Bulletins

Outsourcing Borders: Bulletin 20

This issue shows the EU spending hundreds of millions of euros on migration control in Mauritania, and a Frontex social media monitoring plan
Download
This issue shows the EU spending hundreds of millions of euros on migration control in Mauritania, and a Frontex social media monitoring plan

“We are talking about opportunities for a new chance for irregular migrants” —
Denmark’s migration minister on return hubs in Rwanda

Border management

‘Human rights-based’ approaches to border externalisation

At the 15 July meeting of the External Aspects of Asylum and Migration Working Party (EMWP), delegates were shown presentations from the Irish Presidency of the Council of the EU and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on a “human rights-based approach to migration” (HRBA) and invited to discuss.

The HRBA concept has been around in EU circles for a long time. It appears to be largely a matter of optics and gentle ‘reminders’ to partners rather than anything concrete. As mentioned in a previous edition of this bulletin, the HRBA approach includes instructing EU civil servants to simply mention “human rights” more in internal documents.

With regards to externalisation matters such as return hubs, the annotated agenda for the meeting states that ‘embedding’ human rights into the architecture of its externalisation projects “provides legitimacy to the EU’s work in this area”.

The accompanying discussion document repeats the often-invoked idea that return hub deals may only be agreed with non-EU countries that respect international human rights and non-refoulement standards. It also reminds delegates that the successful implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum will depend “on our work in the external dimension in establishing and maintaining partnerships with key countries of origin and transit and in ensuring all fundamental rights safeguards are implemented”.

The language suggests that delegates are being reminded by the Presidency that the EU needs to show as much as it can its efforts to ensure human rights compliance, in order to maintain the “legitimacy” of externalisation projects such as return hubs.

External migration committee discusses crisis in Sudan

A presidency paper on the “Migratory and displacement situation in Sudan”, presented to the same meeting of the EMWP, gives an overview of the state of the conflict as of 6 July 2026. The paper notes that the conflict “shows few signs of a peaceful resolution” and offers various statistics and analysis.

More interesting than the analysis itself are the questions asked to delegates at the end of the paper. Having made mention of the conflict contributing to “further migratory flows, including to Europe”, it invites delegates to discuss: how regional cooperation can be enhanced to, among other goals, “avoid further international migratory pressures”; how best to anticipate and mitigate risks that might increase those pressures; how “whole-of-route” approaches may aid “stability” in the Sudan region; and how deportations to Sudan can be continued.

Expanded social media monitoring to reinforce ‘migration situational awareness’

A presidency paper, “Reinforcing the EU’s migration situational awareness and early warning capabilities, including during crisis situations” was presented to delegates at a meeting of permanent representatives on 23 September 2026.

Seemingly drafted in response to the events in Ceuta in late July and August, this paper explores the perceived impact social media has on migratory trends, with a particular focus on ‘misinformation’:

“The spread of false or misleading information, amplified by algorithms and automated accounts, poses a growing threat to security and stability.”

The paper recommends building on existing efforts to collect and analyse data to forecast trends and combat misinformation. These efforts have so far been led by agencies such as Frontex, Europol and the EU Asylum Agency, with data feeding into the Commission’s Migration Preparedness and Crisis Blueprint network.

In particular, the paper recommends increasing social media monitoring as an “early-warning tool” and mentions ongoing efforts to pressure social networks into compliance under the Digital Services Act. On top of these efforts, the authors of the paper also envision an expanded role for Frontex and Europol in this regard, making mention of the upcoming mandate reviews and potential for adding “an explicit and sufficiently circumscribed legal basis for the different types of social media monitoring related to migration and migrant smuggling”.

A full analysis of the document and implications for the Frontex and Europol mandate reviews will soon be on the Statewatch site.

Budgets and funding

Mauritania Team Europe Initiatives funding

In response to a Statewatch freedom of information request, the European Commission has released a series of documents related to spending projects in Mauritania. These projects fall under the Mauritania component of the Team Europe Initiative for a “comprehensive approach to Migration on the Atlantic/Western Mediterranean route”.

“Team Europe” is an umbrella approach taken by the EU to external spending, particularly regarding development programmes in the Global South. The basic aim of the initiatives is to harmonise and coordinate EU and member state-level spending. These initiatives cover various themes, including migration, and focus on both individual countries and regional migration routes.

The documents related to Mauritania give an insight into the money being spent there to “address root causes” of migration and limit mobility towards Europe.

