida and Taliban Order leaves it in breach of its obligations under international law.
Documentation
‘G’, ‘K’, ‘A’, ‘M’, and ‘Q’ v. H.M. Treasury: Judgment – full-text (24 April 2004)
Press release: Birnberg-Peirce, Tuckers & Public Law Solicitors (24 April 2004)
For full background see: Britain’s financial Guantanamo (Statewatch, 21 April 2004).
See also Mean and squalid measures, Victoria Brittain (Guardian, 24 April 2004) and Anti-terror asset-freezing order improperly made (Times law report, 5 May 2008)
April 2008 – Britain’s financial Guantanamo: This Thursday [24 April 2008], Mr Justice Collins of the High Court will deliver his judgment the case of ‘G’, ‘K’, ‘A’, ‘M’, and ‘Q’ v. H.M. Treasury. In the words of Rabinder Singh QC, “the facts of the case are reminiscent of an Austro-Hungarian novel”. At issue are two ‘Orders in Council’ adopted under the 1946 United Nations Act. This Act allows the government to introduce domestic law to implement UN agreements – in this case a series of Security Council Resolutions dealing with the financial sponsors of terrorism – without consulting parliament. See full story.
April 2008 – CFI strikes another blow to EU “terrorist list” – legality of “reformed” procedures remains in doubt. The EU Court of First Instance has overturned decisions by the Council of the EU to include the Kurdish organisations PKK and Kongra Gel on the EU “terrorist list” (04.04.2008). In Case T-253/04 bought on behalf of Kongra Gel and 10 other individuals, the EU court ruled that the organisation was not in a position “to understand, clearly and unequivocally, the reasoning” that led the member states’ governments to include them. It reached the same conclusion in Case T-229/02, bought by Osman Ocalan on behalf of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
These judgments were widely excepted following the rulings in favour of Jose Maria Sison and Stichting al-Asqa (both based in Netherlands) in July 2007, and the precedent set in the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI) ruling in December 2006. In this case the Court found that the EU’s proscription regime had denied the PMOI the right to a fair hearing in which it could challenge its designation as “terrorist” in accordance with its fundamental right to a fair trial (see: analysis of PMOI judgment). This paved the way for other proscribed groups and individuals to challenge their inclusion in the list.
In response to the PMOI ruling, the EU “reformed” its procedures for listing and de-listing. Whereas prior to the PMOI judgment no mechanism existed for those proscribed to either receive an explanation for their inclusion or to challenge that explanation, the EU now provides affected parties with a “statement of reasons”. In turn, those parties may then write back to the secret EU group responsible for the decision to contest the statement and request de-listing. The EU has maintained in the “terrorist list” those groups and individuals who have already successfully challenged their proscription at the EU Courts on the grounds that its “reforms” remedy the fair trial breaches that the Court has identified. This issue will not be resolved until the PMOI’s new challenge to the EU’s decision to maintain them in the list (case T-157/07) returns to the Court, which may take several years. In the meantime, the challenges by other proscribed organisations are mounting up – as are the compensation claims.
Ben Hayes of Statewatch comments:
“There isn’t a lawyer in Europe who believes that the EU ‘reform’ of its proscription regime amounts to the fair hearing that EU law demands. On the contrary, the regime remains a recipe for arbitrary, unaccountable and politically-motivated decision making. By ignoring the increasingly clear message from the EU Courts, the member states are doing themselves a great disservice.
Instead of digging its heels in, the EU should introduce a meaningful appeals procedure for affected parties. To wait years for the EU court system or the Strasbourg Court to deliver a judgment that everyone can see coming would be an affront to the EU’s stated commitment to human rights.”
February 2008 – PMOI submits new case at ECJ (case T-257/07). The People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI) successfully challenged its designation as “terrorist” by the European Union in December 2006. In spite of the ruling by the European Court of First Instance, the EU has maintained the PMOI on its “terrorist list”. The PMOI is already seeking ¬1 million in damages from the EU (see case T-157/07) – this latest case seeks annulment of the latest EU Council Decision to include them in the current terrorist list.
January 2008 – PACE demands review of UN and EU blacklisting procedures for terrorist suspects, which violate human rights (Council of Europe press release, 23.1.08)
January 2008 – Opinion in Al Barakaat appeal follows same reasoning as Kadi (Opinion, full-text, 23.1.08): Advocate-General Miguel Poiares Maduro’s opinion on the Al Barakaat appeal reaches the same conclusions as the Kadi opinion, below – the Court of First Instance was wrong to dismiss the initial appeal on grounds of limited jurisdiction; Al Barakaat’s rights to property and a fair trial/judicial review have been breached; the EC regulations implementing the UN decisions re Al Barakaat should be annulled.
January 2008 – EU: Advocate General delivers devastating opinion in Kadi UN challenge (ECJ press release, 13.1.08): Yassin Abdullah Kadi, a resident of Saudi Arabia, is accused of supporting terrorism by the the UN Terrorism Sanctions Committee and included on the UN “terrorist list”, which is incorporated into EU law under EC Regulations. Advocate-General Miguel Poiares Maduro argues that the EU Court of First Instance was wrong to dismiss Kadi’s appeal on the grounds that the EU Courts lack jurisdiction over political decisions taken by the EU. On the contrary, suggests the Advocate-General: because there is no mechanism for judicial review of the UN decisions, the EU must subject the sanctions regime to proper judicial review. Advocate-General Poiares Maduro concludes that the EC Regulations implementing the UN sanctions regime do infringe Mr. Kadi’s right to property and a fair trial/judicial review and should therefore be annulled. He suggests that rather than referring the matter back to the Court of First Instance, the European Court of Justice should give final judgment on these questions. The Opinion will now be considered by the Court of Justice in advance of their ruling. See: full-text of Opinion.
December 2007 – Pakistan: Rashid Rauf escapes (see further “prisoner swap” story, below). Rauf is said to have escaped from Pakistani custody when two policemen escorting him from court in the capital, Islamabad, to a jail outside the nearby city of Rawalpindi stopped to allow him to pray in a roadside mosque. See: The mysterious disappearance of an alleged terror mastermind (Guardian, 28.1.07)
January 2007 – Danish court rules Fighters and lovers not guilty of terror funding (Guardian, 14.12.07): Seven Danes accused of supporting terrorism by selling T-shirts bearing the logos of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine have been found not guilty of the charges. See also: English translation of summary of judgment and “activists” story below. The case has now been appealed by the prosecution. The date of the new trial at the High Court (Landsret) has as yet not been set. Another case against spokesperson of Oproer (Rebellion), Patrick Mac Manus, both for the transfer of 100.000 DKr ($17,000) to PFLP and FARC and the appeal to more than 200 European organisations to challenge terrorist legislation, is set for 12-14 March and 10 April (Rebellion case). It may be postponed until the Fighters and Lovers case has reached a conclusion.
December 2007 – Pakistan launches fresh offensive in Baluchistan, Britain accused of Baluchi “prisoner swap”: Baluchi activists report that on the 6 December the Pakistani army launched a new offensive in the Kahan and Dera Bugti Districts of Baluchistan. Hundreds of Baluchis are said to have been detained, scores killed, and homes and schools destroyed in air strikes from helicopter gunships and fighter planes. Civilians are fleeing to the mountains. Meanwhile, the British government is accused of arresting two Baluchi nationals living in London with the intention of “swapping” them for Rashid Rauf, a 26-year-old Briton held in a high security prison in Pakistan and accused of involvement in the alleged plot to blow-up transatlantic airliners in 2006. Faiz Baluch and Hyrbyair Marri were arrested in London following raids on their homes in the first week of December. They have been charged with inciting another person to commit an act of terrorism “wholly or partly outside the UK”. See UK accused of ‘prisoner swap’ with Pakistan (Telegraph, 7.12.12) and Foreign Office accused of swap deal over terror suspects (Guardian, 11.12.07). For background see Never mind the Baluch? (June 2007).
December 2007 – Denmark: Seven activists facing prison for symbolic support of PLFP and FARC. On 13 December 2007 a Copenhagen court will announce its decision in the case of “Fighters and Lovers”, an activist group that campaigned against the EU terrorist lists by attempting to raise funds for humanitarian projects of the PLFP (Palestine) and FARC (Columbia) by selling t-shirts baring the logo’s of the two banned organisations. “F+L”, which describes itself as “a private enterprise dedicated to the cause of freedom and hard-rocking street gear”, is charged with “sponsoring terrorism”, a crime under recent anti-terror laws that carries a maximum prison sentence of 10 years. For more information see www.fightersandlovers.org. See also Fashion items or dangerous terrorist images? T-shirt trial divides a nation (Guardian, 29.11.07) and Court to decide if ‘T’ in t-shirt stands for terror (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21.9.07). For background, see Rebellion, Denmark.
November 2007 – On 30 November 2007 the UK Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (POAC) ruled that the Home Secretary had acted illegally in refusing to remove the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI) from its proscribed list of ‘terrorist’ organisations. The case was brought by more than 30 members of Parliament and the House of Lords. The POAC ruling represents the first successful challenge to the proscription provisions in the Terrorism Act 2000; the government has said it intends to appeal. See POAC judgment, full-text and Government ordered to end ‘perverse’ terror listing of Iran opposition (Guardian, 1.12.07). See also Britain may lift ban on Iran’s opposition (Telegraph, 27.9.07) detailing an “extraordinary request” by Government’s solicitors to the Commission for a copy of the judgment a week in advance of its publication. The UK ruling follows a judgment by the EU Court in December 2006 that the PMOI’s inclusion on the EU terrorist list was illegal insofar as it breached their fair trial rights, although the EU has subsequently refused to remove the PMOI from its list of banned organisations.
November 2007 – Procedures for blacklisting individuals suspected of terrorist links are unworthy of the UN Security Council and EU (Council of Europe, 12 November 2007, full-text of report, pdf) says PACE. The Legal Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) has adopted a highly critical report by Dick Marty on the EU and UN ‘terrorist lists’, the Swiss senator famous for heading the CoE inquiry into ‘unlawful rendition’. The report argues that the procedures are “unworthy” of the UN and EU, and must be urgently overhauled to make them fairer. See also earlier memorandum by Marty on UN Security Council black lists (March 2007, pdf).
October 2007 – In a case brought by the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice has struck down the European Commission’s decision to grant anti-terrorism assistance to the Philippines government. See Judgment in Case C-403/05 (full-text, 23 October 2007). The ruling follows the EU Court of First Instance’s decision in June to annul the EU Council Decision to place Jose Maria Sison, a Philippine exile and long term opponent of the Philippines government, on the EU list of ‘terrorists’ for the purposes of asset-freezing (see Sison judgment (full-text)).
October 2007 – Four new challenges against EU ‘terrorist’ lists lodged at Court of First Instance. In case T-348/07, Stichting Al-Aqsa are returning to the Court to seek their removal from the list. The CFI has already declared the Council’s earlier decision to include them on the list unlawful but the Council of the EU is refusing to remove them from the list (see July 2007 judgment in Al-Asqa case). In case T-362/07 and case T-363/07, Nouriddin El Fatmi and Ahmed Hamdi are challenging their inclusion on the EU ‘terrorist’ list following their conviction for membership of the “Hofstad” group in the Netherlands. In case T-323/07, El Morabit Mohamed is challenging his inclusion on the EU ‘terrorist’ list on the same grounds, also arguing that since his conviction for membership of the “Hofstad” group in the Netherlands is under appeal, he has been denied the presumption of innocence and a fair trial by the EU.
October 2007 – The European Court of Justice has ruled in case C-117/06 – judgment (full-text) that it is illegal to sell property to people whose assets have been frozen under Community law. The case was brought by the sellers of a property who had agreed the sale in 2000 – before the buyer was included on the EU’s ‘terrorist’ list for the purposes of asset-freezing.
July 2007 – The EU Court of First Instance has today (11.7.07) ruled the freezing of the assets of Jose Maria Sison and Stichting al-Asqa (both based in Netherlands) unlawful. See: The Court of First Instance annuls the Council Decisions ordering Jose Maria Sison and Stichting Al-Asqa funds to be frozen in the fight against terrorism (Press release). Court judgments, full-text: Sison (pdf) and Al-Asqa (pdf). The Court followed the reasoning in the December 2006 ruling on the PMOI. While the rulings strike another crucial blow to the credibility of the proscription regime, the EU has recently reviewed its procedures and now submits that recent “reforms” in respect to notification and appeals mean that it has now remedied the due process problems identified by the Court. The EU may also, on these grounds, refuse to remove the two from its terrorist list, as it has with the PMOI.
June 2007 – The public hearing for the delivery of judgment by the European Court of First Instance on the terrorist blacklisting of Jose Maria Sison (Case T-47/03) has been scheduled for 11 July at 9:15 a.m. See also “statement of reasons” for the blacklisting provided by the EU Council on 23 April 2007 published on Defend Committee website, which cites decisions by Dutch ministers and the US government as grounds for the criminalisation of Prof. Sison and the freezing of his assets.
June 2007 – UK: Never mind the Baluch? Article by Ben Hayes on the UK government’s blacklisting of the Baluchistan Liberation Army and the situation in Baluchistan.
June 2007 – PMOI submits new case at ECJ (case T-157/07).
See earlier report: Iran mujahidin to challenge EU terror list (EUobserver.com, 12.5.07, archived by ncr-iran.org). Despite the ruling by the European Court of First Instance that the EU acted unlawfully in freezing the PMOI’s assets, the organisation remains on the EU “terrorist list”. The PMOI is now going back to court to seek removal from the list and ¬1 million in damages. The matter has also been raised in the Danish parliament.
June 2007 – EU’s secretive counter-terror group to face scrutiny (EUobserver.com, 13.6.07): article suggesting that an “EU clearing house” through which counter terrorism information is exchanged by national intelligence services is responsible for blacklisting decisions and should be held accountable.
June 2007 – Terrorism: the chosen tool of the weak against the mighty (Le Monde Diplomatique) “Does ‘global war on terror’ mask a new imperialism?” asks Eric Rouleau.
May 2007 – EU releases “statement of reasons” for blacklisting of PMOI (EU Council doc. 5418/2/07, 11 May 2007): The EU has declassified the “statement of reasons” it has sent to the People’s Mujahadeen Organisation of Iran to justify its inclusion on the “terrorist list”. The statement cites terrorist attacks by the PMOI in the 1990s, 2000 and 2001 and the decision of the UK government to ban the PMOI in March 2001 as grounds for the EU ban. The UK’s decision was called into question by the CFIs ruling in December 2006 (see analysis of PMOI ruling).
May 2007 – EU cites secret evidence against Iran group (EUobserver.com, 31.5.07): “The EU claims it has secret evidence that justifies keeping Iran opposition group PMOI on its terrorist register but cannot reveal the content for security reasons, in a situation stoking anger among some MEPs….”
May 2007 – Terrorist: Flag of Convenience (Socialist Lawyer, April 2007). Article by Bill Bowring arguing that the response of international organisations to the attacks on the United States now poses a shockingly serious threat to some fundamental human rights, especially procedural guarantees.
May 2007 – Iran mujahidin to challenge EU terror list (EUobserver.com, 12.5.07, archived by ncr-iran.org). Despite the ruling by the European Court of First Instance that the EU acted unlawfully in freezing the PMOI’s assets, the organisation remains on the EU “terrorist list”. The PMOI is now going back to court to seek removal from the list and ¬1 million in damages. The matter has also been raised in the Danish parliament.
May 2007 – UK: Council of Europe: Press release: Dick Marty strongly deplores flagrant injustice of UN Security Council blacklisting people suspected of terrorist links without evidence of wrong-doing (pdf) Dick Marty: Memorandum full-text: UN Security Council black lists (pdf)
May 2007 – UK: Public meeting: “Terrorism” lists versus the rights to self-determination and democracy: Wednesday 2 May, 6.30pm, Committee Room 3, House of Lords, Westminster SW1, Hosted by Lord Rea.
April 2007 – UN Human Rights Council issues damning report on terrorist lists and sanctions (A/HRC/4/88
9.3.07, pdf). The report concludes:
With regard to the United Nations sanctions regime, further improvements are needed to ensure a listing process which is transparent, based on clear criteria, and with an appropriate, explicit, and uniformly applied standard of evidence, as well as an effective, accessible and independent mechanism of review for individuals and concerned States. Fair and clear procedures must include the right of an individual to be informed of the measures taken and to know the case against him or her; the right of such a person to be heard within a reasonable time by the relevant decision-making body; the right to effective review by a competent, independent review mechanism; the right of such a person to representation with respect to all proceedings; and the right of such a person to an effective remedy.
March 2007 – European Court of Justice rejects Basque appeal against inclusion on EU terrorist list (Judgment in case C-354/04 P, 27.2.07, pdf). The European Court of Justice has rejected an appeal by Gestoras Pro Amnistía and two associated individuals against their inclusion on the EU terrorist list.
February 2007 – European Court of Justice rejects Sison appeal against denial of access to EU documents (Judgment in case C-266/05 P, 1.2.07, pdf). The European Court of Justice has rejected Professor Jose Maria Sison’s appeal against the EU Council’s decision to refuse access to the documents relating to his inclusion on the terrorist list. The case concerned the interpretation of the Regulation 1049/2001/EC on public access to EU documents – not the substantive issue of whether Sison should be included in the EU’s terrorist list. See also statement by International DEFEND Committee: www.defendsison.be.
January 2007 – European Court of Justice overturns decision to deny appeal by PKK (Judgment in case C-229/05 P, 18.1.07, pdf). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has ruled that the Court of First Instance (CFI) was wrong to declare inadmissible a case challenging the inclusion of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) in the EU’s “terrorist” list. The case was brought by Osman Ocalan, brother of imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah, on the grounds that the PKK had declared permanent ceasefire in April 2002 and was effectively disbanded. In 2005, the CFI decided that “it is not for the Court, when examining the admissibility of the action, to rule on the reality of the PKKs existence”. However, it then found that because PKK had disbanded, Mr Ocalan could not be its lawful representative. While this paradox was not lost on the Court, it declared the case inadmissible.
The UK government and European Commission both intervened in the case, arguing that the CFI ruling should stand, but, following the advice of the Advocate General (below), the ECJ found that the CFI had “distorted” the evidence and should have recognised Mr Ocalan’s power of attorney. The case will now return to the CFI for a decision on the substantive appeal against the PKK’s inclusion in the terrorist list. Last month the CFI ruled that the PMOI’s right to a fair hearing had been breached by the Council’s failure to provide the organisation with any information concerning its decision to add them to the “terrorist” list (see analysis of PMOI ruling).
The appeal in the PKK case was brought jointly by Mr Ocalan and Serif Vanly, on behalf of the Kurdistan National Congress (KNK), which is not included in the EU terrorist list (only KADEK and KONGRA-GEL are listed as aliases of the PKK). The KNK challenged the proscription of the PKK on the grounds that it was directly affected by the ban but the ECJ upheld the CFI’s decision to declare its appeal inadmissible.
January 2007 – U.S. to let people apply to get off no-fly lists (Reuters India, 18.1.07, link)
January 2007 – UN Sanctions: Listing/De-listing and Due Process (securitycouncilreport.org, link). Article on changes in proscription procedures of the UN Security Council (the UN has proscribed 487 groups and individuals who are alleged supporters or associates of the Taliban or al-Qaeda). A “statement of the case” will be produced for all new listings but groups and individuals will not be informed or be able to challenge the contents of the statement. As to appeals against proscription and the Security Council has established a “focal point” and new de-listing procedures. However, the changes are little more than “window-dressing” since affected parties will still be denied access to the procedure and states will retain maximum discretion over who should be included or removed from the list.
