Less than two years after the fall of the Assad regime, Syria has been added to a list of over a dozen countries with dedicated EU “action files”. Two versions of the files obtained by Statewatch via a freedom of information request show a considerable focus on increasing deportations, with hints at future ambitions to restrict migration from Syria.
The files are monitored by the Operational Coordination Mechanism on the External Dimension of Migration (MOCADEM), a working committee of the Council of the EU in Brussels. Its primary aim is for EU member state representatives to coordinate actions affecting the “external dimension” of migration. This relates to EU-funded actions and programmes affecting mobility outside the EU’s territory. It also covers issues such as deportations and humanitarian support for people affected by displacement.
The EU assigns “action files” to countries where it wants member states to coordinate their actions to make them most effective in shaping migration policies it finds favourable. In other words, an action file is a sign the EU is focussing its resources on preventing people in that country from moving towards Europe. This is combined with sending as many people back as possible.
Both versions of the Syria action file obtained by Statewatch are heavily redacted. The first version, described as the “new” action file, was produced on 22 May 2026. The second version of the action file was produced for a meeting of member state delegations on 26 June. Aside from a list of individual member state actions in Syria, which only appears in the latter file, and a few small differences in redaction, the two files are identical.
The EU takes first steps in migration cooperation with Syria
Since the fall of former President Bashar al-Assad, the EU has moved quickly to re-establish cooperation with Syria, notably lifting its suspension of the overarching cooperation agreement between Syria and the EU and establishing diplomatic relations with Syria’s transitional authorities. As the action file shows, working with Syria on migration and border matters is a priority for the EU. This is reflected in the myriad spending programmes at the union and member state-level, adding up to hundreds of millions of euros over the next few years.
The relationship with the transitional authorities in Syria is still new and the EU’s current programmes are somewhat limited. In comparison, action files for countries such as Libya, Mauritania and Senegal reveal a lot of cooperation, with extensive on-the-ground anti-migration programmes.
For now, the Syria file reveals just one focus area for the EU: deportations.
Since 2015, the presence of hundreds of thousands of Syrians in Europe has been a politically loaded issue. It is no surprise therefore that increasing the amount of Syrians who leave Europe voluntarily or by force is high on the EU’s agenda.
Much reference is made in this action file, for instance, to spending programmes under the EU’s €139m ‘special measure’ support programme for Syria. One of the key stated aims of the programme is the creation of “the conditions for the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of Syrian refugees”. Aims for creating such conditions include increasing political stability, improving governance, providing infrastructure support and improving economic conditions in the country.
There are also financing programmes to help neighbouring countries facilitate the departure of Syrians from their territories. A €95m programme, running from 2025 to the end of 2028, supports “voluntary” returns from Turkey, while similar programmes are mentioned in Lebanon and Jordan, worth tens of millions of euros at least between them.
‘Voluntary returns’ vs deportations
In this document, “returns” are generally framed as voluntary – and it should be noted that over a million displaced Syrians have indeed voluntarily made their way back to Syria since the fall of the Assad regime. Nonetheless, the voluntary nature of returns facilitated by the EU and other countries is a highly contested subject. Previous reports by Statewatch reveal an absence of safeguards and independent oversight for ‘voluntary returns’ procedures conducted by Frontex, the EU borders agency.
At the same time, many EU member states have expressed their desire to begin forcibly deporting Syrians from Europe, something that has already begun to happen. There are oblique references to forced deportations within the action file, such as discussions held with Syria’s transitional authorities “on all types of returns”.
Hints of externalisation to come: ‘Team Europe’ in Syria
Alongside deportations, the Syria action file also reveals plans to exert influence over Syria’s migration governance in the future. This includes a €14m “Syria Technical Assistance Hub”, operated via the EUs “Team Europe Initiatives” (TEI) development programme.
The TEIs are umbrella projects bringing together the EU’s and member states’ various external action tools (the External Action Service, the multi-billion euro ‘Global Gateway’ funding instrument, the European Investment Bank and Bank for Reconstruction and Development, member state development agencies, etc.) to create a coordinated approach in a foreign country.
When it comes to migration, and particularly irregular migration, this coordinated approach is used to persuade other countries to adopt EU-friendly policies, such as preventing people leaving their territories or taking back people deported from Europe. While the EU often pursues these goals using coercion or leverage, it prefers an appearance of consensus, cloaking its influence in the language of “technical assistance” and “capacity-building”.
The “Technical Assistance Hub” to be opened in Syria will likely help serve this purpose. A job advert for a Senior Advisor at the hub specifies that it aims to provide assistance on governance and other issues at the request of the Syrian government, and will be implemented by five European development agencies: GIZ (Germany), Expertise France, AICS (Italy), the British Council and ENABEL (Belgium). These development agencies often serve as implementing partners for the EU’s externalisation projects.
Other noticeable hallmarks of the EU’s externalisation strategy – i.e. its influence over border policies well beyond its own territory – include references to “High Level Political Dialogue” on coordinating migration policies. The document also refers to support for capacity-building and governance reform “aligned with EU interests”. EU officials are urged to “underscore the importance of disrupting smuggling networks” when dealing with Syrian authorities, as well as making the most of existing diplomatic infrastructure and member states’ “long-standing presences on the ground in Syria” to pursue migration cooperation. More explicitly, there is a reference (redacted in the May version of the action file) to:
“targeted technical exchanges with the Syrian transitional authorities to assess immediate operational needs for border management, focusing on enhancing surveillance capabilities, countering human smuggling and trafficking networks, and setting up reliable communication channels on irregular migration routes and border security challenges.”
Individual member state actions in Syria
Alongside union-level efforts, there are 26 individual member state “actions”, or funding programmes in Syria and neighbouring countries. These actions address aid for refugees, displacement, humanitarian needs, stabilisation in Syria and facilitating the “return” of people to Syria.
Fourteen of the 26 actions listed include budgets, adding up to more than €228m in total, with most running for three to four years. The largest donor countries appear to be Germany and France. Denmark is reported as spending €2m on projects addressing, among other themes, border management and migration governance including technical and managerial training for Syrian officials. The Netherlands appears to have similarly focussed programmes, but no budgets are specified. Sweden, Estonia and the Czech Republic are also represented.
It is not a surprise that the EU has opened an externalisation action file on Syria, considering the legacy of the events of 2015/2016 and the last decade of migration politics in Europe. The political situation in Syria is precarious, with plenty of space for outside influence. EU policymakers undoubtedly see this is an opportunity to try to embed its influence deep within the country’s governance structures. Considering the coordinated approach of the MOCADEM committee, and the hundreds of billions of euros reserved for external spending in the next EU budget, it is likely Syria’s action file is only going to get longer.