Taken together, the individual projects (the majority of which appear to still be running, have very recently ended or are yet to commence) appear to total at least €265m in EU and member state funds, accounting for potential budget item duplication. This figure does not include the €180m spent in Mauritania under the ‘MPRR Migrants Protection, Return and Reintegration’ programme, or the €44m spent under the African Peace Facility.

Many of the projects directly address migration control in Mauritania, with tens of millions at least in “support” to Mauritania’s security and border forces. Some of the projects aim at economic development and job creation, ostensibly to address the ‘root causes’ of migration. A few others appear only tangentially related, such as projects on digitalisation, blue economy and green energy.

The full Mauritania spending document is available on the Statewatch site. Highlights related to externalisation include:

  • “Pro-Nexus” – €8.1m “to promote the socio-economic inclusion of refugees, asylum seekers, and vulnerable members of host communities” as well as an apparent further €8m for “refugee inclusion and resilient host communities in Mauritania.” Both Pro-Nexus projects are undated and are implemented by the German development agency GIZ as well as UNHCR.
  • “Appui à la surveillance des frontières maritimes” (support for maritime border surveillance) – an as-yet undefined project worth €25m.
  • “TAWAFOUG” – a €20m “integrated territorial approach” targeting refugees and host communities, implemented by Action contre la Faim, Save the Children Spain and Terre des Hommes Lausanne. Funded via the NDICI AFRICA flexible mechanism.
  • “Appui financier FSI” (financial support to internal security forces) -a €10.39m “direct aid” package for Mauritanian forces “involved in the fight against irregular immigration”. The project is undated but appears to be an annual payment.
  • “Renforcement de la gestion des frontières terrestres et maritimes” (reinforcement of land and maritime border management) – a €6.37m project implemented by the IOM and the Mauritanian interior ministry, 2024-2027.
  • “Renforcement de la gouvernance des migrations” (reinforcing migration governance) – Two projects, for €5.5m and €4.5m each, implemented by the IOM, 2024-2027. There is another €5m project with the same title, for development of Mauritania’s national migration strategy, 2024-2029.
  • “KARAMA” – €4m from the project for “durable solutions for displaced populations in Africa” via Action contre la Faim and UNHCR, 2023-2026.
  • “Appui au Secrétariat de la Déclaration de Niamey” (support to the secretariat of the Niamey Declaration) – €2.05m support package for the fight against human trafficking and smuggling, implemented by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2024-2026.
  • “Réussir ensemble en Mauritanie” (succeed together in Mauritania) – €1.5m component for counter-migration ‘information’ campaigns, implemented by the International Organisation for Migration, 2024-2027.
  • “Migration Intelligence Services Partnership to foster Euro-Africa Cooperation (MISPEAC)” – a €1.75m anti-migrant smuggling project covering The Gambia, Senegal, Mauritania and Mali and implemented by the Spanish intelligence agency, the National Intelligence Centre, 2024-2026.
  • “GAR-SI” – part of a larger project to equip national security forces in the Sahel region for migration control. This €3.5m component involves the creation of a third unit on Mauritania’s southern border, as well as improving operations for the first two units. Implemented by the Spanish FIIAP development agency, 2024-2027.

Further documents related to the Team Europe Initiatives in Mauritania will be analysed and published on the Statewatch site in the coming weeks.

Deportation and readmission

Progress on promoting ‘voluntary’ deportations

A presidency discussion paper on “promoting voluntary return and reintegration” was presented to the 2 July meeting of the Working Party on Integration, Migration and Expulsion (IMEX Expulsion).

The document first recites familiar material on effective return rates and the preferability of “voluntary” returns. It then goes on to note that the “visibility of forced returns” appears to have contributed to an “upward trend” of people subject to removal orders opting for ‘voluntary’ returns rather than being subjected to the violence of forced deportation.

It also reports that ‘voluntary’ returns to the ten common priority third countries for return (redacted in this document) have been low, and reports ongoing dialogue and threats of punitive visa sanctions being used to try to increase them.

It goes on to update delegates on the European Reintegration Programme, and suggests promoting mixed charter flights with ‘voluntary’ returnees and deportees onboard as a “potential area for operational growth”.