See: Security Council Resolution 1730 on de-listing procedures (19 December 2006)
Amended guidelines for the Taliban Sanctions Committee (29 November 2006)
January 2007 – EU backing down on terror list secrecy (EUobserver.com, 16.1.07, link). Report on the implications of the PMOI ruling on the issuing of a “statement of reasons” to groups and individuals on the list. See also Statewatch analysis of PMOI ruling.
January 2007 – US Supreme Court refuses case challenging PMOIs designation as terrorists (New York Times, 9.1.07, link)
December 2006 – EU terrorist list updated (EU Official Journal). On 21 December 2006 the EU added two groups and nine individuals to its list of terrorist entities. The nine are named as members of the Netherlands-based “Hofstadgroep”. The organisation itself is also proscribed. Four of the named individuals have been convicted in Holland, including Mohammed Bouyeri, the man who killed film director Theo van Gogh, although five were acquitted due to a lack of evidence. The other group added to the EU list is the TAK – Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan, a.k.a. Kurdistan Freedom Falcons, Kurdistan Freedom Hawks.
The EU “terrorist” list now contains a total of 50 groups and 54 individuals (see previous list).
December 2006 – Successful challenge to EU terrorist list by PMOI (Statewatch report). In a judgment that has far-reaching implications the EU Court of First Instance has annulled the EU Council’s decision to include the PMOI on its terrorist list. The Court found that the PMOI was denied a fair hearing in which it could challenge the decision. The judgment means that the EU will now have to provide a “statement of reasons” to groups and individuals it designates as terrorist.
ARCHIVE 2001-2006 – click here
Why monitor the terrorist lists?
u003cpu003eu003cstrongu003eWhy monitor the terrorist lists? u003c/strongu003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThis website was launched in June 2005 by u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/u0022 target=u0022_parentu0022u003eStatewatchu003c/au003e in association with the u003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.cacc.org.uk/u0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eCampaign Against Criminalising Communities u003c/au003eand the u003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/research-units/hrsj/home.cfmu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eHuman Rights and Social Justice Instituteu003c/au003e, London Metropolitan University, to monitor the largely secret development of the policy of u0022proscribingu0022 groups and individuals connected with u0022terrorismu0022 (see u003ca href=u0022/terroritst-lists-prel.pdfu0022u003epress releaseu003c/au003e). For updates since the launch, see u003ca href=u0022/listslatest.htmlu0022u003elatest newsu003c/au003e.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eIt provides detailed information and analysis of the u0022terrorist listsu0022 operated by:u003c/pu003ernu003culu003ernu003cliu003ethe United Kingdom, which introduced proscription in 1974 for organisations in Northern Ireland, extending it to foreign organisations in 2000;u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003ethe United States, which introduced the proscription of foreign terrorists groups in 1995;u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003ethe United Nations, which introduced proscription as part of the Taleban sanctions regime – freezing the assets of suspected associates – and then extended it in the aftermath of u0022September 11u0022;u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eand the European Union, which, after incorporating the UN sanctions into EU law, introduced its own u0022terroristu0022 list.u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003esee: u003ca href=u0022/thelists.htmlu0022u003ecurrent listsu003c/au003eu003c/liu003ernu003c/ulu003ernu003cpu003eProscription, or u0022designationu0022, takes various forms and its legal effect differs according to the jurisdiction, varying from complete bans for u0022terroristu0022 groups that criminalise their members and supporters, to the freezing of assets of individuals suspected of supporting terrorism. Groups and individuals are added to the u0022terroristu0022 lists on the basis of u0022intelligenceu0022 alone. The normal judicial process governing such serious accusations, and their prosecution, has been discarded. The UK and US governments are obliged to u0022consultu0022 with parliament and congress respectively, though such consultation has been brief; the executive bodies of the UN (Security Council) and EU (Council) agree their lists on the basis of intelligence provided by their member states without any parliamentary scrutiny. These lists and the related sanctions are binding on all member states.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eIt is very difficult for those included on the u0022terrorist listsu0022 to have their names removed or contest their inclusion. Those in the UK can appeal to a security tribunal (government appointed judges, secret hearing and secret evidence etc.) but the UN and EU lists contain no mechanism of appeal to the courts whatsoever – groups and individuals can only request individual member state governments to make diplomatic representations on their behalf.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eProscription raises serious human rights concerns and is clearly at odds with the European Convention. Moreover, the lack of effective judicial remedies at the national level and the minimal jurisdiction of the EU Courts mean that no proscribed group has yet had full u0022access to courtu0022 and the chance to challenge the underlying matters of law and fact in full, whether domestically or in an international court.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eWere the lists restricted to u0022Al-Qaidau0022, its known members and other groups most people can agree are u0022terroristsu0022, there would be less cause for concern. But they are not – the lists are a recipe for arbitrary and politically motivated decision-making. Hundreds of groups and individuals have now been criminalised around the world and the various lists are expanding as states attempt to add all groups engaged in resistance to occupation or tyranny. Those exercising what many people around the world see as a legitimate right to self-defence and determination are increasingly being treated – on a global basis – the same way as Osama Bin Laden.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThis criminalisation extends beyond the groups and individuals on the u0022terrorist listsu0022 to their supporters. The banning of u0022passive supportu0022 goes as far as to criminalise all solidarity with any of the groups named, regardless of the basis or motivation for that solidarity. The effect can be devastating for entire communities.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eSee Statewatch analysis: u0022u003ca href=u0022/terrorlists.pdfu0022u003eTerrorising the rule of law: the politics and practise of proscriptionu003c/au003eu0022.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eUse the links on the left to view:u003c/pu003ernu003culu003ernu003cliu003ethe current UK, EU, UN and US lists;u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003ea comparative overview of the four lists;u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003elegal analysis of the proscription regimes;u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003echallenges to proscription by groups, individuals and their supporters;u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003elatest news and links to relevant sources of informationu003c/liu003ernu003c/ulu003ernu003cpu003eu003cuu003eNotesu003c/uu003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThis site does not cover the u0022no-flyu0022 lists operated by a number of countries including the US.u003c/pu003e
Current EU, UN, UK and US lists
u003cpu003eThis page provides links to the u0022terroristu0022 lists operated by the UK, US, UN and EU. For links to the legislative provisions etc. see Statewatch’s u003ca href=u0022/listsbground.htmlu0022 target=u0022_parentu0022u003ecomparative overviewu003c/au003e of the four regimes.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cstrongu003eEuropean Unionu003c/strongu003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe European Union has incorporated the UN sanctions regime (below) into EU law under Regulation 881/2002 (for more information see u0022u003ca href=u0022/listsbground.htmlu0022 target=u0022_parentu0022u003ecomparative analysisu003c/au003eu0022) and designates u0022Persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist actsu0022 under Common Position 2001/931 and Regulation 2580/2001:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022/docs/EUterrorlist-May-06.pdfu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eEU list of u0022Persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist actsu0022u003c/au003e (June 2006)u003cbr /u003e u003ca href=u0022https://statewatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/EU-update-dec06.pdfu0022u003eUpdateu003c/au003e (21 December 2006)u003cbr /u003e[54 individuals, 50 groups – updated: 21 December 2006]u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cuu003eNoteu003c/uu003e: The list consists of two sections:u003cbr /u003e1. Personsu003cbr /u003e2. Groups and entitiesu003cbr /u003e(*) Those groups marked with an asterisk are inside the EU and not subject to asset freezing under Regulation 2580/2001.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cstrongu003eUnited Nationsu003c/strongu003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe United Nations designates u0022Usama Bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaida organization and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with themu0022u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htmu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eUN list of u0022individuals and entities associated with al-Qaida or the Talibanu0022u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e[361 individuals, 125 groups; UN website]u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cuu003eNoteu003c/uu003e: The list consists of five sections:u003cbr /u003eA. The list of individuals belonging to or associated with the Talibanu003cbr /u003eB. The list of entities belonging to or associated with the Talibanu003cbr /u003eC. The list of individuals belonging to or associated with the Al-Qaida organisationu003cbr /u003eD. The list of entities belonging to or associated with the Al-Qaida organisationu003cbr /u003eE. Individuals and entities that have been removed from the list pursuant to a decision by the 1267 Committeeu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cstrongu003eUnited Kingdomu003c/strongu003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe United Kingdom proscribes u0022international terrorist organisationsu0022 under the Terrorism Act 2000 and organisations in Northern Ireland are proscribed under previous emergency legislation:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/legislation/current-legislation/terrorism-act-2000/proscribed-terrorist-groups?version=1u0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eUK list of u0022international terrorist organisationsu0022u003c/au003e u003cbr /u003e[44 groups (including 2 proscribed for u0022glorificationu0022) + 14 in Northern ireland; last update: July 2006]u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cstrongu003eUnited States of Americau003c/strongu003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe United States proscribes u0022Foreign Terrorist Organisationsu0022 under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, designates u0022organizations and individuals linked to terrorismu0022, whose assets are to be frozen, under Executive Order 13224 and maintains a u0022Terrorist Exclusion Listu0022, under the USA PATRIOT Act 2001, for immigration purposes:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htmu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eUS list of u0022foreign terrorist organisationsu0022u003c/au003e u003cbr /u003e[42 groups – last update: October 2005; State Department website]u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2004/40947.htmu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eUS list of u0022[Foreign] Persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorismu0022u003c/au003e u003cbr /u003e[over 350 groups – last update 29 December 2004; State Department website. Note this page only contains the latest additions; a full list is maintained by the US Treasury’s u003ca href=u0022http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/u0022u003eOffice of Foreign Asset Controlu003c/au003e. See in particular: Treasury Dept.’s u0022u003ca href=u0022http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/terror/terror.pdfu0022u003eTerrorism brochureu003c/au003eu0022 covering Executive Order 13224]u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2004/32678.htmu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eUS u0022Terrorist Exclusion Listu0022u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e[59 groups – last update 29 April 2004; State Department website]u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htmu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eUS u0022State Sponsors of Terrorismu0022u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e[6 countries – last update August 1993 [removal of Libya pending]; State Department website] u003c/pu003e
Statewatch comparative analysis of the US, UK, UN and EU u0022terrorist listsu0022
u003ctable border=u00220u0022 cellspacing=u00220u0022 cellpadding=u00220u0022 width=u002295%u0022u003ernu003ctbodyu003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 align=u0022CENTERu0022 valign=u0022BASELINEu0022u003ernu003cp align=u0022LEFTu0022u003e u003c/pu003ernu003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 align=u0022CENTERu0022 valign=u0022BASELINEu0022u003ernu003cblockquoteu003eU.S. u003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/US.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003c/blockquoteu003ernu003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 align=u0022CENTERu0022 valign=u0022BASELINEu0022u003eU.K. u003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/UK.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 align=u0022CENTERu0022 valign=u0022BASELINEu0022u003eU.N. u003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/UN.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 align=u0022CENTERu0022 valign=u0022BASELINEu0022u003eE.U. u003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/EU.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003c/tbodyu003ernu003c/tableu003ernu003ctable border=u00220u0022 cellspacing=u00226u0022 cellpadding=u00223u0022 width=u002295%u0022u003ernu003ctbodyu003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd colspan=u00225u0022 height=u00224u0022u003ernu003cpu003e u003c/pu003ernu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/gifs/line3.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u0022100%u0022 height=u00224u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eScope of list(s) u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003ei) u0022Foreign Terrorist Organisationsu0022 [proscription] u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eii) u0022organizations and individuals linked to terrorismu0022 [assert freezing, designation] u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eiii) u0022Terrorist Exclusion Listu0022 [exclusion of aliens associated with u0022terroristu0022 entities, designation] u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002224%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu0022International terrorist organisationsu0022 u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu0022Usama Bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaida organization and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with themu0022u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003ei) u0022Persons and entities associated with Usama binu003cbr /u003eLaden, the Al-Qaida network and the Talibanu0022u003cbr /u003e u003cbr /u003eii) u0022Persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist actsu0022 u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd colspan=u00225u0022 height=u00224u0022u003ernu003cpu003e u003c/pu003ernu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/gifs/line3.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u0022100%u0022 height=u00224u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eLegal basis u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003ei) Proscription under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eii) A u0022Comprehensive List of Terrorists and Groupsu0022 whose assets are to be frozen is contained in u003ca href=u0022http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2001/6531.htmu0022u003eExecutive Order 13224u003c/au003e (full-text, 23 September 2001). See also Tresury Dept.’s u0022u003ca href=u0022http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/t11ter.pdfu0022u003eTerrrorism brochureu003c/au003eu0022 covering Executive Order 13224. The US u0022fulfills its UN obligationsu0022 (see SC Resolution 1267, right) by designating under this Executive Order.u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eiii) The US also maintains a u0022u003ca href=u0022http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2004/32678.htmu0022u003eTerrorist Exclusion Listu003c/au003eu0022 under Section 411 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (8 U.S.C. § 1182) for the purposes of excluding u0022aliens associated with entities on the TEL from entering the United Statesu0022.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002224%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eProscription under Part 2 of u003ca href=u0022http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/terrorism/govprotect/legislation/index.html#Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT)u0022u003eTerrorism Act 2000u003c/au003e. Organisations in Northern Ireland first proscribed in 1974 under u0022emergencyu0022 anti-terrorism legislation.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu0022Designationu0022 on seperate lists under UN Security Council Resolutions u003ca href=u0022http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/300/44/PDF/N9930044.pdf?OpenElementu0022u003e1267u003c/au003e, 15 October 1999 (Taliban) and u003ca href=u0022http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/806/62/PDF/N0080662.pdf?OpenElementu0022u003e1333u003c/au003e,19 December 2000 (Al-Qaida). u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eSC Resolution u003ca href=u0022http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/216/02/PDF/N0221602.pdf?OpenElementu0022u003e1390u003c/au003e (16 January 2002) consolidates the lists and provides for updates by Security Council Committee. u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eSC Resolution u003ca href=u0022http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/214/07/PDF/N0321407.pdf?OpenElementu0022u003e1455u003c/au003e (17 January 2003) provides for monitoring of implementation by the ‘Sanctions Committee’ established under SC Resolution u003ca href=u0022http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/unscrs/1363e.pdfu0022u003e1363u003c/au003e (30 July 2001).u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003ernu003cpu003ei) Taleban/al-Qaida list based on UN Security Council Regulations, incorporated into EU law under EC Regulation u003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/l_043/l_04320000216en00010011.pdfu0022u003e337/2000u003c/au003e, replaced by u003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_139/l_13920020529en00090022.pdfu0022u003e467/2001u003c/au003e, replaced by u003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_031/l_03120050204en00040005.pdfu0022u003e881/2002u003c/au003e.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eii) u0022Terroristu0022 list drawn-up under EU Common Position u003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_344/l_34420011228en00930096.pdfu0022u003e2001/931u003c/au003e (27 December 2001). Provision for the freezing of assets and resources of those persons and groups on the list that come from outside the EU (u0022foreign terroristsu0022) in conjunction with EC Regulation u003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/cgi-bin/eur-lex/udl.pl?REQUEST=Seek-Deliveru0026amp;COLLECTION=oju0026amp;SERVICE=eurlexu0026amp;LANGUAGE=enu0026amp;DOCID=2001l344p0070u0022u003e2580/2001u003c/au003e (27 December 2001).u003cbr /u003e u003c/pu003ernu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd colspan=u00225u0022 height=u00224u0022u003ernu003cpu003e u003c/pu003ernu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/gifs/line3.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u0022100%u0022 height=u00224u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eLegal effectu003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/US.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003ei) Unlawful for any person in the United States (or subject to US jurisdiction) to knowingly provide u0022material support or resourcesu0022 to a designated FTO u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003e[The term u0022material support or resourcesu0022 is defined as u0022currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materialsu0022] u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eRepresentatives and members of FTOs to be refused entry to US and/or deported. u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eii) All US financial institutions must freeze funds of FTOs and groups and individuals designated under the Executive Order 13224 and report them the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eiii) Individual aliens providing support to or associated with entities on the u0022Terrorist Exclusion Listu0022 may be found “inadmissable” to the U.S., i.e., such aliens may be prevented from entering the U.S. or, if already in U.S. territory, may in certain circumstances be deported. u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002224%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/UK.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eOffences related to proscription include a) membership of a proscribed organisation, b) inviting support, including fund-raising, for a proscribed organisation, c) managing or assisting in the arranging of meetings to support or further the activities, or to be addressed by a member of a proscribed organisation and d) addressing a meeting where the address encourages support for a proscribed organisation. u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eThose found guilty are liable, on conviction, u0022to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, to a fine or bothu0022 or u0022on summary convictionu0022, to imprisonment for no more than six months, a fine, or both. Persons wearing an item of clothing or wearing, carrying or displaying u0022an article, in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisationu0022 in a public place, will be liable to imprisonment for up to six months, to a fine or both.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/UN.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eSC Resolution u003ca href=u0022http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/216/02/PDF/N0221602.pdf?OpenElementu0022u003e1390u003c/au003e requires all UN member states to a) freeze the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of these listed, u0022including funds derived from property owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their directionu0022; b) prevent the entry into or the transit through their territories of those listed (unless they are citizens of that state); c) Prevent the u0022direct or indirect supply, sale and transferu0022 to those listed u0022of arms and related materiel of all types including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipmentu0022 and u0022technical advice, assistance, or training related to military activitiesu0022. u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eSC Resolution 1390 also reaffirms the broader anti-terrorism commitments in SC Resolution u003ca href=u0022http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElementu0022u003e1373 u003c/au003e(28 September 2001) under which u0022statesu0022 are obliged to refrain from u0022providing any form of support, active or passiveu0022 to u0022entities or persons involved in terrorist actsu0022. UN member states must also u0022deny safe havenu0022 to terrorists, crimianlise fundraising and u0022afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist actsu0022.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/EU.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003ei) Under the Taleban/al-Qaida Regulations (above), member states are required freeze the assets of those designated and uphold a flight ban on certain aircraft. u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eii) Under Common Position u003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_344/l_34420011228en00930096.pdfu0022u003e2001/931u003c/au003e the member states must u0022afford each other the widest possibleu003cbr /u003eassistance in preventing and combating terrorist actsu0022 and u0022proceedings conducted by their authorities in respect of any of the persons, groups and entities listedu0022.u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eThe member states must also freeze the assets and resources and prohibit financial transactions with the u0022foreign terroristsu0022 on the list, , imposing u0022effective, proportionate and dissuasiveu0022 sanctions (Regulation u003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/cgi-bin/eur-lex/udl.pl?REQUEST=Seek-Deliveru0026amp;COLLECTION=oju0026amp;SERVICE=eurlexu0026amp;LANGUAGE=enu0026amp;DOCID=2001l344p0070u0022u003e2580/2001u003c/au003e). The financial sector must cooperate fully in this process. u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eThe EU member states are also bound by Common Position u003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/cgi-bin/eur-lex/udl.pl?REQUEST=Seek-Deliveru0026amp;COLLECTION=oju0026amp;SERVICE=eurlexu0026amp;LANGUAGE=enu0026amp;DOCID=2001l344p0090u0022u003e2001/930u003c/au003e (27 December 2001) which implements UN SC Resolution 1373. However, the Common Position goes further than the Resolution, requiring EU states to prevent u0022the publicu0022 from offering u0022any form of support, active or passiveu0022 to u0022entities or persons involved in terrorist actsu0022. In addition, the non-binding provisions in the SC Resolution – including the security vetting of all asylum-seekers and refugees for connections with terrorism, the abolition of the u0022political offenceu0022 exception in terrorism extradition cases, and the exchange of intelligence – are binding in the Common Position.u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eThe EU has also begun entering the names of individuals on the lists into the Schengen Information System, registering the foreign u0022terroristsu0022 as u0022illegal aliensu0022 to be refused entry. u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd colspan=u00225u0022 height=u00224u0022u003ernu003cpu003e u003c/pu003ernu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/gifs/line3.