Frontex presents deportation scorecard for first half of 2026

Frontex presented its half-yearly report “Implementation of Frontex activities in the field of return” to the 2 July IMEX Expulsion meeting. In it, the agency reports overseeing 11,410 forced deportations and 21,065 ‘voluntary’ returns in the first half of 2026. The presentation also reports on how the conflict between the US/Israel and Iran has impacted deportations, estimating that over 2,000 people were not deported due to cancelled charter or scheduled flights.

Frontex cooperation with third countries

In June 2026, Frontex presented its 2025 report on cooperation with third countries.

In his foreword, Executive Director Hans Leijtens noted the agency’s “closer relations with Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan”. He also described cooperation in West Africa as a priority, mentioning in particular Cabo Verde, Senegal, Mauritania, the Gambia and Nigeria.

Items of note from the report include:

  • The agency reports a newly “Fully-fledged operational presence” in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  • As part of the EU4BorderSecurity Project, the agency delivered “workshops, trainings and capacity building through transfer of light technical equipment” to ‘Southern Neighbourhood’ partners. Frontex also “intensified dialogue” with Egyptian authorities and “supported EU re-engagement efforts” in Libya.
  • Regarding Egypt in particular, the agency reported the “important milestone” of two bilateral activities on document fraud and human trafficking detection.
  • In Lebanon, Frontex provided “technical equipment for supporting search and rescue activities” at sea, as well as capacity-building and training.
  • The agency reports cooperation with Cabo Verde on “the launch of aerial surveillance to increase situational awareness over the Atlantic.”
  • In Mauritania, Frontex reports the planning of a technical meeting on coast guard functions, and work on negotiations for a Working Arrangement. The possibility of cooperation on search and rescue exercises and workshops was also discussed.
  • The report notes the deployment of a Liaison Officer to Morocco in December 2025 as “marking a new milestone towards closer and more structured cooperation with Moroccan authorities.”
  • The agency has expanded EUROSUR cooperation with Cabo Verde, Ukraine, Moldova and The Gambia. The goal of this expanded cooperation is to “collectively establish and visualise a near-to-real-time situational picture related to irregular migration and cross-border crime.” Similar work is ongoing with the UK.
  • Frontex delivered “awareness sessions on EUROSUR” to representatives of Lebanon, Iraq, Pakistan and Armenia.
  • Meetings of the Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community (AFIC) are reported through 2025, providing the “possibility for sharing intelligence and tackling cross-border crime, including human trafficking and irregular migration.”

Other statistics of note include:

  • The top ten countries of return in 2025 were, in order: Turkey (9970 people), Syria (5911), Georgia (5184), Colombia (2747), Albania (2493), Iraq (2395), Brazil (1806), Nigeria (1777), Moldova (1774), and India (1750).
  • Ten European Return Liaison Officers were deployed at the end of 2025, covering Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Vietnam, Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Egypt, the DRC, Congo, Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and The Gambia.
  • At the end of 2025, the Frontex Liaison Officer (FLO) network covered Turkey, Albania, North Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Senegal, The Gambia, Mauritania, Morocco and Pakistan.

Frontex also gave a presentation on third country cooperation to the 15 July meeting of the EMWP, mentioning Working Arrangement negotiations launched with Lebanon and Jordan.

Migration partnerships

Egypt in focus as a ‘priority third country’

At the September 11 meeting of the EMWP committee, delegates discussed the EU’s cooperation with Egypt, following a presentation from the EU’s main externalisation partner the International Centre for Migration Policy Development.

According to an accompanying presidency paper “Cooperation with Egypt as a priority third country”, Egypt remains one of the main countries of origin for people arriving in Europe irregularly. 18,543 Egyptian nationals arrived in the EU in 2025, according to the paper, 56% up from 11,922 in 2024. In the first half of 2026, however, that had come way down, with only 2,635 people arriving, 67% down from the same period in 2025. This “significant decrease” is attributed at least in part to stricter exit controls from Egypt to Libya.

The paper reports that there are over 850,000 Sudanese registered refugees and asylum seekers in Egypt, with another 100,000 from Syria, though the overall population of irregular and regular migrants in Egypt is much higher. Egypt is also described as an important transit country for Bangladeshi and Pakistani nationals on their way to Libya.

The paper goes on to list various discrete EU funding programmes for Egypt totalling tens of millions of euros. It then observes “the context of a continuous economic hardship and rising anti-migrant sentiments” in Egypt, with the Egyptian authorities carrying out mass arbitrary arrests, detention and deportation programmes, particularly against hundreds of thousands of Sudanese people.