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u0022100%u0022 height=u00224u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eFirst u0022terroristu0022 list agreedu003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/US.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eOctober 1997 u003cbr /u003e(30 groups)u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003e[In January 1995 the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) was subject to an Executive Order signed by President Clinton prohibiting financial transactions and blocking their assets in the United States]u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002224%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/UK.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003e29 March 2001u003cbr /u003e(21 groups, see u003ca href=u0022http://www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2001/20011261.htmu0022u003eSIu003c/au003e).u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003e[Another 14 groups in Northern Ireland are proscribed under previous legislation dating back to 1974]u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/UN.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003e25 January 2001 u003cbr /u003e(78 individuals)u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003e[This is the earliest date that groups and individuals on the u0022consolidatedu0022 list (under SC Res. 1390) are recorded as being u0022listed onu0022. According to the Security Council press releases its u00221267 Committeeu0022 first designated the funds and financial resources of the Taliban on 13 April 2000]u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/EU.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003e27 December 2001u003cbr /u003e(29 individuals; 13 groups)u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd colspan=u00225u0022 height=u00224u0022u003ernu003cpu003e u003c/pu003ernu003ca href=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/thelists.htmlu0022u003eSee current lists for updatesu003c/au003eu003cbr /u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/gifs/line3.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u0022100%u0022 height=u00224u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eCriteria for inclusionu003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/US.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003ei) FTOs must engage in u0022terrorist activityu0022 or u0022terrorismu0022 or u0022retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorismu0022. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States. u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eii) The criteria used for the designated individuals and groups in the Presidential Executive Order are not known, though the Order itself cites u0022the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on US nationals or the US constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the USu0022.u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eiii) An organization can be placed on the u0022terrorist exclusion listu0022 if the Secretary of State finds that the organization: u0022commits or incites to commit, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity; prepares or plans a terrorist activity; gathers information on potential targets for terrorist activity; or provides material support to further terrorist activityu0022.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002224%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/UK.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eA terrorist organisation is defined as u0022any association or combination of personsu0022 which u0022commits or participates in acts of terrorism, prepares for terrorism or encourages terrorism or is otherwise concerned in terrorismu0022. u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eThe Home Secretary has to take into account, when making a decision, factors including: u0022a) the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities; b) the specific threat that it poses to the UK; c)the specific threat that it poses to British nationals overseas; d) the extent of the organisation’s presence in the UK; and e) the need to support other members of the international community in the global fight against terrorismu0022.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/UN.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eIndividuals and entities are designated as u0022belonging or related to the Taliban, Usama Bin Laden and the Al-Qaida organizationu0022 on the basis of u0022relevant informationu0022 provided by the UN member states and u0022regional organisationsu0022. u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eu0022Proposed additions to the list should also include, to the extent possible, a narrative description of the information that forms the basis or justificationu0022.u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003e[See Guidelines of the u003ca href=u0022http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267_guidelines.pdfu0022u003eSecurity Council Committeeu003c/au003e established pursuant to resolution 1267]u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/EU.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003ei) The EU list of Taleban/al-Qaida associates is apparently based on the UN list. However, the Commission is empowered to supplement and/or amend the list on the u0022basis of pertinent notificationu003cbr /u003eor information by the UN Security Council, the Taliban Sanctions Committee and the Member States, as appropriateu0022.u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eii) u0022Terroristu0022 groups and individuals are listed on the basis of u0022precise information or material… which indicates that a decision has been taken by a competent authority in respect of the persons, groups and entities concerned, irrespective of whether it concerns the instigation of investigations or prosecutionu0022.u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eu0022Persons, groups and entities identified by the Security Council of the United Nations as beingu003cbr /u003erelated to terrorism and against whom it has ordered sanctions may be included in the listu0022.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd colspan=u00225u0022 height=u00224u0022u003ernu003cpu003e u003c/pu003ernu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/gifs/line3.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u0022100%u0022 height=u00224u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eDefinition of terrorismu003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/US.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eCriminal acts dangerous to human life and apparently intended to: u003cbr /u003e u003cbr /u003e(i) intimidate or coerce a civilian population; u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003e(ii) influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003e(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnappingu003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002224%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/UK.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eThe use or threat of action designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological causeu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e u003c/pu003ernu003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/UN.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eNo formally agreed definition. UN General Assembly Resolution 51/210 (1999) on measures to eliminate international terrorism:u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003e1. Strongly condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed;u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003e2. Reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify themu003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/EU.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eOffences committed with the aim of:u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003e- seriously intimidating a population, oru003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003e- unduly compelling a Government or international organisationu003cbr /u003eto perform or abstain from performing any act, oru003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003e- seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a countryu003cbr /u003eor an international organisationu003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd colspan=u00225u0022 height=u00224u0022u003ernu003cpu003e u003c/pu003ernu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/gifs/line3.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u0022100%u0022 height=u00224u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eDecision-u003cbr /u003emaking u003cbr /u003eprocedureu003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/US.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eThe Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the State Department (S/CT) identifies the groups to be included and prepares an u0022administrative recordu0022 for the Secretary of State. u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eThe Secretary of State then designates them as u0022Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO’s)u0022, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury.u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eCongress then consulted (see following box).u003cbr /u003e u003cbr /u003eNo consultation of Congress in the case of groups and individuals designated under the Executive Order.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002224%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/UK.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eGroups selected by Home Secretary on the basis on information including classified material from UK and foreign intelligence services, along with police, security and legal advice. A working group exists within the government service at which all the interested parties meet and scrutinise proscriptions.u003cbr /u003e u003cbr /u003eParliament is then consulted (see following box).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e u003c/pu003ernu003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/UN.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eList agreed by the u003ca href=u0022http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267_guidelines.pdfu0022u003eSecurity Council Committeeu003c/au003e established pursuant to resolution 1267 which comprises one representative from each state in the Security Council.u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eThe Committee reaches decisions u0022by consensusu0022. If consensus cannot be reached on a particular issue, the Chairman organises u0022further consultationsu0022 to u0022facilitate agreementu0022. If after these consultations consensus still cannot be reached, u0022the matter may be submitted to the Security Councilu0022. u0022Given the specific nature of the information, the Chairman may encourage bilateral exchanges between interested Member States in order to clarify the issue prior to a decisionu0022. u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eu0022Where the Committee agreesu0022 decisions may be taken by u0022written procedureu0022. This mean that proposed decisions are simply circulated to the Committee member and adopted if no-one objects within 2 working days (u0022or in urgent situations, such shorteru003cbr /u003eperiod as the Chairman shall determineu0022). u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/EU.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eu0022Terroristu0022 list agreed by unanimous Decision in the Council of the EU (the 25 member states). u0022Written procedureu0022 has been used to adopt and amend the lists (see previous box).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe Commission is apparently empowered to add groups and individuals to the Taleban/al-Qaida asset-freezing list on the basis of u0022pertinent informationu0022 from the member states.u003cbr /u003e u003c/pu003ernu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd colspan=u00225u0022 height=u00224u0022u003ernu003cpu003e u003c/pu003ernu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/gifs/line3.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u0022100%u0022 height=u00224u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eDemocratic oversightu003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/US.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eCongress is notified of the Secretary’s intent to designate the organization and given seven days to review the designation. After the seven days notice of the designation is published in the Federal Register, at which point the designation takes effect. u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002224%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/UK.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eHome Secretary places an Order before parliament listing all the proscribed groups. The list is debated and must be approved by parliament. However, the Order can only be approved or rejected wholesale.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/UN.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eNoneu003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/EU.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eNoneu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd colspan=u00225u0022 height=u00224u0022u003ernu003cpu003e u003c/pu003ernu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/gifs/line3.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u0022100%u0022 height=u00224u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eExpiry/reviewu003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/US.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eFTO designations expire automatically after two years, but the Secretary of State may redesignate an organization for additional two-year period(s), upon a finding that the statutory criteria continue to be met. u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002224%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/UK.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eNo time limit for expiry of proscription Orders.u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eThe government’s working group reviews all proscriptions every 6 months u0022in the light of intelligence and other information, all of which is quality assessedu0022. u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eBi-annual review of Terrorism Act by u0022Independent Revieweru0022 who may make u0022Recommendationsu0022.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/UN.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eNo time limit for expiry of designations.u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eThe need to maintain the list is considered in the annual reviews provided for in the relevant Security Council Resolutions.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/EU.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eNo time limit for expiry of lists. u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eThe names of persons and entities on the list must be reviewed u0022at regular intervals and at least once every six months to ensure that there are grounds for keeping them on the listu0022.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd colspan=u00225u0022 height=u00224u0022u003ernu003cpu003e u003c/pu003ernu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/gifs/line3.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u0022100%u0022 height=u00224u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003ernu003cpu003eAppeal mechanismu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e[see also u0022u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/temp/terrorlists/terrorlists.htmlu0022u003echallenging proscriptionu003c/au003eu0022 for cases and judgments]u003c/pu003ernu003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002220%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/US.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eAn organization designated as an FTO may seek judicial review of the designation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit not later than 30 days after the designation is published in the Federal Register.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002224%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/UK.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eThe proscribed organisation or any person affected by the organisation’s proscriptionu003cbr /u003emay apply to the Secretary of State to remove the organisation from the list. u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eIf the application is refused, the applicant may appeal to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (POAC). This uses the same process as the notorious SIAC hearings under ATSA 2001- government appointed judges, secret hearings, secret evidence and special advocates. u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eIf the POAC rejects the application for u0022deproscriptionu0022 the Court of Appeal may only consider applications that raise points of law (i.e. challenges to the proscription/POAC system itself). There have been no successful challenges to date.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/UN.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eIndividual(s), groups, undertakings, and/or entities on the 1267 Committee’s list u0022may petition the government of residence and/or citizenshipu0022 to request a review and u0022support for de-listingu0022. The government to which a petition is submitted should review all relevant information and then approach bilaterally the government(s) originally proposing designation. If, after reviewing any additional information, the petitioned government wishes to pursue a de-listing request, it should seek to u0022persuade the designating government(s) to submit jointly or separately a request for de-listing to the Committeeu0022. If u0022consensusu0022 on the de-listing request can not be reached, the matter should be submitted to the Security Council.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctd width=u002218%u0022 valign=u0022TOPu0022u003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022https://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/EU.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002220u0022 height=u002213u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eNo mechanism provided for appeal against inclusion on the list of u0022persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist actsu0022under the Common Position. Moreover, the validity of EU Common Positions cannot be challenged before the Court of Justice, and national courts cannot ask the European Court questions about their validity or interpretation.u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eNeither is their any mechanism for appeal to the EU against the order for the u0022foreign terroristsu0022 and associates of the Taleban or al-Qaida whose assets and resources are frozen. However, those affected can apply to a member state requesting a u0022specific authorisationu0022 to unfreeze funds and resources. After consultation with the other Member States, the Council of the EU and the European Commission the requested state can reject the application or grant the specific authorisation.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe Regulations and Decisions implementing them are subject to possible rulings by the European Court of Justice on their interpretation or validity, but this is undermined where the Regulations are connected to the the Common Position.u003c/pu003ernu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003c/tbodyu003ernu003c/tableu003e
EU case law
u003cpu003eu003cstrongu003eThe EU Courtsu003c/strongu003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eNeither the legislation on the u0022terroristu0022 lists (Common Position 2001/931 and Regulation 2580/2001) or on the incorporation of UN sanctions framework (Regulation 881/2002) make any provision for individuals or groups to challenge the incorrect freezing of assets as a result of erroneously being included. Moreover, the validity of EU Common Positions cannot be challenged before the Court of Justice, and national courts cannot ask the European Court questions about their validity or interpretation. However, those subject to freezing orders can apply to a member state requesting a u0022specific authorisationu0022 to unfreeze funds and resources. After consultation with the other Member States, the Council of the EU and the European Commission the requested state can reject the application or grant the specific authorisation.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe Regulation and Decisions implementing them are subject to possible rulings by the European Court of Justice on their interpretation or validity, but this is undermined for Regulations connected to the Common Position. Thus, the only possible legal remedies are general principles of EU/EC law. There are two methods formally available at the EU level and several other possible avenues which commence with national litigation.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eFirst, a Council Decision can be challenged by an annulment action according to Article 230 TEC. Second, damages may be sought from the Community institutions if there is harm as a result of their unlawful acts under Article 288 EC (the unlawful act for EU external blacklisted people and groups would be the freezing of their assets, whereas EU internal blacklisted people and groups would probably only be able to complain about damage to reputation). A number of cases have been lodged on these grounds (see below).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eLess likely is the possibility that a listed u0022EU externalu0022 person or entity has assets (for example, a bank account) within an EU state which is frozen. That person or entity could, theoretically, bring an action under national law for breach of national law (for example, contract law) against the entity (the bank) for refusing to allow access to the asset (the account). The bank in turn will defend its action by reference to the regulation. The national court would than have to decide the issue of the lawfulness of the regulation, in turn (usually) requiring a request to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling under Article 234. It is also possible to argue, before the European Court of First Instance, on the basis of the u0022Borelli principleu0022 that the Council decision is invalid because there is no valid and correct decision by a national competent authority justifying a blacklisting. Under EC case law, national decisions must be motivated by reference to objective and reviewable criteria, including where this is relevant, expert opinions and recommendations. Alternatively, one can challenge whether the considerations by the Council justifying the blacklisting decision are reasonable and proportional. Finally, one can argue that the preparatory decisions of the competent national authority and/or the Council decision violate fundamental rights. Even though the Charter on Fundamental Rights does not (yet) have a binding legal status, according to the well established case-law of the ECJ and Article 6 TEU, the EC is bound to respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law (Cameron, 2003 – see note 1).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eLawyers for one of the proscribed individuals have also challenged – unsuccessfully – the EU Council’s decision to refuse access to the documents relating to the decision to include their client on the u0022terroristu0022 list.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eBowring and Korff (see u003ca href=u0022/listslegal.htmlu0022u003elegal analysisu003c/au003e) urge caution over pursuing cases through the CFI and the ECJ, arguing that these courts are ill-equipped to deal with the matters in question and are likely to adopt a minimalist approach to any judicial review they may carry out of the Common Positions and Regulations concerned. They suggest that this could set a bad precedent for any Strasbourg adjudication on the matter. Instead they recommend:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e• that legal challenges are pursued with vigour at the national level, first of all in countries in which it is likely that the courts will decline jurisdiction on the basis that the issue is entirely determined by EC/EU law: this would allow for an immediate submission thereafter of an application to the European Court of Human Rights; andu003cbr /u003e u003cbr /u003e• that an organisation pursue challenges in countries in which it has a good chance of the domestic courts being willing to hold (either on the basis of the ECHR, where the Convention is directly applicable and given a high status, or on the basis of the national constitution) that they should be granted full “access to court”, with the (domestic) court in question being able to assess the underlying matters of law and fact in full.u003ca name=u0022anchor507486u0022u003eu003c/au003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eFor information on the procedures used in the UK, US, EU and UN frameworks see u0022u003ca href=u0022/listsbground.htmlu0022 target=u0022_parentu0022u003ecomparative analysisu003c/au003eu0022u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cstrongu003eThe European Court of First Instanceu003c/strongu003eu003c/pu003ernu003ctable border=u00220u0022u003ernu003ctbodyu003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eApplicant(s)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eDateu003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eCase referenceu003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eDetailsu003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eJudgmentu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eAbdirisak Adenu003cbr /u003eand Others [al-Barakaat, Sweden]u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e10 December 2001u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/c_044/c_04420020216en00270028.pdfu0022u003eT-306/01u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(OJ 2002 C 44/47)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eThe Applicants argued that the EU Council had exceeded its powers in freezing the resources associates of the Taleban under Regulation 467/2001 (March 2001) under Articles 60 EC and 301 EC. They sought annulment of Regulations 467/2001 and 2199/2001 (implementing legislation), arguing that the u0022fundamental legal principle of the right to a fair and equitable hearingu0022 had been disregarded.u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eUltimately, the al-Barakaat trio were removed from the UN and EU lists (see below).u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003ernu003cpu003eApplication for interim relief (u0022urgency proceedingsu0022) dismissed, u003cbr /u003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl?lang=enu0026amp;num=79979492T1901%20R0306_1u0026amp;doc=Tu0026amp;ouvert=Tu0026amp;seance=ORDu0026amp;where=()u0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003e7 May 2002u003cbr /u003eu003c/au003e[2002] ECR II-2387u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eDismissed, u003cbr /u003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/sep/10terrorlists.htmu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003e21 September 2005u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(appealed to ECJ, see case C-402/05 P, below)u003c/pu003ernu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eYassin Abdullahu003cbr /u003eKadi [Saudi Arabian businessman]u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e18 December 2001u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/c_056/c_05620020302en00160017.pdfu0022u003eT-315/01u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(OJ 2002 C 56/16)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eAlso concerns Regulation 467/2001 (above). Applicant sought an annulment of the Regulation as far as it relates to him, arguing interference with property rights and violation of the Community Law principle ofu003cbr /u003eeffective judicial control because of the failure to provide any opportunity for redress.u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eLater removed from ECJ register – applicant presumably delistedu003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eDismissed, u003cbr /u003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/sep/10terrorlists.htmu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003e21 September 2005u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eOmar Mohamedu003cbr /u003eOthman [Jordanian residing in the UK]u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e17 December 2001u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/c_068/c_06820020316en00130014.pdfu0022u003eT-318/01u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(OJ 2002 C 68/13)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eAlso seeks annulment of Regulation 467/2001 (above) and implementing Regulation 2062/2001. Argues misuse of Council powers and violation of articles 3 and 8, ECHR and violation of theu003cbr /u003eprinciple of subsidiarity.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eCongrès Nationalu003cbr /u003edu Kurdistan [in respect to PKK]u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e2 July 2002u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003ernu003cpu003eu003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/c_247/c_24720021012en00130013.pdfu0022u003eT-206/02u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(OJ 2002 C 247/13)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eNote: the UK and the Commission supported the Councilu003c/pu003ernu003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eSought annulment of the decision to proscribe the PKK arguing defamation, erroneous judgment, denial of freedom of expression and sought damages of 10,000 euro. Also argued failure to provide procedural remedies and that the PKK has been advocating non-violence since 1999.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eDismissed, u003cbr /u003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=enu0026amp;Submit=Submitu0026amp;alldocs=alldocsu0026amp;docj=docju0026amp;docop=docopu0026amp;docor=docoru0026amp;docjo=docjou0026amp;numaff=T-206%2F02u0026amp;datefs=u0026amp;datefe=u0026amp;nomusuel=u0026amp;domaine=u0026amp;mots=u0026amp;resmax=100u0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003e15 February 2005u003c/au003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eOrganisation desu003cbr /u003eModjahedines du Peuple d’Iran (OMPI) [PMOI]u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e26 July 2002u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/c_247/c_24720021012en00200020.pdfu0022u003eT-228/02u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(OJ 2002 C 247/20)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eThe Applicants sought partial annulment of the Decisions and Common Positions implementing Common Position 2001/931 and Regulation 2580/2001 (on freezing the assets of u0022foreignu0022 terrorists) and damages of 1 euro. In support of their claims, the applicants argued breach of the right to defence, failure to recognise its actions as resistance to occupation and tyranny and breach of the principle of non-discrimination.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eRuling in favour of applicant, u003cbr /u003eu003ca href=u0022/docs/CFI-PMOI-judgment.pdfu0022u003e12 Decmber 2006u003c/au003e u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eKurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and Kurdistan National Congress (KNK)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e31 July 2002u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003ernu003cpu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/sep/pkkecj.pdfu0022u003eT-229/02u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(OJ 2002 C 233/32)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eNote: the UK and the Commission supported the Councilu003c/pu003ernu003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eThe Applicants sought annulment of the Decision to proscribe them and related damages. They argued that the EU had breached its own procedural rules in failing to recognise that the PKK had renounced violence, breach of civil, cultural and political rights, breach of fundamental rights and principles of Community law and misuse of Council powers.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eDismissed, u003cbr /u003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=enu0026amp;Submit=Submitu0026amp;alldocs=alldocsu0026amp;docj=docju0026amp;docop=docopu0026amp;docor=docoru0026amp;docjo=docjou0026amp;numaff=T-229%2F02u0026amp;datefs=u0026amp;datefe=u0026amp;nomusuel=u0026amp;domaine=u0026amp;mots=u0026amp;resmax=100u0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003e15 February 2005u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(appealed to ECJ, see case C-229/05 P, below)u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eChafiq Ayadi [Irish resident]u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e22 August 2002u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/c_289/c_28920021123en00250025.pdfu0022u003eT-253/02u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(OJ 2002 C 289/25)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eSeeks annulment of Regulation 881/2002 implementing Regulation 467/2001 (on freezing Taleban associates’ assets. above). Argues that UN measures do not impose a duty to apply such measures, misuse of Council and Commission powers and violation of the principles ofu003cbr /u003esubsidiarity and proportionality and respect for human rights. Also argues failure to provide opportunity for judicial redress and reasons.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eDismissed, u003cbr /u003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=enu0026amp;Submit=Rechercheru0026amp;alldocs=alldocsu0026amp;docj=docju0026amp;docop=docopu0026amp;docor=docoru0026amp;docjo=docjou0026amp;numaff=T-253/02u0026amp;datefs=u0026amp;datefe=u0026amp;nomusuel=u0026amp;domaine=u0026amp;mots=u0026amp;resmax=100u0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003e12 July 2006u003c/au003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eGestoras Pro Amnistía association, Juan Mari Olano Olano and Julenu003cbr /u003eZelarain Errasti [a Basque Group and associated individuals]u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e31 October 2002u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/c_019/c_01920030125en00360037.pdfu0022u003eT-333/02u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(OJ 2002 C 19/36)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eThe Applicants sought combined damages of 1.2 million euro. Arguments identical to those in case T-338/02, below.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eDismissed, u003cbr /u003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=enu0026amp;Submit=Submitu0026amp;alldocs=alldocsu0026amp;docj=docju0026amp;docop=docopu0026amp;docor=docoru0026amp;docjo=docjou0026amp;numaff=T-333%2F02u0026amp;datefs=u0026amp;datefe=u0026amp;nomusuel=u0026amp;domaine=u0026amp;mots=u0026amp;resmax=100u0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003e7 June 2004u003c/au003e u003cbr /u003e(appealed to ECJ, see case C-354/04 P, below)u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eSEGI association, Araitz Zubimendi Izaga and Aritza Galarraga [a Basque Group and associated individuals]u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e13 November 2002u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/c_007/c_00720030111en00240025.pdfu0022u003eT-338/02u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(OJ 2003 C 7/24)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eThe Applicants sought combined damages of 1.2 million euro. They argued that their fundamental rights to the presumption of innocence, a fair hearing, freedom of speech, self-determination and privacy had been breached. They also argued that the procedure used to adopt Common Position 2001/931 and Regulation 2580/2001 was unlawful and failed to provide them with adequate defence rights.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003ernu003cpu003eDismissed, u003cbr /u003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=enu0026amp;Submit=Submitu0026amp;docor=docoru0026amp;numaff=338%2F02u0026amp;datefs=u0026amp;datefe=u0026amp;nomusuel=u0026amp;domaine=u0026amp;mots=u0026amp;resmax=100u0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003e7 June 2004u003c/au003e u003cbr /u003e(appealed to ECJ, see case C-355/04 P, below)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e u003c/pu003ernu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eJose Maria Sison [accused of being head of the u0022New People’s Armyu0022 in The Philippines, residing in Holland]u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e6 February 2003u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/c_101/c_10120030426en00410042.pdfu0022u003eT-47/03u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(OJ 2003 C 101/41)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eSeeks partial annulment of the Decisions to proscribe Mr. Sison, annulment of Regulation 2580/2001 and damages of at least 100,000 euro. Argues that Mr. Sison is a political refugee recognised by the Netherlands, that he is not head of the New People’s Army, that his fundamental rights under articles 6, 7, 10 and 11 ECHR have been breached. Also argues that Regulation 2580/2001 is unlawful.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eApplication for interim relief dismissed, u003cbr /u003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/c_226/c_22620030920en00170017.pdfu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003e15 May 2003u003cbr /u003eu003c/au003e[2003] ECR I-2047u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eJose Maria Sisonu003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e24 March 2003u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/c_146/c_14620030621en00390040.pdfu0022u003eT-110/03u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(OJ 2003 C 146/39)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eMr. Sison’s lawyers requested from the General Secretariat of the EU Council all documents which formed the of the Decision to proscribe the applicant and the New People’s Army as well as access to any information regarding which Member States provided documents mentioned in the contested Decision. The Council refused on the grounds that these documents constituted u0022sensitive informationu0022 (and exception in the Regulation on public access to documents) and suggested their release would breach the Council’s Security Regulations.u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eDismissed, u003cbr /u003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/may/ecj-sison1.pdfu0022 target=u0022_selfu0022u003e26 April 2005u003c/au003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eJose Maria Sisonu003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e30 April 2003u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/c_213/c_21320030906en00360037.pdfu0022u003eT-150/03u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(OJ 2003 C 213/36)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eSeeks annulment of Council’s Decision to reject Mr. Sision’s lawyers’ u0022confirmatory applicationu0022 (appeal) contesting the Decision of the Council to refuse access the to documents requested above.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eDismissed, u003cbr /u003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/may/ecj-sison1.pdfu0022 target=u0022_selfu0022u003e26 April 2005u003c/au003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eStichting al-Asqau003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e19 September 2003u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/c_289/c_28920031129en00300030.pdfu0022u003eT-327/03u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(OJ 2003 C 289/30)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eThe Applicants sought annulment of the Decision to proscribe them and asked the Court to declare inapplicable Regulation 2580/2001 and provide related damages. They argue violation of procedural rules and the right to a fair hearing and breach of other fundamental rights.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eJose Maria Sisonu003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e12 December 2003u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/c_035/c_03520040207en00170017.pdfu0022u003eT-405/03u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(OJ 2004 C 35/17)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eJoined to cases T-110/03 and T-150/03 (above). Concerns reply to u0022confirmatory applicationu0022.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eDismissed, u003cbr /u003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/may/ecj-sison1.pdfu0022 target=u0022_selfu0022u003e26 April 2005u003c/au003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eFaraj Hassan [UK resident]u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e12 February 2004u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/c_094/c_09420040417en00520052.pdfu0022u003eT-49/04u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(OJ 2004 C 94/140)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eSeeks annulment of Regulation 881/2002 implementing Regulation 467/2001 (on freezing Taleban associates’ assets. above) as far it relates to the proscription of the applicant, and related damages. Argues that theu003cbr /u003emeasures u0022annihilate his peaceful enjoyment ofu003cbr /u003ehis property and his private and family lifeu0022 and that the defendants u0022wholly failed to provide him, bothu003cbr /u003ebefore and after the decision was taken, with a fair hearing or effective remedyu0022. Also claims that the measures violateu003cbr /u003ethe principle of proportionality.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eDismissed, u003cbr /u003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=enu0026amp;Submit=Rechercheru0026amp;alldocs=alldocsu0026amp;docj=docju0026amp;docop=docopu0026amp;docor=docoru0026amp;docjo=docjou0026amp;numaff=T-49/04%20u0026amp;datefs=u0026amp;datefe=u0026amp;nomusuel=u0026amp;domaine=u0026amp;mots=u0026amp;resmax=100u0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003e12 July 2006u003c/au003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eZubeyir Aydar on behalf of Kongra-Gel and 10 others [proscribed as alias of PKK]u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e25 June 2004u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/c_262/c_26220041023en00280028.pdfu0022u003eT-253/04u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(OJ 2004 C 262/28)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eThe Applicants seek annulment of the Decision to proscribe them, arguing u0022failure to apply accessible, objective criteria to the correct factsu0022, breach of freedom of expression, breach of principles of Community law and misuse of power. Also argues failure to ensure right to a fair hearing.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eHani El Sayyed Elsebai Yusef [UK resident]u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e6 January 2006u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/c_262/c_26220041023en00280028.pdfu0022u003eT-2/06u003c/au003eu003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eSeeks annulment of Regulation 881/2002 implementing Regulation 467/2001 (on freezing Taleban associates’ assets. above) as far it relates to the proscription of the applicant. The applicant was listed pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1629/2005 of 5 October 2005, amending for the 54th time Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002. The Regulation 1629/2005 was published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 6 October 2005 so the time-limit for commencing annulment proceedings expired on 30 December 2005.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eRejected (application received too late), u003cbr /u003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=enu0026amp;Submit=Rechercheru0026amp;alldocs=alldocsu0026amp;docj=docju0026amp;docop=docopu0026amp;docor=docoru0026amp;docjo=docjou0026amp;numaff=T-2/06%20%20u0026amp;datefs=u0026amp;datefe=u0026amp;nomusuel=u0026amp;domaine=u0026amp;mots=u0026amp;resmax=100u0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003e31 May 2006u003c/au003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eAl-Bashir Mohammed Al-Faqih [Libyan, UK resident]u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e5 May 2006u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=enu0026amp;Submit=Rechercheru0026amp;alldocs=alldocsu0026amp;docj=docju0026amp;docop=docopu0026amp;docor=docoru0026amp;docjo=docjou0026amp;numaff=T-135/06u0026amp;datefs=u0026amp;datefe=u0026amp;nomusuel=u0026amp;domaine=u0026amp;mots=u0026amp;resmax=100u0022u003eT-135/06u003c/au003eu003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eSeeks the annulment of Regulation 246/2006 by which the applicant was inluded in the list of persons, groups and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban (pursuant to Article 2 of Regulation No 881/2002). Argues that the Council was not competent to adopt Article 2 of Regulation in that Articles 60 EC, 301 EC and 308 EC do not confer on the Council the power to do so. Also argues that the Council and the Commission misused their powers and that Article 2 of Regulation No 881/2002 as amended infringes the fundamental principles of Community law (subsidiarity, proportionality and respect for fundamental rights). Also cites infringement of an essential procedural requirement in the adoption of Regulation No 881/2002 to state adequate reasons why the measures considered necessary cannot be determined by individual Member States.u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eSanabel Relief Agency Ltd [UK-based]u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e5 May 2006u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eT-136/06u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003ePleas and arguments identical to those in case T-135/06, aboveu003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eGhunia Abdrabba [UK resident]u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e5 May 2006u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eT-137/06u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003ePleas and arguments identical to those in case T-135/06, aboveu003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eTaher Nasuf [UK resident]u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e5 May 2006u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eT-138/06u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003ePleas and arguments identical to those in case T-135/06, aboveu003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eOrganisation desu003cbr /u003eModjahedines du Peuple d’Iran (OMPI) [PMOI]u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eJune 2007u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eT-157/07u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003earguments not yet reportedu003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003c/tbodyu003ernu003c/tableu003ernu003cpu003eu003cstrongu003eThe European Court of Justiceu003c/strongu003eu003c/pu003ernu003ctable border=u00220u0022u003ernu003ctbodyu003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eApplicant(s)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eDateu003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eCase referenceu003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eDetailsu003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eJudgmentu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eGestoras Pro Amnistía association, Juan Mari Olano Olano and Julenu003cbr /u003eZelarain Errastiu003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e17 August 2004u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=enu0026amp;Submit=Rechercheru0026amp;alldocs=alldocsu0026amp;docj=docju0026amp;docop=docopu0026amp;docor=docoru0026amp;docjo=docjou0026amp;numaff=C-354/04u0026amp;datefs=u0026amp;datefe=u0026amp;nomusuel=u0026amp;domaine=u0026amp;mots=u0026amp;resmax=100u0022u003eC-354/04 Pu003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(OJ 2004 C 251/9u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eAppeal against CFI judgment in Case T-333/02, above; joined with case C-355/04 (below).u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eOpinion of AG recommending rejectionu003cbr /u003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=enu0026amp;Submit=Rechercheru0026amp;alldocs=alldocsu0026amp;docj=docju0026amp;docop=docopu0026amp;docor=docoru0026amp;docjo=docjou0026amp;numaff=C-354/04u0026amp;datefs=u0026amp;datefe=u0026amp;nomusuel=u0026amp;domaine=u0026amp;mots=u0026amp;resmax=100u0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003e26 October 2006u003c/au003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eSEGI association, Araitz Zubimendi Izaga and Aritza Galarraga u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e17 August 2004u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/c_251/c_25120041009en00100010.pdfu0022u003eC-355/04 Pu003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(OJ 2004 C 251/10)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eAppeal against CFI judgment in Case T-338/02, above; joined with case C-354/04 (above).u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eOpinion of AG recommending rejectionu003cbr /u003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=enu0026amp;Submit=Rechercheru0026amp;alldocs=alldocsu0026amp;docj=docju0026amp;docop=docopu0026amp;docor=docoru0026amp;docjo=docjou0026amp;numaff=C-354/04u0026amp;datefs=u0026amp;datefe=u0026amp;nomusuel=u0026amp;domaine=u0026amp;mots=u0026amp;resmax=100u0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003e26 October 2006u003c/au003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eKurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and Kurdistan National Congress (KNK)u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e18 May 2005u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=enu0026amp;newform=newformu0026amp;Submit=Submitu0026amp;alljur=alljuru0026amp;jurcdj=jurcdju0026amp;jurtpi=jurtpiu0026amp;jurtfp=jurtfpu0026amp;alldocrec=alldocrecu0026amp;docj=docju0026amp;docor=docoru0026amp;docop=docopu0026amp;docav=docavu0026amp;docsom=docsomu0026amp;docinf=docinfu0026amp;alldocnorec=alldocnorecu0026amp;docnoj=docnoju0026amp;docnoor=docnooru0026amp;typeord=ALLTYPu0026amp;allcommjo=allcommjou0026amp;affint=affintu0026amp;affclose=affcloseu0026amp;numaff=229-05u0026amp;ddatefs=u0026amp;mdatefs=u0026amp;ydatefs=u0026amp;ddatefe=u0026amp;mdatefe=u0026amp;ydatefe=u0026amp;nomusuel=u0026amp;domaine=u0026amp;mots=u0026amp;resmax=100u0022u003eC-229/05 Pu003c/au003e u003cbr /u003e(OJ 2005 C 243/2)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eAppeal against CFI judgment in Case T-229/02, above.u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eRuling in favour of applicant (case to return to CFI)u003cbr /u003eu003ca href=u0022https://statewatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/ECJ-PKK-07.pdfu0022u003e18 January 2007u003c/au003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eJose Maria Sison (access to documents cases)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e27 June 2005u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=enu0026amp;newform=newformu0026amp;Submit=Submitu0026amp;alljur=alljuru0026amp;jurcdj=jurcdju0026amp;jurtpi=jurtpiu0026amp;jurtfp=jurtfpu0026amp;alldocrec=alldocrecu0026amp;docj=docju0026amp;docor=docoru0026amp;docop=docopu0026amp;docav=docavu0026amp;docsom=docsomu0026amp;docinf=docinfu0026amp;alldocnorec=alldocnorecu0026amp;docnoj=docnoju0026amp;docnoor=docnooru0026amp;typeord=ALLTYPu0026amp;allcommjo=allcommjou0026amp;affint=affintu0026amp;affclose=affcloseu0026amp;numaff=C-266%2F05+Pu0026amp;ddatefs=u0026amp;mdatefs=u0026amp;ydatefs=u0026amp;ddatefe=u0026amp;mdatefe=u0026amp;ydatefe=u0026amp;nomusuel=u0026amp;domaine=u0026amp;mots=u0026amp;resmax=100u0022u003eC-266/05 Pu003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e(OJ 2005 C 243/4)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eAppeal against CFI judgment in Cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03, above.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eDismissedu003cbr /u003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022https://statewatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/ECJ-Sison-07.pdfu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003e1 February 2007u003c/au003eu003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eKadi v Council and Commissionu003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e24 November 2005u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st15/st15408.en05.pdfu0022u003eC-402/05 Pu003c/au003e u003cbr /u003e(Council doc. 15408/05; not yet published in OJ)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eAppeal against CFI judgment in Case T-315/01, above.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eYusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Councilu003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e1 December 2005u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/06/st05/st05064.en06.pdfu0022u003eC-415/05 Pu003c/au003e u003cbr /u003e(Council doc. 5064/06; not yet published in OJ)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eAppeal against CFI judgment in Case T-315/01, above.u003cbr /u003e u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003ctru003ernu003ctdu003eGerda and Christiane Möllendorf (concerns Salem-Abdul Ghani El-Rafei, Dr. Kamal Rafehi and Ageel A. Al-Ageel)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e21 February 2006u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eu003ca href=u0022http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/c_108/c_10820060506en00060006.pdfu0022u003eC-117/06 Pu003c/au003e u003cbr /u003e(OJ 2006 C 108/6)u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003eReference from German Courts regarding sale of property by persons listed by UN Taleban Sanctions Committee.u003c/tdu003ernu003ctdu003e u003c/tdu003ernu003c/tru003ernu003c/tbodyu003ernu003c/tableu003ernu003cpu003eu003cstrongu003eThe European Court of Human Rightsu003c/strongu003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe European Court of Human Rights has held that all judicial remedies (including the EU Courts) must be exhausted before it can consider any cases – leaving applicants facing lengthy procedures.u003c/pu003ernu003culu003ernu003cliu003eSee: u003ca href=u0022/SEGI_ECHR.pdfu0022u003eJudgmentu003c/au003e (23 May 2002) in Case Nos. 6422/02 and 9916/02, SEGI association, Gestoras Pro Amnistía and Others vs. Council of the European Union.u003c/liu003ernu003c/ulu003ernu003cpu003e u003c/pu003e