Nonetheless, amid the various crises affecting the region, the EU estimates that “Egypt provides relative stability and diplomacy” and is cooperative on anti-migration measures and deportations: “Therefore, cooperation with Egypt is considered to be of strategic importance both to the EU and to the Member States.”

In that light, and considering the ‘comprehensive and strategic partnership with Egypt’, the paper invites delegates to discuss how cooperation on migration can be improved.

Egypt action file update: lots of new spending

Statewatch has acquired a revision of the Egypt action file, dated 9 January 2026.

When compared to the previous September 2025 Egypt action file, this version shows considerable engagement with Egypt. These include:

  • An Austrian online anti-migration information campaign “Myths about migration”, active in five countries including Egypt. This programme appears to have been running since January 2021, though it is not explicitly mentioned in the previous action file. There is another Austrian programme designed to “reduce investments in irregular migration”, partnering with project partners including Seefar, a noted provider of such anti-migration campaigns.
  • Italy appears to have implemented several spending programmes in Egypt in recent years. These include €9.3m for a UNHCR-implemented programme to develop a “favourable protection environment for asylum-seekers and refugees in Egypt”, €1.99m for unaccompanied minors and young people, and a €1.7m programme to tackle ‘root causes’.
  • The financing agreement for a €75m Annual Action Plan on socio-economic reforms was signed in October 2025.
  • A €9m top-up to a pre-existing programme for resilience and host communities was contracted in December 2025.
  • Europol is reported to still be engaging on “capacity building” in Egypt, and there are still hopes for a personal data-sharing arrangement between Egypt and Europol. A Europol training session for Egyptian law enforcement took place September 2025.
  • A workshop on “return, readmission and reintegration” took place in Cairo in December 2025.
  • The second phase of CONMIGO, a project “dedicated to migration governance support”, was to begin in March 2026.
  • Various meetings and dialogues are reported through 2025 and 2026, including a “programming mission” in Cairo with officials from the Commission directorate for the MENA region. A meeting for senior officials on security was held in 2025, with another due in the third quarter of 2026.
  • In accordance with the EU’s commitment to embedding a ‘Human-rights based approach’ into its external partnerships, the preface to the action file (otherwise identical to the previous version), now includes the sentence: “The protection of the human rights of all migrants and forcibly displaced people and the full respect for international law are the guiding principles for the EU’s engagement.”

Other

Migration Partnership Facility puts out 2026 call for proposals

The Migration Partnership Facility, an EU-funded externalisation initiative run by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, has put out a call for funding proposals for “opportunities to strengthen cooperation between EU Member States and partner countries across key migration and security priorities.” Funding for proposals will come from the EU’s AMIF, BMVI and ISF funds, with a combined pool of €14m between them. Grants for funding start at €200,000 with no fixed maximum. The call focuses on projects with countries in the Southern Neighbourhood, Sub-Saharan Africa and Central, South and West Asia.

The guidelines for applications reflect a wide array of externalisation projects, including strengthening border management, targeted anti-migration ‘information campaigns’ and cross-border intelligence and technology programmes. Previous examples of such projects include the MISPEAC project for EU-Africa intelligence sharing along the Western Mediterranean and Atlantic routes, a ‘Common Operational Partnership’ for counter-trafficking and counter-smuggling operations in Nigeria and the Prometheus II project on migration flow management in Georgia.

“These new Calls are intended to give a practical expression to the Pact’s objectives for the external dimension through cooperative approaches with priority countries outside the EU”, said MPF official Jennifer Tangney on the web page for the call.

Frontex seeks ‘structured cooperation framework’ with Pakistan

In a press release for Frontex chief Leijten’s visit to Pakistan, 17 September 2026, the agency announced it is “seeking to develop a structured cooperation framework with Pakistani authorities” on areas such as information exchange, border management training, document security and risk analysis.

Frontex also promoted a video about its WELDO reintegration partner in Pakistan. Published on YouTube in February 2025, the video touts how the EU Reintegration Programme helped a deportee in Pakistan “rebuild his life”. At the time of writing this bulletin, it had 657 views.

ICMPD tender for river and lake patrol boats

The International Centre for Migration Policy Development, the EU’s main externalisation partner, has put out a tender for the provision of “Patrol boats for rivers and lakes”. The tender does not mention for which country (Statewatch asked on LinkedIn but received no answer) but a question from an applicant references “similar contracts in countries like Albania”.