The Opror/Rebellion case
u003cpu003e(u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/terrorlists.htmlu0022 target=u0022_parentu0022u003eStatewatch terrorist lists siteu003c/au003e, updated 9 January 2007)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe Danish association Opror (‘Rebellion’) was founded to defy both national anti-terrorism legislation and the political paradigm underlying the so-called ‘war on terror’. It has now been charged with terrorist fund raising and is awaiting prosecution in 2007. See u003ca href=u0022http://www.opror.net/article.php3?id_article=50u0022u003eRebellion in Denmark, an overviewu003c/au003eu003c/pu003ernu003culu003ernu003cliu003eOctober 2004: ‘Rebellion’ publicly transferred substantial funds to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).u003cbr /u003e u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eApril 2005: ‘Rebellion’ issues international appeal to organisations in the EU encouraging them to join it in its defiance of European anti-terrorist legislation and the ‘terrorist list’ of the European Union: u003ca href=u0022http://www.ungdomslejr.dk/ru/dokumenter/engelsk.pdfu0022u003eappealu003c/au003e (link)u003cbr /u003e u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eAugust 2005: ‘Rebellion’ charged with breaching of 114a(2) of the Danish criminal code by allegedly supporting u0022groups having the intent of committing terrorist actsu0022: u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/aug/06denmark.htmu0022u003ereportu003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eAugust 2005: Copenhagen Magistrate’s Court ordered the removal of ‘Rebellion’s’ international appeal from its homepage. u003cbr /u003e u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eOctober 2005: High Court (Landsret) upholds decision to censor ‘Rebellion’ website. This is now being appealed by ‘Rebellion’ to the Supreme Court (Hoejesteret)u003cbr /u003e u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eFebruary 2006: Police authorities remove the international appeal from the websites of the parliamentary party Red-Green Alliance, of the left daily newspaper ‘Arbejderen’, and of a socialist youth group.u003cbr /u003e u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eApril 2006: Board of Appeal of Danish Supreme Court declares admissible appeal against decision to censor ‘Rebellion’ website: u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/apr/denmark-%27Rebellion%27-case-goes-to-supreme-court.pdfu0022u003ereportu003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eOctober 2006: Danish minister of justice confirms prosecution of ‘Rebellion’ under anti-terrorist laws will go ahead: u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/oct/08denmark-oproer-case.htmu0022u003ereportu003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eNovember 2006: Copenhagen International Conference: Anti-terrorism legislation, political rights and international solidarity Saturday 18 November 2006: u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/nov/denmark-rebellion-declaration.pdfu0022u003edeclarationu003c/au003eu003c/liu003ernu003c/ulu003ernu003cpu003eFoor more information, see u003ca href=u0022http://www.opror.net/u0022u003e’Rebellion website’u003c/au003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eSee also: u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/oct/11sweden.htmlu0022u003eu0022Arbitraryu0022 EU anti-terrorist laws tested by Swedish Young Leftu003c/au003e on another u0022illegalu0022 donation to the PLFP. No charges were brought by the Swedish authorities.u003c/pu003e
Legal analysis
u003cpu003eu003ca href=u0022/OSCE-UN-feb-2007.pdfu0022u003eThe human rights implications of international listing mechanisms for ‘terrorist’ organisationsu003c/au003e (pdf) u003cbr /u003eProfessor Bill Bowring, Birkbeck College, University of London, background paper for OSCE/UN Expert Workshop on International Cooperation in Counter-terrorism, 15-17 November 2006 (Final report published February 2007, see pages 75-114).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/docs/Fassbender_study.pdfu0022u003eTargeted Sanctions and Due Processu003c/au003e (pdf) u003cbr /u003eBardo Fassbender, Associate Professor of Law, Institute of International and European Law, Humboldt University Berlin, Study commissioned by the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, March 2006.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/docs/Cameron-06.pdfu0022u003eThe ECHR, Due Process and UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Sanctionsu003c/au003e (pdf) u003cbr /u003eProfessor Iain Cameron, Council of Europe, February 2006u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/docs/Birkhauser.PDFu0022u003eSanctions of the Security Council Against Individuals – Some Human Rights Problemsu003c/au003e (pdf)u003cbr /u003eNoah Birkhäuser, European Society of International Law (2005)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/terrorlists.pdfu0022u003eTerrorising the rule of law: the policy and practice of proscriptionu003c/au003e (pdf)u003cbr /u003eBen Hayes, Statewatch, June 2005u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/feb/bb-dk-joint-paper.pdfu0022u003eTerrorist Designation with Regard to European and International Law: The Case of the PMOIu003c/au003e (pdf) u003cbr /u003eJoint Opinion by Prof. Bill Bowring, Director of Human Rights and Social Justice Research Institute, London Metropolitan University and Prof. Douwe Korff, Professor of International Law, London Metropolitan University, November 2003.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003ca href=u0022/listEUexperts.htmlu0022u003eExcerts from u0022Thematic Report on counter-terrorismu0022u003cbr /u003eu003c/au003eEU Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights (March 2003), compiled by Statewatch. See also u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/apr/CFR-CDF.ThemComment1.pdfu0022u003efull Thematic Reportu003c/au003e (pdf).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/jan/02euterr.htmu0022u003eThe EU’s Common Positions on terrorism – an absence of legal and democratic accountabilityu003c/au003eu003cbr /u003eStatewatch, January 2002u003c/pu003e
Excerpts from Thematic Report on counter-terrorism of the EU Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights
u003cpu003eLegal analysisu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThematic Report on counter-terrorism of the EU Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights (March 2003)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eOpinion of EU Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rightsu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e******* remove notesu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e(Pages 9-10) From introductionu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eIn the European Union, the risk to fundamental rights posed by the adoption of measures to fight terrorism are all the greater since democratic and juridical controls are still very inadequate in the current institutional balance, particularly in the context of headings V and VI of the Treaty on European Union. The deliberate choice by Member States to base an important part of the Union’s response on the second pillar of the Treaty in particular the adoption of common positions as a tool for the measures as specific the drawing up of lists of terrorist organisations or the exchange of information, in addition to a growing number of u0022anti-terroristu0022 clauses in agreements with non-Member States, deprives parliamentary institution of all sources of information and possibility of Action[7]. The lack of democratic legitimacy of these measures is all the greater, since a large part of theu003cbr /u003efight against terrorism takes place in the context of implementing international commitments and positions decided within the United Nations Organisation, reducing further the option of parliamentary control over inter-governmental options. Several of the measures adopted by Member States in response to the terrorist threat were implemented in execution of Resolution 1373 (2001) adopted on 28 September 2001 by the United Nations Security Council determining the strategies for fighting terrorism by every available means, including its financing. Common Position 2001/930/CESP on the fight against terrorism [8], Common Position 2001/931/CESP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism [9] and in respect of the freezing of assets, Council Regulation 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001; specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and bodies with a view to fighting terrorism [10] were adopted within the European Union on the basis of this resolution. Decision 2001/927/EC of 27 December 2001, establishing the lists stipulated in this regulation, was made on the basis of Article 2 § 3 of the Regulation. Point VI of this Comment will analyse this problem in greater detail…u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e(Pages 40-46) VI. Elimination of the finance of terrorismu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eVI.1. Freezing of assets upstream of notification of offencesu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eArticle 8, par. 1 and 2 of the United Nations Convention on the suppression of the financing of terrorism requests contracting States to criminalize acts of financing terrorism and to adopt measures needed to identify, detect, freeze or seize any funds used or intended to be used to commit terrorist offences, and the proceeds of such offences, for possible confiscation. The process of ratification of this important instrument accelerated sharply after the attacks on 11 September 2001. In addition, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 on the freezing of terrorist assets and the finance ofu003cbr /u003eterrorism recommends making a crime u0022criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist actsu0022 (Article 1a). This resolution also specifies that the funds, financial assets or economic resources of persons who u0022commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist actsu0022 shall be frozen along with those of persons or bodies associated with them (Article 1b).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eFollowing the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, the European Union assumed two common positions on 27 December 2001164. Member States also decided to criminalize the finance of terrorism, freezing assets of certain persons or bodies identified in an appendix to the Common Position 2001/931/EPSC as assisting terrorism (a). At the same time, police and judicial cooperation have been strengthened in respect of groups, organizations and individuals listed in theu003cbr /u003eAppendix (b). The list which contains names which are updated twice a year, has been drawn up on the u0022the basis of precise information or material in the relevant file which indicates that a decision as been taken by a competent authority in respect of the persons, groups and entities concerned, irrespective of whether it concerns the instigation of investigations or prosecution for a terrorist act an attempt to perpetrate, participate in or facilitate such an act based on serious and credible evidence or clues, or condemnation for such deeds.u0022 (Article 1 § 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP). The compilation and modification of the list are carried out by the Council on the basis of confidentialu003cbr /u003ecriteria which have not been defined in advance.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e(a) On 27 December 2001, the Council also adopted Regulation 2580/2001165 since Community intervention was needed to implement the asset-freezing provisions of the Common Position 2001/631/CFSP and a ruling was necessary to draw up the list stipulated by Article 2 § 3 of the Regulation.166 The concepts of u0022…funds and other financial assets or economic resourcesu0022 are defined in a wide sense, and including u0022…including funds of any kind, tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, how ever acquired, legal documents or instruments of any kind, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to or interest in, such assets, including but not limited to bank credits,u003cbr /u003etravellers’ cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts and letters of creditu0022.167 The Common Position 2001/931/CFS was later updated several times168 and also guided the actions of the Union against the Al Qaida movement169. This body of standards gave rise to a series of annulment actions, some of which in particular question the grounds of the measure, namely, the right of the persons in question to engage in an armed struggle170, whilst others prefer to adopt the formal framework of the adoption of these texts or the breaching of their political activities171. The provisions in question here are particularly Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the European Convention Human Rights on property rights and Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights laying down the right to a fair trial. These measures affect the presumption of innocence172 because the freezing of assets prejudges the guilt of persons who have not been convicted of a crime.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e(b) The persons, groups or entities concerned exclusively by Article 4 of the Common Position 2001/631/CFSP on specific measures for police and judicial cooperation to prevent and fight terrorist acts173. At this time, in fact, there is no judicial control of the measures adopted in the context of Title V of the Treaty on European Union in the legal order of the European Union.174 This situation cannot be reconciled with Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights nor, a fortiori, with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. No doubt in the decision of inadmissibility given onu003cbr /u003e23 May 2002 on the joint applications SEGI and others and Gestoras Pro-Amnistia and others vs. the European Union, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the plaintiffs cannot be considered u0022victimsu0022 of an infringement of their rights, in the meaning of Article 34 of the European Convention of Human Rights, as a result of the adoption of the two common positions in question on 27 December 2001 in the framework of CFSP (common position 2001/930/CFSP on combating terrorism andu003cbr /u003ecommon position 2001/931/CFSP on the implementation of specific measures for police and judicial cooperation to combat terrorism)175. The Court considered in fact that recognising the plaintiffs as u0022victimsu0022 in this situation would be equivalent to accepting that the individual’s right to lodge complaints under the European Convention of Human Rights could be used to prevent an infringement of the Convention, and would thus extend the concept of u0022a potential victimu0022 to a violation beyond which this concept had been used in the past. It based its opinion on the observation that the u0022commonu003cbr /u003epositionsu0022 adopted in the context of CFSP are not, as such, directly applicable in the Member States and the implementation requires the adoption of concrete provisions in national law in the appropriate legal form in each Member State.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eHowever, it would be a mistake to conclude from the Segi and others judgment that the absence of any judicial control in the context of Title V of the Treaty of European Union is an acceptable principle. The fundamental rights of the persons include the right to be protected against damage to his/her honour and reputation and the right to be presumed innocent until guilt is established. But these two rights may be threatened, or violated, by the positions of the Council adopted in the context of the CFSP that identifies certain individuals or organizations in order to attribute certain responsibilities to them, and asks the Member States to adopt measures against them, or that simply designates theseu003cbr /u003eindividuals or organisations by certain terms that could jeopardise their reputation. This is the reason, moreover, that the European Court of Human Rights considered that the circumstance that two of the plaintiffs were listed in the annex to the Common position 2001/91/CFSP was troublesome, but it refused to draw the consequent conclusions from this observation. If the Court of First Incidence of the European Communities, before which a complaint has been lodged by the organisations in question!, should consider that it is not competent to investigate these complaints, it will be difficult not to conclude that the legal protection of the individual is insufficient with regard to the potential consequences of common positions or actions adopted under Title V of the Treaty of European Union.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003edo not however have the right of equal recourse to the Courts, since their inclusion on this list does not at first sight, jeopardize personally and individually their rights and freedoms, but tends to affirm that priority should be given to inquiries concerning them176. It does however appear that the disreputable stigmatisation incurred by a body or individual in the list must not be neglected, and that the absence of any satisfactory remedy for the protection of their fundamental rights must be seen as regrettable177.u003cbr /u003eAside from questions of the confidentiality of the collection of information, which must not result in a complete absence of control, an important question remains, that of the veracity and reliability of information which results in inclusion in the list, the danger of abuse of asset freezing increasing with a lack of a definition of a terrorist offence. Undeniably, the means of drawing up this list do not appear to be satisfactory in their present form, since the choice of an administrative procedure (inclusion in a list by a governmental body) concerns a field which should fall strictly within the authority of theu003cbr /u003ejudiciary. In addition, inclusion in the list, which can result simply from an investigation launched in a Member State, will require the other Member States to freeze the assets of the persons listed, although no control by the judicial authorities of those States is envisaged178.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe initiatives taken by the Member States are strongly convergent, since they were taken under the United Nations Convention on the suppression of the financing of terrorism, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, and Regulation 2580/2001 on the implementation of the freezing of assets. The last of these instruments is directly applicable in the Member States, only sanctions for breaches of the Regulation having to be adopted by the States.179u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThus, Belgium has enacted Royal Decree of 2 May 2002 on restrictive measures against certain persons and bodies in the context of the fight against terrorism180. Under Article 2, persons convicted of a breach of Regulation 2580/2001 are liable to a prison sentence of from eight days to five years and a fine from € 25 to 25,000181. This Decree is retroactive in respect of situations prior to the date of its publication, since it comes into force from 28 December 2001. It appeared necessary, however, for the legislative chambers to deal with this problem by means of a proposal for a law u0022…on the implementation of restrictive measures adopted by the Council of the European Union against States, certain persons and bodiesu0022 voted by the House of Representatives on 27 February 2003182. This proposal nevertheless contains other questionable aspects in that it allows the implementation of Common Positions (which are not binding, however) by Royal Decree, ipso facto circumventing Parliament.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eOn 9 April 2002, Spain ratified the international convention on the suppression of the financing of terrorism183. In addition, in 2002 it submitted a draft law on the prevention and seizure of financing of terrorism, which is yet to be approved by the Senate. The purpose of this legislation is to block transactions and movements of capital belonging to terrorist entities and to prevent opening of financial accounts where one of the parties to the transaction is associated with terrorist groups or organizations. A Monitoring Committee will direct and control these activities.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eIn Ireland, Sections 12-44 of the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Bill, 2002184 deal with the suppression of financing of terrorism by making provision for the measures necessary to enable ratification by Ireland of the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999. The definition of financing terrorism in Section 13 is quite broad and provides that a person is guilty of the offence if s/he, inside or outside the State, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides, collects or receives funds intending that they be used or knowing that they will be used to carry out an act that is an offence under Irish law and within the scope of a treaty annexed to the abovementioned 1999 Convention185. Attempts to commit such an offence are also covered. A schemeu003cbr /u003efor freezing and confiscating funds used or allocated for use in connection with the offence of financing terrorism is inserted into the Criminal Justice Act, 1994 by Sections 21-43.186 A procedure (based on the Proceeds of Crime Act, 1996) for the freezing, restraint or confiscation of funds, by means of a court order, in the possession or control of a person that are being used or may be intended for use in committing, or facilitating the commission of, a terrorist offence or an offence of financing terrorism is provided for by Sections 14-20. Une répartition de la charge de la preuve est prévue: Section 18 (based on Section 8 of the 1996 Act) makes provision for the use of opinion evidence by au003cbr /u003emember of An Garda Siochana (Irish Police) not below the rank of Chief Superintendent with the proviso that the High Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for that opinion. The section also stipulates that the standard of proof to be applied is that applicable to civil proceedings, i.e. the balance of probabilities.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eIn the United Kingdom, the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism has been ratified, entering into force on 10 April 2002. The offences created by this will be added to the list of extraditable offences. Par ailleurs, on constate que unlike the power of forfeiture (ss 1-3 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Secutity Act 2001), that relating to the freezing of assets is not restricted to use in connection with terrorism (ss 4-14). In particular it covers their use in respect of action detrimental to the United Kingdom economy. Not only could this apply to economic activity that is entirely legitimate where it takes place but also fails to give any criteria by which detriment to theu003cbr /u003eeconomy is to be assessed so that the potential exercise of the power might not be anticipated. The lack of criteria will also handicap judicial scrutiny of any exercise of this power. These provisions are thus not entirely consistent with the controls permitted over the peaceful enjoyment of possessions.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eItaly has ratified the Convention of New York of 9 December 1999 on the suppression of the financing of terrorism187. In view of the contents of Resolution 1373 of United Nations Security Council, the Government has also formed a financial security Committee responsible to the Minister of Economy and Finance188. The prevention of Mafia type activities (law of 19 March 1990 n° 55) is thus strengthened for the offences listed in Article 270b which includes the finance of terrorism (decree 374/2001, supra, concerning the definition of terrorism), by stipulating disciplinary sanctions, the suspension or revocation of the authorisation to exercise banking activities, already provided in respect of the harbouring of stolen goods, money laundering, use of money, goods or other assets of illicit origin189. The main problem raised by the new standards concerns the punishment of conduct which contributed only occasionally to the achievement of the association’s aims, the option of criminalising support given to an association which has not involved the effective membership of a person in that association, entails the risk of breaching the principle of lawfulness by the creation ofu003cbr /u003enew repressive schemes not sanctioned by law.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eFor its part, Sweden has engaged in discussions on decision (SC/7206) concerning three Swedish citizens (originally from Somalia) who were accused of being associated with a terrorist organization and whose assets were frozen on this basis within just a few days despite their strong denial of any connections with Al-Qaida. Several Swedish NGOs have expressed criticism with regard to withholding information within the UN Security Council about the case in question and thereby not giving any opportunity to the accused to dispute the decision.190 It is of utmost importance that those under suspicion of having committed a crime are not penalised until their guilt has been proven in a fair trial by an independent court. According to the Swedish Red Cross this fundamental legalu003cbr /u003eprinciple has obviously not been taken into consideration in the case of the three Swedes.191 They were sentenced without a hearing and without a chance to defend themselves. Initially, they were denied legal aid despite the fact that they had no resources whatsoever at their disposal. In other words, the Swedish Government has been criticised for the way in which it has enforced the UN resolutions and EU regulations.192 The issue is currently subject of proceedings in Luxemburg (at the ECJ), focusing primarily on the actions by EU and Sweden in the matter. The three Swedes as well as the organization Al Barakaat initiated an action for annulment before the Court of first instance of the EC on 10 December 2001 challenging, inter alia, the EU decision to freeze their assets (Annex I to Regulation No (EEC) 881/2002).193 The Court of first instance pronounced on 7 May 2002 its decision on the part of the application dealing with a claim for provisional measures in the case T-306/01R, Abdirisak Aden, Abdulaziz Ali, Ahmed Yusuf, Al Barakaat International Foundation v. EU and the Europeanu003cbr /u003eCommission. The claim was rejected.194 Meanwhile the names of the three Swedish citizens have been struck from the sanctions list as the result of an agreement between them and the US.195 In preparation for the ratification of the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism from 1999196 a new act (Lag om straff för finansiering av särskilt allvarlig brottslighet i vissa fall, m.m; (SFS 2002:444)) (Act on Punishment for the Financing of Especially Serious Crimes in Certain Circumstances (2002:444) and a new regulation (Förordning om åtgärder mot penningtvätt och finansiering av särskilt allvarlig brottslighet i vissa fall, (SFS 2002:552)) were approved and entered into force on 1 July 2002. The new act criminalises the financing of terrorist crimes in accordance with Article 2 of the UN Convention. It also comprises explicit rules concerning jurisdiction, forfeiture of funds, used or allocated for the purpose of committing the offences set forth in Article 2. In addition, the Act requires companies covered by the Act on Measures against Money Laundering (SFS 1993:768) to examine any transaction, which can be assumed on reasonable grounds to be intended for the financing of the crimes covered by the law (i.e., the terrorist crimes enumerated in the Convention and its annex). The companies shall report any circumstances that may be indicative of such transactions to the Swedish FIU.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eLastly, it should be remembered that Austria, Finland, Greece and France have ratified the International Convention on the suppression of the financing of terrorism197. In Luxembourg, a proposal for a law No. 4954, submitted on 16 May 2002, on the suppression of terrorism and its finance and approving the International Convention on the suppression of the financing of terrorism of 10 January 2000, has not yet been adopted198.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003ePage 52, under the heading: General conclusionsu003cbr /u003e6. The EU u0022terrorist listsu0022 and freezing of assets of suspected terroristsu003cbr /u003eThe lot of persons, groups or bodies targeted by Article 4 of the Council common position 2001/91/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the implementation of special measures in the fight against terrorism – subsequently confirmed by common position 2002/340/CFSP of 2 May 2002 and 2002/940/CFSP of 17 June 2002 – clearly illustrate the risk for the guarantee of the right to effective remedy before a judge, of the absence of any judicial control in the context of Title V of the Treaty of European Union. Independently of the quality of the information on basis of which these persons were identified, it must be observed that these persons, groups or bodies undergo a serious violation of their right to presumption of innocence, and their right to preservation of their reputation. Even if it should appear possible for them to obtain compensation of the damage incurred as a result of these violations, the situation remains unsatisfactory: infringement of fundamental rights must be avoided, insofar as possible, and not simply compensated once been committed.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eEU Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights (March 2003), compiled by Statewatch. See also u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/apr/CFR-CDF.ThemComment1.pdfu0022u003efull Thematic Reportu003c/au003e (pdf).u003c/pu003e
Terrorising the rule of law: the politics and practise of proscription
u003cpu003eStatewatch analysis, prepared by Ben Hayes [u003ca href=u0022/xxxu0022u003ealso available as PDFu003c/au003e] * u003cuu003edraft – 6 June 05u003c/uu003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe policy of u0022proscriptionu0022, or u0022designationu0022, of groups and individuals as u0022terroristu0022 is an integral part of the global u0022War on Terrorismu0022 led by the United States. u0022Proscriptionu0022 has a binding legal effect, criminalising named u0022terroristsu0022. However, the criminal courts are all but excluded u003ca href=u0022/-u0022u003e-u003c/au003efrom what is a highly politicised process with very serious implications for those who may be included on the u0022terrorist listsu0022. In the aftermath of u0022September 11u0022 the policy was embraced uncritically by the u0022international communityu0022 – despite the obvious problems it poses for understandings of u0022due processu0022 and the application of international human rights standards.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThis analysis explores the emergence of the policy of proscription, its global extension under the u0022War on Terrorismu0022 and the implications for groups and individuals who are now proscribed in law as u0022terroristu0022. It borrows much of the legal argument and many of the quotations from the Joint Opinion on proscription by Professors Bill Bowring and Douwe Korff of London Metropolitan University (1).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cstrongu003eBackgroundu003c/strongu003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eProscription was first introduced in the UK in 1974 under the u0022Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Actu0022. The Secretary of State was empowered to ban any organisation in Northern Ireland u0022that appears to him to be concerned in terrorism … or in promoting or encouraging itu0022. This policy continued throughout the u0022Troublesu0022 to the present day. The United States introduced proscription in the mid-1990s, under the Clinton administration. Even then, the US was keen to combat u0022international terrorismu0022 wherever it occurred and proscribed 30 u0022foreign terrorist organisationsu0022. In 2000 the UK followed-suit, extending proscription to foreign groups where the Secretary of State u0022believesu0022 that they are u0022concerned in terrorismu0022 – most of the 21 groups proscribed by the UK were on the US list.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eIn a process known as u0022policy launderingu0022, the US and the UK have encouraged other states to adopt this policy. (2) Since 2002, Canada has proscribed 35 groups (29 of which are on the US list and 4 on the UK list) and Australia has proscribed 18 organisations (15 of which are on both the UK and US lists). (3) In 2002 New Zealand also introduced proscription. The US/UK policy of proscription has also been u0022launderedu0022 through the intergovernmental frameworks of the UN and EU, giving it a truly global reach.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe UN introduced u0022designationu0022 (a form of proscription) in 1999 under a Security Council Resolution in the sanctions framework against the Taleban – part of the United States’ attempt to force the regime to hand over Osama Bin Laden by freezing its assets and resources. Twelve days after u0022September 11u0022 2001, the US President signed an executive order blocking the assets of 189 u0022organisations and individuals linked to terrorismu0022. The UN quickly followed, extending its Taleban sanctions framework to all groups and individuals associated with Bin Laden and u0022Qaidau0022.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eIn the EU, the UN sanctions regime was quickly incorporated into EU law. The EU then went further, introducing its own list of groups and individuals u0022involved in terrorismu0022 (including u0022domestic terrorismu0022) and extended the asset-freezing regime to the u0022foreign terroristsu0022 on the list.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eIt is worth noting that the US also maintains a u0022Terrorist Exclusion Listu0022 (TEL; 59 groups currently deisgnated) under the PATRIOT Act of 2001, for the purposes of excluding u0022aliens associated with entities on the TEL from entering the United Statesu0022. In addition, the US maintains u0022no-flyu0022 and u0022lookoutu0022 lists – said to contain 20,000 amd 120,000 names respectively (4) – as well as a u0022most-wantedu0022 list of terrorists. These domestic measures, which are pursued by many countries, are not considered any further in this analysis but obviously raise the same kind of concerns.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cstrongu003eScope and effectu003c/strongu003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe United States has now proscribed 40 u0022foreign terrorist organisationsu0022 and designated more than 350 under the Executive Order on asset freezing. The United Kingdom has 25 u0022international terrorist organisationsu0022 on its list (with another 14 in Northern Ireland), and the European Union has agreed on the designation of 47 groups and 45 individuals suspected of involvement with terrorism. The United Nations list is the longest, designating 322 individuals and 115 groups as suspected members or associates of Qaida and the Taliban.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eAs noted above there is considerable overlap, though only 12 groups are common to the UK, US and EU lists, these are:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eAbu Nidal Organization (ANO, an anti-Israeli group)u003cbr /u003eQa’ida u003cbr /u003eContinuity IRAu003cbr /u003eETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty)u003cbr /u003eGama’a Islamiyya (GI)u003cbr /u003eHamasu003cbr /u003eKADEK (formerly PKK)u003cbr /u003eLashkar-e Tayyiba (LT, Kashmir)u003cbr /u003eMujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK, aka People’s Mujahadeen of Iran, PMOI)u003cbr /u003ePalestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)u003cbr /u003eReal IRAu003cbr /u003eRevolutionary People’s Liberation Army/Front (DHKP/C, Turkey)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe legal effect of inclusion on the list varies according to the jurisdiction. The proscription of u0022terrorist groupsu0022 by the US and UK allows the prosecution of their members – including for acts committed outside the two countries – and the prosecution anyone providing financial, material or even ideological support. The UN and EU lists provide for the freezing of assets and resources connected to the designated groups and individuals. The UN framework obliges u0022statesu0022 to refrain from u0022providing any form of support, active or passiveu0022 to u0022entities or persons involved in terrorist actsu0022. The EU framework, which is modelled on the UN mechanism but goes further, requires EU states to prevent u0022the publicu0022 from offering u0022any form of support, active or passiveu0022. (5)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eProscription thus carries extremely serious consequences, particularly for individuals subject to asset freezing. As Iain Cameron notes:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e“The effect[s] of a freezing order, if it is effectively implemented, are devastating for the target, as he or she cannot use any of his or her assets, or receive pay or even, legally speaking, social security.” (6)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eBefore examining the judicial remedies available to groups and individuals on the various lists it is worth examining how they came to be placed there in the first place.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cstrongu003eSelection criteria and political processu003c/strongu003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe process is fairly straightforward. u0022Intelligenceu0022, much of it secret, provides the basis for including groups and individuals on the various lists. The judiciary is excluded and parliaments play only a minimal role. Except in the EU and UN frameworks where there is no democratic scrutiny whatsoever. Diplomats have admittedu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eIn the US and UK the u0022intelligenceu0022 is evaluated by the offices of the Secretary of State/Home Secretary, who then proscribe groups they believe are involved with u0022terrorismu0022 after u0022consultingu0022 Congress/Parliament. In the UN and EU frameworks the u0022intelligenceu0022 on groups and individuals comes from the member states; the executive bodies of the UN (Security Council) and EU (Council) then agree their lists – there is no consultation of the UN General Assembly or the European Parliament.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eNone of the regimes provide for notification to the accused that designation is pending or opportunity for the accused to contest any allegations before proscription: the normal judicial process is entirely discarded.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eUK parliamentary debate over the first list of 21 foreign terrorist groups was limited to an hour and half, late at night. Menzies Campbell, the respected Liberal Democrat spokesman, asked:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu0022Does the Secretary of State understand the discomfort that some of us feel at the notion that 21 organisations should appear in the motion that we are debating, and that there has not been an opportunity to deal with each on an individual and separate basis?”u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eJeremy Corbyn MP questioned the motivation and political influence on the government’s decision, stating that he was:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu0022very well aware that the Indian government, the Turkish government, the Sri Lankan government, the Iranian government and undoubtedly many other governments have been constantly pressing the British government to close down political activity in this country by their opponents.u0022u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe first EU u0022terroristu0022 list was agreed, together with the EU legislation allowing proscription, by u0022written procedureu0022 on the 27 December 2001. This meant that the four legal texts were simply faxed round to the foreign ministries of the 15 EU member states and adopted if none raised any objection, which two days after Christmas was surely unlikely. The various UN Security Council Resolutions have been adopted in similar fashion – at least in terms of the absolute lack of debate. Both the UN and EU lists have been amended so many times it is very difficult to keep track of the decisions being taken.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eMany of the groups named contest their designation as u0022terroristsu0022, suggesting it is politically motivated. In September 2002, 331 MPs (a Commons majority) and 122 Peers (in the House of Lords) declared in a statement that they u0022support the struggle of the people of Iran and the People’s Mojahedin Organisation [of Iran, PMOI] to achieve democracy and human rights as an essential part of the defeat of terrorism at home and abroad.” Support for a banned organisation is a criminal offence under the Terrorism Act 2000; the show of support in the UK parliament leaves the law looking something of an ass. As does Jack Straw’s meeting with Hamas.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThough it is hard to conceive of any justification for the exclusion of the judiciary and marginalisation of democratic institutions over such politicised and potentially devastating measures as proscription, u0022terrorismu0022 and the current political climate provide one. As Bill Bowring and Douwe Korff explain:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu0022It is plain in our view that the US legislation is a recipe for arbitrary, secretive and unjust executive decision-making, shielded from the scrutiny of the courts, and equally removed from most public debate precisely because of the ‘chilling’ effect of the use of the term ‘terrorism’.u0022u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe same can be said of the UK, EU and UN frameworks for proscription, all of which carry a:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu0022manifest risk of arbitrary, in particularly politically motivated abuse of such lawu0022.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cstrongu003eDefinitions of terrorismu003c/strongu003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eSince the criteria for inclusion on the terrorist lists is a connection with u0022terrorismu0022 (or Qaida or the Taleban in the UN framework), it is impossible to separate the politics of proscription from the way in which terrorism is defined in the various jurisdictions. It is notable that the UN is the only one of the four that does not have an agreed definition of terrorism. The UN attempted to elaborate such a definition for most of the 1970s but failedu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu0022because the Group of 77, the formerly colonised states, repeatedly emphasised the legitimacy of actions by national liberation movements, and demanded that such actions should in no way be confused with terrorismu0022 (Bowring and Korff).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe degree of subjectivity arguably makes it impossible to find a definition that could provide such a guarantee. As Judge Rosalyn Higgins, of the International Court of Justice, said in 1997:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e“Terrorism is a term without any legal significance. It is merely a convenient way of alluding to activities, whether of States or of individuals, widely disapproved of and in which either the methods used are unlawful, or the targets protected, or both.”u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eWhen the concerns about the criminalisation of liberation struggles are taken out of the equation, as they have been in the US, UK and EU, the very similar definitions of u0022terrorismu0022 adopted have been very broad indeed. The UK definition, which was clearly modelled on the earlier US definition, and provided the basis for the EU definition that followed, is:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu0022The use or threat of action designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological causeu0022u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eAs Bowring and Korff note, in no definition is there any actual mention of u0022terror”, leaving open the possibility that acts or groups that clearly do not cause u0022terroru0022 in any tangible sense could be criminalised. This concern was voiced by Statewatch and others during the adoption of the EU definition of terrorism.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eHow then, ask Bowring and Korff:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu0022can it then be possible to move to proscribe organisations with any degree of legal certainty, adherence to the rule of law, or proportionality?u0022u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eCameron identifies a number of specific problems in defining terrorism in the proscription process, including:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e1) There is no requirement that the group has recently committed acts of terrorism – for example, the decision to include the PKK in May 2002 several years after it had renounced violence.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e2) There is no requirement that the terrorist act be directed against a non-military target, as is the case with the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e3) There is no requirement that the acts be directed against a democratic government.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cstrongu003eCriminalising solidarity, criminalising communitiesu003c/strongu003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThus, as Helena Kennedy QC has pointed out, it is:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu0022hard to have confidence that struggles for self-determination and other political activities will not be wrapped up in accusations of ‘terrorism’.”u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eMoreover, as Bowring and Korff note:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu0022Very often, in countries in which there are serious political tensions, or serious repression, there will both be organisations using violence which claim that their use of violence is legitimate, and political groups which espouse similar aims to the violent groups, but which deny that they are in hock with those groups. Here too the lines are difficult to draw.u0022u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThese concerns, which have been stated repeatedly by solidarity groups and critics of arbitrary anti-terror laws, have proved well founded with the UK and US governments moving to proscribe groups involved in liberation struggles or resistance to occupation and tyranny. The complex situations in the Basque country, Colombia, India, Iran, Palestine, Sri Lanka, The Philippines, Turkey – each with its own history and context – have all been lumped together under the banner of u0022international terrorismu0022 and subjected to the same sanctions as Osama bin Laden and Qaida. This is devastating for these movements, criminalising not only the proscribed/designated u0022terroristu0022 groups and named individuals, but their members (and suspected members), supporters, associates and their family members and so on. The criminalisation of u0022passive supportu0022 goes as far as to criminalise all solidarity with any of the groups named, whatever the basis and motivation for that solidarity. Incredibly, long established networks like the Palestine Solidarity Campaign and the Columbia Solidarity Campaign now find themselves on the wrong side of the law.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eIn European countries that have large resident populations associated with these movements – for example the Kurds in the UK and Germany and the Iranians in France – we are witnessing the criminalisation of entire communities. Along with resident Muslim and Arab populations, foreigners from areas associated with u0022terrorismu0022 are demonised in the media and treated as u0022suspect communitiesu0022, fuelling racism and resentment. The u0022launderingu0022 of the u0022terrorist listsu0022 through the intergovernmental frameworks of the EU and the UN means this criminalisation impacts not only locally but globally. The UN Security Council resolutions and the EU measures oblige member states to afford one another full cooperation in the u0022war on terroru0022 generally and as regards the freezing orders and specific investigations.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cstrongu003eReview and appeal mechanismsu003c/strongu003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eWhat then can an organisation or individual who appears on any of the various terrorist lists do about it? In the UK, the Terrorism Act 2000 provides for appeal to the Home Secretary to remove an organisation from the list. If this application is refused the applicant may appeal to the Proscribed Organisations Appeals Committee (POAC). In turn POAC judgments may be appealed to the Higher UK Courts. Several of those listed did jointly challenge the legality of the proscription regime in 2002 but this was dismissed on the grounds that the provision to appeal POAC judgments provided affected groups with adequate judicial remedy (7). POAC is similar in structure to the controversial SIAC tribunals that ruled on the detention without trial of foreign nationals under provisions now repealed of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: government appointed judges, secret hearings and secret evidence etc. Ultimately the POAC decisions could be appealed to the European Court of Human Rights.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eIn the United States the (Federal) Court of Appeals denied the PMOI’s application for judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision to designate them a u0022foreign terrorist organisationu0022 because it felt – wrongly in the view of many – that it could not examine the basis for that decision:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eWe reach no judgment whatsoever regarding whether the material before the Secretary is or is not true … [T]he record consists entirely of hearsay, none of it was subjected to adversary testing, and there was no opportunity for counter-evidence by the organizations affected. [The Secretary of State’s] conclusion might be mistaken, but that depends on the quality of the information in the reports she received – something we have no way of judging.”u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe UN and EU lists make no provision for appeal to the courts whatsoever. Groups and individuals on the lists may make diplomatic representations to their government, or the government that they believe proposed their proscription. An individual EU member state may grant a u0022specific authorisationu0022 to unfreeze funds and resources after consultation with the other Member States, the Council of the EU and the European Commission (the issue of whether to continue to include someone on the EU list is decided by the Council). In the UN framework the requested member state may then make u0022diplomaticu0022 representations to the Security Council Committee with a view to informal resolution of the issue (and failing this, resolution by the Security Council itself).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eAs far as the courts are concerned, individuals and groups could challenge the application of the EU/UN measures in the national courts on the basis that they contravene human rights or constitutional standards – though such appeals could well be denied on the grounds that international sanctions regimes are binding on member states.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eGroups and individuals have indirect recourse to the EU Courts and can seek annulment of the Council measures implementing the freezing regime, or damages for unlawful Council acts at the European Court of First Instance (and subsequently the full European Court of Justice). However, the proceedings in these courts would be directed at the EC/EU rules; they would not really concern the national measures implementing them. Finally, once all other avenues for appeal have been explored, proscription may be challenged at the European Court of Human Rights.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eA number of groups have taken case to the EU Courts and claim sizeable damages. (8) Legal experts, however, have argued that the composition and functioning of the CFI and ECJ as international courts leaves them inadequately equipped to deal with the complex issues raised by proscription cases. In such a situation they offer no real prospect of adequate judicial redress for groups and individuals proscribed as u0022terroristu0022 by the EU. However, the European Court of Human Rights has so far held that all judicial remedies (including the ECJ) must be exhausted before it can consider any cases – leaving applicants facing lengthy procedures. This position is rejected by Bowring and Korff on the grounds that there is no prospect of an effective remedy at the EU Courts. They are also concerned that a conservative judgment by the EU Courts could set a bad precedent for any subsequent Strasbourg judgment.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe upshot of this highly complex legal landscape is that no proscribed group has yet had full u0022access to courtu0022, with the (domestic) court being able to address the underlying matters of law and fact in full. The only successful challenges to terrorist blacklisting have been diplomatic representations to the United States – for example in the Barakaat case (9). In these situations the United States offers to remove groups and individuals in return for u0022anti-terroristu0022 commitments (which may include renouncing the movements with which they are associated). This underscores the political nature of the international proscription regimes and the power that the US enjoys within these frameworks.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cstrongu003eAn affront to justice and human rightsu003c/strongu003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eIn their submissions to the UK’s POAC tribunal on behalf on the PMOI (10), Lord Lester QC and Rabinder Singh QC raised the following Human Rights Act complaints:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e(i) infringement of the right to freedom of expression (article 10)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e(ii) infringement of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom ofu003cbr /u003eassociation (article 11)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e(iii) interference with the right to a good reputation pursuant to article 8u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e(iv) arbitrary and discriminatory treatment (article 14)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e(v) lack of due process and procedural unfairnessu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e(vi) lack of proportionality, andu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e(vii) failure to comply with the requirements of legal certainty and “prescribed by law”.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe proscription regimes also clearly breach the Council of Europe “Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism”, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 July 2002. These include:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cuu003eII. Prohibition of arbitrarinessu003c/uu003e: All measures taken by states to fight terrorism must respect human rights and the principle of the rule of law, while excluding any form of arbitrariness, as well as any discriminatory or racist treatment, and must be subject to appropriate supervision.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cuu003eIII. Lawfulness of anti-terrorist measuresu003c/uu003e: 1. All measures taken by states to combat terrorism must be lawful. 2. When a measure restricts human rights, restrictions must be defined as precisely as possible and be necessary and proportionate to the aim pursued.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cuu003eXIV. Right to propertyu003c/uu003e: The use of the property of persons or organisations suspected of terrorist activities may be suspended or limited, notably by such measures as freezing orders or seizures, by the relevant authorities. The owners of the property have the possibility to challenge the lawfulness of such a decision before a court.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eAs Bowring and Korff point out, these principles clearly echo the ECHR and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and expressly affirm that it must be possible to challenge freezing before a court – something precluded by the EU blacklisting regime.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cstrongu003eConclusionu003c/strongu003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eProscription has extremely serious consequences, not just for the groups and individuals that are named expressly on the lists, but their associates, supporters and contact networks. Given these implications for fundamental rights, the failure to provide adequate mechanisms for appeal and redress for groups and individuals affected by proscription is extremely alarming. The broader criminalisation of complex internal conflicts is no less alarming. The lessons of the WWII and German and Italian fascism meant the United Nations was born with the ethos that the u0022international communityu0022 should show solidarity with those resisting occupation and tyranny. What has happened in the post-u0022September 11u0022 world is precisely the opposite. Resistance is instead defined as u0022terrorismu0022 by tyrannical and occupying states, while the international community shows solidarity not with the oppressed, but the oppressor, in a framework geared toward the global criminalisation of all u0022terroristsu0022. This criminalisation impacts locally and globally, criminalising communities and solidarity networks.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe process of proscription takes place in a secret realm which has marginalised democratic institutions and sidelined the judiciary. Those outlawed as u0022terroristsu0022 have little possibility of a fair hearing at which they can challenge the evidence against them and the laws being used. This type of u0022preventative actionu0022 by the state – based on the criminalisation of all those u0022believedu0022 to be associated with u0022terrorismu0022, based on extrajudicial convictions, secret u0022intelligenceu0022 and guilt by association – is fast being normalised under the u0022war on terrorismu0022. And it is to the extreme detriment of established norms for the protection of human rights and the administration of justice.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eNotesu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e1. This analysis was developed from a talk given by Ben Hayes at the European Social Fourm in London: u0022Proscription without process: the UK, US, EU and UN u0022terroristu0022 listsu0022, (CAMPACC, Institute of Race Relations and Statewatch ESF seminar), 15 October 2004.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eMuch of the legal argument follows the Joint Opinion by Professors Bill Bowring (Director of Human Rights and Social Justice Research Institute, London Metropolitan University) and Douwe Korff (London Metropolitan University), u0022u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/feb/bb-dk-joint-paper.pdfu0022u003eTerrorist Designation with Regard to European and International Law: The Case of the PMOIu003c/au003eu0022 (pdf; November 2004).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e2. For an explanation of policy laundering see u003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.policylaundering.org/u0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003ehttp://www.policylaundering.org/u003c/au003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e3. See organisations proscribed by u003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/national_security/counter-terrorism/Entities_e.aspu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eCanadau003c/au003e (government website) and u003cuu003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurityhome.nsf/Page/Listing_of_Terrorist_Organisationsu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eAustraliau003c/au003eu003c/uu003e (government website).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e4. See u0022u003ca href=u0022http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2004/32678.htmu0022u003eTerrorist Exclusion Listu003c/au003eu0022 on US State Department website. On u0022no flyu0022 etc see u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/apr/07us-passenger-screening.htmu0022u003eUS: Report on airline passenger screeningu003c/au003e (Statewatch news online, April 2005).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e5. Information about the legal basis, scope, effect and procedures etc. regarding the various lists see the u003ca href=u0022/listsbground.htmlu0022u003ecomparative overviewu003c/au003e prepared by Statewatch.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e6. Iain Cameron (2003) European Anti-Terrorist Blacklisting, in Human Rights Law Review, vol. 3, no. 2. Cameron is quoted at length by Bowring and Korff (see note 1, above).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e7. Case Nos. CO/2587/2001, CO/4039/2001 and CO/878/2002 (PKK, PMOI and Nisar Ahmed), click here for u003ca href=u0022http://hei.unige.ch/~clapham/HRClass2002/NationalDecisions/UK/pkk.docu0022u003etranscriptu003c/au003e.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e8. A number of groups have taken case to the EU Courts. For annotated links to full-text documentation see u0022u003ca href=u0022/listschallenges.htmlu0022u003echallenging proscriptionu003c/au003eu0022 produced by Statewatch.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e9. The al-Barakaat case is also explained in u0022u003ca href=u0022/listschallenges.htmlu0022u003echallenging proscriptionu003c/au003eu0022.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e10. See note 6, above.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThis research was produced as part of the u0022Policy Launderingu0022 project, see: u003ca href=u0022http://www.policylaundering.org/u0022 target=u0022_parentu0022u003ehttp://www.policylaundering.org/u003c/au003eu003c/pu003e
News and documentation archive 2001-2006
u003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e November 2006 – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/nov/denmark-rebellion-conf.pdfu0022u003eCopenhagen International Conferenceu003c/au003e (agenda). Conference on anti-terrorism legislation, political rights and international solidarity, Saturday 18 November 2006: u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/nov/denmark-rebellion-declaration.pdfu0022u003edeclarationu003c/au003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e November 2006 – u003ca href=u0022http://www.kurdmedia.com/news.asp?id=13621u0022 target=u0022Frame12100u0022u003eTime for justice – end the ban on Kongra Gelu003c/au003e (kurdmedia.com, 18.11.06). A public meeting in the House of Commons on 15 November discussed the ban on Kongra Gel, a Kurdish organisation committed to entirely non-violent political change inside Turkey. Remzi Kartal, the Brussels-based European spokesman for the banned organisation was denied permission to enter the UK to attend the meeting.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e October 2006 – u003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=enu0026amp;Submit=Rechercheru0026amp;alldocs=alldocsu0026amp;docj=docju0026amp;docop=docopu0026amp;docor=docoru0026amp;docjo=docjou0026amp;numaff=C-354/04u0026amp;datefs=u0026amp;datefe=u0026amp;nomusuel=u0026amp;domaine=u0026amp;mots=u0026amp;resmax=100u0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eEU: Advocate General calls for rejection of appeal by Basque groupsu003c/au003e (AG Opinion in joined cases C-354/05 and C-355/05 P, 26 October 2006, link). The appeal concerns the inclusion of Juan Mari Olano Olano, Julen Zelarain Errasti and u0022Gestoras Pro Amnistíau0022 and Araitz Zubimendi Izaga, Aritza Galarraga and u0022Segiu0022 on the EU terrorist list.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e October 2006 – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/oct/08denmark-oproer-case.htmu0022 target=u0022Frame12100u0022u003eDanish group ‘Rebellion’ to be charged with terrorist fund-raisingu003c/au003e (report). The Danish Minister of Justice, Ms. Lene Espersen, decided on 11 October to follow the advice from the national prosecutor (Rigsadvokaten), Mr. Henning Fode, and open a case against the private association u0022Oproeru0022 for having breached the Danish anti-terror laws (u003ca href=u0022/listsrebellion.htmlu0022u003ebackgroundu003c/au003e).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e October 2006 – u003ca href=u0022http://mondediplo.com/2006/10/05baluchistanu0022 target=u0022Frame12100u0022u003ePakistan’s Baluch insurgency: A sophisticated armed fight for a province’s autonomyu003c/au003e (Selig S Harrison, Le Monde Diplomatique, link). Examines the history of the Baluch independence struggle following recent troubles in the resource rich province and the assassination of an opposition leader in August. Ben Hayes comments:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu0022Barely an eyebrow was raised when the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) was proscribed as a u0022terrorist organisationu0022 by the UK government in July 2006 [see below]. The upshot of this u0022quid pro quou0022 – a direct reward for General Musharraf’s support of the US-UK u0022war on terroru0022 – is that Britain has decreed as u0022terrorismu0022 another complex struggle against the repression of legitimate demands for autonomy. Instead of pressing Musharraf for a political settlement with the minorities, as some EU officials have done, Britain and the US have backed him with political support and F16su0022.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e October 2006 – u003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022/docs/AG-PKK.htmlu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eEU: Advocate General calls for CFI ruling on PKK to be set asideu003c/au003e (AG Opinion in Case C-229/05 P, 27 September 2006, link). The PKK was listed as u0022terrorist organisationu0022 by the EU Council in 2002. Osman Ocalan (brother of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, who is imprisoned in Turkey) brought an action against that decision on behalf of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) together with Serif Vanly, on behalf of the Kurdistan National Congress (KNK). The EU Court of First Instance dismissed the cases in February 2005 as inadmissible on the grounds that Mr Ocalan was unable to prove that he represented the PKK (he had argued that it no longer existed) and that the KNK was not individually affected by the Council’s decision to proscribe the PKK. Both applicants lodged appeals with the Court of Justice.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eIn the opinion of Advocate General Kokott, the Court of First Instance made an error of law in its assessment of the admissibility of the PKK application. It was incorrect to conclude from Mr Ocalan’s explanation that because the PKK no longer existed that he could no longer represent it and in so doing, the Court of First Instance distorted his evidence. Since the Council continued to designate the PKK a terrorist organisation, the PKK had to be entitled to bring proceedings against its corresponding inclusion on the list. In the Advocate General’s view, the Court of First Instance also made a procedural error. In view of its doubts as to whether Mr Ocalan could represent the PKK, it ought to have given him the opportunity to clarify his power of attorney. The Advocate General proposes that the Court should decide that Mr Ocalan is entitled to bring proceedings on behalf of the PKK and that his application should be referred back to the Court of First Instance for a decision on whether it is also well founded. As far as KNK is concerned, the Advocate General maintained that it was not affected by the proscription of the PKK.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eAG opinions are not binding on the Court (their role is to propose, in complete independence, a legal solution to the cases for which they are responsible) unless they are endorsed by Judges of the Court of Justice who are now beginning their deliberations in this case (Judgment will be given at a later date). But if the ECJ follows the opinion of its Advocate General the PKK will at last be able to challenge the substance of the EU decision to designate it as u0022terroristu0022. Kadek and Kongra-Gel, who are listed by the EU as aliases of the PKK, will also be able to challenge their inclusion.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe Advocate General’s opinion in the appeals bought by Basque groups and individuals (u0022SEGIu0022, u0022Gestoras Pro Amnistíau0022 and others) is due on the 26 October.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e July 2006 – u003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/press-releases/ban-terror-groupsu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eUK: first groups to be proscribed for u0022glorification of terrorismu0022; two new u0022foreign terrorist organisationsu0022 and two PKK u0022aliasesu0022 will also be bannedu003c/au003e (Home Office press release, 17.7.06, link). The Home Secretary has drafted two u0022Orders in Parliamentu0022 extending its proscription regime. The first Order will ban UK-based organisations u0022Al-Ghurabaau0022 and the u0022Saved Sectu0022, said to be u0022offshoots of Al-Muhajirounu0022, for u0022glorifying terrorismu0022. u0022Teyrebazen Azadiya Kurdistanu0022 (TAK, or the u0022Kurdistan Liberation Hawksu0022) and the u0022Baluchistan Liberation Armyu0022 (BLA), based in western Pakistan, will also be proscribed under the Order as u0022foreign terrorist organisationsu0022. The second Order adds u0022Kongra Gele Kurdistanu0022 and u0022Kadeku0022 to the UK u0022terrorist listu0022 on the grounds that they are u0022alternative names for the PKKu0022 (both have already been proscribed by the EU).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThis is the first time the new proscription provisions in the u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/mar/uk-terrorism-act-2006.pdfu0022 target=u0022Frame12100u0022u003eTerrorism Act 2006u003c/au003e (pdf) have been used by the UK government. The Act allows the proscription of u0022extremistu0022 groups for u0022glorifyingu0022 terrorism and extends proscription to u0022aliasesu0022 of organisations already listed. The draft proscription Order is subject to approval by both Houses of Parliament and will be debated in Parliament at some point in the next week. The draft Order proposing alternative names for the PKK will not be debated and will enter into force on 14 August.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e July 2006 – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/jul/ecj-terr-list-case.pdfu0022u003eTwo more cases dismissed by EU Court of First Instanceu003c/au003e (EU Court Press Release, 12.7.06, pdf). The EU Court of First Instance has dismissed Cases T-253/02 (Chafiq Ayadi v Council of the EU) and T-49/04 (Faraj Hassan v Council of the EU and European Commission). Mr. Ayadi is a Tunisian national resident in Dublin while Faraj Hassan is a Libyan national held in Brixton Prison pending extradition to Italy. Both challenged their inclusion on the UN u0022terrorist listu0022 (of supporters of Al-Qaeda or the Taleban), which is incorporated into EU law under Council Regulations. Both cases were dismissed – taking the number of unsuccessful challenges to proscription at the CFI to 8 – though there an interesting spin was put on the rights of the individuals concerned to compel their governments to raise questions in the Security Council. This so-called u0022diplomatic remedyu0022 is currently the only chance of de-listing on offer to affected individuals. Lawyers have two months to appeal to the full EU Court of Justice (5 appeals against similar CFI rulings are also pending). Ben Hayes of Statewatch comments:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003e“With respect, the repeated rulings by the CFI that being listed by the UN Security Council as a supporter or associate of Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda or the Taleban u0022does not prevent the individuals concerned from leading a satisfactory personal, family and social lifeu0022 is plainly wrong. In today’s political climate it is hard to think of a more serious allegation than being publicly branded a “terrorist” – whether by the UN, EU or national governments – never mind the crippling effect of the sanctions themselves. The fact remains that these regimes are a recipe for arbitrary, secretive and unjust decision-making. Unless procedures are introduced allowing affected parties to know and challenge the allegations against them in a court of law the “terrorist lists” will continue to lack legitimacy.”u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eSee: u003ca href=u0022/listschallenges.html#anchor507486u0022 target=u0022_selfu0022u003eChallenging proscriptionu003c/au003eu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e June 2006 – u003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=enu0026amp;Submit=Rechercheru0026amp;alldocs=alldocsu0026amp;docj=docju0026amp;docop=docopu0026amp;docor=docoru0026amp;docjo=docjou0026amp;numaff=C-266/05u0026amp;datefs=u0026amp;datefe=u0026amp;nomusuel=u0026amp;domaine=u0026amp;mots=u0026amp;resmax=100u0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eECJ Advocate General recommends rejection of Sison appeal over access to EU documentsu003c/au003e (Opinion, 22.6.06, link). The AG has recommended that Professor Jose Maria Sison’s appeal to the European Court of Justice against the EU Council’s decision to refuse access to the documents relating to his inclusion on the terrorist list should be rejected.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e June 2006 – u003ca href=u0022/listschallenges.html#anchor507486u0022u003eFour more proscription cases lodged at EU Courtu003c/au003e (cases T-135/06, T-136/06, T-137/06 and T-138/06). Lawyers representing the UK-based Sanabel Relief Agency Ltd and messrs Al-Bashir Mohammed Al-Faqih, Ghunia Abdrabba and Taher Nasuf have lodged cases challenging their inclusion on the UN u0022terrorist listu0022 (of supporters of Al-Qaeda or the Taleban) at the European Court of First Instance. This takes the total number of legal challenges to the EU/UN proscription regime to 18 (not including those cases relating to access to the relevant EU documents).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e May 2006 – u003ca href=u0022/docs/89791.pdfu0022u003eLiberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) added to EU terrorist listu003c/au003e (EU Council press release, 9974/06, 31.5.06, pdf). The formal EU decision was taken on 29 May 2006, following earlier threats to do so. The LTTE has already been proscribed by the UK, US and Canada (last month, see below). Anton Balasingham, the Tamil Tigers’ chief negotiator, commented:u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu0022Further proscriptions will invigorate the hardline [Sinhalese] elements in the south, including those in the present Sri Lankan government urging the military defeat of the LTTE and silence those advocating a negotiated solution… The more the international community alienates the LTTE, the more the LTTE will be compelled to tread a hardline individualist path.”u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eThe EU declares itself u0022fully committed to the peace process in Sri Lankau0022 and recognises that the u0022upsurge in violence is not caused by the LTTE aloneu0022. It sees no contradiction in banning the LTTE, freezing its funds and assets and prohibiting financial support while only u0022strongly urging the Sri Lankan authorities to curb violence in Government controlled areasu0022.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eSee: u003ca href=u0022http://www.ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=33296u0022u003eTamil Tigers Warn Against Possible EU Banu003c/au003e, Inter Press Service News Agency (link) u003cbr /u003e- u003ca href=u0022/docs/89790.pdfu0022u003eDeclaration by EU Presidency on proscription of LTTEu003c/au003e (9962/06, 31.5.06, pdf)u003cbr /u003e- u003ca href=u0022/docs/EUterrorlist-May-06.pdfu0022u003eUpdated EU terrorist listu003c/au003e (OJ L 144/25, 31.1.06, pdf)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e May 2006 – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/may/sison-case-en-fr-nl.pdfu0022u003eBriefing on the Jose Maria Sison caseu003c/au003e (English, French, Dutch pdf). u0022On Tuesday 30 May 2006 the Court of First Instance of the European Communities will examine the legality of the antiterrorist list adopted by the Council of the European Union in the case of Filipino professor Jose Maria Sison. Can the Ministers of the 25 European countries qualify a person as a terrorist and exclude him from economic life with neither evidence nor due process? The stake is crucial for all the defenders of fundamental rights in Europe…u0022u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eIn a separate case, Sison’s lawyers have lodged an appeal against a Court of First Instance judgment last year in which he was refused access to the documents leading up to the decision to list him as a u0022terroristu0022. The opinion of the Advocate General in this case is due on 22 June 2006 (see u003ca href=u0022/listschallenges.htmlu0022 target=u0022_selfu0022u003eChallenging proscriptionu003c/au003e)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e May 2006 – u003ca href=u0022http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/66244.htmu0022u003eLibya removed from US list of u0022state sponsors of terrorismu0022u003c/au003e (US State Department press release, 15 May 2006, link). Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced her intention to rescind Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. The decision will take effect in 45 days unless Congress objects.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/66262.htmu0022u003eWill Venezuela take its place?u003c/au003e Venezuela, meanwhile, has been designated as u0022Not Fully Cooperating with U.S. Anti-Terrorism Effortsu0022, a designation that will end all commercial arms sales to Venezuela (US State Department, 15 May 2006, link).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e April 2006 – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/apr/denmark-%27Rebellion%27-case-goes-to-supreme-court.pdfu0022u003eDanish association Oproer (‘Rebellion’) granted permission to appeal to Supreme Court against injunction over support for u0022terroristu0022 groupsu003c/au003e (Statement issued 26.4.06). The Board of Appeal of the Danish Supreme Court has granted spokesperson of the Danish association ‘Oproer’ (Rebellion), Patrick Mac Manus, permission to appeal the confiscation of the association’s international appeal to civil society groups to challenge the EU terrorist lists and show solidarity with groups like FARC and the PLFP. ‘Rebellion’s’ international appeal was removed from the association’s homepage by order of the Copenhagen Magistrate’s Court on 12 August 2005. This injunction was upheld 14 October 2005 by the High Court (see u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/feb/13denmark-rebellion.htmu0022 target=u0022_selfu0022u003ecriminal charges raised against Danish association ‘Oproer’ (Rebellion)u003c/au003e). The Danish Board of Appeal grants permission of appeal to the Supreme Court only in cases involving fundamental legal or constitutional principles. The association ‘Rebellion’ has argued that the confiscation of its international appeal is in conflict with both paragraph 77 of the Danish Constitution “prohibiting the re-introduction of censorship at any time”, and the European Declaration of Human Rights, Article 10, on freedom of expression. Moreover, the lower courts had in their injunctions merely made reference to the ‘terrorist list’ of the European Union, without in any way assessing the legal validity of such a list in the Danish legal system.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e April 2006 – u003ca href=u0022http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=59514675-9026-492d-828c-06c6e0fd33a2u0026amp;k=28254u0022 target=u0022_selfu0022u003eCanada adds u0022Tamil Tigersu0022 to its terrorist listu003c/au003e (Canada National Post, 10.4.06 (link)). The new Conservative Canadian government has proscribed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam as a u0022terroristu0022 organisation. Stockwell Day, the Public Safety Minister, said the move was u0022long overdue” and u0022sends a signal to the (Tamil) community and right across the country that the government will not tolerate terrorism or terrorist activities”. The Tamil Tigers have long been proscribed in the UK and US and the EU has recently threatened to follow suit.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e February 2006 – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/feb/13denmark-rebellion.htmu0022 target=u0022_selfu0022u003eDocuments confiscated and criminal charges raised against Danish association ‘Oproer’ (Rebellion)u003c/au003e (Statement issued 25.2.06). Police authorities have ordered the removal of the international appeal for solidarity with proscripted organisations from the association ‘Rebellion’ from the web sites of a Danish parliamentary party, a left daily newspaper and a socialist youth group. ‘Rebellion’ is charged with transferring approximately 14000 Euro to the resistance movements FARC (Colombia) and PFLP (Palestine) in October 2004. The second charge concerns a statement on Danish television on 1 August 2005 by a spokesperson for ‘Rebellion’, Patrick Mac Manus, announcing that the association was in the process of collecting further funds in support of organisations on the EU ‘terrorist list’, and that it had issued an international appeal to democratic and solidarity organisations in the European Union urging them to similarly challenge national anti-terrorist legislation and the EU ‘terrorist list’. Both charges have been raised personally aginst the spokesperson, Patrick Mac Manus, and not against the association as such.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eSee also u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/aug/06denmark.htmu0022u003eRaids and arrests against solidarity organisation for u0022terroristu0022 fund-raisingu003c/au003e (Statewatch News Online, 20.8.05).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e February 2006 – u003ca href=u0022http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0%2C%2C329413592-117700%2C00.htmlu0022 target=u0022_selfu0022u003eCommons agree u0022glorificationu0022 offence – u0022extremistu0022 groups to be banned?u003c/au003e (link: Guardian, 16.2.06) The creation of a new offence of glorifying terrorism (by a vote of 327 to 279) will extend proscription beyond groups accused of direct involvement in terrorist activity to groups u0022extremistu0022 groups accused of u0022glorifyingu0022 terrorism. Announcing the Bill in August 2005, Tony Blair suggested that Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun were likely to banned on these grounds.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e February 2006 – u003ca href=u0022http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0%2C%2C5395150-111026%2C00.htmlu0022 target=u0022_selfu0022u003eUK Libyans listed by UN claim innocenceu003c/au003e (link: Guardian, 9.2.06) Five men based in the Midlands in the UK have had their assets frozen after being listed by the United Nations security council. Three related property companies and a Birmingham-based charity were also proscribed.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eSee also u003ca href=u0022http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/pdflist.pdfu0022u003elatest UN listu003c/au003e (pdf, updated 6 February 2006).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e January 2006 – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/jan/norway-EU-terror-list-5jan2006.pdfu0022 target=u0022_selfu0022u003eNorway pulls out of EU terrorist listsu003c/au003e (Press release: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5.1.06). The Norwegian government has decided it will u0022no longer align itself with any other [terrorist] list than that published by the UNu0022 (Norway is not an EU Member State but participates in various aspects of EU police and judicial cooperation and security policy). The explanation is that continued participation u0022could cause difficulties for Norway in its role as neutral facilitator in u0022certain peace processesu0022. Norway has facilitated negotiations in Sri Lanka, Sudan, Guatemala and Palestine – it is the EU’s proscription of Hamas and other Palestinian groups that is most compromising.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e January 2006 – u003ca href=u0022/listschallenges.htmlu0022 target=u0022_selfu0022u003eTwo more appeals to EU Court of Justiceu003c/au003e The Judgment of the EU Court of First Instance in cases T-306/01 and T-315/01 of September 2005 has been appealed to the ECJ (see cases C-402/05: Kadi v Commission and Council and C-415/05: Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council). See also u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/sep/10terrorlists.htmu0022u003eCFI Judgment of 2005u003c/au003e.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e December 2005 – u003ca href=u0022http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/87838.pdfu0022 target=u0022_selfu0022u003eEU: Addition to list of foreign terrorist groupsu003c/au003e (EU Council press release, 23.12.05). The group u0022Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF)u0022 was added to the list.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eSee also: u003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_340/l_34020051223en00800084.pdfu0022u003econsolidated EU listu003c/au003e of 45 individuals and 47 groups (Official Journal)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e November 2005 – u003ca href=u0022http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/87236.pdfu0022 target=u0022_selfu0022u003eEU: Addition to list of foreign terrorist groupsu003c/au003e (EU Council press release, 30.11.05). The group u0022Hizbul Mujahideenu0022 was added to the list.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eSee also: u003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_314/l_31420051130en00410045.pdfu0022u003econsolidated EU listu003c/au003e of 45 individuals and 47 groups (Official Journal)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e November 2005 – u003ca href=u0022/FitchAlexander.pdfu0022 target=u0022_selfu0022u003eReport on the criminalisation of Turkish-Kurds in Britainu003c/au003e (6 September 2005), by Alexander John Fitch. Looks at how the discourse on u0022terrorismu0022 has served to criminalise marginalised communities by examining the situation of Kurds in Britain.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e October 2005 – u003ca href=u0022http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st13/st13469.en05.pdfu0022 target=u0022_selfu0022u003eEU: Addition to list of foreign terrorist groupsu003c/au003e (EU Council press release, 18.10.05). The Communist Party of the Philippines, which includes the New Peoples Army (already listed), linked to Jose Maria Sison (who is also already listed), was added to the list.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e October 2005 – u003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/terrorism-act/proscribed-groupsu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eUK: 15 groups added to list of u0022international terrorist organisationsu0022u003c/au003e (Home Office website, 14 October 2005)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e September 2005 – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/sep/10terrorlists.htmu0022u003eEU: First judgments in challenges to EU implementation of UN terrorist listsu003c/au003e (Statewatch News Online, 21.9.05). The lower EU court, the Court of First Instance, has finally ruled in cases T-306/01 and T-315/01, rejecting the challenges in both cases. The applicants may appeal to the EU Court of Justice within two months.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e August 2005 – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/aug/06denmark.htmu0022u003eDenmark: Raids and arrests against solidarity organisation for u0022terroristu0022 fund-raisingu003c/au003e (Statewatch News Online, 20.8.05). On 9 August 2005 Patrick Mac Manus, spokesperson for the Danish solidarity association Oproer (Rebellion) was arrested and charged with attempting to u0022directly or indirectly collect funds for a group or organisation which has the intent of committing terrorist actionsu0022. The charge is related to a TV news interview broadcast on 1 August in which Mr. Mac Manus announced the launch of an international appeal by Oproer to European democratic organisations and solidarity movements urging them to challenge national anti-terrorism legislation and the EU u0022terrorist listsu0022.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e August 2005 – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/aug/02pm-terror-statement.htmu0022u003eUK to extend proscription from u0022terroristu0022 to u0022extremistu0022 groups?u003c/au003e (statement by Tony Blair, 5.08.05). The prime minister has announced his intention to proscribe u0022Hizb-ut-Tahriru0022 and any successor organisations to u0022al-Muhajirounu0022, widening the scope for proscription with new legislation in the autumn if necessary. Hizb-ut-Tahrir is a political organisation that has been committed to non-violence for 50 years and it would be without precedent to proscribe such an organisation. Shami Chakrabarti, Director of Liberty, suggests it is u0022unwise to emulate the banning tendencies of Middle Eastern regimes that radicalised generations of dissenters by similar policiesu0022 (u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/aug/shami-chakrabarti-Guardian.pdfu0022u003eGuardian, 8 August 2005u003c/au003e).u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e July 2005 – u003ca href=u0022/terroritst-lists-prel.pdfu0022u003eEU terrorist lists extended to 13 non-EU members-statesu003c/au003e (pdf, EU Press release, 11473/05, 29 July 2005). Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Croatia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the FYR Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, Ukraine and Moldova are to u0022ensure that their national policies conformu0022 with the EU rules.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e June 2005 – u003ca href=u0022/terroritst-lists-prel.pdfu0022u003eStatewatch, the Campaign Against Criminalising Communities and the Human Rights and Social Justice Institute launch Observatory on the u0022terrorist listsu0022u003c/au003e (Statewatch press release, 29 June 2005, pdf)u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e June 2005 – u003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/jun/08spain-terr-charges-dismissed.htmu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eSpanish court dismisses terrorism charges against Basque youth associationsu003c/au003e (Statewatch news online, 21 June 2005). The organisations Jarrai, Haika and Segi – all of whom are on the EU’s u0022terroristu0022 list – were accused of membership of a terrorist organisation (ETA). The charges were dismissed.u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e June 2005 – u003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0%2C3858%2C5214146-103681%2C00.htmlu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eHizbullah appeals to UK over banu003c/au003e (The Guardian (link) 13 June 2005)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e June 2005 – u003ca href=u0022http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st09/st09995.en05.pdfu0022u003ePKK appeals EU proscription to European Court of Justiceu003c/au003e (pdf, EU Council doc. 9995/05, 9 June 2005)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e June 2005 – u003ca href=u0022http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/IOR610132005ENGLISH/$File/IOR6101305.pdfu0022u003eAmnesty International calls for review of u0022terroristu0022 list legislationu003c/au003e (see AI EU report: u0022Human rights dissolving at the borders? Counter-terrorism and EU criminal lawu0022, pdf, 31 May 2005, see pp. 11-15)u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e May 2005 – u003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/national_security/counter-terrorism/Entities_e.aspu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eCanada proscribes PMOI, Kahane Chai and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – bringing total to 38u003c/au003e (link to Canadian gov’t site; department of Emergency Preparedness press release, 24 May 2005.u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e April 2005 – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/may/ecj-sison1.pdfu0022u003eCourt of First instance rules against Sison access to documentsu003c/au003e (Judgment, pdf).u003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e Febraury 2005 – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/feb/bb-dk-joint-paper.pdfu0022u003eTerrorist Designation with Regard to European and International Law: The Case of the PMOIu003c/au003e (pdf) Joint Opinion by Prof. Bill Bowring, Director of Human Rights and Social Justice Research Institute, London Metropolitan University and Prof. Douwe Korff, Professor of International Law, London Metropolitan University.u003cbr /u003e u003cbr /u003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e 2004u003cbr /u003e u003cbr /u003eNovember – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/nov/02sison.htmu0022u003eProfessor Sison case on access to documents goes to courtu003cbr /u003eu003c/au003eJune – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/jun/01terrlists.htmu0022u003eEU list updatedu003cbr /u003eu003c/au003eApril – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/apr/03terrlists.htmu0022u003eEU list updatedu003c/au003eu003cbr /u003eu003cbr /u003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e 2003u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eDecember – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/dec/19terrlists.htmu0022u003eEU list updatedu003cbr /u003eu003c/au003eSeptember – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/sep/08terrlists.htmu0022u003eEU list updatedu003c/au003eu003cbr /u003eJune – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/jun/28terrlists.htmu0022u003eEU list updatedu003c/au003eu003cbr /u003eApril – u0022u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/apr/18funrights.htmlu0022u003eExperts on Fundamental Rights highly critical of EU response to 11 Septemberu003c/au003eu0022 (including the EU terrorist lists)u003cbr /u003e u003cbr /u003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e 2002u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eDecember – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/dec/09list.htmu0022u003eEU list updatedu003c/au003eu003cbr /u003eOctober – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/oct/16list.htmu0022u003eEU list updatedu003cbr /u003eu003c/au003eOctober – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/oct/10sison.htmu0022u003eCampaign launched to defend Professor Sisonu003c/au003eu003cbr /u003eSeptember/October – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/oct/11sweden.htmlu0022u003eu0022Arbitraryu0022 EU anti-terrorist laws tested by Swedish Young Leftu003c/au003e u003cbr /u003eJune – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/jun/13terrlist.htmu0022u003eEU list updatedu003c/au003eu003cbr /u003eMay – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/may/12terrlist.htmu0022u003eUK has a dominating influence over the composition of EU’s terorrist listu003cbr /u003eu003c/au003eMay – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/may/04pkk.htmu0022u003eStatewatch commentary on the updating of the EU’s terrorist listu003cbr /u003eu003c/au003eApril – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/apr/03somalia.htmu0022u003eUSA puts three Swedish citizens on UN terrorist listu003c/au003eu003cbr /u003eJanuary – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/jan/02euterr.htmu0022u003eEU agrees first list of u0022terroristsu0022u003c/au003eu003cbr /u003e u003cbr /u003eu003cimg src=u0022/spyglass.gifu0022 border=u00220u0022 alt=u0022u0022 width=u002230u0022 height=u002234u0022 align=u0022BOTTOMu0022 /u003e 2001u003cbr /u003e u003cbr /u003eOctober – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/oct/03finance.htmu0022u003eStatewatch report on draft Regulation for EU terrorist listu003cbr /u003eu003c/au003eOctober – u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/oct/01proscribed.htmu0022u003eStatewatch analysis of the UK’s process of proscribing organisations under the Terrorism Actu003c/au003eu003c/pu003e
Links
u003cpu003eTHE STATEu003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eEuropean Unionu003c/pu003ernu003culu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn/2003-04/04rn63.pdfu0022u003eEU Common Foreign and Security Policyu003c/au003e: Consolidated list of persons, groups and entities subject to EU financial sanctionsu003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/terrorism/index_en.htmu0022u003eEuropean Commissionu003c/au003e: Terrorism homepageu003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn/2003-04/04rn63.pdfu0022u003eEuropean Union in the USu003c/au003e: Preventing the financing of terrorism and of certain foreign regimes: European Commission and European banks establish u0022electronic-consolidated targeted financial sanctions list (E-CTFSL)u0022u003c/liu003ernu003c/ulu003ernu003cpu003eUnited Kingdomu003c/pu003ernu003culu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/u0022u003eHome Office u0026gt; Terrorism and the lawu003c/au003eu003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page70.htmlu0022u003eMI5 resource on UK Anti-Terrorism legislationu003c/au003eu003c/liu003ernu003c/ulu003ernu003cpu003eUnited Nationsu003c/pu003ernu003culu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn/2003-04/04rn63.pdfu0022u003eUN Security Councilu003c/au003eu003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htmu0022u003eUN 1267 committeeu003c/au003e (List of individuals and entities belonging to or associated with the Taliban and al-Qaida organisation as established and maintained by Security Council sub-committee)u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/u0022u003eUN u00221373 Committeeu0022u003c/au003e (UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee)u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.un.org/terrorism/u0022u003eUN Action Against Terrorismu003c/au003eu003c/liu003ernu003c/ulu003ernu003cpu003eUnited Statesu003c/pu003ernu003culu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/u0022u003eDepartment of Homeland Securityu003c/au003eu003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.state.gov/s/ct/u0022u003eState department: Counterterrorism Officeu003c/au003eu003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn/2003-04/04rn63.pdfu0022u003eTreasury: Office of terrorism and financial intelligenceu003c/au003eu003c/liu003ernu003c/ulu003ernu003cpu003eOther statesu003c/pu003ernu003culu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurityhome.nsf/Page/Listing_of_Terrorist_Organisationsu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eNational Security Australia: Listing of Terrorist Organisationsu003c/au003e (see also u003ca href=u0022http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn/2003-04/04rn63.pdfu0022u003eThe politics of proscription in Australiau003c/au003e, Australian Parliamentary Library Research Note (June 2004))u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/national_security/counter-terrorism/Entities_e.aspu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003ePublic Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada: Listed entitiesu003c/au003eu003c/liu003ernu003c/ulu003ernu003cpu003eu0022CIVIL SOCIETYu0022u003c/pu003ernu003cpu003eGroups and NGOsu003c/pu003ernu003culu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.cacc.org.uk/u0022u003eCAMPACC: Campaign Against Criminalising Communitiesu003c/au003eu003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/observatory2.htmu0022u003eStatewatch: Observatory on u0022September 11u0022 and civil libertiesu003c/au003eu003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.i-cams.org/u0022u003eICAMS: International Campaign Against Mass Surveillanceu003c/au003eu003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.irr.org.uk/security/index.htmlu0022u003eIRR News: National Securityu003c/au003eu003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity/NationalSecuritylist.cfm?c=111u0022u003eACLU: Terrorism and Emergency Powersu003c/au003eu003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.privacyinternational.org/terrorismu0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003ePrivacy International: Anti-terrorism home pageu003c/au003eu003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://web.amnesty.org/web/content.nsf/pages/gbrsep11crisisu0022u003eAmnesty International: u0022justice not revenge: 11 September crisisu0022u003c/au003eu003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.ehwatch.org/u0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eEHwatchu003c/au003e (Euskal Herria Watch: Observatory on legal proceedings against Basque groups)u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca rel=u0022noopeneru0022 href=u0022http://www.opror.net/u0022 target=u0022_blanku0022u003eu0022Rebellionu0022u003c/au003e: a Danish solidarity organisationu003c/liu003ernu003c/ulu003ernu003cpu003eCritical analysisu003c/pu003ernu003culu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.cacc.org.uk/articles.htmlu0022u003eCAMPACC: articles and information on the UK Anti-Terrorism Actsu003c/au003eu003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/may/03ifj-statewatch.htmu0022u003eIFJ/Statewatch: Journalism, civil liberties and the war on terrorismu003c/au003e (May 2005)u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/feb/bb-dk-joint-paper.pdfu0022u003eTerrorist Designation with Regard to European and International Law: The Case of the PMOIu003c/au003e (pdf) Joint Opinion by Prof. Bill Bowring and Prof. Douwe Korff, Professor of International Law, London Metropolitan University, November 2003.u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/jan/02euterr.htmu0022u003eThe EU’s Common Positions on terrorism – an absence of legal and democratic accountabilityu003c/au003e, Statewatch News online (January 2002)u003c/liu003ernu003c/ulu003ernu003cpu003eHuman rights and counter-terrorismu003c/pu003ernu003culu003ernu003cliu003eCouncil of Europe: u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/jun/coe-uk-report.pdfu0022u003eReport by Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, on his visit to the United Kingdomu003c/au003e (June 2005, pdf)u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eAmnesty International report: u003ca href=u0022http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/IOR610132005ENGLISH/$File/IOR6101305.pdfu0022u003eHuman rights dissolving at the borders? Counter-terrorism and EU criminal lawu003c/au003e (May 2005, pdf)u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022/listEUexperts.htmlu0022u003eu0022Thematic Report on counter-terrorismu0022u003c/au003e, from EU Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights (March 2003). See also u003ca href=u0022http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/apr/CFR-CDF.ThemComment1.pdfu0022u003efull Thematic Reportu003c/au003e (pdf).u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_rights/cddh/3._Committees/08._Other_Committees_and_Working_Groups/02._Terrorism_%28DH-S-TER%29/02._Documents/02._Working_Documents/2002/H%282002%29004%20E%20Guidelines.asp#TopOfPageu0022u003eCouncil of Europe: Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorismu003c/au003e (July 2002)u003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/terrorism/rapporteur/index.htmu0022u003eUN Sub-Commission on the promotion and protection of human rightsu003c/au003e: Special Rapporteur on human rights and terrorismu003c/liu003ernu003cliu003eu003ca href=u0022http://www.un.org/terrorism/ecosoc.htmu0022u003eResolutions on terrorism of the UN Commission on Human Rightsu003c/au003eu003c/liu003ernu003c/ulu003e